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
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
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
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
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THE
HISTORY OF ITALY,

FROM

THE ABDICATION OF NAPOLEON I.,

WITH INTRODUCTORY REFERENCES TO THAT OF EARLIER TIMES.

BY

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ERRATA.—VOL. II.

THE reader will be good enough to make the following corrections in this volume:—

PAGE

29 last line, for "Salerno," read "Sicily."
31 line 19, after alight, read "which."
53 in the heading, for "Taxis," read "Taxes."
68 line 18, for "Schiarrino Reggino," read "Schiarrino Rimino."
71 line 21, for "was," read "of."
79 line 21, for "Milan," read "Mantua."
178 note 38, line 8, for "was not the cause," read "was the cause."
204 line 6, for "that," read "those."
207 note 10, for "History of Italy," read "Italy past and present."
226 line 28, for "baron" read "band."
252 note 8, line 9, for "facta," read "fact."
256 line 8, for "authority," read "authenticity."
 in note, for "iter," read "ita;" "regum," read "regem;" for
 "pontificum," read "pontificem."
268 note, line 17, for "whenever," read "wherever."
260 note, line 8, for "named," read "passed."
264 for "Sevoli," read "Sevaroli."
291 line 6, for "military," read "arbitrary."
296 line 24, for "February 24th," read "January 24th."
358 line 8, for "1806," read "1809."
468 line 17, for "thus," read "then."
506 line 23, for "instruction," read "indiscretion."
510 in contents, for "causes," read "cause."
512 for "boundaries," read "territories."
515 line 10, for "insisted," read "asserted."
519 last line but one, omit "it."
531 line 10 for "Sicilian," read "Sardinian."
552 line 7, omit "that."

ADDENDA.—VOL. II.

Note to page 258.

A very striking proof that the decree of Nicholas was not designed to exclude the laity from interference in the elections, is supplied by the form of oath which was taken by a prince who, about the same period, agreed to hold his territories as a vassal of the Pope.

When Nicholas, immediately after the issuing of this decree, gave the investiture of the Duchy of Apulia to Robert Guiscard, the latter took an oath of fealty to the Holy See, which contained the following clause.

“Shouldst thou, or any of thy successors, depart this life before me, I, under the direction of the better disposed cardinals, the clergy, and the people of Rome, will do my best to secure the election and ordination of a Pontiff to the honour of St. Peter.”—*Bowden's Life of Gregory VII.*, vol. i. p. 205.

Note to page 284.

It is not possible that any controversy can really arise as to the fact of the Papal brief of excommunication omitting all mention of names. It is set at rest by a reference to the document itself as published verbatim by Cardinal Pacca, who had of all men the best reason to be acquainted with its contents.

Nevertheless it is a singular fact that two biographers of Pius VII., Alphonso Beauchamp, whose work was published at Paris in 1815, and Pistolesi in his *Memoirs*; published at Rome soon after the Pontiff's death, both state that an Italian document was affixed to the doors of the churches, in which Napoleon was mentioned by name as having incurred the penalty of excommunication.

Moroni, who has published under Pontifical sanction a *Dictionary of Ecclesiastical History*, distinctly states that no name was mentioned, and commends for this both the prudence and the forbearance of the Pope. The following passage occurs in the article on France:—

“Il magnanimo Pontifice così scandalosamente spoliato proteste solennemente nel medesimo giorno con sua bolla ‘Quum memoranda’ contre le ve volexsi alla quale la sede apostolica ed egli stesso erano fatti segno et coll’ autorità, di Dio omnipotente, dei beati apostoli Pietro et Paolo, et con la pienezza di sua pontificia potesta ne scommunico gli autori fautori et executori *senza peno con mirabile prudenza nominare alcuno.*”—*Dizionario Di Erudizione Storico ecclesiastico. Tit. Francia*, vol. xxvii. p. 123.


In subsequent portions of the same work published at a much later date he refers to the statement of Pistolesi but adheres to his own.—*Idem*, vol. liii. p. 187. *Tit. Pio Nono.* Vol. lxii. p. 292, *Tit. Scommunicata.*

Note to page 484.

In Gibbon's "Antiquities of the House of Brunswick" will be found a very clear and full statement of the connection both of Modena and Ferrara with the House of Este.

Modena was a free city, like the other towns of Tuscany; after the death of the Countess of Matilda, like the others, it submitted in time to the supremacy of a lord. It fell under the dominion of the Dukes of Ferrara, was conquered from them by Julius II., who asserted the title of the Church to it, as part of the exarchate of Ravenna and of the bequest of Matilda. It was not long severed from the dominions of the House of Este, being ceded to the Duke of Ferrara by Leo X. at the request of Francis I.

In the same treatise the reader will find a detailed account of the annexation of Ferrara to the Holy See. Some doubt is thrown by Gibbon on the illegitimacy of the Duke Cesar, from whom the Pope reclaimed the possession. There seems, however, no reason to suppose that the claim of the Pope was not founded in right. Cesar was unquestionably illegitimate at his birth, and there is no proof to sustain the conjecture that he was legitimised by a subsequent marriage of his parents—the only plausible ground upon which the charges of an unjust annexation can be maintained.



HISTORY OF ITALY.

CHAPTER I.

Murat—His quarrel with Napoleon—Leaves the French army at the close of the retreat from Moscow—Proposal to Lord William Bentinck—Meeting in the island of Ponza—Reconciliation with Buonaparte—Negotiation with the Austrians—Visit from Fouché—Murat enters into an alliance with Austria—Declares against Napoleon—Campaign of 1814—Acquires possession of Rome and the Papal States—Conduct in the campaign—Proclamation of the Prince of Salerno at Leghorn—Disclaimed by British government—Interview with Lord William Bentinck—Official note of Lord William Bentinck—Battle of the Taro—News of Napoleon's fall—Convention of Schiarino Rizzino—Reflections on Murat's conduct in the Campaign—His return to Naples—Administrative and fiscal Reforms—Splendour and gaiety of his Court—Visit of the Princess of Wales.

DURING the exile of the Bourbons in Sicily, the continental dominions of Naples were successively governed by two kings of the family of Napoleon. The second of these monarchs was destined to fill a remarkable, if not an important place, in the pages of Italian history. So long as the combination of heroism and misfortune moves the sympathies of men, an interest of no ordinary kind will attach to the story of the fall of Joachim Murat.

Born in an humble rank of life, the son of an inn-keeper who lived by his hostelry, in an obscure village

at the foot of the Pyrenees—himself in the days of his boyhood a waiter in a Parisian tavern—he was raised in the tumult of the Revolution to be a marshal of France, and when little more than forty years of age, he was married to the sister of the emperor, and was himself a king. Personal exterior and manner contributed largely to his elevation. His figure was noble and commanding, and mounted on his charger, he realised in appearance the traditions of the manly dignity of the most renowned knights of ancient times.¹ No man ever surpassed him in that personal bravery which is ignorant of fear. No man could more excite the enthusiasm of the soldiers to

¹ Very opposite accounts have been given of his personal conduct in battle.

“It was impossible to regard him without an involuntary feeling of respect, when he was beheld returning from a charge, his sabre dripping wet with the blood of the Cossacks whom, in the impetuosity of overflowing courage, he had challenged and slain in single combat.

“Such was his passion for danger, that he used to challenge the Cossacks to single combat, and when he had vanquished them, he would give them their liberty, often accompanied by a gold chain, which he took from round his neck, or one of the richly jewelled watches, which he always had on his person.”—*Alison's History*, c. 78, s. 57.

“The gentleness of his heart made him repugnant to bloodshed. . . In charging he never used a sabre, nor even a small sword; the only weapon he wore on horseback was a Roman blade, broad and short, useless in attack or defence against the long blades of the enemy's cavalry. This blade, with a hilt of mother-of-pearl, artistically inlaid with precious stones, was ornamented with the portrait of the beautiful Queen Caroline his wife, and their four children. . . He said to the Count De Mosbourg, who had administered his finance with talent and fidelity worthy of a greater empire, ‘My sweetest consolation, when I look back upon my career as a soldier, a general, and a king, is that I never saw a man fall dead by my hand. It is not, of course, impossible that in so many charges when I dashed my hand forward at the head of the squadrons, some pistol shots, fired at random, may have killed or wounded an enemy—but I have known nothing of the matter; if a man fell dead before me, and by my hand, his image would be always present to my view, and would pursue me to the tomb.’”—*Lamartine's History of the Restoration*, vol. i. p. 239.

“Every day Murat was engaged in single combat with some of them, and never returned without his sabre dripping with the blood of some he had slain.”—*Napoleon, O'Meara*, vol. ii. p. 96.

follow him to the field ; no chieftain ever led the charge of cavalry with more brilliant and fearless dash ; none had a quicker eye for taking in, at a moment, the scope of a battle-field, so that he might rush with his horsemen upon the spot where they could deal destruction on their foes. Here, however, ended his qualifications. He adds another, and the most remarkable, to the many instances of great cavalry officers who have shown themselves deficient in the qualities that fit men for the management of affairs. Without steadiness or judgment, he was emphatically "*le beau sabreur*," but he was nothing more. Napoleon rightly estimated his character, when he said, "He was brave as a lion in battle, but an imbecile when left to himself."

Those who have been accustomed to associate his name with chivalry, must prepare for deep disappointment in the transactions which are to be recorded in his connection with Italian story. Gifted with unrivalled personal courage ; with that open-hearted frankness which in some natures is but a part of daring—liable to be swayed by generous, and, except so far as vanity mixed with them, unselfish impulses, to which he yielded without thought of the personal consequences to himself—he yet failed to add to these instincts of chivalry its nobler qualities, which consist in a lofty scorn of meanness and deceit, and an undeviating loyalty to truth. His early education was not calculated to foster the higher feelings of our nature. The terrible events of the revolution appeared to exempt all who were under its shadow from the strict obligations of the rules of rectitude. In the triumph of crime, in the licence

of human passion which marked that era, men might be almost forgiven for believing that the laws of moral right were suspended with those of social order ; few indeed were they who passed through that fire with their principles unscathed. The future king of Naples had drunk deep of the poisoned cup of the revolution ; Marat had been the hero of his youthful worship, and when the dagger of Charlotte Corday rid the world of the monster, his young admirer, with characteristic egotism, wrote to the Jacobin Club to say that he had changed his name to that of the murdered patriot. The school of his elevation was not calculated to unteach him the lessons of his youth, and surrounded by perilous temptations on the throne of Naples, he found himself, on that dizzy elevation, without either fixed principles or moral dignity to control the promptings of vain glory, or resist the suggestions of an ambition which to himself was not the less dangerous, because its purposes were wavering and weak.

The lesson of the instability of all human greatness is not new. The events of Murat's last years convey the more melancholy one, of the uncertainty of all human friendship. Upon many a field of desperate conflict, in many a distant land—in hours of danger, of toil and of triumph—the friendship of Napoleon and Murat had been proved. In the crisis of Napoleon's fate, when on the memorable 10th of November he retired from his attempt to dissolve the council of 500, repulsed, disconcerted, and almost fainting, Murat, with his brother Joseph, met and sustained him. It was Murat who received him in his arms, and revived his sinking courage.

It was Murat who turned the fortune of that day, more eventful than that of many a mighty battle, by entering the hall with his grenadiers, and dispersing the representatives of the nation. The alliance with Napoleon's sister was no arrangement of ambition, but a pledge of sincere affection and regard. "He was my right hand when he was with me," was Napoleon's testimony to the services he had rendered in many a campaign. Richly had those services been recognised by his grateful chief. The marshal's staff was but a prelude to the sovereignty which he received as Grand Duke of Berg, and a little later the brows of the adventurer were encircled with the kingly crown. If ever there was friendship of which it might have been predicted that it would defy the vicissitudes of time, it was this. "Murat loved me—nay, he adored me," said Napoleon at St. Helena, looking back to their intimacy years after the estrangement which was followed by such melancholy results. If ever the haughty soul of the emperor was moved by true regard for any of his comrades, assuredly he entertained feelings of the strongest affection for Murat.

Of the first estrangement between Napoleon and Murat the cause is left in obscurity. That malicious ingenuity which, like the eastern monarch in the fable, traces every calamity to woman, attributes it to a quarrel arising from circumstances connected with his queen. By others its origin is attributed to the opposition of Murat to the project of Josephine's divorce. In 1810 the first public indication of their disagreement occurred. The king of Naples left his capital,

to be present by special invitation at the christening of the infant king of Rome. He returned before the ceremony, and the alienation between the brothers-in-law was soon manifest to the world, in the rather imperious reversal by the emperor of an ordinance which Murat had issued for the government of his kingdom.

This difference passed away, although aggravated by the slight which Napoleon subsequently offered to Murat, in violating the diplomatic etiquette of the empire, by sending a minister instead of an ambassador to the Neapolitan Court. In the disastrous Russian expedition, the King of Naples accompanied Napoleon. For once, more wise in counsel than his chief, he had implored him to turn back from that fatal enterprise. "I will reach Moscow," said Napoleon. "If you do," replied Murat, "Moscow will be your ruin." He followed the emperor notwithstanding. His far-famed sabre flashed at the head of those impetuous charges, which, against the storm of grapeshot that poured upon the advancing squadrons, carried the posts of Borodino. He shared the dismay of his imperial chief, as he looked by his side upon the flames, by which the long-wished for shelter of Moscow was consumed. During the snows of October and November, from Moscow to Smorgoni, he endured the worst of the horrors of that dismal retreat. The seizure of his baggage by the Russians at Inkowa disclosed to history the extremities of famine to which Murat was personally reduced.²

When, on the 5th of December, Napoleon left

² In the kitchen of Murat were found roasted cats and boiled horseflesh, from which his cook was preparing the dinner for the king.—*Jomini*, iv. 163.

Smorgoni for Paris, he confided to the King of Naples the command of his disorganised army. For six weeks amid the unspeakable miseries that attended the retreat of starved and famished battalions—unable to exercise any effectual command over the marshals whom he was left to guide—he continued to lead, through frost and snow, that spectre host. In the month of January the Russians had ceased to pursue; the miserable remnant of that which had been the “Grand Army” had found shelter, some in Dantzic, others in Posen. From the latter place Murat departed for Naples; and Eugene Beauharnais assumed the command, for which the King of Naples never had been suited, and which, pressed by intelligence requiring his presence at his own capital, he resigned.

Justly or unjustly, Napoleon regarded this step as the betrayal, or, at least, the desertion of his cause. In the *Moniteur* appeared the galling announcement, “The King of Naples, being ill, has left the command of the army, and placed it in the hands of the Viceroy of Italy. The latter is more accustomed to great administrations, and has the confidence of the emperor.”³

In a private letter Napoleon, in unmeasured terms, expressed his indignation to Joachim himself. “I suppose,” he wrote, “you are among the number of those who think the lion dead; if so, you will find yourself mistaken. You have done me all the mischief in your power since I left Wilna. Your elevation to the throne has turned your head. If you wish to retain possession of it, conduct yourself properly.”⁴

To his sister, Napoleon expressed himself in terms still more disparaging to her husband.⁵ Fired with indignation at these insults, still more exasperated at the public slights in the *Moniteur*, Murat gave vent to his feelings in a letter in reply.

“It is not in the power of your majesty to heal the wound you have inflicted on my honour. You have insulted an old comrade-in-arms, who has been faithful to you in danger, who has assisted you in no small degree in your victories, who has supported you in your greatness, and who revived your courage when you were disheartened on the 18th of Brumaire. . . .

“You say that those who have the honour of belonging to your illustrious family should never do anything to endanger its interests, or cast a shade on its splendour ; and I, sire, say in reply, that your family has received as great an honour as you bestowed on me, when I united myself in marriage with Caroline Buonaparte.

“A thousand times, though a king, I have sighed for the time when, as a simple officer, I had superiors, but not a master. Created a king, even in this high position, I am tyrannised over by your majesty, and governed in my own family ; and I have felt more than ever the thirst for freedom and liberty.

“Thus you sacrifice to your suspicions those who have been most faithful to you, and who have served you best in the stupendous path of your fortunes. Fouché was sacrificed to Savary—Talleyrand to Champaigny—Champagny himself to Bassano, and Murat to

⁵ Letter, 24th of January.

Beauharnais—to Beauharnais, who has in your eyes the merit of blind obedience, and besides, still more to his shame, because more base, of having been willing to announce to the senate the repudiation of his own mother.”⁶

This letter although in one sense the outburst of sudden passion, was manifestly the ebullition of feelings long pent up—jealousy of Beauharnais—indignation at the imperious manner of his brother-in-law—dissatisfaction with the domestic tyranny which he fancied or felt he was submitting to in his home—distrust in the friendship or the gratitude of Napoleon, resulting from his observation of the manner in which others had been treated—all the thoughts upon which he had been brooding for years, appeared to find their utterance in one wild tumult of indignation. The bitter language in which he refers to the scenes that attended the divorce of Josephine, gives probability to the conjectures of those who attribute to his opposition to that proceeding, the first quarrel between the emperor and his brother-in-law and friend.

This letter was written in January, 1813. It was soon followed by the first approach of Murat to the enemies of Napoleon. Under the excitement of the feelings disclosed in his letter, believing that by that letter his brother-in-law was made his enemy for ever, Murat wrote to Lord William Bentinck proposing a secret meeting between an envoy from himself, and some one to represent the British general, appointing the island of Ponza for the conference. Lord William

⁶ Letter of Murat to Napoleon, Colletta.

believing the matter of too great importance to be trusted to a subordinate, left Sicily for Ponza himself. Disguising his destination from the Sicilian court, he proceeded to the island, where Murat was represented by an Englishman by birth, but long resident in Naples, of the name of Robert Jones. The arrangements proposed were that Murat should act against the French in Italy on condition of being acknowledged King of Naples by the English. Sicily was reserved by Lord William Bentinck for the Bourbon king.

There is no doubt that Murat's designs were far wider and more noble than those which were involved in the mere preservation of his throne. Years before this the hopes of those who looked for the independence of Italy had been turned to the brave and chivalrous King of Naples, and vague communications had for some time subsisted between him and the leaders of the patriotic cause. In his passage home through Lombardy he was not indisposed to listen to the complaints of those, who represented with truth, the dissatisfaction felt in Lombardy with the government of Beauharnais and the French. Austria was neutral in the war between Buonaparte and England. The matrimonial connection with the emperor made her the ally of France. She had then no possessions in Italy, and if French power in the peninsula fell, there was nothing to prevent Murat being King of Italy. The Pope was a prisoner in France, and his temporal power was no longer an obstacle to fixing the capital of the Italian realm at Rome. These were the ambitions which then dazzled the imagination of Joachim, and

which, had he been steady in his determination, might possibly have been realised in the result.

The only guarantee which was offered by his new allies was one for his retention of the Neapolitan throne ; but from his own frontier to that of Piedmont no power in alliance, or even on friendly terms with England, could claim a right to the Italian soil. France alone was in possession, and the French once expelled, Murat might well rely upon his right of conquest, and the enthusiasm which he expected would be shown for him by the people, to place him on the throne of that united Italy, from which, with the aid of Italian patriotism, he had driven its oppressors.

It was not without a struggle that Murat consented to except the island of Sicily from the programme of the Italian kingdom which his own mind had thus concerted. Upon this point Lord William Bentinck would not and could not yield, and finally it was arranged that England should guarantee to Murat the kingdom of Naples ; and that he should declare himself the enemy of French dominion in Italy. An army of 25,000 English troops was to land in Naples, and be placed under the command of the king, and with these troops, in concert with his own, and with the levies of Italian patriots, upon whom Murat confidently calculated, he was to embark in the enterprise of freeing Italy from the dominion of the French.

It was necessary for Lord William Bentinck before the final ratification of this agreement, to procure the sanction of his own government to its terms. He promptly sent a cruiser to England with despatches

to obtain that sanction. The consent of the English cabinet was at once given. But before the return of the messenger, the vacillation of Murat had put an end to the treaty, and without receiving any communication from him, Lord William Bentinck found to his amazement and indignation that his intended ally had set out to join the army of Napoleon on the Elbe.

Napoleon, apprised by Caroline of the extent of the alienation he had created in the mind of Murat, had taken steps to keep him faithful to his cause. Affectionate letters from the emperor himself revived the old sentiments of friendship in his breast. Others from Ney and Fouché made to his feelings still more dexterous appeals. The destinies of France were in his hands ; the cavalry were impatient for the presence of their daring chief ; the whole army missed the King of Naples from their ranks. Joachim could not resist these appeals to his chivalry, his vain glory, and that love of the French army, which was one with his ardour for military renown. The three master passions of his heart were touched ; his ambitious schemes were flung to the winds or remembered only to be realised with the aid of France ; and without paying Lord William Bentinck even the poor compliment of a letter breaking off the negotiations, the Marshal of France hurried to join the standard of his former chief.

The autumn campaign of 1813, too plainly proved that never again would that standard float as the symbol of conquest. In the summer of that year the Emperor of Austria joined the coalition against the waning fortunes of his son-in-law. The power of the latter

fell before the united strength of the great military monarchies of the East of Europe. At Leipsic the doom of the empire was fixed. Its last hour was come when the sovereigns of Russia and Austria and Prussia led their victorious troops in person along the streets from which just before Napoleon had with difficulty escaped. They entered the city at one side, while at the other the emperor fled through the confused throng of his routed army—the crush, and crowd, of men, and horses, and guns, and carriages, and waggons that blocked every passage in their terrible retreat.

Metternich, who had persuaded the Austrian emperor to desert the cause of Napoleon, had endeavoured to draw into the alliance against him as many as possible of his former friends. Bernadotte had already cast aside his indecision and had led the Swedish contingent to swell the host which overwhelmed Leipzic. Communications were addressed both to Beauharnais and Murat by the wily diplomatist. Murat required the assent of England to any negotiations into which he entered. Metternich assured him that he acted with the authority of the British cabinet. Matters had proceeded thus far when, on the 7th of November, Murat parted with Napoleon at Erfurth. Napoleon dissembled his knowledge of his dealings with his enemies, and the comrades of innumerable battles affectionately embraced each other as they parted for the last time.

The uncertain inclinations of Murat still leaned to the cause of his former chief. On his return to Naples he wrote to Napoleon that he had 30,000 men whom he could place at his disposal, but urged on him the

absolute necessity of taking steps to attach to him Italian feeling by making Italy independent. Napoleon coldly replied by desiring him to march his army to the Po, and wait there the further orders he would receive.⁷

Compliance with this direction would have risked the loss of Naples, which would have been left exposed to an invasion from Sicily. Murat seeing that he was distrusted by Napoleon continued his negotiations with Austria, and in the meantime marched into the Papal States an army of 20,000 men.

The French generals in command offered no opposition to the march of Murat's troops ; no declaration of hostility to France had yet been made. The soldiers of Murat were permitted to occupy the town of Ancona as friends, while those of Napoleon still held the citadel, and in the month of December, Fouché, Duke of Otranto, who had been sent as governor to Rome, visited the court of Naples, upon what errand or with what result no reliable account informs us.

The affections of Joachim's Neapolitan subjects were shaken. Lord William Bentinck, indignant at the faithlessness of Murat in their former negotiation, had opened communications with the chiefs of the Carbonari in the southern regions of the Neapolitan kingdom. The terrible severities with which the district had been visited by Murat had made his government detested in Calabria. Manhes, who had so cruelly suppressed the revolt of the brigands, was sent to crush the treason of the Carbonari. Among many deeds of cruelty, an act of sanguinary perfidy stained the conduct of the royal

⁷ Colletta.

officials. The chief of the society, a gentleman of independent fortune, occupied a castle in the mountains, in which it was difficult to effect his capture. Janelli, the military commander in the district, pretending to believe in his innocence, invited him to a banquet. As he left the hospitable board of his entertainers, he was dragged to prison, and executed the next day.⁸ The feeling in the whole province against Murat was intense. Even Ferdinand was regarded as the friend of liberty : the French king as a tyrant. It was in this state of things that, just as Fouché left Naples, Count Neipperg, the Austrian envoy, reached it with offers of friendship from the Court of Vienna.

The Duke of Otranto has told us, that on a subsequent occasion he advised the King of Naples to desert the cause of Napoleon, and turn his arms against France. Many of those acquainted with the secret movements of the Court of Naples, assert that when he visited Murat in December, he came to offer the same advice⁹—that, holding a commission from Napoleon, he was at the same time employed by Metternich to detach both Murat and Beauharnais from his cause. If this account of his visit be correct, he represented in the strongest terms the utter ruin of Napoleon's power. He urged both on Murat and on Caroline that by adhering to him, they could only bring ruin on themselves—that joining the allies was the only course by which they could really serve the emperor, as they would thus acquire a voice among

⁸ Colletta, book vii. chap. 3.

⁹ Lamartine's "History of the Restoration," ii. 247.

those who would certainly be his conquerors; and, finally, he assured them that it was with this very object that the Austrian emperor anxiously desired the adhesion to the European coalition of those who, in the hour of its triumph, would not be disposed to press extreme measures against their fallen foe.

Arguments like these were suffered to reconcile the sisterly affection of Caroline with her ambition to retain her crown. The project of the alliance against her brother no longer met with her opposition.¹⁰ Count Neipperg found no difficulty in accomplishing the object for which he came, and on the 11th of January, 1814, the treaty was signed, by which Joachim Murat bound himself to be the enemy of Napoleon.

The object of this treaty was declared to be the prosecution of the then existing war, in order that the contracting powers might concur in united efforts to establish a just balance of power, and secure a real

¹⁰ A letter from Metternich is said to have decided the queen. In that letter he stated that in the negotiations which had taken place between Napoleon and the allied powers, the former had offered to give up all Italy and even Naples, but that at the same time he had through the King of Bavaria made it a stipulation that the Milanese should be assigned to Eugene Beauharnais.

"Une lettre de M. Metternich a décidé la reine de Naples à entrer dans la coalition. . . .

"La lettre de M. Metternich est perfide; après ayant fait le tableau des forces de la coalition et des désastres de la France, elle ajoute que l'empereur Napoleon dans des négociations avec les puissances coalisées cède toute l'Italie et même Naples; toutefois qu'il a fait demander par le roi de Bavière le Milanais pour votre Altresse."—*Letter of Fouché to Eugène Beauharnais, January 21st, 1814.*

"The object of the coalition," adds the wily diplomatist with prophetic sagacity, "is very simple. It is to restore things as they were before 1789. The King of Naples will find it out when it is too late.—*Mémoires du Duc de Raguse*, tome ix, p. 444.

state of peace in Europe, and especially to Italy. The Emperor of Austria guaranteed to his majesty the King of Naples, his heirs and successors, the full and entire sovereignty of all the Italian States, of which he was then in possession. Austria undertook to keep in the field 150,000 men, of whom 60,000 were to be employed in Italy. The contribution to be supplied to the united army by the King of Naples was to amount to 30,000 men ; but the treaty, recognising the danger from Sicily which threatened his own kingdom, exempted him from the necessity of furnishing this contingent until Austria should be able to arrange with England, an agreement for a cessation of all hostilities against Naples on the part of that power. If Murat led his soldiers in person, he was to be the generalissimo of the combined forces ; if not, the supreme command was to belong to Bellegarde, in consideration of his rank of field-marshall, which he held in the imperial service. Secured in the possession of the throne of Naples, Murat on his part, renounced all pretension to that of Sicily : a secret article of the treaty provided, that for the surrender of his claim upon that island, Murat was to be compensated by the addition to his territories of a district with a population of not less than 400,000 souls ;¹¹ the Austrian emperor covenanting that the acquisition to the Neapolitan territories was to be made at the expense of the possessions of the Pope. Austria, indeed, regarded the Papal States as already appropriated to herself ; the agreement with Naples was one for their partition.

¹¹ *Colletta*, book vii. chap. iv.

On the 3rd of February an armistice between Naples and England, was signed by the Duke del Gallo and Lord William Bentinck.¹² By the terms of this convention, free trade between Naples and England was established, both parties bound themselves to assist Austria against France in Italy, and it was stipulated that the truce thus concluded between the English and the Neapolitans was not to be terminated without three months notice upon either side.

This armistice was signed by Lord William Bentinck in obedience to the positive injunctions of his own government, with evident symptoms of reluctance and dislike. The form in which Lord Castlereagh communicated to him the commands of the Prince Regent that he should do so, did not indeed imply that the acquiescence of the English Cabinet in the arrangement was very cordial. In a despatch written from Basle, and dated the 22nd of January, the foreign secretary informed Lord William Bentinck, that "the Emperor of Austria having entered into an engagement with the person exercising the government of Naples," "it was the wish of the Prince Regent that the British general should enter into an armistice, suspending hostilities with that country, and use his influence to induce his Sicilian majesty to do the same."¹³

Even before receiving this despatch, Lord William Bentinck had personally visited Naples, and given to Murat an assurance that from the hour when he became

¹² Letter of Lord William Bentinck to Lord Bathurst, February 15, 1814.—*Parliamentary Papers*, 1815.

¹³ *Hansard's Debates*, Papers on Murat.

the ally of Austria he might regard the English as his friends.¹⁴ Satisfied with this assurance, the king did not wait for the formal signature of any convention, adopting probably the memorable opinion expressed by his queen, that she would rather have a verbal declaration from a general of Great Britain, than a formal treaty signed by any other power of Europe.¹⁵ In the middle of January he announced by a proclamation to his subjects that he had joined the coalition against France. On the same evening he appeared in state at the theatre accompanied by the queen. They were received with an enthusiasm which was meant to express the satisfaction of the people with the part he had taken.¹⁶ On the next day, the 23rd of January, the king left Naples, and proceeded to place himself at the head of his troops; on the 30th he issued a proclamation which left no room for the allegation that he did not unequivocally take his part with the allied cause.¹⁷

The Duke of Otranto, in his *Memoirs*, tells us that, in the interim between the departure of the king from

¹⁴ Memoir of Duke de Campo Chiaro to Congress of Vienna.—*Parliamentary Papers*, 1815.

¹⁵ Speech of Mr. Horner in the House of Commons, February 5th, 1815.

¹⁶ *Memoirs of Madame Recamier*.

¹⁷ " Soldiers ! as long as I could believe that the Emperor Napoleon combated for peace and the happiness of France I fought by his side; but now it is no longer possible to credit that illusion. The emperor breathes nothing but war. I should betray the interests of my native country, of my present dominions, and of yourselves, if I did not at once separate my arms from his, to join them with those of the powerful allies, whose magnanimous intentions are to re-establish the independence of nations and the dignity of thrones. Soldiers ! There are but two banners in Europe—on the one are inscribed religion, morality, justice, law, peace, and happiness;—on the other, persecution, artifice, violence, tyranny, war, and mourning to all nations."—*Proclamation of Murat*.

Naples and the issue of this proclamation, he and Murat had a secret interview at Modena, where he corrected the draft proclamation which Murat had prepared. If we are to give implicit credence to the narrative of Fouché, he found Murat wavering in his purpose, and he urged him to manifest by all means his zeal in the allied cause ; he communicated to him his last intelligence received from Paris, which could leave no doubt that the downfall of Napoleon's power was approaching.¹⁸ Before the interview closed, he contrived to extract from the king a sum of 170,000 francs, which he alleged to be due to him as arrears of his pay as governor of Rome, a debt which he had the dexterity to persuade Murat was one for which, as occupying the country, the government of Naples was responsible.¹⁹

There is some reason to suspect that, in his history of this interview, Fouché has transferred its leading

¹⁸ "In consequence of the seriousness of events, I judged it expedient again to confer with Murat in person, and I had a second interview with him at Modena. There I convinced him, since he had taken a decisive part, that he ought to announce it. If you had, said I to him, as much firmness of character as excellence of heart, you would be superior in Italy to the coalition. You can only conquer it here by much decision and frankness."

"He still hesitated. I communicated to him the latest news I had from Paris. Determined by this, he confided to me his idea of a proclamation, or rather declaration of war, in which I suggested some alterations, which he made."—*Fouché's Mémoirs*, vol. ii. p. 223.

¹⁹ "I had also to treat with Murat upon a particular business which involved my own interests ; I had to claim as governor-general of the Roman States, and afterwards of Illyria, the arrears of pay, amounting to 170,000 francs. The King of Naples having seized the Roman States and the public revenues, became responsible to me for my debt. He gave an order for it, the execution of which was attended with some delay. However, before leaving Italy, I was enabled to say that I had not lost my time there for nothing."—*Fouché*, vol. ii. p. 224.

incidents from the earlier date at which they really occurred, and that the advice to Murat was given in the previous December, when the Duke of Otranto went to Naples avowedly as the emissary of Napoleon, but in reality to earn the wages of Metternich.²⁰ With all the apparent self-abandonment of candour which marks the Duke of Otranto's confessions of his own baseness, this candour is generally assumed to gain credit for some falsehood that offers a trifling extenuation of his guilt. There would be comparatively little infamy in offering such advice to Murat, when the latter had already taken his part against his old master, and when it was evident to everyone that Napoleon was on the eve of his fall. The probability is that the confession of the lesser baseness is intended to blind men to the real truth that he went to Naples in December for the purpose of gaining the adhesion of the King of Naples to the proposals which Metternich had already made.

His character lends at least some probability to the statement that he at the same time advised Murat to those communications with the French which after-

²⁰ It seems improbable that between the 23rd of January, the day on which Murat left Naples and the 30th of the same month, the date of his proclamation from Bologna, Fouché could have had his secret interview with him at Modena. It is, however, not impossible, and the story must rest on the credit which the reader is disposed to give to the statement of the Duke of Otranto.

The demand of the 170,000 francs would appear more naturally to have been made at a later period, when Fouché formally surrendered the Roman territory.

On the 18th of February, Fouché wrote to Napoleon, that he had in vain attempted to approach Murat, having been stopped by the outposts at Florence.

wards so deeply compromised the unhappy king in the estimation of the allies. He is said to have done it with the double object of keeping himself safe with Napoleon, and of having Murat in his power if the enemies of the emperor should be in the ascendant. That he had been the friend of Joachim lends only probability to the story. His favourite maxim, that the past should never be considered by a statesman (a category in which he included everyone engaged in an intrigue), means that all ties of honour, all obligations of friendship, all memories of gratitude, must be forgotten in the phase which the interest or the convenience of the moment may assume. He performed an exploit upon which he prided himself, when he sat down to consult with his friend, when he entered with apparent sincerity into his counsels, shared all his difficulties, and led him step by step to his ruin. No accusation of treachery can be brought against the Duke of Otranto, for which his character does not lend at least one element of probability.²¹

²¹ Nothing is so well calculated to impress the mind with a low estimate of the manner in which the affairs of mankind are managed, as to find this man holding his place under so many successive governments. It has been said that he owed this to his ability; but those who have read the memoirs in which he has left on record his own story of his remorseless treacheries, will probably agree with the observation, that his reputation for ability is as little creditable to the discernment, as the connection with him is to the moral feelings of those who retained the arch-traitor in their pay. Mankind are so easily imposed upon by success, that they are always ready to impute superior powers to those who achieve it, by means in which nothing else can be commended. Yet treachery is a profession which, for its successful pursuit, requires but a very low amount of mind; it demands much more the absence of the moral than the presence of the intellectual qualities of our nature. However society may be ready to award the poor praise of cleverness to the cheat, the man who has no moral sensibilities to trouble him has an easy

The conduct of Murat in the campaign which ensued, was made the subject of grievous accusation in the Congress of Vienna. In following his steps, we have the advantage of memoirs written by two of the generals who accompanied his army, and by a comparison of these, and a reference to official documents, his movements may accurately be traced.²²

Colletta tells us, and there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the statement, that the king communicated with Fouché and the French generals in the Papal States, in friendly terms, informing them of his alliance with Austria, but still expressing the hope that he might yet find means of reconciling his duty as King of Naples with his own feelings and wishes in favour of France.²³ It has been said, indeed, that these letters were written in pursuance of a plan laid down at Naples with Fouché himself.

Within a few weeks after Murat had placed himself

triumph in imposing upon those who are not upon their guard against a complete extinction of the compunctions of conscience—and with Fouché, as with most men of his class, a careful examination will make large deductions from his reputation for ability, when we estimate how much of his success is to be attributed to the skill, and how much to the unscrupulousness of the perfidy with which he betrayed.

²² Generals Colletta and Pepe both held commands in the army of Murat during this campaign, and both have left us their account.

To the congress of Vienna the Duke de Campo Chiaro submitted, on behalf of Murat, a formal narrative of the campaign. The Austrian general Nugent, impeached its accuracy, and delivered a counter-statement of his own.

Both the latter documents, and others relating to Murat were laid before the British Parliament. They will be found collected in the thirty-first volume of "Hansard's Parliamentary Debates," 1815.

²³ Colletta, book vii. chap. iv. "He wrote me letter after letter, repeating that his alliance with the coalition appeared to him the only means of saving his throne, and requiring me to tell the Emperor the whole truth upon the actual state of Italy."—*Fouché's Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 221.

at the head of his army, the whole of the Papal territories were in possesion of the Neapolitan troops. The fortresses were successively invested, but in almost every instance, either the besiegers withdrew when resistance was offered, or the garrison retired without firing a shot. At Ancona alone a brisk cannonade of twenty-four hours preceded the surrender of the castle.

Towards the end of February an armistice was signed between the Duke del Gallo on the part of the King of Naples, and the Duke of Otranto as French governor of Rome, by which all the Papal territories and Tuscany were surrendered to Murat's troops. The garrisons of the French by the terms of the convention were permitted to retire beyond the Po.

But while the Roman States were thus passing into the possession of the Neapolitans, already grounds of dissatisfaction had arisen between Murat and his new allies. It was observed that on every occasion he avoided coming into collision with the French. Whenever there was a probability of a conflict, the Neapolitan generals understood the wish of the king that the Austrian battalions should lead the van. The surrender of all Central Italy by the French was looked upon almost as a friendly transfer from those who knew that they were not really giving it over into hostile hands. It was more than insinuated, that if the troops of the King of Naples had not made their appearance at all, the Austrian division under Count Nugent would have seized the Papal territories in as short a time, but that, in that event the French garrisons would not have been sent

to swell the army of the Viceroy on the other side of the Po.

During the month of February, Murat not only distrusted his new allies, but had secretly opened negotiations by which he hoped to make himself independent of their aid. Early in the month of February, and immediately after Eugene had achieved a brilliant although not decisive success against the Austrians on the Mincio, messengers of Murat approached the Viceroy with a proposal that they should enter into a treaty to divide Italy between them.²⁴ It is possible that Murat reconciled this with his engagement to Austria by supposing that this was to be effected on the terms of detaching Eugene from France.²⁵ The act was yet one which, even by such charitable conjectures, it is impossible to justify, and the only excuse that can be offered for it is the fact that when these negotiations were opened, Austria still withheld the promised ratification

²⁴ "The King of Naples as soon as he heard that I had gained the battle of the Mincio, sent me an officer to make me some overtures. it would be a splendid result for me if I could bring about that he would declare in our favour."—*Letter of Eugene to the Princess Augusta, 11th February, 1814.*—*Memoir of the Duke of Ragusa*, vol. ix, p. 446.

²⁵ "The king still continued his wavering policy, the more so from having received intelligence of Napoleon's successes in Champagne. This circumstance caused Joachim to send two of his generals to the Viceroy Eugene, to propose an alliance between them against the Austrians, his newly made friends."—*Pepe's Memoirs*.

"Eugene owned to me that Murat had made to him a secret proposal to unite their forces for the purpose of sharing Italy, after having sent away the French troops, and that he had rejected the absurd offer."—*Fouché*, vol. ii. p. 228.

The letter of Eugene vindicates the memory of Murat from the insinuation of Pepe so far as his original approach to Eugene is concerned. Whatever was the motive of the King of Naples in these overtures, they were commenced some days before the successes in Champagne.

of the treaty of the 11th of January, and withheld it on the ground that England refused to sanction that treaty unless the guarantee of Naples to Murat was made conditional on an indemnity being found for Ferdinand elsewhere. Such an alteration changed in effect the whole character and effect of the treaty, and if during the month of February, Murat maintained secret communications inconsistent with the position in which he had placed himself towards Austria, he had reason, on the other hand, for the suspicion that Austria was not strictly keeping faith with him.

Eugene treated the proposal as an idle fancy. He submitted it to Napoleon without giving Murat any reply. The emperor wished to use it as a means of embroiling Murat with the Austrians, and on the 12th of March he wrote to Beauharnais desiring him to enter into a treaty with Murat for the partition of all Italy between them excepting the territories of Piedmont and Genoa. The treaty was to be made in the name of the emperor, and Napoleon did not hesitate to intimate plainly his intention, as soon as Murat had committed himself against the Austrians, of disregarding it as not binding in the case of one who had been guilty of the perfidy which the King of Naples had displayed.²⁶

²⁶ "My son, I send you a copy of my very extraordinary letter which I have received from the King of Naples. At a moment when they are assassinating both me and France, sentiments like these are inconceivable.

"I have also received the letter which you have written, with the project of a treaty which the king has sent to you. You think this idea is a piece of folly; nevertheless, send an agent after this extraordinary traitor, and make a treaty with him in my name. Do not meddle with Piedmont or Genoa, but divide with him the rest of Italy into two kingdoms. The treaty must remain a secret until the Austrians are driven from Italy; and twenty-four hours after

Before this authority had reached Eugene, another change came over the spirit of Murat's fitful dream—his policy cannot be as well described by any other appellation. An autograph letter from the Emperor of Austria explained the delay in the ratification of the treaty, and personally pledged the faith of Francis to the scrupulous fulfilment of all its engagements.²⁷ Another from the Emperor of Russia expressed sentiments of friendship, and proposed a formal treaty of alliance.²⁸ Animated by these assurances, Murat seemed disposed to set aside his indecision, and throw in his fortunes unre-servedly with the cause he had espoused.

On the 8th of March the Neapolitan army and Murat himself were for the first time brought into direct hostile collision with the French. Nugent, with the Austrian division and some Neapolitan troops at Parma, was assailed by Grenier, and obliged to give way. His retreat was protected by General Pepe and some regiments of Murat's army, and the next day the combined armies gloriously avenged this reverse. The French were driven back upon Reggio, and the town

its signature the king must declare himself and fall upon the Austrians. You can do everything in this sense. Nothing must be spared in our present situation to combine with our own efforts those of the Neapolitans. Hereafter we may do as we please, for after such ingratitude and in such circumstances no tie can bind."

"Wishing to embarrass him, I have given orders that the Pope should be sent on by Placentia and Parma to his advanced posts. I have had a communication made to the Pope that as he has demanded, as *Bishop of Rome*, permission to return to his diocese, I have given it to him. Take care not to engage yourself in any way relating to the Pope, either in recognising him or refusing to recognise him."—*Letter of Napoleon to Eugène, March 12th, 1814.*—*Memoirs of the Duke of Ragusa*, p. 452.

²⁷ Colletta, vol. ii, p. 176.

²⁸ Life of Murat.

was carried by assault. Joachim took part at the close of the engagement, and threw himself with his characteristic daring into the thickest of the fight. In the French camp the act of Murat was looked upon as one of treason.²⁹ The Marshal of France had committed the inexpiable crime of directing himself the fire upon the soldiers of the Empire. The part of Murat in the struggle was irrevocably fixed.

His Austrian allies were not so easily satisfied, even by this last proof of his sincerity against France. His own Neapolitan generals appeared to have shared the Austrian distrust. It was said, however, that Pepe had engaged the Neapolitan troops in opposition to the instructions, or at least without the orders, of the king. It was observed that Murat permitted some French troops to retire after they had been virtually made prisoners, and suspicion was increased by the fact that in the first attack of Grenier upon the Austrian lines, a Neapolitan company had been captured, but the same day were released, and permitted to rejoin their comrades, bringing with them their arms. Blood, however, had been shed. The king had personally commanded an assault upon the French troops : it was expected by all that his vacillation was ended, and that he would vigorously proceed with the attack upon Piacenza, when intelligence reached him, just as he entered Reggio, which more than justified the inaction which ensued. If his allies

²⁹ "The King of Naples has at last raised the mask. He attacked us yesterday morning at Reggio with from 18,000 to 20,000 men. I had not quite three thousand, and they held out the entire day. General Severoli had his leg carried off, and we have lost from 250 to 300 men."—*Eugène to Princess Augusta, March 9th, 1814.—Memoirs of Duke of Ragusa.*

doubted his sincerity, they seemed determined to give him grounds for distrusting their good faith. Information arrived from Leghorn that an Anglo-Sicilian expedition had landed in its vicinity ; but at the same time came the intelligence that, on their leaving Palermo, the Sicilian prince had issued an order of the day, in which he declared his father's determination to assert his rights to the crown of Naples—and that this order had been again distributed on their landing on the Tuscan shore.³⁰

The circumstances under which this occurred were calculated to excite distrust even in a mind less suspicious than that of Murat. In the end of February, Lord William Bentinck set sail from Sicily with a combined force of English and Sicilian troops. Leghorn was the point of their destination.

While the English fleet was actually menacing the place, the convention with the Duke of Otranto had already placed the town and the entire of the district

³⁰ " My brave and faithful soldiers ! Behold, the moment is arrived in which you are about to land in Italy, your common country, to co-operate by your labours in the great work of its delivery. The fidelity which you have evinced in constantly following the cause of the king, my august father, and your legitimate sovereign, is to me a sufficient guarantee for your never forgetting to consider him as your only king and sovereign, whilst he, having never renounced his rights to his kingdom of Naples, will ever regard you as his faithful subjects with the feelings of a tender parent, for such my august father has ever been towards you. He considers you as his beloved sons, in like manner as I shall constantly regard the Neapolitans as your brethren.

" My brave and faithful Sicilian soldiers ! Combine your efforts with those of your brethren united under our standards ; remember that together with the real liberation of Italy, you will assure your own liberty and political existence, and you will render yourselves worthy of such remuneration as shall bear a just proportion to your fidelity and courage.

" Palermo, Feb. 20, 1814."

—*Proclamation of Prince of Salerno to Sicilian troops.*

in the occupation of the Neapolitan troops. Lord William Bentinck continued his menacing position, and proposed that Leghorn should be garrisoned by the English, and intimated his intention of persevering in this demand. Before the proposal formally reached Murat, he sent orders to his general to keep possession, and privately instructed the engineer officer in charge of the fortifications to put them with as little delay as possible into the best order he could for defence.

The truth was that Lord William Bentinck regarded neither Murat nor the new alliance with a favourable eye. He had not forgotten the sudden breaking off of the negotiations which, at the desire of the king, he had opened in the beginning of the previous year. There was in the history of that transaction sufficient to justify distrust, if not in the sincerity, at least in the steadiness of the king; and it is not necessary to call in aid of this very natural impression the feeling of annoyance at the personal slight must have had some little influence even on a mind the most inaccessible to such resentments. This was not all. The alliance with Murat completely disappointed a public project to which, after the failure of this negotiation, the English general had committed himself, even by communications with the Sicilian royal family—that of placing Sicily under English protection, and withdrawing it from the dominion of the Bourbons. In addition to all this, the high feelings of the British officer could not very cordially accept the alliance of a man who, to preserve his own interests, deserted in its distress the cause of the chieftain to whom he owed his

throne. With these feelings influencing his judgment, and with so much in the conduct of Murat, if not to justify, at least to supply grounds for the belief, it is not to be wondered at that Lord William Bentinck adopted the conviction of the insincerity of his professed adherence to the allied cause.

It was in this conviction that, on his landing at Leghorn, he asked that Tuscany should be handed over to the English troops. It was then that he issued that celebrated proclamation, in which he called on the Italian population to join the English in freeing Italy from the dominion of the stranger, and winning the independence of their native land. It was at the same time that the Sicilian prince took the step of distributing among the Neapolitan troops of Murat the proclamation in which they were addressed as still the subjects of Ferdinand.

It cannot be denied that the language of this proclamation, however excusable it might be in the particular circumstances of the Sicilian court, was, when appearing under the implied sanction of the English, calculated to excite the distrust, and provoke the resentment of the king. When followed up by the demand that the districts of Tuscany, which had been just taken by the Neapolitans, should be transferred by them to the forces of England, it justified the darkest suspicions which could suggest themselves to the mind. The demand of the surrender of Tuscany was based, it is true, upon strategical considerations, to enable the English commander to co-operate with the movements of Murat and Bellegarde ; it was, however, not the less a demand

to place Tuscany in the possession of an expedition which had landed with a declaration of intentions that could scarcely be called friendly.

It must be added, that of this extraordinary conduct no satisfactory explanation was ever assigned. Of the issue of that proclamation Lord William Bentinck denied to Murat all knowledge, but no counter-proclamation ever appeared to contradict it. Its effect upon the Neapolitan soldiers and upon the country was not the less ; it was issued publicly, and in the face of day ; it had notoriety enough to attract the attention of the home government in London ; and, giving implicit credence to the statement of the English general, that it had escaped his cognizance, it is not possible to believe that the Sicilian prince would have ventured upon this step if he had not known that the feelings of the British commander were not exactly those that might have been expected from the general of a nation prepared to guarantee to Murat his throne.

The Neapolitan generals of Murat's army were at this time actually meditating the step of petitioning him to form a council of war ; perplexed by his indecision, and fearing that his hesitation between the two parties was leading himself and their country to ruin, they had resolved upon a course, which would have been virtually to depose him from the command, when the arrival of Lord William Bentinck at Reggio saved Murat from this humiliation.³¹ It was well known that he came to dictate to the king. The generals could not resist the appeal of the sovereign when he asked them, “ De-

³¹ Colletta.

serted by my generals and subjects, how can I meet this man as becomes me either as the commander of an army, or a king ? ”

Lord William Bentinck came to demand the surrender of Tuscany to the English. The king peremptorily refused compliance. Angry words were used by Lord William, Murat had recourse to recriminations still more angry.³² It was impossible for the English general to answer the complaints of the King. Murat pointed to his landing at Leghorn as a breach of the terms of the convention he had just signed, which expressly stipulated that all movements of the allies should be made in pursuance of previous concert among themselves. He asked by what right the Sicilian troops had been joined in the expedition, while the king had still refused to sign the armistice with Naples. The troops which had landed under the flag of England were the enemies of Naples. To prove that they had actually landed in that character, the king produced to the astonished British commander the Sicilian proclamation, to which the latter could give only the answer that—issued from his camp, and distributed with his own—all this had been done without his knowledge. It may well be believed that, after such an interview, the demand for the evacuation of the Tuscan territory was not pressed. Murat finally offered to Lord William the command in Tuscany over the Neapolitan troops.

The ministers and generals of Austria, exasperated as they were themselves with the indecision of Murat, had yet strongly urged upon Bentinck the inconvenience

³² Letter of Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh, February, 1815.
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of adopting towards him a tone of hostility and menace inconsistent with the respect which was due to the ally of their imperial master ; and, after mutual explanations, which satisfied neither party, the English general returned to his encampment to wait for further instructions from home.

It did not tend to conciliate the good will either of Murat or his friends, when, after the departure of Bentinck, the owner of the house in which he lodged reported the expression of contempt which the latter had freely used towards the king. “Pendant de Bernadotte,” was the phrase which he applied to him, either in contempt of his desertion of Napoleon, or as expressing a belief of his insincerity in his present cause.³³

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the month of March should have passed away in inaction. The discontent among Murat’s own generals was every day increasing. The king moved his quarters from one place to another, without apparent reasons. He found some objection to urge to every military operation that was proposed—and so far did he now create the suspicions of all, that Count Nugent seriously contemplated his arrest ; a letter of Lord William Bentinck written to General Bellegarde, on the 25th of March, gives, at least, countenance to the statement that the British general had concurred in the propriety, if he did not advise the necessity, of such a step. Immediately afterwards dispatches reached Bentinck from England, which entirely altered the position of affairs. The Sicilian proclamation had come

to the knowledge of the home government. Lord Castlereagh indignantly referred to this as a matter calculated to create the strongest dissatisfaction in the Neapolitan Court—as alike inconsistent with the convention, and with the intention of the English government. Lord William Bentinck was instructed at once to communicate these views to Murat, and give him a written assurance of England's entire and unreserved accession to the Austrian treaty. His Sicilian majesty was to be warned, that if he chose to pursue his own interests in a manner injurious to the common cause, he must take the consequences of his own acts; but that England was prepared to protect the King of Naples against any ill-advised act of aggression which Ferdinand might be rash enough to commit.³⁴ Lord William Bentinck a second time repaireed to the quarters of the king. He found him at Bologna, where he communicated to him the contents of the despatches he had received; and, finally, placed in the hands of the Duke del Gallo a written abstract of their purport, which contained the following statement relative to the Austrian treaty: "in case of the Neapolitan government exacting a written confirmation of the sentiments which Lord Castlereagh has verbally declared, a confirmation which has not been called for, not thinking it necessary, the undersigned is authorised to declare officially that the English government entirely approves of the treaty concluded between the Austrian and Neapolitan governments; that it consents to the addition of the territory there specified, under the same condition made by Austria,

³⁴ Letter of Lord Castlereagh, Parliamentary Papers, 1815.

of an active and immediate co-operation of the Neapolitan army ; and that, if the English government refuse to sign a definitive treaty, it is caused by sentiments of honour and delicacy, which make it unwilling that the hereditary estate of an ancient ally should be given up without an indemnity ; and the undersigned has, in consequence, orders to invite the Neapolitan government to make the greatest efforts, in order to obtain the same object.”³⁵

On similar assurances conveyed through his envoy from London, Murat had a few days before agreed to accept the treaty, with the modifications which had been made to meet English scruples.

The ratifications of this treaty were finally exchanged, and on the 7th of April, Murat, Bellegarde, and Lord William Bentinck met at Reggio, to arrange the plan of joint operations, the harmony of which nothing now seemed likely to interrupt. It was then settled that while Lord William Bentinck conducted his troops to an attack upon Genoa, Murat should assail the stronghold of Piacenza, and Bellegarde cross the Mincio with his army, and drive Eugene from his position on the Po.

During the few days which fortune left for the campaign, it does not appear possible to impute to Murat any deficiency either in energy or zeal. Placing himself at the head of his own troops, and of the Austrian division of Count Nugent, he crossed the fords of the Taro, in defiance of the Italian and French battalions, after a brilliant engagement, in which both sides

³⁵ Minute of Lord William Bentinck.—*Annual Register*, 1814.

sustained considerable loss. Following up his advantage, he drove the enemy over the Nura, and before the evening of the 14th, he had compelled the French force to take shelter within the fortifications of Piacenza.

He made all his preparations for an assault ; but it was not his destiny to give the last blow to the Italian power of his chieftain and his friend. About noon on the 15th, as he was walking in a meadow near the walls, reconnoitering the fortifications in company with some of his staff, a despatch from General Bellegarde was placed in his hand ; it announced the abdication of Napoleon. For some minutes he walked up and down in silence, and then with a face pale, and a voice agitated with emotion, he read the intelligence he had received, which told to those around him, that the power of Napoleon was at an end.

On the same day, at the little village of Schiarinno Rizzino, a convention was signed between Eugene Beauharnais and Bellegarde, by which hostilities were suspended. The armistice was nominally for eight days, but hostilities were not to be resumed on either side without the notice of a month. The Austrian troops were to occupy all the district east of the Mincio ; Eugene to retain Milan, and all the districts to the west of the river ; while the Neapolitan troops were to hold Central Italy to the south of the Po.

A copy of this convention was sent the same day to Murat for his sanction. Having signed it, he issued orders for the cessation of all acts of hostility, and returned to Bologna, unable to control the tumult of

the conflicting emotions which the intelligence from France had excited in his breast.

Thus closed the short Italian campaign of 1814—a campaign in which Murat had rendered the most important services to the allies without receiving any gratitude or winning any esteem. While his own indecision of character mainly contributed to this result, great allowance must be made for the position in which he was placed. Whatever judgment may be formed of his desertion of Buonaparte, it was impossible that he himself should regard his own conduct with entire complacency, or feel, in an alliance against Napoleon, perfectly at ease. To his conscience he could only defend it by the pretence of his duties as King of Naples—a pretence that, after all, could not be perfectly effectual in imposing on his own heart. The upbraidings of these feelings must occasionally have been heard; and, at times, he must have been conscious of the truth, that he had deserted Napoleon to save his own throne.³⁶ Had Murat's nature been inaccessible to these sentiments he would probably have thrown himself into the attack upon his old comrades with a desperation pro-

³⁶ In the *Memoirs of Madame Recamier* the scene is described which occurred in the Queen's private apartments on his return from the council in which he had finally adopted the resolution of declaring against Napoleon. Entering the room in great excitement he found Madame Recamier with the Queen; he appealed to that lady as to his duty in the circumstances in which he was placed, without informing her of the step that had been taken. She answered that he should remember that he was a marshal of France. "Then I am a traitor," he exclaimed, and opening the window he pointed to the English fleet entering the port; then throwing himself on a seat he buried for some time his face in his hands. Within half an hour he and the Queen were driving through the streets receiving with smiles the salutes of the people.—*Mémoires de Madame Recamier*, vol. i. p. 249.

portioned to the self-abandonment it implied, and he would have been hailed by the voice of the allies as entitled to be ranked among the deliverers of Europe.

It must be remembered that in joining an alliance against Napoleon, it did not at all follow that he regarded himself as leagued for his destruction.³⁷ Most of those who entered the last and decisive confederation against him contemplated only forcing upon the French emperor terms that would have secured the peace of Europe. Almost all of them had been his allies. In the course of that long-continued war diplomatic vicissitudes had abundantly proved that the enemy of to-day might be the most effectual friend of to-morrow. The great power with which Murat contracted his direct obligations was certainly not believed to be anxious for the total overthrow of the sovereign to whom the last of the Cæsars had given the imperial daughter of Austria as his bride. More than one of the sovereigns who were parties to the alliance, would have regarded with sorrow the utter downfall of Napoleon's fortune, to which it led. In November 1813, about the very period when the Austrian alliance was first proposed to the King of Naples, the Emperor Francis, with the full consent of the allies, addressed an autograph letter to his daughter, offering honourable terms of peace to her husband; and the declaration of the allies from Frankfort, of the 1st of December, expressly proclaimed that they were not

³⁷ "He never thought that his secession in the first instance would have been so ruinous to me or he would not have joined the allies. He concluded that I would have been obliged to give up Italy and some other countries, but never contemplated my total ruin."—*O'Meara's Voice from St. Helena*.

warring with the existence, but with the ambition of the empire of the French.³⁸ We must not judge of Murat's conduct in joining that alliance, nor yet of his subsequent acts and expressions, by the passions which then agitated England, and which, at a subsequent period, became those of Europe, when Napoleon's own conduct precluded all hope of accommodation, and converted the alliance against him into one of extermination.

The wavering disposition of Murat, and the relentings of his heart towards his country, his comrades, and his chief, made him cherish those hopes of an amicable settlement with France which some of those less committed to Napoleon did not abandon until the conferences of Chatillon were finally broken up. In his army he had French officers, in his cabinet French advisers, and their councils contributed to the indecision of conduct to which his own feelings naturally led. Upon the appearance of the proclamation against Napoleon, the French soldiers in his ranks, and very many of his officers, left his standard ; the services of some of them he retained by a private assurance that his secret views were not those of hostility to France.³⁹ Throughout the movement of February and March, the earnest wish of his Neapolitan generals was that the French who remained should follow their departed comrades with all speed. To the presence of the French generals they attributed the uncertainty of action which they looked upon as likely to ruin their sovereign

³⁸ Annual Register, State Papers, 1813.

³⁹ Colletta. Pepe.

and themselves.⁴⁰ Murat made it a matter of pride and feeling that he should not be utterly deserted by his old companions in arms. It lessened even to himself the appearance of a betrayal on his part of former engagements ; and to the anxiety still to be able to point to Frenchmen in his service, he was ready to sacrifice the active prosecution of the hostilities of the campaign. His manifest unwillingness to place his own troops in collision with the soldiers whom he had formerly led is easily to be accounted for, without imputing to him deliberate treachery to the cause he had espoused. He deferred the actual firing on the troops of Napoleon until it was an inevitable necessity, in the vague hope that something might occur which would altogether relieve him from the act from which the instincts of his nature shrank.

We may believe without difficulty that it partly was to this desperate hope, partly to the dissatisfaction and alarm created in his breast by the withholding of the ratification of the treaty, that we may attribute the act

⁴⁰ "The Neapolitan generals wished the French away, because they saw in them the supporters of the King in his vacillating policy." *Colleta*, 2—176.

"The courage of this officer in the field is no less remarkable than his indecision and uncertainty in the cabinet. This disposition, most unfortunately for him, was actively worked upon by two contending parties in his court and army ; one French—the other Neapolitan. Murat's attachment was to France—in all his abuse of Napoleon there was an evident feeling of fear and respect for him. He coveted above all the good opinion of the French army. His French advisers always played upon these feelings—magnified the successes of the French arms, and endeavoured to keep him in the alliance to their country. He was besides most anxious not to lose his French officers, who he knew would not stay with him when his conduct assumed a decided aspect. The Neapolitan counsellors, army, and nation, were all against France, and were extremely desirous that Murat should join heartily in the cause."—*Letter of Lord William Bentinck, February 1815; Parliamentary Papers*, 1815.

for which of all his acts the least justification can be found —the entering on secret negotiations with Eugene. But those who so scrupulously examined his fulfilment of his engagement ought certainly to have left nothing to be complained of in the manner in which they carried out their own ; and however much we may condemn the double dealing of Murat, we must remember that when he essayed to form an alliance with Eugene, the conduct of Austria appeared to him to indicate an anxiety to escape from the promises that had been made.

But whatever were his secret misgivings, whatever may have been the intention of his inmost heart, it could not be denied that he did, at the same time, all that he had agreed to accomplish. He was in possession of all Italy south of the Po in a space of time as short as would have been occupied by the most sanguinary assaults upon the garrisons of the French. His army was on the southern bank of that river as soon as Bellegarde was prepared to cross the Mincio to attack. It was from the armies of Murat that the restored pontiff received the possession of Rome. By them too the Tuscan territory was restored to its Grand Duke. The attempt subsequently made to evade the fulfilment of the obligations of a positive and strict treaty, upon the ground that the co-operation of the king had not been marked by the ardour, or the energy which was expected by his eager allies, must be classed with the efforts that are too often made to find pretexts for getting rid of a bargain, when the advantages having been gained, it is found inconvenient to pay the price

by which they were obtained. Nor can it be denied that there were matters which excused, although they did not justify, the most sinister forebodings of his distrust. In October he had been assured by Metternich that both Lord Aberdeen and Lord William Bentinck had been authorised by their cabinet to assent to a formal treaty, by which England would have guaranteed to him his kingdom of Naples.⁴¹ In the January following he was unable to obtain from the English minister anything beyond a convention, which suspended hostilities, but pledged the English government to no future arrangement. In the treaty with Austria he had stipulated for an immediate exchange of the ratifications; after an interval of six weeks this stipulation was still unfulfilled. Contrary to all usage, a treaty was presented to him differing in essential particulars from the first. The reason assigned for the alteration was, that England made it the condition of her assent. Just at that moment, the English general landed with an expedition on the coast of a country in the occupation of Murat, without any previous consultation or concert. He demanded in not very friendly terms the transfer of that territory to the English arms, and finally, from the very camp of that English general, the son of his competitor for the Neapolitan throne distributed a proclamation calling on the troops in his service to take up arms to restore their lawful sovereign to his throne. The armistice on the part of Ferdinand which was promised, had not been signed,

⁴¹ Colletta. Statement of the Duke of Campo Chiaro to the Congress of Vienna.—*Parliamentary Papers*, 1813; *Hansard*, vol. 'xxxi.

while Murat knew that the king of Sicily was entirely under the control of the English general. Under such circumstances Murat is scarcely to be blamed for the inaction in which, after the battle of Reggio, the rest of the month of March was consumed. He openly declared that he would not act further until the treaty was ratified. Yet, satisfied with the assurances he received, he committed himself against France.

When Lord William Bentinck's second visit and the written memorandum of the English minister removed from his mind all doubts of the part to be taken by England, he appears to have thrown himself into the cause of the allies without reserve. The course of events left but a few days within which his sincerity could be tested. They were days, however, in which he gave the decisive proof of a personal conflict with the soldiers of the French army. If any man needed excuse for distrusting in the events which occurred the good faith of England, they could be found for Murat in the circumstances of his position and his education. Pursuing himself a course which he found it difficult to reconcile with the obligations of gratitude and honour, he was the more ready to believe in the insincerity of others, and to adopt those suggestions of distrust which found a ready place in the suspicions of his fickle and jealous heart. The monarch whose throne was the creation of the revolution, calculated but little on the sympathy of legitimate kings. The rival queen was a princess of Austria. His own French birth and his education in the armies of the republic and the empire, had impressed his nature with a distrust in England. When

we add to this the fact that his real inclinations were with France, and remember the perplexities that distrusted him in the conflicting obligations he had incurred, we do not need the additional element of his own wavering and uncertain nature to account for the indecision and hesitation he betrayed.

Returning to his capital, Murat was received with rejoicings in which much of insincerity was mixed. He had before he left Bologna, restored to the returning pontiff Rome and the surrounding districts, including that which is said, in the language of Papal records, to constitute the patrimony of St. Peter. Of the rest of the States of the Church, his troops still retained the occupation. Tuscany, at the request of the Emperor of Austria, he had surrendered to the commissioners of the Grand Duke. His interview with Pius VII. belongs rather to the chapter which shall record the events that attended the return of the pontiff to Rome.

Believing himself secured on his throne by the engagement both of England and Austria, the King of Naples directed his attention to reforms, by which he hoped to conciliate the affections of his subjects. These reforms were administrative and fiscal. Freed from the control of his haughty brother-in-law, he now adopted a measure to which on a former occasion Napoleon had peremptorily refused his consent. To remove the jealousy of the Neapolitans as to the employment of Frenchmen in the public offices,⁴² a law was passed prohibiting the holding of office by anyone who was not either a Neapolitan by birth, or a naturalised

⁴² Colletta, vol. ii. p. 195.

subject. The rules with regard to naturalisation were made so strict that they would have deprived of their employments many of those French officers who in his last campaign had given up all to follow the fortunes of the king. The remonstrances of these persons, who represented themselves, not without reason, as the victims of a treatment which was cruel, and hardly reconcilable with good faith, induced the king to obtain from the council a modification of the rules, which however even in their amended form still left many instances of hardship and grounds of just complaint.

The measure which gave the greatest satisfaction, was the great commercial reform which he affected in the abolition of a number of burdensome duties, and of still more oppressive fiscal regulations which had long inconvenienced the internal and external trade of Naples. His fiscal reforms were hailed with satisfaction, especially by the English merchants, to whose commerce they gave great relief.

These measures did not prevent the discontent which was felt at the silence of the King upon the subject of a constitution. Some difficulty had been already experienced in preventing the Carbonari from breaking out into open revolt. Private assurances were conveyed to them from Murat, as we shall find there were subsequently from Ferdinand. The emissaries of the latter were not slow in contrasting his conduct with that of Murat. The hereditary Bourbon had already confirmed to Sicily a constitution formed on the model of that whose freedom was the admiration of the world. The monarch who sat upon the revolutionary throne

had not yet conceded to his people even the poor privileges which were intended for them by the statute of Bayonne.⁴³ The murmurs of the discontented did not interfere with the gaiety or the splendours of the court. Murat indulged in all that oriental magnificence which had been his taste. His Queen for the first time presiding over a court free from all hostile alarms, distributed its honours, and dispensed its hospitalities, with dignity and grace. Refined observers remarked indeed an excess of ceremony, and a profusion of pomp, characteristic of those not always accustomed to royal state. Nevertheless, no court of Europe vied with that of Naples in its brilliancy and its attractions. Of the multitude of English travellers to whom the peace had opened the continent after an interval of twenty years, Naples would under any circumstances have attracted many. Caroline was not unwilling to conciliate the favour of the English, by attentions paid to every visitor of station from that country. The fame of her illustrious husband invested her assemblies with an attraction which an older royalty could not have bestowed. Gorgeous military spectacles were each week presented in reviews, which the presence of the great Marshal was sufficient to elevate into historic scenes. The amusements of the chase were maintained with a splendour that recalled the forest hunts of Louis XIV.; while an almost unintermitting succession of assemblies and banquets kept up the festive hospitalities

⁴³ On resigning the throne of Naples, Joseph had, by a statute promulgated at Bayonne, granted to the kingdom a constitution. Its provisions were sanctioned by Napoleon, but were never carried into effect.

of the royal abode. Among those who shared these festivities was another Caroline, whose name was unhappily yet destined to attract the attention of the civilised world. The ill-fated Caroline of Brunswick, wife of the Prince Regent, was received at the Neapolitan palace with all the honour due to her rank ; notwithstanding a very plain intimation from the court of St. James's, that respect paid to the Princess was not the best recommendation to the favour of the Prince.⁴⁴

Among the articles of accusation that afterwards sustained the bill of pains and penalties preferred against the Queen of England, was the allegation that she had appeared in the dress, or rather undress, of the Muse of History, at her own residence in Naples, when she endeavoured by a magnificent fête to Murat and his queen, to return the attentions paid to her by the Court. In the scenic representations with which she entertained her guests, was one in which a curtain slowly rising discovered the princess in the classic costume of the Historic Muse, standing beside a bust of Joachim, upon the head of which she placed the laurel wreath of Fame.

Amid these gaieties of the Court, and the cares of administrative reform, passed away the months of that eventful year. Attention was turned with some anxiety to the approaching Congress of Vienna, but that anxiety

⁴⁴ "A short time previous to her arrival, the King wrote to the Duke de Campo Chiaro, who was his minister, although not acknowledged as such, to inquire in London, from the British Minister of State, how she should be received. The reply was, that if he would please the Regent, it would be well to meet her with indifference and neglect. As soon as the princess arrived in Naples, Joachim went to visit her, and showed her every possible attention and kindness."—*Pepe's Memoirs*.

was rather as to the extent, than the certainty of its award. It was not until unfavourable rumours reached him from the sittings of the Congress, that it ever entered into the mind of Murat to fear that in that illustrious conclave, he might happen, after all, to find himself betrayed.

CHAPTER II.

Fall of the Kingdom of Italy—Its Independence recognised by the European powers—Its constitution—Changes in constitution—Eugene Beauharnais Viceroy—Condition of Kingdom under his rule—Taxation—Conscription—Campaign in Italy of 1813—Proposals made to him to desert Napoleon—Visit of Prince of Taxis—Reply of Eugene—The Vice-queen—Charges against him of not aiding Napoleon in France—Charges examined—View of Eugene's conduct after Napoleon's fall—Position of Italian kingdom—Senate resolve to send Deputies to ask for Beauharnais as their King—Duke of Lodi—Government of Eugene—State of parties at Milan—Austrian Agents at Milan—Count Confalonieri—Protest against proceedings of Senate—Violent tumults at Milan—Murder of Prina—Convening of Electoral Colleges—Provisional Regency appointed—New Deputies named—Beauharnais by a new convention hands over all Lombardy to the Austrian troops—His Proclamation—Indignation of the Italian army—Eugene forced to leave Milan in secret—Escapes through the Tyrol—Breaking up of the Italian army—Milan occupied by the Austrian troops—Provision for Beauharnais.

AFTER the withdrawal of the troops of the King of Naples from the Po, the events followed rapidly which marked the fall of the kingdom of Italy.

That kingdom, it has been already observed, notwithstanding the abdication of Napoleon, existed still a sovereign and independent Italian state. In 1796 Lombardy and the Papal legations had been formed into the Cisalpine Republic, and by the treaty of Campo Formio, that by which the iniquitous annexation of

Venice to the empire of Francis was accomplished, the existence of the new republic was, by Austria, distinctly recognised.¹ Both its existence and independence were actually guaranteed by the Court of Vienna in the treaty of Luneville in 1801,² and frequent accessions of territory were the occasions of repeated recognitions of the place of the Cisalpine Republic among European States. In 1802, its constitution had undergone a total change in a convocation strangely assembled at Lyons. For the universal suffrage of its first institution, were substituted three electoral colleges; one composed of landed proprietors, one of the learned professions, and one of the mercantile classes. The number of the members of these colleges was fixed, and vacancies were filled up from among those qualified by the election of the remaining members. By these three colleges, a legislative assembly of seventy-five persons was chosen. With the adoption of this constitution, the name of the republic was changed from the Cisalpine to the Italian; and under this, virtually aristocratic, form of government, the Italian Republic continued for three years.

In 1805, the Legislative Assembly invited Napoleon to become their king. The Italian Republic became thus the kingdom of Italy. It was originally the intention of Napoleon to have placed his brother Joseph upon this throne. He refused to accept the dignity, if the kingdom was to be subject to a tribute to the empire. The terms insisted on by Joseph, Napoleon

¹ Treaty of Campo Formio, 4th article.—*Koch—Martens.*

² Treaty of Luneville, 5th article.—*Koch—Martens.*

would not yield ; and the former wisely declined the offer of a throne, on which he perceived he must incur the odium of exactions, the unpopularity of which must ultimately be fatal to his power. The result was, that Napoleon himself assumed, in accordance with the pre-arranged request of the Legislative Assembly, the kingly title and power. In assuming it, he expressly declared his intention effectually to sever the crowns of France and Italy, by transferring the latter to the head of one of his family. Eugene Beauharnais was understood to be the person designated as his successor. On his marriage with the daughter of the King of Bavaria, he was a few months afterwards nominated, by solemn act, as the heir to the crown, a nomination which could call in its support the matrimonial connection which was formed upon its faith. In the mean time, he was appointed Viceroy of the kingdom. The electoral colleges and legislative body remained as under the republic. On the 24th of May, 1805, the iron crown of the ancient monarchs of Lombardy was brought, in solemn pomp, from its treasury at Monza. By the high altar of Milan's glorious cathedral, Napoleon, after the example of Charlemagne, placed it on his own head. The ambassadors of Prussia and Naples represented their respective sovereigns at that splendid ceremonial ; the gorgeous inauguration of the monarch was obviously intended to recall to the popular mind the glories of that Italian kingdom, which had once been independent, while, in truth, it pointed to that sovereignty which Charlemagne had assumed, and which the supposed successors of Charlemagne

were accustomed to claim as the perquisite of the elected German chiefs.

In the same year the victory of Austerlitz compelled Austria once more to peace with France. The Venetian territory was ceded to the Italian kingdom, and the treaty of Presburgh recognised the new state under its monarchical constitution as solemnly as the republic had been previously acknowledged.³ In 1807 Napoleon found it necessary to conceal the enormous tribute which France was demanding from the kingdom, by substituting for the legislative assembly a senate whose members were recommended and paid by the crown.

The youthful Viceroy, who at the time of his appointment had only reached the age of twenty-five years, was left as best he could to reconcile the Lombard people to the exactions which year by year increased with the growing necessities of France.

Under French rule the kingdom of Italy bore heavy burdens both in taxation and conscription. More than a million sterling was annually remitted to France, part of which was expended in maintaining in the Lombard territory a French army of 30,000. The taxation fixed in 1805 at four millions, was increased in 1811 to nearly six millions. In the six years ending with 1814, the levies of soldiers in the kingdom of Italy amounted to 98,000.⁴ The drain upon the population was severely felt. It has been calculated that within these six years, 30,000 Italian conscripts were sent into Spain, of whom not one-third ever returned to

³ Treaty of Presburgh, 5th article.—*Recueil de Traitées*, p. 94.

⁴ Spalding's Italy, vol. iii. p. 78. Pecchio, "Saggio Storia sulla amministrazione Finanziaria del Ex-regno d'Italia, dal 1802 al 1814."

their native land. The German and Russian campaigns made still severer demands. The latter especially was heavily felt by the higher classes. The young men of the upper ranks were compelled to serve in the emperor's guard of honour. Encountering hardships which their previous habits ill suited them to sustain, they sunk rapidly under the severities of a Muscovite winter, and at the close of 1812, there was scarcely a family of distinction in Lombardy which was not arrayed in mourning for some relative who had perished amid the Russian snows.

Yet the period of the Italian kingdom was one that for Lombardy contrasts favourably both with that which preceded and that which followed it. The introduction of the Code Napoleon gave to the people the benefit of equitable and simple law. Trial by jury was not established in criminal cases, but the procedure was public, and it was regulated by law. Arbitrary punishments followed sometimes on offensive publications, but there was no censorship, and if there was not absolute freedom of the press, there was a larger amount of toleration of free discussion, than had ever before existed. The personal mildness of the Viceroy, tempered many of the most oppressive ordinances of his master. If taxation was heavy, everything was done by the undertaking of great public works to stimulate the industry and facilitate the improvement of the country. The Lombards were reconciled even to the suppression of the monasteries by the expenditure of their revenues upon the completion of the cathedral of Milan. In Italy, as in England, the

capabilities of the nation seemed to rise to exertion with an elastic vigour under a system of heavy burdens and of vast expenditure ; and on the whole, the territories which constituted the Italian kingdom enjoyed under Beauharnais a prosperity to which they had been long unused.

We shall see presently that as the burdens on the people increased, discontent with the French government became widely diffused, and finally effected its overthrow. Before that overthrow, Eugene had the merit of rejecting promptly and without hesitation, offers which would have given him a kingdom upon condition of his desertion of Napoleon's cause. In the end of 1813, the Viceroy of Italy was exposed to the same temptations which proved too strong for the fidelity of Murat, and through the medium of his father-in-law, the king of Bavaria, Metternich approached Beauharnais with proposals which offered him a guarantee of the crown of the Italian kingdom as the reward of the betrayal of his master.

In the short campaign of the autumn of that year, Eugene had been obliged to retire before the advance of the German troops. All the conquests of France on the eastern shores of the Adriatic were re-taken by the Austrian General Hiller.

So was the Italian Tyrol. In the month of November, the Austrian head-quarters were advanced to Vicenza ; those of the Italian army were at Verona, where, behind its strong fortifications, Eugene was preparing to defend on the line of the Adige, at least Milan and the Lombard province from assault.

In October Eugene had received from his father-in-

law, the king of Bavaria, a letter, informing him that pressed by circumstances which he could no longer control, he was obliged to seek safety in joining that coalition into which all the powers of Europe were then entering against Napoleon. Eugene replied to this communication with expressions of affection, but of grief.⁵ The die, however, was cast, and as in the case of Napoleon himself, the father and son-in-law were ranged on opposite sides in the struggle which was coming to decide the destinies of Europe.

On the 22nd of November, an officer in the Austrian uniform, and giving the name of Major Eberle, presented himself with all the formalities of a parley to the outlying picquets of the Italian army, on the high road that led to Verona, and presented letters for the general, stating that he was the bearer of an important message which he was to deliver to the Viceroy himself. Some hours elapsed when an answer was returned fixing the church of a little village named San Michele, as the place of meeting. Thither the Austrian officer was conducted according to military usage with bandaged eyes.⁶

Entering the village church, which was appointed as

⁵ "I know not," he said, "how unfavourable fortune may prove to me, if it be so I shall regret all my life that Augusta and her children have not received from me all the happiness I would have wished to insure them; but my conscience shall be clear, and I will leave, as an inheritance to my children, a father's memory without stain."

"I know not what your new position may place in your power. I do not venture to recommend to you your son-in-law, but I would fail in my first duties if I did not say—'Sire, never forget your daughter and your grandchildren.'"*—Letter of Eugene, October 15th, 1813.—Duke of Ragusa's Memoirs.*

⁶ The account of this interview is taken from one drawn up, in 1836, by the Prince of Taxis himself, and presented to the Duchess of Leuchtenberg, the widow of Eugene, at her request.—*Memoirs of the Duke of Ragusa*, vol. ix. p. 428.

the rendezvous, Eugene was handed a note from Maximilian Joseph which apprised him that the supposed Austrian officer was a trusted friend of the Bavarian monarch, an officer in his army.⁷ The Prince of Tours and Taxis was the messenger who, at the request of Metternich, had undertaken to bear to Eugene a letter from his father-in-law, and with these credentials verbally to state the proposals which Metternich was authorised by the allied sovereigns to make. Eugene read the letter of the king, left the church, and went into the open space outside. Retiring a short distance from his staff with the envoy of the allies, he paced up and down the little avenue that led from the church door. In the interview which lasted nearly an hour, much of the fortune of Italy was decided.

The Viceroy, to his honour be it told, at once rejected the proposal. The other pressed on him the arguments which he had been desired to urge. He represented the certainty of the overthrow of Napoleon's power. Eugene replied that this was the very time which demanded the steadfast adherence of those who were bound to him by the ties of gratitude and honour ; the argument that he was throwing away for his son the inheritance of a crown, was answered by the declaration of Eugene that if any of his children should ever wear that crown, it must be without a stain upon their

⁷ " You may place faith, my dear Eugene, in everything which the Prince of Taxis, the bearer of this letter, will say to you. He has my entire confidence, and though young he is worthy of it. The enclosed paper will give you a general idea of the state of affairs. Destroy it when you have read it. I embrace you tenderly, and will love to my latest breath you, my daughter, and my grandchildren."—*Letter of King of Bavaria to Eugene, Duke of Ragusa's Memoirs*, vol. ix. p. 427.

father's name. The fact that Murat had lent a willing ear to similar proposals produced no effect upon Eugene's resolve. Grieved as he would be to hear of such ingratitude on the part of Murat, "our cases," observed Eugene, "are not the same. He is an independent sovereign, I am but the Viceroy of Napoleon, that which would be ingratitude, perhaps treachery in him, in me would be treason." The Prince of Taxis ceased to press him, and on parting he could not help assuring him, that however the King of Bavaria and the allied sovereigns would regret his determination, they would honour and respect his fidelity. Eugene rode back with his staff to Verona. The same evening a reply to the king's letter was brought to the Prince of Taxis at San Michele, and he was conducted in safety beyond the Italian lines. No one had overheard the conversation between Eugene and his visitor, and the prince of Taxis left without anyone in the camp having any suspicion either of the rank of that visitor, or the nature of the mission on which he came. Eugene communicated the circumstance only to Napoleon and to his own wife.⁸ The loss of a queenly diadem did not prevent the latter from conveying to him her cordial approval of his act. Rising superior to the seductions of ambition, and even the influences of

⁸ "I send you, my good Augusta, a letter which I have received from the king by an officer coming with a parley. This officer was no other than the Prince of Taxis. I have conversed more than an hour with him, and I assure you I said nothing but that which I ought. In two words, he brought me a proposal on the part of all the allies to recognise me as King of Italy, to induce me to desert the cause of the emperor."

"I answered exactly as you would have done; he left me in emotion and admiring my way of thinking. As he saw that I would listen to nothing

her early home, she encouraged her husband in rejecting the proposal which her father had conveyed, and in preferring the obligations of truth and gratitude to the temptations of a crown.

About the same period a fairer opportunity presented itself to him of attempting to secure for himself the crown of the realm over which he had ruled as Viceroy. Zucchi, who commanded the Italian contingent at the battle of Hanau, returned immediately afterwards to Milan with the authority of Napoleon to declare that he released his Italian subjects and soldiers from their engagements to him, and desired only that they should achieve the independence of their country. Eugene and his council formed the plan of proclaiming a union of all the states of Upper Italy into one kingdom in alliance with France under Eugene as its king. The decree was actually prepared and was afterwards cancelled.⁹ Either letters were received from Napoleon inconsistent with his hasty declaration to Zucchi, or the Viceroy feared the manifestation of that unpopularity in Lombardy which already he had provoked.

The fidelity which Eugene had shown in rejecting the offer of the allied sovereigns did not protect him from the charge of having in the last days of Napoleon's power sacrificed to an anxiety to watch over his own interests,

but an armistice, he assured me that the king would more readily obtain it for me as the allies admired my character and conduct."

"It is already a noble reward to command thus the esteem of one's enemies."

"Tear up the king's letter and never speak of it."

"In the army nothing is known except that an Austrian officer came to me on a parley."—*Letter of Eugene to Princess Augusta, November 23rd, 1814.*
—*Duke of Ragusa's Memoirs*, vol. ix. p. 487.

⁹ *Lord Broughton's Italy*, vol. i. p. 20.

the opportunity of turning the tide of fortune in favour of the emperor. The imputation is founded on the fact that in the beginning of 1814 Napoleon had issued instructions to Eugene desiring that in the event of Murat declaring against France, he should himself lead all the French in his service over the Alps into France, while he left his Italian troops still to garrison the fortresses of Lombardy, and embarrass as much as they could the movements of their foes. These instructions are said to have been disobeyed; pressing representations not only of Napoleon but of the ex-empress Josephine are alleged to have been disregarded. The neglect is attributed to his unwillingness to leave Italy at a time when his absence might have affected his own pretensions to its crown, and writers have been found who have not hesitated to attribute to the Viceroy's supposed desertion of the interests of his master, the downfall of Napoleon's power.¹⁰ The accusation is not answered by a mere appeal to the noble integrity with which Eugene refused the offer of Metternich. Many men who would reject with scorn the proposal directly to betray a cause, can yet unconsciously be led to sacrifice to the seduction of indolence, or to the present and absorbing temptation to attend to those interests which may most nearly affect themselves, the opportunity of vigorous exertion for the very same cause.

¹⁰ Memoirs of the Duke of Ragusa, vol. vi. p. 24, *et seq.* The imputations cast by the Duke of Ragusa upon the memory of Eugene induced his family to send to the editor of these memoirs a series of documents, throwing light upon the transactions in which he was engaged. These documents were published in the ninth volume, and are those referred to in this chapter, and in the last with reference to the proposals made by Murat to Beauharnais.

Even from this imputation a fair review of the circumstances acquits Eugene. On the 17th of January Napoleon wrote to the Viceroy alluding to the defection of Murat, and telling him as soon as he had official information of it to gain the Alps with his army. In that case "le cas échéant"—he desired him to leave Italians to garrison Mantua and other places.¹¹ The instruction seemed based altogether on the policy to be pursued for the safety of the Italian army, and to have no reference to support expected to be given to Napoleon's own operations in France.

In the meantime affairs were becoming desperate at Paris. As the allies advanced over the frontiers of France, Napoleon looked impatiently for the arrival of Eugene with his troops. He blamed him for not instantly executing the order he had given him. Another and a more pressing letter was despatched from the Duke de Feltro, the minister of war.¹² The Empress Josephine was appealed to, to add the authority of maternal solicitations to that of the imperial commands, and a letter from her to her son conveyed

¹¹ "The Duke of Otranto will have informed you that the King of Naples has joined our enemies. As soon as you have official information of this, it appears to me important that you should reach the Alps with your army. When the case occurs, leave garrisons of the Italians in Mantua and other places."—*Letter of Napoleon to Eugene, 17th January, 1813.—Duke of Ragusa's Memoirs.*

¹² "The Emperor has commanded me by a letter, dated from 'Nogent Sur Seine,' the 8th instant, to repeat to your Royal Highness the order which his Majesty had already given you to move to the Alps as soon as the King of Naples shall have declared war against France.

"According to the intention of his Majesty, your Imperial Highness must not leave any garrison in the fortresses of Italy, except one of Italian troops, and you must come in person with all the French troops by Turin and Lyons."—*Duke de Feltro to Eugene, February 9th, 1814.*

to him the disappointment which was felt at his not having followed the instructions he had received.¹³

These letters reached Eugene when he had just been victorious on the Mincio, when Murat was still pursuing his strange and undecided course, and when offers of alliance and support had been made by the Neapolitan king. On the 18th of February he wrote to the emperor reminding him of the conditional nature of his orders, and at the same time pointed out the ruin that must have followed the attempt to execute a retreat across the Alps.¹⁴ Napoleon was satisfied with these reasons; even before he received them he had altered his views. His own successes in Champagne had relieved him in some degree of the pressure under which he had written with such urgent impatience, and the officer who carried to Paris the despatches of the battle of the Mincio, brought back to Eugene the expression of the emperor's wish that Italy should be defended to the last.¹⁵

If we can do full justice to the proud fidelity with which Eugene adhered to the cause of Napoleon in the days of its disaster, if we freely acquit him of the

¹³ "The letter of the Empress Josephine is gone by this morning's post; it is as pressing as possible."—*King Joseph to Napoleon, February 10th, 1813.*—*Duke of Ragusa's Memoirs*, vol. vi. p. 26.

¹⁴ See this letter at the end of this chapter.

¹⁵ Report of Count Tascher of his interview with Napoleon on the 18th of February.—*Duke of Ragusa's Memoirs*, vol. ix. p. 148.

On the day of his interview with Count Tascher, Napoleon wrote to Eugene, describing his own recent successes: "If fortune favours us, we may preserve Italy. In this supposition probably the King of Naples will change sides."—*Napoleon to Eugene, February 18th, 1813.*—*Ibid.* vol. ix. p. 148.

charge of deserting it, a charge only to be sustained by an entire misapprehension or perversion of the facts,¹⁶ there is the more reason to regret that the last acts of his viceroyalty in Italy should compromise his claims to admiration and respect. But yet a very few weeks were sufficient to prove that he was deficient in those higher energies of character which are necessary to carry men with perfect truth and integrity through the sterner and more troublous exigencies of life. There are occasions in which the absence of these qualities is more than a mere defect of character—times when it amounts to a moral fault. Unhappily for the fame of Eugene, he was placed in a position surrounded by difficulties, which he had not strength or decision of character successfully to encounter, and under which, therefore, he failed in fulfilling the obligations which he owed to the people over whom he ruled.

The convention of Schiarrino Reggino left the kingdom of Italy untouched. Notwithstanding Napoleon's abdication that kingdom still remained, possessing and entitled to all the attributes and rights of a sovereign state.

Eugene Beauharnais, the viceroy, was the guardian of the state. If the abdication of Napoleon could be said to destroy his delegated powers, his duty was to have appealed to the senate as the body representing the authority of the realm. He might have asserted with much more reason, that upon the abdication of the reigning sovereign, his own nomination as his successor took effect, and that by that abdication he legally became

¹⁶ See the note at the end of this chapter.

king. In the convention of the 15th of April, he took the position which it was his duty as general of the Italian army to assume. The truce which was then concluded was a military convention between the armies of two independent states. By the suspension of hostilities, the useless shedding of blood was avoided, and the final settlement of the terms of peace was referred to the authorities that represented the supreme power of each state, the senate of the kingdom of Italy on one hand, and the Emperor of Austria on the other. It might be, indeed, that in the relative positions of the parties, the senate might be reduced rather to sue than treat for peace; but it was still open to the authorities of the kingdom of Italy, if they failed in obtaining honourable terms, to resist, and brave, in defence of their independence and their rights, the advance upon their soil, of that invading host whose onward march by the armistice had been stayed. Nothing could be more distinct or clear than the position in which all parties were placed by the convention of the 15th of April. Yet within ten days after signing that convention, Eugene Beauharnais took on himself to enter into a new one, and to hand over Lombardy to the Austrian troops.¹⁷

In accordance with the convention, the French regiments of his army at once left his quarters, and were already on their way across the Alps. He was still at the head of an Italian army, composed in part at least of soldiers whose fame had been won upon

¹⁷ Convention of Schiarino Rizzino.

the hard fought fields of Napoleon's greatest glory ; he was in possession of the almost impregnable fortress of Mantua ; and while the senate of the kingdom were preparing to send their deputies to Paris, the nation was, by the very terms of the convention, exempt from all fear of the renewal of hostilities, for at least the month which was required as notice of the intention to resume them upon either side. In this position stood matters at the period of the occurrences about to be narrated.¹⁸

The senate, it will be remembered, consisted exclusively of the nominees of the government. The Duke of Lodi (Melzi) held, by the appointment of Napoleon, the position of its president, one for which his rank, his character, and his influence eminently qualified him ; he was, from the very incident of that position, the partisan of the reigning powers ; he had filled the office of President of the Legislative Assembly, from the establishment of the Italian republic in 1802, and it was upon his proposal that the body over which he presided, had resolved on offering to Napoleon the crown of the kingdom of Italy. Immediately on being apprised of the arrangements of the convention, the Duke of Lodi issued circulars convening the senate to deliberate on the state of national affairs. Informing them of the terms of the convention, he stated his intention of proposing the immediate despatch of a deputation to Paris, and further, that they should be instructed to demand

¹⁸ The full account of these transactions will be found in Farini, *Storia d'Italia*, vol. i.; Gualterio, *Rivolgimenti Italiani*; Count Guicciardi's *Historical Narrative*; Botta, *Storia d'Italia*, lib. 27; Lord Broughton's *Italy*, vol. i. chap. 2.

the independence of the kingdom of Italy with Eugene Beauharnais as their king.

If the government of Eugene had been popular in Lombardy, and the senate supported by the nation in this demand, it is more than probable that it would have been successful. The friendship of the Russian emperor for Eugene was well known. A short time after these transactions, Alexander soothed the death-bed of Josephine, by promises of protection to her children ; and the disposition of that monarch was just the one which would have led him to fulfil that chivalrous pledge, by retaining her son upon the throne of Italy, if he had been in a position to demand it. The alliance of Beauharnais with the royal family of Bavaria would have powerfully seconded his claim. The convention of the 15th of April, still left him in possession of an unconquered territory, to which the allied powers could not as yet assert that right of conquest, which was avowedly the foundation of all their distribution of territory at Vienna.

Although the strict rules of right might have justified the Austrians, after a month's notice, in taking up hostilities where the convention stopped them, and proceeding still to conquer Lombardy ; the allied sovereigns would scarcely have permitted a fresh resort to force, to overcome the resistance of a state, which all of them, except England, had recognised. These considerations, at least to some extent, justify the observations of those Italian historians who say that the Lombard patriots, who rejected Eugene Beauharnais as their king, prevented the only combi-

nation that presented a hope of maintaining their independence. But the French were now, in Italy, as elsewhere, suffering the consequences of the system of exaction, and of disregard of national feelings, wherever they came in contact with French interests, which had everywhere marked their sway. The Italian kingdom had been popular in its institution ; it dazzled the Lombards by the revival of their ancient glories, and its appeal to that sentiment of national pride, which is the master passion of the Italian heart. The administration of Eugene was calculated to improve these elements of popularity. A brilliant court restored Milan to the rank and prosperity of a capital. The vigour which everywhere marked French administration, was felt in the promotion of useful works, in the improvement of the country, and last, not least, in the architectural embellishment of Milan. The Bavarian princess, who was the vice-queen of the court, brought to her high station both the virtues and the graces which were calculated to conciliate the affections of those around her : it must be recorded to the credit of the Princess Augusta, that the years of its existence effected a change greatly for the better, in at least the external habits of the Milanese. Domestic relations were held once more in honour ; husbands were taught not to be ashamed to pay attention to their wives, and wives to consider it no discredit to appear in public under the protection of their husbands, instead of the “cavalière serviente.”¹⁹ In the

¹⁹ Those interested in such matters tell us, that among the changes of fashion insisted on by Napoleon himself, was that of inserting in cards of invitation the names both of the master and mistress of the house.—*Lady Morgan's Italy*, vol. i. p. 257.

appointment of his officials, Eugene showed no preference for French; his administrations were essentially Italian. All that was French was the Code Napoleon, and this secured to the people the free and impartial administration of justice, instead of a jurisprudence complicated by the procedure of the old national law, and confused still more by the superaddition of the Austrian code. All this, however, failed, as the event lamentably proved, to secure permanently for the government of Eugene Beauharnais, the attachment of the people. The haughty Milanese patricians were not reconciled to submission to the yoke of that which they regarded as the upstart power of the existing dynasty of France; local jealousies were felt, that places were conferred on the natives of Romagna, and distant provinces of the kingdom, which the hereditary pride of Milan, as strong now as in the days of Barbarossa, fancied should have been reserved exclusively for the denizens of the sovereign city—as they still termed her in their adoption of the recollections and traditions of the olden times. They were not without much juster reasons of discontent. The suppression of their representative institutions, and the substitution for the elected legislative assembly of a paid senate of nominees, had virtually deprived the Italians of all national administration, and all control over their own affairs. It mattered little in what country either minister or senators were born, if they were the mere instruments of executing the decrees that issued from the chancery of Imperial France. To forward the ambition of France all Italian policy must be directed; for the wars of France a severe

conscription deprived the families of Milan and Mantua of their sons and their brothers ; it was to recruit the exhausted exchequer of Paris that tax after tax was imposed ; the blood and the treasure of Italy was squandered in wars in which Italy had no interest to serve, and of which even the poor compensation of glory was monopolised by France. The Italian kingdom, except in the pageant of a court, and perhaps, increased severity of taxation, was as much a department of the empire as Genoa or Rome. A very short experience of the reality had disenchanted the illusion of the ancient Lombard monarchy, and men pondered on the Austrian proclamations which told them that the kingdom of Italy was, in all that concerned national independence, a mere myth—its only real existence was in the sacrifices it exacted, and in the burdens it imposed.²⁰

Nor in later years were there wanting elements of personal unpopularity in the Viceroy. After his return from Moscow he was never liked by the Italians. Personal differences had broken out between him and the generals of the Italian army, and the national pride was deeply wounded by the impression, well or ill founded, that he had unjustly depreciated the heroism and services of that army. Still further odium was excited against him by the discovery that he had sanctioned one of the worst of the expedients of despotism, and that the agent of his government had been in the habit

²⁰ Proclamation of the Archduke John, August 22nd, 1809 ; Gualterio, Documenti, p. 1.

of examining the correspondence that passed through the Post Office.²¹

In this state of feeling, the French interest had in Lombardy but few partisans beyond the members of the senate and those bound by ties of interest or gratitude to the court; to these, however, were united in political action a small but influential section among the old nobility, who had wisdom enough to see that the support of the claims of Beauharnais presented the best chance of securing their national independence, which, once freed from the influence of Napoleon, they believed would soon become a reality and not a name. There were partisans too, at Milan, of the old Austrian rule, men who venerated legitimacy, and saw all blessings in the rule of an emperor with hereditary right—men with whom it was a matter almost of religion, that they should die under the rule beneath which they had been born—and who abhorring all the principles and shocked by the crimes of the revolution, with a summary and a convenient faith believed that the surest way of undoing its mischief was to replace every authority which it had disturbed. But by far the greater portion of the nobility and intelligent classes were enrolled in the ranks of the national party, who were only anxious to establish really that freedom and independence which the French had professed to give them. This party, under the guidance of Count Confalonieri, was united in their opposition to the designs of Eugene. Their

²¹ Lord Broughton's *Italy*, vol. i. p. 18; Guicciardi.

great fault was, that their views were provincial, not national ; they thought of Milan, not of the kingdom of Italy. Most of them would have been content with an independent municipality governing the city, and a few miles of territory around ; and it was in this spirit that they pressed the elevation of one of the heads of the patrician families of Milan to the throne ; the Duke of Lodi himself, and General Pino, were named among others. The more sagacious of the party, including Confalonieri, suggested that their chances would be better by offering to accept one of the imperial family as their prince, with an independent sovereignty and representative institutions ; a proposal which had the further advantage of conciliating to their movements, that small but honourable section of the old aristocracy from whose minds the events of the revolution had not yet obliterated the traces of loyalty in which they had been trained to the House of Hapsburgh in their youth. While such was the state of feeling among the higher classes, the lower orders were animated by only one feeling, that was, hatred of French taxation.

Secret societies existed to a considerable extent in Lombardy, and republican principles had many partisans in the towns. Their members were on this occasion content to range themselves in the array of those who seemingly took the part of national independence against the French. There was, in fact, but little time for deliberation, very little for appeal to the feelings of any of the districts, except those in the immediate neighbourhood of Milan. The senate, it was

believed, were actually disposing of their liberties and their national independence ; and we can scarcely wonder at the exasperation which was felt, at the attempt of a body who were the mere nominees of the Viceroy, to exercise the supreme authority of the nation, by disposing of the crown. The step was one very natural for them to take, but also very naturally resented by those who did not wish to submit to their despotism or their choice. It was overlooked, in the zeal of the patriots, that by the existing constitution of the kingdom, the Viceroy had a right to the crown, and that the senate were only discharging their duty in asserting that right of the sovereign, and the independence of the kingdom. In these agitations, the agents of Austria were prompt and vigilant in forwarding the interests of their imperial master : the very evening on which the convention was signed,— a nobleman holding the rank of a member of the Aulic Council, left the camp of Bellegarde for Milan.

He placed himself immediately in communication with Confalonieri and his friends ; there is no doubt that his presence materially forwarded the organisation of that movement which defeated the intentions of the senate, and which he promoted by all those arts and means which the diplomacy of Austria has never scrupled to employ. It is not just, without further evidence than can be adduced, to throw upon him the guilt of those sanguinary and disgraceful tumults of which it must be remembered all parties would be naturally anxious to shift the disgrace and the odium from themselves. The result was, that while Melzi believed that the

adoption of his proposals by the senate, would be a matter of course, a combination was forming against him, of parties who probably had never been united before. The partisans of Austria acted in concert with the most enthusiastic advocates of Italian independence, and the haughty patricians of Milan made common cause with the democrats and leaders of the rabble ; all were influenced by the common desire of the expulsion of the French. The senate at once unanimously agreed to that part of Melzi's proposal which related to the sending deputies to Paris, to insist on the preservation of the independence of the kingdom. A confusion exists in the accounts which tell us of the fate of the second portion of the proposal, some representing it as also adopted, others as encountering unexpected opposition, which led to the postponement of the decision to a future day. A meeting of the senate was certainly fixed for the 20th, a day memorable in the annals of Milan.

The first step of the confederates, was to draw up a protest against the right of the senate, which in no sense represented the nation, to act in the manner that was proposed. This protest demanded that the electoral colleges established by the constitution of 1802, should at once be convened, and that their decision should be taken on the momentous question of the disposal of the crown. It was signed, in a few hours, by 150 of the most influential names in Milan. A less creditable, although more effective opposition, had been by some persons or other, secretly arranged. Emissaries were sent among the

peasants, exciting their passions to the utmost by representing to them, that the real question involved was one of new taxation, to meet further exactions of the French. Bands regularly organised entered Milan on the morning of the day appointed for the meeting of the senate ; the peasants of the surrounding districts flocked into the town ; and when the unsuspecting senate assembled, they found the city in the possession of an infuriated mob, to control whose movements the authorities had only the night-watch ; their supineness had not even provided for the safety of the senate by the presence of a guard. The tumultuous assemblage of the people compelled the senate to revoke the decree by which they had named the deputies who were to proceed to France. Revoking this decree, the senate at the same time desired the electoral colleges to be convened. Elated by their victory, the mob proceeded to more criminal violence ; attacks were made upon the houses of many of the friends of the French interest, and Milan was in possession of the mob.

In vain did Confalonieri and his friends exert themselves to control the passions they had excited. Prina, the minister of finance, a native of Piedmont, was the peculiar object of the fury of the mob. The general belief was, that his house was filled with enormous treasures, the produce of his plunder of the people ; in search of these imaginary hoards, they rushed upon his mansion and ransacked every apartment ; they found in his desk but one hundred pounds. The truth was the finance minister was poor and in debt, but the passions of a mob do not attend even to demonstration ;

the story of the hidden treasures was still believed. His guilt was aggravated by the crime of having effectually concealed them. The unfortunate minister was recognised as he was flying to take refuge in the house of a friend. He fell dead in the street without a wound upon his person, and it was said that he was beaten to death by the umbrellas of the crowd.²² Milan was probably saved from the horrors of sack and pillage by the determination of some of the citizens, who formed themselves into a volunteer guard, and promenaded the streets, until the crowds that filled them had retired, and order was restored.

In the eyes of the municipality, Eugene had virtually abdicated his functions as regent of the state, whose peace he had left unprotected. The day following these melancholy proceedings, the municipal council of Milan nominated a provisional regency, comprised exclusively of those opposed to the interests of the French. On the 22nd the electoral colleges assembled, they declared the senate dissolved, and by a unanimous vote they conferred the command of the Italian army upon General Pino. The following day they again assembled, and made a formal declaration of the independence of the kingdom of Italy, to be governed by an hereditary monarchy.

The viceroy, in the meantime, remained at Mantua with the Italian regiments of his army. The very day after the convention, he had taken his farewell of the French regiments, and they were on their way

²² Lord Broughton's Italy.

beyond the Alps. A proclamation assured them that he would have permitted no one but himself to take the charge of conducting them to their homes, if it had not been that "the rest of his existence was consecrated to the good, generous, and faithful people, whose happiness henceforth it was the only object of his life to promote." It is difficult to account for the supineness which left Milan wholly unprotected, when, as it afterwards appeared, protection was absolutely indispensable to its peace ; the presence of one regiment in Milan would have entirely altered the course of events. There seems indeed scarcely an excuse for the culpable negligence which at such a moment left the capital unguarded. Resistance to the senate appears never to have been contemplated as possible in the councils either of Eugene or any of his advisers.

The provisional regency entered at once upon their duties ; they named the deputies who were to proceed to Paris and place before the allies the claim of the Italian kingdom for independence, with a declaration of their readiness to accept one of the imperial family of Hapsburgh for their king. Count Confalonieri was placed at the head of this deputation. Two of that deputation proceeded to Mantua to inform Eugene of what had been done. Disappointed and irritated, he adopted the fatal resolution of surrendering to the Austrians the kingdom and the army which he believed he could no longer hold for himself. Recent information shows that he contemplated at first the step of assuming the crown by his own authority, and that he prepared, if he did not actually issue, a proclamation to

that effect.²³ Had he done so, he would have vindicated a title far more legitimate than that which has carried many a claimant to a throne : he would have been perfectly justified in marching troops to Milan to suppress a movement which combined in point of moral authority, the vices of both a revolt and a surprise. By boldness and decision it is possible that he might even then have conciliated his opponents, and at the head of a united people, asserted before the powers of Europe the independence of the kingdom which he claimed.

It would, perhaps, have been too much to expect from human nature, that submitting to the decision of the people, he would still have offered his services in

²³ "That Prince (Eugene) hearing of the murder of Prina, and not aware of any efforts to support his pretensions, resolved to assume the crown by an act his own. Accordingly, he published a proclamation, declaring his readiness to take upon himself the cares of sovereignty, without much attempt at reasoning or justification, and only alluding shortly to the exigencies of the times. Perhaps of all the strange accidents of this eventful period, it is one of the most singular, that a prince who had been the heir of an imperial crown, and a viceroy over a great kingdom, and who was now a general of high repute, at the head of a formidable army in an impregnable fortress, should create an independent monarchy, and place the crown of it on his own head ; and that an act of such vast significance should not only be productive of no results, but should drop as it were still-born, so that the very fact may be said to have been almost unknown. Count Guicciardi does not mention it in his narrative, nor Botta in his history. But the proclamation was issued : I was assured of that fact in Mantua, in 1816. No notice was taken of it, except that murmurs were heard amongst the superior officers. It was never cancelled nor contradicted, nor acted upon ; indeed the paper upon which it was printed could hardly have been dry when Eugene himself signed, with Marshal Bellegarde, the convention of the 23rd of April, by which he lost his crown, his army, and his honour. What he secured was a retreat in Germany, and his military treasure."—*Lord Broughton's Italy*, vol. i. p. 30.

The probability would appear to be, that the proclamation was prepared, and of course seen by several persons, but that before it was actually issued the intention was abandoned.

command of the army, at the head of which he was placed. But it was not to be expected that he would have left them both their army and their own position untouched by any act of his. Possibly he considered that the Italian kingdom was altogether a fiction, and that everything that nominally belonged to it, was in reality his own, which, as representing Napoleon, he might deal with as he pleased. By whatever reasoning he justified the act to his conscience, on the 23rd he took the step for which in vain we seek for justification or excuse, and signed a new convention with the Austrian general, by which all the remainder of the kingdom was handed over to the Austrian troops. Bellegarde was to send a commissary to Milan, formally to take possession of the kingdom in the name of the allied powers. All the existing authorities were to continue in their places, and in the exercise of their functions ; the Italian army was to preserve its organisation until the allies should decide on its future disposal ; in the meantime it was to be placed under the command of Bellegarde. His only stipulation for the army was, that any officer who wished, should be permitted to leave the service upon signifying that wish to the Austrian authorities.²⁴

A proclamation from Eugene to his soldiers vainly endeavoured to disguise the real nature of the transaction. The departure of the viceroy had been fixed for the morning after its issue. Indignation was spreading fast through the ranks, threats were heard from the lips of many a soldier, that when he attempted to leave on

²⁴ Farini, vol. i.

the morrow, the army would rise simultaneously, and arrest him as a traitor to their cause. So general were the manifestations of feeling, that Eugene considered it more prudent to hasten his departure and privately leave Mantua under cover of the night. Contriving to pass through the garrison unnoticed, he travelled rapidly to Munich to seek an asylum with the royal family to whom, by marriage, he was allied. In passing through the Tyrol, he narrowly escaped the fury of the populace, who were bent on revenging in his person that which they considered the assassination of Hofer.

On hearing of the new convention, and finding themselves deserted, the army offered to the provisional regency at Milan to defend the capital against the Austrian troops; the offer, as might have been expected, was refused. Before evacuating Mantua, the troops burned their eagles, and scattered their ashes to the winds. Over the burning embers passionate oaths were taken, that never would they serve except under the colours of Italian independence.²⁵ On the 24th, Bellegarde entered Milan with the Austrian troops, and Colonel Sommariva, as an imperial commissioner, issued a proclamation taking possession of all Lombardy in the name of the allied powers. The provisional regency was confirmed.²⁶

There is nothing further to throw light upon that transaction by which Eugene, beyond all question, surrendered the rights of that army and that nation, which it was his bounden duty to defend. It has

²⁵ *Lady Morgan's Italy*, vol. i. p. 254.

²⁶ *Gualterio, Documenti*, p. 125.

been said, that when he signed the convention of the 15th of April, he was not aware of the abdication of Napoleon ; and that the receipt of this intelligence was the occasion of his acceding to the second. The very terms of the first convention disprove an assertion contradicted by all the dates, and which, were it established, could make no alteration in the material facts. It is true that the eight days limited by the first armistice, expired on the day of the signature of the second; but it is equally true that there could, by the terms of that convention, have been no renewal of hostilities for another month. The very object of the first convention was to allow the authorities of the Italian kingdom a sufficient space of time to enter upon negotiations which they were to conduct, under the protection of the armistice that had been agreed. The viceroy was bound either to vindicate the authority of the senate, or to submit to that which had taken its room.

Passing through the Tyrol with difficulty, Eugene arrived at Munich, the capital of his father-in-law. From this he went to Paris, in the days of the first restoration of the Bourbons, and passed from that city to the Congress of Vienna. Although at Vienna he was suspected of holding communication with Napoleon on his return from Elba, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia were able to secure to him the possessions in the kingdom of Italy which were guaranteed to him on his marriage. The inalienability of the Church possessions did not protect the Papal States from being compelled to make good that portion of them which lay

within their limits, and the kingdom of Naples was compelled to pay to the Viceroy a sum of 250,000*l.* in compensation for his claims.

The treaty of the 11th of April, 1814, had stipulated for the preservation of all the private properties of the princes and princesses of the family of Napoleon, and moreover for a suitable establishment for Prince Eugene from resources independent of France.²⁷ The influence of the King of Bavaria and the friendship of Alexander were sufficient to ensure, at the Congress of Vienna, that in favour of Eugene these stipulations should be magnificently fulfilled. Private agreements amply provided for his endowment.²⁸ In affluence and rank he was left without reason to complain. In addition to the fortune which he carried with him from Italy, he received from Bavaria the revenues and the title of the principality of Eichstadt. A few years later he was elevated to the rank of an Austrian prince, with the title of Duke of Leuchtenberg. He died in 1824. His children have already taken their place among the royal families of Europe. The destiny that was said to have been mysteriously attached to the fortunes of Josephine would seem to have followed her descendants, and in them alone is royalty preserved among the relatives of Napoleon.²⁹ Of the daughters of Eugene one became Queen of Sweden, another is still Empress Dowager of Brazil. His eldest son married Donna Maria the

²⁷ Treaty of 11th April, 1814, article 8th.

²⁸ Protocol of conference of Congress of Vienna, May 27th, 1814.—*Foreign Office State Papers*, 1814.

²⁹ The present Emperor of the French is the grandson of Josephine by her daughter Hortense, Queen of Holland.

Portuguese Queen. His second, who bore on the death of his brother the title of Duke of Leuchtenberg, became the husband of a Russian Grand-Duchess ; and it is within the range of possibility that a descendant of Josephine may yet occupy the throne of the Czars.

NOTE.

The following is the letter addressed by Prince Eugene to Napoleon, which is too long for insertion in the ordinary place in the notes :—

“ *Volta, February 18th, 1814.* ”

“ **SIRE**,—A letter which I received from the Empress Josephine, informs me that your Majesty reproaches me for not having shown sufficient eagerness in executing the order which you have given me by your letter in cypher, and which has been repeated to me the 9th of this month by the Duke de Feltre.

“ Your Majesty has also appeared to believe that to bring me nearer to France in present circumstances I required to be incited by other motives than my devotion to your person and my love for my country.

“ Your Majesty will pardon me for saying that I have merited neither your reproaches nor the want of confidence which you have shown in the feelings which will ever be the most powerful motives of all my actions.

“ The order of your Majesty expressly desired that, in case the King of Naples should declare war on France I should retire upon the Alps. This order was only conditional. I would have been guilty if I had executed it before the contingency upon which its execution depended had occurred. However I immediately placed myself, by retiring upon the Mincio, and by an echelon movement upon Placentia, in a position to carry out the retreat which your Majesty had pointed out to me, as soon as the King

of Naples, overcoming his indecision, should have formally declared himself against us. Up to the present time, his troops have committed no act of hostility against those of your Majesty: the King has always refused to co-operate actively in the movement of the Austrians, and only two days ago he conveyed to me that his intention was not to act against your Majesty, and at the same time gave me to understand that it only required a fortunate circumstance to make him declare in favour of the colours under which he had always fought. Your Majesty then sees clearly that I could not permit myself to think that the time for executing your conditional order had arrived.

“ But if your Majesty supposes for one moment that I could have interpreted your orders in such a manner as to have retired immediately on receiving them, what would have resulted from it? I have an army of 36,000 men, of whom 24,000 are French and 12,000 Italians. But of these 24,000 French, more than one-half are natives of the Roman States, of Genoa, Tuscany, and Piedmont, and assuredly none of these would have recrossed the Alps. The men who belong to the departments of Leman and Mont Blanc, who already begin to desert, would soon have followed the example of the Italians, and I would have found myself in the defiles of Mont Cenis, or of Fenestrille, as I shall still do whenever your Majesty gives me a positive order, with scarcely 10,000 men, and bringing after me upon France 70,000 Austrians, and also the Neapolitan army, which then, deprived of the presence of the French army (which serves it at present more as a support than a restraint), would have been immediately forced to act offensively against us. It is besides impossible to doubt that the entire evacuation of Italy would have thrown into the ranks of your Majesty's enemies a great number of soldiers who are now your subjects.

“ I am therefore convinced that the movement of retreat prescribed by your Majesty would have been very fatal to your arms, and that it is very fortunate that up to the present time it was not my duty to execute it. But if the intention of your Majesty was that I should as quickly as possible return to France with what I could keep of your army, why have you not deigned to order me to do so? You might be quite certain your slightest wish would always be supreme law to me, but your Majesty has taught me that in the profession of arms we are not permitted to guess intentions, and must limit ourselves to executing orders.

“ However this may be, it is impossible that such doubts could have originated in the heart of your Majesty. A devotion as perfect as mine must excite jealousy ; may it never succeed in altering your Majesty’s kindness towards me, that kindness will always be my dearest recompense. The aim of all my life shall be to justify it, and I will never cease to place my happiness in proving to you my attachment, and my glory in serving you.

“ I am, Sire,

Signed, “ EUGENE NAPOLEON.”

—*Letter of Eugene to Napoleon. Memoirs of the Duke of Ragusa*, vol. ix. p. 446.

The charges against Eugene in connection with this transaction may be summed up in the following extract from the *Memoirs of Marshal Marmont, the Duke of Ragusa*.

“ Napoleon,” writes the Duke of Ragusa, “ had given orders to Prince Eugene to evacuate Italy after having either made an armistice or else thoroughly misled (*ou bien trompé*) the Austrians, and blown up all the fortresses except Mantua, Alexandria, and Genoa. I had at the time some doubts of the truth of these directions. But they have been certified and guaranteed to me by the officer who carried the instructions and orders, Lieutenant-General Antouard, first aide-de-camp of the Viceroy. He has entered with me into the circumstantial details which I am about to narrate.

“ The French and Austrian armies in Italy were on the Adige. Eugene had orders to negotiate an armistice by giving up the fortresses of Palma-Nuova and Osopo—to send his Vice-Queen to Genoa or Marseilles, giving her two battalions of the Italian guard—to leave garrisons at Mantua, Alexandria, and Genoa, of the Italian troops—to give up all other places simultaneously—and to return to France by forced marches, after having everything prepared to execute this movement with despatch.

* * * * *

“ When we reflect on the almost incredible resistance which we offered even with the wreck of the army, which never in all formed 40,000 men, we can imagine what would have been the result of the sudden arrival of such a reinforcement and the execution of such a movement. Eugene evaded compliance with the orders of the Emperor. He made his cause a separate one (*il fit cause*

a part). He intrigued for his own interest. He gave himself up to the strange idea that as King of Italy he could survive the Empire ; he forgot that the branch cannot live when the trunk that supports it is fallen. Next to the great cause of Napoleon's downfall—his own character—Eugene, I say, contributed most to effectuate it, yet so strange is the justice of men, he is persistently held up as a hero of fidelity. I hold myself bound in conscience to establish these facts, of which the truth is perfectly known, and which are not without interest in history.

“ The disobedience of Prince Eugene to the formal orders of Napoleon produced consequences so fatal, consequences so direct, and his friends have so dexterously disguised his conduct, that the truthful and honest historian is bound to state the facts as they really occurred. Eugene not only did nothing to carry into effect the orders he had received, but he never intended to perform them. He occupied himself in making it impossible for him to obey them, or at least in creating pretexts for disregarding them. From some new documents that have fallen into my hands, I have the means of proving this.

“ The orders to regulate his movements so as to direct his operations on the Alps, had been carried to him by General Antouard in the end of 1813. A letter from the Empress Josephine to her son, earnestly pressing him to accelerate his movements, had been sent by a courier, of the 10th of February, by direction of Napoleon. On the 3rd of March, a fresh letter had been addressed to him by the minister of war, with the same object. Thus it is demonstrated that no counter-orders to his first instructions, nor any modifications of them, ever had been sent.

* * * * *

“ He was bound carefully to conceal his project from Bellegarde, whose duty it would have been to detain and prevent him from joining Napoleon. Instead of this, what did he do ? He wrote to Bellegarde a letter in which he announced his intentions, and indirectly provoked him to oppose them. He told him that the events of the war might oblige him to evacuate Italy, and asked him if he might leave the Vice-Queen in safety at Milan, confiding her to his care. What a ridiculous question ! He was dealing with civilised enemies. He was sure that protection, security, and care would not be withheld from her. This is a demand usually made some hours before quitting a town, and in presence

of the advanced guard of the enemy. It is plain that a question so inopportune and premature could have no other object than to put the Austrian general on his guard.

"Eugene evacuated Verona and slowly retreated. He was quietly (*avec mollesse*) followed by the Austrian army, and without any attempt on their part at an engagement, for the Austrian general, who had no anxiety for battle, believed in a tacit understanding for an evacuation, and, on his part, a mere taking of possession. But matters proceeding thus did not suit the views of Eugene. He could not assign as a reason for remaining that the Austrians were throwing obstacles in the way of his departure. Their conduct seemed to favour it. Thus all at once he took advantage of their security to attack them suddenly and in a manner not quite fair. He gained over them a slight success. He hoped thus to throw dust in the eyes of Napoleon, and to blind his judgment. Then, after the battle of Valleggio, he resumed his impassibility, and remained aloof from the events of the campaign in France, on the results of which he might have exercised so powerful an influence."—*Memoirs of the Duke of Ragusa*, vol. vi. pp. 23—27.

To those accustomed to the calmer style in which English historical discussion is conducted, these accusations may possibly appear more actuated by the spirit of a partisan, than directed by the impartiality even of a witness. They are not the less entitled to a deliberate examination.

The whole impeachment rests upon the assumption that, in December, 1813, Napoleon sent orders to Eugene to withdraw his army from Italy, and come to his assistance in France. This assumption is without any foundation in fact. The care of Eugene's relatives has preserved the written injunctions which General Antouard brought with him, dictated by the emperor, and written down in his presence. So far from desiring Eugene to give up Italy, the paper is one of instructions to defend it to the last. He is enjoined not to leave the line of the Adige without giving battle. In the event of his defeat, a result which Napoleon did not anticipate, successive points of resistance are indicated, and the final retreat to Mount Cenis is suggested as the last resource of the army, if unfortunately it should be driven from every intervening line of defence. Genoa was to be defended, if possible. The bold movement of outflanking the enemy and falling upon

Treviso or Pavia in their rear was suggested, and finally the Viceroy was assured that, if he could only hold out until February, he would receive strong reinforcements from France. The opinion of the emperor was that the enemy never could force the passage of the Adige. These instructions appear to have been directly the opposite of those which the extract from the Duke of Ragusa's memoirs represents to have been sent.—*Instructions dictated by Napoleon.—Memoirs of Duke of Ragusa*, vol. ix. p. 436.

The rest of the facts appear to be almost equally distorted. In the end of January, Eugene received orders to leave Italy, in the event of Murat declaring war against France. His letter abundantly justifies the course which he pursued, and whatever may have been the faults of the Viceroy, it certainly cannot be imputed to him that from any selfish motive he deserted the cause of his patron in its need.

The charge which represents him as adopting the ingenious device of asking protection for his wife as a means of giving notice to the Austrians that he intended to evacuate Italy is one that refutes itself. The Vice-Queen, it appears from the letters, was approaching her confinement, and it neither was unnatural nor blameable that her husband should appeal to the generosity of his enemy for an assurance that if the fortune of war should oblige him to evacuate Milan, he might leave her with a certainty that she should be unmolested in her home. The whole facts of the campaign refute the assertion, obviously hazarded on conjecture, that the Austrian general expected an easy seizure of Lombardy. Were there nothing else to disprove it, it is contradicted by the anxiety with which Murat's co-operation was demanded. In the last hour of Napoleon's reign, Marmont himself deserted the hopeless cause, and led 12,000 of his troops to join the forces of the Allies. No power could then have averted the destiny against which all struggling was in vain. "Venit summa dies et ineluctabile fatum." It may have been unjust to impute either perfidy or baseness to that act, but it is not necessary to its justification to throw the blame of Napoleon's overthrow upon those who adhered to his fortunes with desperate fidelity to the last.

CHAPTER III.



Paris in May, 1814—Arrival of the Italian Deputies—Interview with the Emperor Francis—With Humboldt—Metternich and Lord Castlereagh—Declarations of Lord Castlereagh—Secret Agents of England in Lombardy—Demands of Austria—Secret Treaty of Prague, between England and Austria—Memorandum of Prince Metternich to Lord Castlereagh—Extent and effect of Austrian demands.

THROUGHOUT the months of April and May the city of Paris was the theatre of scenes almost more strange and imposing than any which even in the marvellous events of the Revolution it had witnessed. The allied sovereigns had entered in triumph on the 31st of March ; German battalions and Cossack squadrons had defiled through the streets ; the Bourbon sovereign had returned to a capital invested and occupied by foreign armies. In that capital the veteran warriors who had combated with France on many a hard-fought field, and who finally overthrew the power of Napoleon, were assembled. The foremost men of Europe, in diplomatic as well as military rank, were gathered within its walls. Alexander, the autocrat of the greatest empire in the world, attracted all eyes. Wellington, although not yet the conqueror of Waterloo, divided, even with imperial

dignity, the homage of the strangers, and of many among the French. Gorgeous military spectacles, in which appeared the uniforms of many nations, reminded the French people of the conquest which united Europe had accomplished over their fallen chief—and in long and anxious deliberations sovereigns and statesmen took council on the future destinies of Christendom.

In the city in which such scenes were passing, appeared the eight deputies whom the senate of the Italian kingdom had sent to represent their wishes, and to plead the cause of their independence. Five of them were chosen from the city of Milan, one from Brescia, one from Cremona, and one from Pavia.¹

Full of hope and confidence they approached the city in which were met the potentates who had the power of deciding on their country's fate. Unacquainted with the ways of diplomacy, they relied on the justice of their cause. They were encouraged by the memory of those spirit-stirring proclamations which had called on them to take up arms in the cause of Italian independence; and their confidence was not diminished when they heard that the minister of free and constitutional England had arrived in Paris, to support, they doubted not, by his presence and influence, the cause of liberty and the independence of nations.

They were not long in learning that, after the surrender of the territories of the Italian kingdom to the arms of Austria, and the substitution of the provisional regency—sanctioned by an Austrian proclamation—for the recognised authorities of the kingdom, they appeared

¹ Botta, *Storia D'Italia*, vol. iii.

in Paris in a character very different from that which they would have borne if they had come as the representatives of an unconquered nation, with an army still ready to protect its rights.

To the communications which they addressed collectively to the allied sovereigns, no reply was given. The emperor Francis received them, and after listening calmly to their story, dismissed them with the brief, but emphatic answer, that the troops of his imperial majesty had reconquered their country, and that any commands the emperor had to give them they would receive at Milan. "You should have brought 25,000 soldiers to back your negotiations," was the taunt with which Humboldt, the Prussian minister, answered their appeal; and the language of Metternich, more detailed and more polite, was equally explicit: they were given distinctly to understand that they were a conquered people, and that Austria was prepared to assert over them the strictest rights of her ancient power. The deputation virtually represented only the Milanese. It was the vice of this, as of many other Italian movements, that it was confined by the influence of a municipal jealousy to the interests of a province and a town; the spirit of disunion had descended from their ancestors through generations in which the nobler qualities of those ancestors had disappeared.

Convinced by these interviews of the hopelessness of their errand, Confalonieri yet thought it due to himself and his country to make the last effort of an appeal to Lord Castlereagh and Lord Aberdeen, the representatives of England. The interview of the deputies with

Lord Aberdeen was a short one, and no account of it has been preserved ; that with Lord Castlereagh has been authentically, and no doubt faithfully, narrated in the report which Confalonieri himself transmitted to the provisional regency at Milan.²

Lord Castlereagh received the deputies with dignified courtesy, and treated them with a candour not always observed in diplomatic communications. Confalonieri addressed to him the arguments which he thought most likely to have influence with an Englishman. He referred to the proclamations in which Generals Wilson, Mc Farlane, and lastly, Lord William Bentinck, had called on the Italians to join the British arms in asserting^{*} the independence of Italy. He appealed to the sympathy of Englishmen with a nation seeking those representative institutions which had made England great and free, and asked of Lord Castlereagh, as the minister of that nation, to secure to Lombardy the same protection against misgovernment which had so long and so happily existed in the constitution of Britain.

In reply to this appeal, Lord Castlereagh denied that England could be bound to fulfil all the expectations that might have been excited by the unauthorised expressions of her officers. Whatever might be thought of the English constitution, it did not appear to be suited to the habits or genius of the Italians, an assertion in support of which he referred to that which he termed its failure in Sicily. He finally assured the deputation that if they were about to be placed under

^{*} Foscolo, *Della Servitù D'Italia*, Appendix ; Wrightson's *Italy*, p. 29.

a government like that of Napoleon's, he would support them in their demand for guarantees against oppression ; but that under the imperial house of Austria power never yet had been abused, and that in the character of that illustrious family they had the best guarantee for a government that would consult the happiness, protect the interests, and respect the privileges of the Lombard people.

To rely on the virtues of their sovereign as the only security of the subject against oppression, was not just the lesson which men might have expected to hear from the lips of an English minister ; possibly it occurred to some of Lord Castlereagh's hearers to suggest, that an experience of two years was scarcely sufficient to entitle him to pronounce an authoritative condemnation of that imperfect copy of the English constitution, the working of which in Sicily had been thwarted by those court and foreign intrigues which Lord Castlereagh himself had so severely and justly condemned.

Whatever might be the value of his reasonings, Lord Castlereagh was one of those upon whose decision the future destination of Lombardy depended. What that destination was, he told them explicitly enough at the close of an interview which lasted a considerable time, and in which he made the most minute inquiries upon many points connected with the internal economy of Lombardy. Lord Castlereagh assured the deputation that the English government and nation would ever take the deepest interest in everything that could affect the happiness of Italy. "Austria," he continued, "is

actuated by the same feeling, and will treat you with generosity and liberality. I will use all my efforts to secure this. I tell you frankly that I will not act in opposition to Austria, but I will endeavour to ensure a good understanding between the emperor and you ; in this I can and will act as your friend. I earnestly advise you to do the same."

On the 18th May, Confalonieri wrote to the provisional regency his report of this interview, intimating at the same time that they must now consider the future destiny of their country as unalterably fixed.³

It appears, however, that at this period, and subsequently, views were entertained which, if carried into effect, would not indeed have made Lombardy independent, but would have separated it from Austrian rule. In a former chapter, the interviews have been mentioned which took place in London between Count D'Aglie and Lord Castlereagh, immediately before his departure for Vienna.⁴ The inquiries of the British agents in Lombardy must have continued for some time, for their reports mentioned that the policy of Victor Emmanuel created in Lombardy the strongest feeling against him.

The truth would appear to be, that at Paris nothing was determined on, except the recognition of Austria's claims to her ancient possessions of Mantua and the Milanese. While the Allies still held the dis-

³ It has been stated that, in this interview, Lord Castlereagh observed, that her constitution was not the best thing of which England had to boast. No trace of such an expression is to be found in the official report.

⁴ *Ante*, vol. i. p. 277. See, post, note to chap. viii.; Farini, *Storia D'Italia*, vol. i. book iii. p. 90.

posal of Venetia, the rest of the Italian kingdom, and the Legations, it would have been easy, even in Italy, to have found compensation for any concession of territory to Piedmont which Austria might have been called on to make out of the territories which, as belonging to her before the Revolution, might be considered as her ancient demesne.⁵

It is impossible to complete the narrative of these Paris negotiations without noticing a statement, resting upon authority too high to permit it to be lightly questioned, which represents all the relations between the parties as modified and controlled by engagements which the ministers of England are alleged to have previously contracted to the Austrian court. In the earlier portions of an Italian history published in the course of the year 1859, Signor Farini, an author whose position, either as a statesman or an historian, entitles his assertions to respect, has given to the world the copy of a document which he alleges to exist in the archives of the Foreign Office at Vienna. This docu-

⁵ In the second article of the treaty of Paris, the Ticino was fixed as the boundary of the Austrian possessions; but there is a very remarkable absence of any statement of the limits of those possessions on the other side.

The proclamation of Marshal Bellegarde, on the 12th of June, announced only the re-annexation of Lombardy to the Austrian dominions. It was significantly silent as to Venice.

The department of the Adda, in the kingdom of Italy, contained the valleys of the Valtelina, Chiavenna, and Bormio. These valleys, lying north of the Duchy of Milan, had originally belonged to the Swiss canton of the Grisons. They were detached from it by Bonaparte, to form a portion of the territories of the Cisalpine republic.

It was originally proposed to re-unite them to the Swiss Confederation; but, on the 18th March, 1815, under the pressure of Bonaparte's return, they were added to the Duchy of Milan; an annexation which, in the words of the official announcement, "had become a measure of necessity, prescribed by the most imperious circumstances."

ment purports to be a letter addressed by Prince Metternich immediately before the signature of the treaty of Paris, by which, in the form of a secret protest, the Austrian minister insists on obligations which England had contracted by a treaty signed at Prague on the 27th of July, and ratified at London on the 27th of August, 1813.

To understand this letter it is necessary to bear in mind the transactions which occurred at Prague in the summer of 1813. In the month of June in that year Austria assumed the position of a mediator between Napoleon and the allied powers. On the 30th of June a convention was entered into, in accordance with which a conference was to assemble at Prague with a view of settling the conditions of a peace. Austria, in fact, held the balance of Europe in her hands. Vast bodies of her troops were collected on the frontiers of Bohemia, ready by a junction with either side to exert an influence which, to all appearance, would be decisive on the fate of the campaign. In the progress of the negotiations Austria finally acceded to the views of the Allies, and agreed with them upon the terms to be submitted to Napoleon, engaging, in the event of his refusal, to join her forces to those of the coalition against France. On the 7th of August the ultimatum of the Cabinet of Vienna was forwarded to Napoleon. On its rejection war was declared against France by Austria upon the 12th.⁶

It has been frequently stated that, on the 27th of July, Austria finally entered into engagements with the

⁶ Alison's History of the French Revolution, vol. xvii. p. 103.

Allies, by agreeing to accept a subsidy from England provided for her by a treaty entered into with Russia on the 6th of that month.⁷ Upon that day it is asserted that the ministers of England purchased the adhesion of Austria by entering into secret engagements, which bound them to use all their influence at the general peace to place the emperor in a position which would have virtually made him lord paramount of all the Italian States. The treaty was one kept secret from the British parliament and from Europe ; its character was so confidential that it was unknown even to some of those officially engaged in the same transactions, and the statement of its existence rests on the authority of the historian, who unequivocally asserts that the evidence which proves it is preserved in the Aulic archives of Vienna.⁸

That evidence is to be found in the letter from Prince Metternich already referred to, in which the Austrian minister recites the provisions of the treaty of Prague. According to these representations, England had bound herself, in the event of Napoleon being conquered, to use all her influence to obtain for Austria the supreme direction of the affairs of Italy, except those relating to the ancient territories of the Sardinian King. Her mediation was to be employed with the King of Spain, to obtain the surrender of any Bourbon

⁷ "On the 27th of July, all hope of accommodation having vanished, the Emperor Francis at last affixed his signature to the secret article, which had been reserved for his signature by Count Stadion, at Reichenbach, and thus incorporated Austria with the Grand Alliance."—*Alison's History of the French Revolution*.

⁸ Farini, *Storia D'Italia*, vol. i. p. 86.

rights, either to Parma or Tuscany, in favour of an Austrian prince ; Austria was to receive, as her own proper possession, the entire kingdom of Italy, including the legations, which had belonged to the Papal States ; Genoa was to be also at the disposal of the emperor. All the provinces of Italy which formed part of the French empire were to be given over to Austria as conquered territory. In this cession of Rome, no reservation was made of the sovereignty of the Pope ; his imperial majesty was further authorised to make terms with Murat for his adhesion to the confederation ; and, finally, England by anticipation confirmed whatever Austria might think it convenient to do in Italy, engaging to use all her influence at a general peace to have these dispositions confirmed by the allies.⁹ We have already seen that, upon the occasion of the victories of Suwarrow in 1799, Austria had put forward the same claims with the additional demand of the Sardinian territory for herself.¹⁰ England had then offered to her demands but little opposition ; she had now engaged herself to support them—with the exception of that which involved the spoliation of a sovereign with whom she had contracted treaty obligations. While England was bound to support these pretensions, no obligations were imposed on Austria to abstain from seeking more.

However extravagant these claims may now appear to those who regard Italian questions only from their present point of view, there is nothing improbable in

⁹ Memorandum of Metternich to Lord Castlereagh, *post.*

¹⁰ See the account of this, *ante*, vol. i. chap. vi. p. 227.

the statement that in 1813 they were conceded by the ministers of England. When demands of a similar character had been made in 1799, Lord Grenville expressed the traditional policy of England in the declaration that the aggrandisement of the House of Hapsburgh was not in itself a subject which this country was accustomed to regard with apprehension or alarm. In 1813 the concession of such terms was still less likely to meet with objection from the English Cabinet. The overthrow of Napoleon was then an object of vital importance to England. The revolutionary war had been, in fact, one long-continued struggle between England and his power, and the accession of Austria to the European confederation was an advantage which most Englishmen would then have gladly purchased by conceding all that was stipulated in this treaty. Russia, it will be remembered, had manifested very different feelings on the subject of the Italian aggrandisement of Austria, and in this alone there was abundant reason for the secrecy which was observed.

On the 3rd of October following, an open and public treaty was concluded between England and Austria. It contains no provisions, except those relating to the part which each power was to take in the war ; and unless the allegation of this secret treaty be correct, Austria joined the alliance without obtaining from England any stipulation whatever as to the results that were to follow its success.

On the 11th of September treaties were entered into both with Russia and Prussia, by which both these powers agreed that the Austrian monarchy should be

reconstructed as nearly as possible as it stood in 1805. The effect of this provision as to Italy would have been to restore to Austria the provinces she had lost by the peace of Presburg, which was signed on the 27th December in that year.¹¹

This would have preserved to her Venice, but it would have taken from her Lombardy and northern Italy to the Adige, all of which in the beginning of 1805 were parts of the kingdom of Italy.

It was under these circumstances that Prince Metternich is said to have addressed to Lord Castlereagh, at Paris, the following letter ; unquestionably, if its genuineness be sufficiently established, one of the most remarkable as well as important documents connected with the history of modern times.

“Paris, 26th May, 1814.

“ Since the communication received from your Excellency in your letter of the 19th instant, in reply to the previous notes which I had the honour to transmit to you in the name of my August Master, with respect to the distributions of territory (*partages*) sanctioned by the treaty of Prague on the 27th of July, 1813, between the contracting parties by their representatives, and ratified at London on the 23rd of August in the same year—distributions which should have their effect in Italy, as well as Germany, I have received orders from my court to make known to your Excellency in the form of a secret protest, that His Imperial and Royal Majesty is firm and decided in his resolution not to depart in the slightest particular from the arrangements which have been made with respect to the affairs of Italy by the above-mentioned treaty.

“ I. The 4th, 9th, and 10th articles were absolutely decisive, and place no restriction upon anything relating to the affairs of Italy, the supreme government of which, except that of the

¹¹ Martens, *Recueil des Traitéa.*

ancient possessions of the King of Sardinia, was submitted to the power of his Imperial and Royal Majesty, in accord with the British Government.

“ II. By the 11th article, the British Minister promised Austria his mediation with Spain respecting Tuscany and the States of Parma, undertaking to arrange with the Bourbon family an exchange for that branch which had reigned, first in Parma, and afterwards in Tuscany—an exchange to be effected in the distribution which should be made of the German States.

“ III. The 12th article, not mentioning the restoration of the ancient state of the temporal sovereignty of the Roman Pontiff, there remains entire the incontestable right which the House of Austria has over that part of Italy, as well in quality of King of the Romans as in that of hereditary emperor, and head of the Germanic Confederation.

“ IV. The 14th article gave to the House of Austria full power to conclude a treaty of guarantee with Joachim Murat King of Naples, in case that he would join the confederates, a treaty by which he would be promised an indemnity at the close of the war.

“ V. The 23rd and 24th articles gave to His Imperial and Royal Majesty all that territory known under the name of the Kingdom of Italy, comprising the states of Genoa and Parma, which he was at liberty to use for the benefit of a Prince of his family, excepting the Duchies of Modena, Reggio, and Massa Carrara, belonging to the House of Este, and the territories of Lucca and Piombino, which should be joined to Tuscany in favour of the Grand Duke Ferdinand III.

“ VI. By the 25th article, the Illyrian Provinces were given up to His Imperial and Royal Majesty, in order that they might be annexed to the Empire of Austria in exchange for the Provinces known under the name of Austrian Poland, given up to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia as King of Poland, and in compensation for the part of Austrian Silesia which had been yielded to His Majesty the King of Prussia—Provinces both of which, up to this time, have formed an integral part of the States of His Imperial and Royal Majesty.

“ VII. By the 30th article, England has confirmed by anticipation all that Austria may think proper to do in Italy, and has promised to obtain the approval of the allied powers, at the

general peace, to those distributions which formed part of the final arrangement; the 32nd article further provides, that all the States of Italy which have formed part of the French Empire, except Piedmont, should be given to Austria, as having been declared conquered countries.

"For these just reasons, I beg of your Excellency to lay before the British Cabinet this declaration of the unalterable wish of my Master the Emperor, who, while strictly adhering to all that has been established in his favour by the above-mentioned articles of the treaty of Prague, wishes now to express a hope that nothing may lessen the good understanding which has up to the present existed between the two Powers."¹²

This letter of Prince Metternich appears to have been addressed to Lord Castlereagh five days before the treaty of Paris was signed, and when probably all its provisions had been arranged. It assumes the form of a secret protest, which was meant to imply that

¹² Memorandum of Prince Metternich to Lord Castlereagh, quoted by Farini, "Storia d'Italia," vol. i. p. 27.

This document is distinctly stated by Farini, from whose pages it is taken, to exist in the Aulic archives at Vienna. The statement is made without the slightest intimation of doubt or distrust in the accuracy of his information.

It may be right to state why, after this distinct and clear assertion, any doubts of its authenticity are hinted at in the text.

It is to be observed, that Farini does not state the channel through which he acquired the information of its existence in the Aulic archives. Those disposed to question that information may fairly say, that everything depends upon the character of that channel. It is possible, at least, that the circumstances under which it was received might leave room for suspecting imposition.

Doubts have unquestionably been thrown upon the statement by persons very competent to form an opinion.

Not the slightest mention either of Metternich's letter, or of the treaty itself, is to be found in any published English document, in any of the debates in parliament, or in any of the memoirs of any of the statesmen of the time.

There are still living statesmen who, it may be supposed, would have probably known of such a transaction, and who deny all knowledge of its existence.

It is also stated that no record, either of the treaty or of Prince Metternich's letter, exists in the English foreign office.

On the other hand, there is the distinct and positive statement of Farini that

Austria did not waive her more extended claims, nor yet relieve England from her obligation to support them ; and that notwithstanding her present adherence to the treaty of Paris, she reserved her right to assert, whenever opportunity offered, those pretensions which England by the treaty of Prague had bound herself to support.

Upon reading this document, insisting upon obligations so strange, impliedly claiming the pledge of England still to forward views so vast, ambitious, and overweening, the question at once is suggested, is it possible England could have entered into obligations so momentous, and yet that the fact should have been kept a profound secret from parliament and the country ? The allegation has been made in the face of Europe that on the 27th of July, 1813, the ministers of England

the document exists in the Aulic archives — the improbability of any one forging such a document for the purpose of imposing on him—the guarantee which his own experience affords against the attempt at such an imposture with success—and, lastly, the internal evidence of the letter itself.

The statement is also corroborated by letters still extant, written from Rome to the court of Turin by Count D'Aglie, one on the 9th, the other on the 19th of July, 1814, in which he mentions the belief at Rome that a treaty of the nature now alleged had been concluded in July, 1813, between Austria and England, and that Metternich had appealed to it in a letter to Lord Castlereagh.

There is also the established fact, that, on the date indicated, the 27th of July, some document was signed between Austria and England.

Farini, in his preface to his History, excuses himself for not citing his authorities, by the statement that, in the condition of Italy when he wrote, to do so might have compromised the safety of some of his correspondents.

“ Un chiaro editore forestiero mi aveva ammonito a venire notando a' pie delle pagine i luoghi d'onde piglio i documenti. Egli non puo forse essere capace di tutti i riguardi che uno scrittore prudente debba usare in Italia. L'altra parte testificando io qui che quei documenti, i quali per la prima volta escono alla luce, sono presi dai privato dagli archivi di stato nostri o stranieri e che, dove sieno per me volti nella lingua Italiana la traduzione e letterale, questa nota puo valere per tutte.”—*Avvertenza*, p. 10.

contracted these engagements—that in May, 1814, the Austrian minister, if he did not claim their immediate fulfilment, insisted upon their remaining as a secret understanding between the two powers. Yet of this alleged treaty no trace exists in any public record—no intimation ever has been given of its existence in all the protracted debates to which the relations between Austria and England gave occasion ; and after the lapse of half a century it is reserved for an Italian historian to obtain from the archives of Vienna the document which, for the first time, brings this transaction to light, and acquaints the English nation with the obligations which have been contracted in their name—obligations which virtually affected the whole system of Europe, and controlled the entire foreign policy of the British Court. If this were possible in English diplomacy, if the alleged treaty of the 27th July, 1813, did really exist, it may perhaps suggest to the reflective that, with all the boasted freedom of the English constitution, there was one department of her administration to which popular influence had not found its way—and that the foreign policy of the country was conducted with a secrecy and an independence of national opinion, which has no parallel in the proceedings of the courts in which the forms of the most absolute despotism prevailed. In the days of their haughtiest power—with all the mysterious privacy that marked their proceedings—the council of the Venetian republic could never have attempted an act like this. The power is inconsistent with free government, which permits any select number of individuals secretly to

bind a nation to engagements which may involve that nation in the most fearful responsibilities of war. If a treaty, such as that alleged, were secretly entered into by the ministers of the year 1813, the transaction stamps upon the English administration of foreign affairs a character very different from that which is usually associated with representative government. If it be further true, that of this treaty no public minute is preserved—the secrecy which excludes from the ordinary state records all trace of such a dealing, stands alone in the history of nations. The records of the Aulic Council of Vienna supply the full history of their management of public affairs—and those who obtained access to the official minutes of the Venetian councils found a perfect note of matters long kept secret from the public gaze.

The belief in the existence of this secret treaty rests upon the credit which is to be given to the solemn and deliberate assertion of the statesman and historian to whom reference has been already made. That assertion does not consist in the mere vague statement of the existence of a document; it is the publication of the exact text of a letter bearing the signature of Prince Metternich, with all the details of time and place, and minute reference to circumstances and events. That a document purporting to be a copy of such a letter is in the possession of the author of the “*Storia d’ Italia*,” it is impossible to doubt: if it be not a genuine letter, it must be, on the part of some person, a wilful fabrication, of which it is not easy to suggest the motive. The accuracy of the statement can only be perfectly

tested by those who have access to the archives in which it is alleged to exist ; but those who must form their judgment upon the evidence which is within the reach of the public, will probably find it very difficult to discredit the testimony by which its existence is established, and will be slow to believe the letter just quoted to be a forgery for which—if it be one—in the whole history of imposture—not even excepting the donation of Constantine—no parallel is to be found.

By whom, or on whose authority, was such a treaty contracted ? Why should it have been kept a profound secret ? Were its obligations ever rescinded ? or were its stipulations by mutual consent regarded as cancelled or suppressed ? These are questions relating to the secrets of that period, secrets upon which, as the last actors pass from the stage of life, history is every day throwing some new and clearer light.

As we proceed, however, with the narrative of Italian history in the years which immediately followed the settlement of 1815, we shall, perhaps, find in the events of that history no slight confirmation of the statement—in the policy which Austria subsequently pursued—in the treaties by which, immediately after that of Vienna, she bound several of the Italian sovereigns to herself—in the assumption of supremacy over Italy, which was constantly maintained—and last, not least, in the intense jealousy with which the most sagacious and best informed of the Papal ministers regarded any pretext of interference on the part of Austria with the States of the Church.¹³

¹³ The jealousy of Consalvi of Austrian interference was manifested on

The pretensions put forward in this document were of the most extended and of the loftiest character. The claim was one of a higher nature than was involved in the mere accession of territory. Even in this view it amounted to a demand of the mastery over Italy, but it is manifest that compliance with the requisitions that were made in it would have involved the complete territorial subjugation of Italy to Austrian rule. Mistress of Genoa and the legations—with Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, held by princes of the imperial house—Austria would have been absolute sovereign of northern and central Italy. With the Genoese territory interposed as an Austrian province between his frontiers and the sea, the sovereign of Piedmont would have been powerless as an Italian prince. With Murat the court of Vienna claimed the right of making stipulations which would have left him, at least, indebted to her for a throne. Over the States of the Church the highest title of sovereignty was asserted. They were said to belong to Francis I. of Austria, as the successor of the Cæsars, by virtue of the old imperial right. In thus demanding the recognition of his imperial master as the inheritor of the empire of the West, as king of the Romans, as chief of the Germanic Confederation, and therefore lord paramount of Italy, Metternich put forward pretensions still more lofty

every possible occasion. See his Protest against the concessions made to Austria by the Congress of Vienna, of the right of garrisoning Conmachio and Ferrara within the Papal States. Gualterio has published several letters of Cardinal Consalvi and Cardinal Spina, written in 1820 and 1821, in which the legates of the Papal power are earnestly implored to pursue the strictest order so as not to supply Austria with the pretext of interference for which she was on the watch.

than even those which were advanced in his territorial claims.

In one of the paragraphs it was asserted, that "as the twelfth article of the treaty of Prague made no mention of re-establishing the ancient state of the temporal sovereignty of the Roman pontiff, there remained untouched the incontestable right, on the other hand, which the head of the house of Austria had over this part of Italy, as well in the character of king of the Romans, as in that of hereditary emperor and head of the Germanic body."

Over Rome itself the assertion of sovereignty was clear. The temporal power of the Pope having fallen, that of the emperor remained. Francis of Austria was king of the Romans; Pius VII. was bishop of Rome. The former was the Roman sovereign as completely as ever had been Constantine or Charlemagne. With him alone were to be adjusted the relations between the sovereign of the city and its bishop; and if any temporal power were to be exercised by the Pontiff, he could only possess it by the cession of Austria, and as the acknowledged subject of the Imperial crown.

But not only as to Rome itself, but also as to all the Italian states, the most extravagant pretensions of the early German emperors were revived. The long-forgotten prerogatives of Conrad, and Henry, and Frederick, reappeared from the gloom of former ages; and Metternich boldly recorded a claim on the part of the house of Austria, to exercise over Italy all those rights of supreme sovereignty which had been asserted

by the successors of Charlemagne and Otho in the empire of the West.

Strange as were the pretensions of the German emperors to be the successors of the Cæsars, still more strange was the claim thus made on behalf of the house of Hapsburg, to represent the Italian rights and dignities of the elective German chiefs.

Francis I. of Austria, on whose behalf these claims were thus advanced, had been elected king of the Romans, according to the ancient constitution of that Teutonic league which disposed of the dignities of the Holy Roman Empire. By the ancient usage of the empire, the legality of the departures from which seem doubtful, he had no right to the title of Emperor, never having received coronation by the Pope. He was, however, the acknowledged chief of the Germanic Confederation, and continued to wield the sceptre of its imperial sovereignty up to the period of his abdication in 1806.

In the year 1804, he foresaw the probable dissolution of the ancient empire by the growing power of Napoleon among the German states. Anxious, perhaps, to attach to himself, as the last possessor of the imperial dignity, some fragments of its broken power—unwilling, at all events, to descend in rank—he adopted the resolution of elevating his hereditary state of Austria into the dignity of an empire, by assuming the title of its emperor, instead of its archduke. The step was taken on the 11th of August, immediately after he had recognised the assumption of a similar dignity by Napoleon, in proclaiming himself Emperor of France. The step was justified as necessary to maintain the

proper rank of Austria among the great powers, in consequence of the assumption of the higher title, both by the sovereigns of Russia and of France. If the days had not passed when monarchs disputed for precedence in their rank, his right to assume even the title would have been questioned.¹⁴ As it was, it provoked no little jealousy among the German powers. In the rights of Austria, or of its sovereign, it was plain it made, and could make, not one particle of change. The alteration of title gave to the emperor no right over other nations, except those which had previously belonged to the archduke.

For some time he continued to hold both characters, as Emperor of Austria, one of the subordinate states of the German empire, and at the same time swaying the sceptre and wearing the crown of that empire, to which the prince of Austria, in common with all the princes of Germany, owed their allegiance. In July, 1806, the Confederation of the Rhine proclaimed the territories of those who joined it severed for ever from the German empire. On the 6th of August in that year, Francis, declaring that he was convinced of the impossibility of discharging any longer the duties which the imperial crown imposed upon him, solemnly abdicated that crown, and absolved the electors, princes, and states, members of the supreme tribunal, and other magistrates,

¹⁴ The truth is, that at this period the title "emperor" lost all significance or meaning. The representatives of these new and self-constituted dignities, possess no claim whatever either to the ancient rank or precedence of that title. In its only true and proper sense, emperor was a title belonging only to the successors of the Caesars. Assumed at the fancy of any sovereign, it conveys with it not one particle more of power or dignity, than that of king.

from the duties by which they were united to him as their legal chief.¹⁵

After this abdication it would have been very difficult to argue, that Francis could even personally retain any of those rights which may have belonged to him as elected King of the Romans—impossible to pretend that he could transmit them to his descendants, or attach them to his house. Absurd indeed was the claim which supposed that when he thus resigned his imperial crown, he could carry any of its rights to the distinct and novel sovereignty which he had himself erected the year before. Francis, the day after his abdication, had deprived himself of every particle of power which he derived from the elective dignity he resigned: he was, as King of Bohemia, an elector of the empire—but in this capacity he could not allege a title to its rights which might not have been put forward in behalf of George III., who was also an elector. The attempt to confound the Emperor of Austria with the Emperor of Germany was a juggle that could impose upon no one. The claim to attach to the newly-created, self-constituted, and hereditary empire the rights which were said to belong to that ancient empire, in which a diet of princes controlled, in which old-established laws regulated, and in which, upon each vacancy, election determined the succession to the imperial power, was a pretence which it might be thought could scarcely be seriously put forward—which, at all events, it was impossible in the face of any opposition to maintain.

¹⁵ See the act of abdication, *Annual Register*, 1806.

Yet such is the influence of name and titles even upon statesmen, that this pretension on behalf of "the hereditary emperor" was put forward in that document which officially recorded Austria's claims. The long succession, broken only by a short interval, in which the throne of the empire had been filled by the princes of the house of Hapsburg, gave certainly a shadow of justification for the claim that impliedly asserted it was theirs by hereditary right.¹⁶

The treaty of Paris bears indeed some internal evidence that demands resembling these in principle were made upon the allies. Thus are explained some of the provisions which at first appear to have been inserted out of place. In a treaty the object of which was to regulate the boundaries of the countries which were still to belong to France, we should scarcely have expected to find a stipulation that Italy, beyond the limits of the territories that should return to Austria, should consist of sovereign states. This was the very mildest protest that could be made against the pretensions of Austrian sovereignty in Italy; it disposed of them practically without calling on Austria to make any theoretical renunciation of her supposed rights. To the same desire to set at rest the Italian claims of Austria, we may obviously trace the secret articles

¹⁶ Rudolph of Hapsburgh, the founder of the family, was elected emperor in 1273. The imperial crown occasionally passed into other families until the election of Albert II. in 1438. From this period it continued in uninterrupted line of succession in his descendants until the extinction of the male line with Charles VI. in 1740. For a short interval of three years, the Elector of Bavaria, as Charles VII., occupied the imperial throne. On his death, in 1745, Maria Theresa secured the election of her husband, Francis, Duke of Lorraine, in whose descendants the dignity remained until its abolition.

which provided for the annexation of Genoa to Piedmont, the restoration of his ancient territories to the Sardinian king, and the stipulation that the Ticino was to be the limit of the Austrian territory to the west.

The treaty of Paris was finally signed on the 30th of May, two months after the allied sovereigns had entered Paris. The congress of monarchs was then broken up. The sovereign of Austria returned to his capital to make fitting preparations for the illustrious assemblage that was to meet within its walls. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia crossed the channel to receive in England the acclamations and the honours which greeted those who were regarded as the deliverers of Europe.

CHAPTER IV.

Austria in Lombardy—State of Lombardy—Freemasons—Communications with Murat—Occupation of Milan—Proclamation of Marshal Bellegarde—Memorials of Italian nationality suppressed—An Austrian Spy—Arbitrary Arrests—Lombardo-Venetian kingdom established—Establishment of communal and national Congregations—Their constitution.

THE deputies of the Italian kingdom returned to Italy, disappointed and dissatisfied with their mission. All hope of preserving the independence of their country was at an end ; and in gloomy and sullen discontent, the wisest and best of its patriots prepared to submit to the inevitable destiny which they had vainly endeavoured to avert.

There were, however, in Lombardy men who contemplated securing for Italy by force that independence which negotiation had failed to obtain. The society of Freemasons existed in the Italian kingdom as elsewhere, free by its constitution from political association, and devoted to the peculiar objects for which its mysterious confederation was framed. Prince Eugene had accepted the office of grand master of the Masonic body, and believed that he presided over an association in all respects similar to those which, in other countries, have enrolled princes and sovereigns in their mystic ranks.

Within the masonic society, there was another and a still more secret society, in which enthusiastic patriots availed themselves of the name, and, to some extent, of the organisation of freemasonry, to bind men together for the object of recovering the independence of their native land. Four thousand persons in the kingdom of Italy were combined in this secret association ; they recognised each other by symbols known only to themselves ; they had their own chiefs, and their own rules.¹ In 1813, on the return of Murat from Russia, the leaders of this conspiracy had communicated with him on his way through Milan. These communications were maintained up to the period of his setting out on that fatal expedition in support of Italian independence, which was to end in his destruction.

In the transactions recorded in the last chapter, the members of this society at Milan had taken part against Eugene. It has been stated that a pledge had been conveyed to them by an English general officer, in the name of the Emperor Francis, that the Austrian troops were advancing, not to re-establish their own dominion, but to secure the independence of Italy.² The Austrian generals had publicly proclaimed the same.³ It is certain that the impression was universal, that the triumph of the allies would accomplish that result ; it was not until the report of the deputies reached

¹ Lord Broughton's "Italy," vol. i. p. 16.

² Lord Broughton, vol. i. p. 469.

³ "You have already been enough oppressed. . . . But our armies have come into Italy to free you. . . . You must all become an independent nation."—*Proclamation of Count Nugent, Ravenna, December 10, 1813*—*Qualterio, Documenti*, vol. i. p. 8.

Milan from Paris that they discovered how fatally they had been deceived.

On the same day on which Bellegarde occupied Mantua, a proclamation appeared at Milan from Sommariva, a colonel in the Austrian army, in which he announced that, as commissary of his Imperial Majesty, he took possession, in the name of the allied sovereigns, of all the districts of the kingdom of Italy which the allied armies had not previously conquered. This proclamation confirmed the provisional regency of Milan, and continued the appointments of all existing officials. On the 12th of June, Marshal Bellegarde issued a proclamation in which he announced to the people of Lombardy and of the states of Mantua, Brescia, Bergamo, and Crema, that "a happy lot was destined for them—their province was definitively incorporated with the empire of Austria." "The first care of the emperor," he assured them, "would be to give their provinces a satisfactory and durable form of government, and an administration adapted to secure their future happiness," so that "their minds might be full of joy in contemplating an epoch as happy as it was remarkable, and their gratitude transmit to remote generations the indelible proof of their devotion and their loyalty." The senate, the regency, the electoral colleges, were all immediately suppressed. The Lombards began to fear that even the very name of their nationality would be destroyed. It was indeed the object contemplated in the councils of the imperial court. Francis did not hesitate to express his satisfaction at reducing Milan to the rank of a provincial

town. "The Lombards," he wrote to his ministers, "must forget that they are Italians ; my Italian provinces must have only one bond of union, obedience to their emperor."⁴ Metternich, with equal explicitness, avowed the principle upon which the proclamation of Bellegarde had been framed. "My master," he said to the Marquis San Marzano, "desires to extinguish the spirit of Italian unity, and to destroy all idea of an Italian constitution. He has not therefore taken, and he will not take, the title of King of Italy. He wishes to put down the spirit of Italian Jacobinism, and thus secure the peace of Italy ; with this view it is that he has disbanded the Italian army, and abolished all those institutions which preserved anything of the idea of an Italian kingdom."⁵ The Lombard people did not fail to read this policy even in the glowing phrases of Bellegarde's proclamation ; nor did it escape their sarcasm that the document was drawn in ignorance of their geography. "This German writes," they said indignantly, "as if the people of Mantua, Brescia, and Crema, were not Lombards."⁶ The proclamation of Bellegarde did not embrace the Venetian provinces. Over these a provisional government was established. The Austrian authorities held them in the name of the allies, and administered the government until their future disposal was arranged.

In Lombardy the dominion of Austria was re-established. A regency formed by the imperial government, with Bellegarde at its head, administered the affairs of

⁴ Farini, "Storia d' Italia," vol. i. p. 71.

⁵ Bianchi-Giovini.

⁶ *Ibid.*

Milan. Successive proclamations gradually destroyed every vestige of the institutions of the Italian kingdom ; the treasury, the different ministerial departments, were all suppressed ; nothing meantime was substituted in their room ; the intentions of the imperial government as to the future organisation of the Italian provinces was left to conjecture. This delay was not accidental ; the councils both of the imperial court and family were divided. Francis himself and some of the more violent of his advisers desired to destroy all trace of the lost independence of the Lombards, and reduce his Italian provinces to mere districts of the empire. Others, including more than one of the Archdukes, were anxious for a different policy ; they saw no object in insulting national susceptibilities, already too deeply wounded, and they desired to conciliate the feelings of the Italians by the cheap concession of a separate administration. They urged that no real danger to Austrian influence could attend such a proceeding ; the pageant of a viceroy was more likely to distract men from the true idea of independence than to suggest it. The court of one of the imperial archdukes at Milan would flatter the pride of the Milanese, while, at the same time, it would form a centre of Austrian influence, round which all the worshippers of power would naturally gather. It would take nothing from the dignity of the emperor, if, like Charlemagne, he placed on his head the iron crown—the traditional emblem in Italy of more than royal dignity and power.

Against these arguments there was little to oppose.

But Francis, and even Metternich, gave way to the passions which seem the law of arbitrary rule. Nothing however was immediately resolved ; the extent of the Austrian dominions was still unsettled, and this presented an excuse, indeed a reason, for deferring all action until the disposal of Venice should be finally and formally determined. When that period arrived, the counsels of conciliation derived from the progress of events an assistance which made them, in part at least, ultimately to prevail.

While the councils of the Imperial court were thus divided at Vienna, discontent in Lombardy was rapidly extending. The suppressed regency had during their brief existence been permitted to pass only one law—an enactment directed against secret societies ; and this law the Austrian authorities severely enforced. It was administered so as, in fact, to be one of proscription against many who had joined these confederations when no criminality was attached to them. So numerous were the fugitives from Lombardy that in Naples alone there were found enough to constitute a separate corps. The organisation of them in such a body was one of the accusations brought against Murat in the Congress of Vienna.

The thoughts of the Milanese were turned in every quarter from which they could look for hope of deliverance. The enquiries of the English agents could not be so secretly conducted as not to excite some suspicion of their object, and their source. It was rumoured that France and England were both determined on supporting at the Congress a proposal to make the

kingdom of Italy independent, obtaining compensation elsewhere for Austria. In vague reliance upon this hope, many of the national party deferred all exertions, and kept aloof from the communications which were passing between some of the number and the Neapolitan King.

The Austrian government, suspecting the communications with Naples, and aware of the expectations that were still formed from England and France, contrived, by a device more dexterous than creditable, completely to disconcert and disturb the councils of those opposed to the establishment of their rule.

Alarmed at the manifestations of popular discontent—without means of distinguishing their friends from their enemies—distrusting the nobility and upper classes, whose feelings they felt they were wounding—the government resorted to one of those devices which carry with them the most emphatic condemnation of the authority that condescends to such artifices for its support. In the end of 1814, a personage supposed to be a French nobleman visited Milan.⁷ He bore the title of the Count St. Aignan, and brought with him letters of introduction to some of the first persons in Milan. Seeking out the most eminent of the national party, he confidentially communicated to them the object of his mission. He had come to Milan under the auspices of the Prince Regent of England and Louis XVIII.; both these personages were, according to his statement, favourable to the cause of Italian

⁷ Gualterio, "Revolgimenti Italiani," vol. i. p. 407; Bianchi-Giovini, "L'Austria in Italia," p. 122.

independence ; and they only wanted the Lombard people to show themselves anxious for it. His letters of introduction, whether forgeries or not, gave countenance to these pretensions, and won for him the confidence of two men who stood high in Milanese society. The physician Rosari and Marchal were his intimate friends. Long and confidential consultations were held, and letters were entrusted to the Count St. Aignan, which authorised him to express to his illustrious employers the earnest desire of the writers for their intervention to secure to Lombardy the national government which was the wish of her people.

The count left Milan to report the result of his mission to the courts of England and France. Scarcely had he disappeared when every one of those whom he had honoured with his confidence were arrested by the police. The mystery was soon explained. The French count was an Austrian functionary, a near relative of Bellegarde. The letters which he had obtained were all in the hands of the officials of the police.

The parties arrested occupied the highest position in the society of Milan ; among them were two of the generals of the army of Italy, who had just returned to Milan crowned with the honours of hard-fought campaigns. Eleven in all were, at a moment's notice, taken from their homes and carried off to dungeons in which they were rigorously excluded from all communication with their friends.

These arrests excited the strongest sensation in Milan. Apart from the character of the trick, the Milanese felt as a national insult the arbitrary arrest,

at the mere pleasure of the police, of some of those most honoured in their community. The genius and excellence of Rosari, and his professional reputation, had made him universally respected and beloved. He was dragged to prison in company with Marchal and others who held a social position equal to his own. Still more bitterly did they feel the consignment to common dungeons of Lecchi, and some of the most distinguished officers of that Italian army whose achievements were identified with the glory of the Lombard people. It was another blow struck at the national pride ; the abolition of the name of the Italian kingdom was the first ; every suppression of a national institution had but followed up the stroke ; but in the ignominious arrest—as if they had been felons—of some of the most honoured of their citizens, the haughty Milanese patricians were taught that they were in the hands of a despotism which, in its unsparing tyranny, levelled all distinctions of rank, of character, and of worth. The Austrian government justified the transaction by the dangers of which intimation had been already given, dangers which made it absolutely necessary to know upon whom among the Lombard nobility and gentry they could rely. Whatever may be thought of the morality or expediency of such a course, it inaugurated badly the rule of the Austrian monarchy in those provinces which the assembled representatives of Europe were about to assign to its care. Taken from home without notice, the prisoners were subjected to that rigorous confinement which the Austrian law prescribes, even for persons who are under accusation. The proceedings

which followed belong to subsequent years ; but their story may be here completed in connexion with the arrests. After long detention in prison, the prisoners were brought before the criminal tribunal on a charge of high treason. The tribunal found nothing upon which they could convict them of such a charge. The government conveyed an intimation to the judges that they desired a conviction—not with any intention of carrying the sentence into effect, but only as an opportunity of displaying imperial clemency by a pardon. The judges compromised between their sense of justice and their desire to meet the wishes of the government, by finding the prisoners guilty, but sentencing them, not to death, but to imprisonment for five years. The mildness of the sentence disappointed the contemplated exhibition of imperial mercy ; it never was intended that the prisoners were to escape altogether without punishment : and the judges had in fact anticipated the imperial commutation. Remission of a capital sentence would have been an act of grace ; the mere shortening of a term of imprisonment would hardly be regarded as a very signal act of clemency. Under these circumstances, the imperial cabinet adopted a singular contrivance, by which they attempted to combine the grace of a free pardon with the infliction of punishment. By the rules of the Austrian procedure, all sentences must be confirmed by the emperor ; and until they are so, they remain secret. The sentence on Rosari and his companions was detained at Vienna for two years, during which the prisoners were kept in imprisonment, with the additional penalty of the anxiety that resulted from uncertainty as

to their fate. When two years elapsed, it was returned to Milan, with an announcement that his imperial majesty had in his clemency granted all the prisoners a free pardon. The promise to the judges of the tribunal was fulfilled: to the Lombard people a display of royal clemency was made; but in the mean time, while the imperial cabinet was supposed to be deliberating on its remission, one-half the sentence had been endured.⁸

Before the meeting of the Congress of Vienna, Austria had in fact established her sway over almost all northern Italy. The duchies of Parma and Placentia were formally occupied by the officials of the emperor in the name of his daughter Maria Louisa. Lombardy was incorporated with the empire. Modena was held by a military occupation, which was, in fact, martial law. Over Venice, nominally under a provisional government, the emperor had almost tacitly assumed the rights of sovereign dominion. The once proud Queen of the Adriatic began to understand, although not yet to be reconciled to, her inevitable fate. In August the citizens ventured to address the emperor in terms that acknowledged him as their future lord. In reply his majesty assured them, that "no obstacle could now interfere between his wishes and the plans he had formed for their happiness."⁹ "Your provinces," he said, "will always be one of the brightest gems in my crown. They shall all recover their ancient prosperity." "The industry of a good people shall be supported and encouraged by mild and protecting laws.

⁸ Farini, "Storia d' Italia," vol. i. p. 72.

⁹ Vienna Court Gazette, August 27th; Annual Register, 1814, p. 86.

Venice shall regain her rank amongst the first cities in the world."

It was not until the congress of Vienna had virtually closed its deliberations, until Napoleon's return from Elba had startled Europe, and until Murat had raised the standard of Italian nationality, that Francis was induced to yield, to the opinions of those who had counselled conciliation, his determination of making his Italian provinces mere portions of his German empire. In the conference of the 18th of March, the representatives of the allied powers finally completed the cession of Northern Italy to Austria, by attaching to her dominions the valleys of the Valteline, Chiavenna and Bormio. The members of the imperial family who had advocated a separate administration for Italy, now strongly urged the adoption of their views. The opportunity was offered, in the final settlement of the emperor's dominions, of gracefully accounting for the past. delay and making the concession appear the result of an intention, the execution of which had only been deferred. Under the pressure of danger these counsels prevailed. Alexander and Lord Castlereagh warmly seconded the advice. Napoleon in Paris, and Murat advancing to the Po, were with Metternich at least more powerful persuasives than even the representations of the Russian emperor, or the more influential advice of the minister of England. The result was, that Francis granted to his Italian subjects not only a distinct administration, but institutions which were intended to have at least the appearance of being representative.

On the 7th of April, letters patent were issued by the emperor, which recited that the treaties concluded with the allied powers had united to the empire of Austria all the Lombardo-Venetian provinces, including the valley of the Valteline and the counties of Chiavenna and Bormio ; and proceeded to state, that to prove the imperial goodwill to his Italian subjects, and the distinguished value the emperor placed upon this addition to his territories, he had resolved to erect them into a kingdom to be styled the Lombardo-Venetian realm. The emperor was to be represented by a viceroy ; the kingdom to be divided into two governments, each with a governor subordinate to the viceroy—the government of Milan including all the district to the west of the Mincio, that of Venice all that was situated to the east. Both governments were divided into provinces, over each of which a royal commissioner was to preside ; the communes were maintained in all their existing municipal rights. But the most important part of the patent was that which gave to the people, if not representative government, at least representative institutions.

“ In order to ascertain by lawful means the wishes and wants of his Lombardo-Venetian realm,” and “ to be able to profit, in the public administration for the good of the country, by the intelligence and advice of their representatives,” the emperor by this patent instituted representative assemblies, “ taken from different classes of the nation.” A central congregation was to assemble at Milan, another at Venice ; provisional assemblies of inferior rank were to be held at each seat of an

imperial delegation. The minute regulations of these representative assemblies were reserved for a future decree; the "communal councils" were maintained until some other decision should be made regarding them; in the Venetian territory, where they had been suppressed, they were re-established.¹⁰

While the Lombards anxiously waited for the promulgation of the charter which was to define the rights and regulate the election of these new assemblies, the concession was received with a satisfaction which went far to appease the discontent which previous events had caused. They saw still with regret that the new-fangled, and to them outlandish title of Lombardo-Venetian kingdom had been substituted for that of "kingdom of Italy," a name which appealed directly to their national traditions, and to the sympathies of the Italian heart. Upon this point Francis was inexorable. Both he and Metternich had declared that the title of King of Italy the emperor would never take. It was true that he declared, "the ancient and primitive iron crown, with which all his successors were to be crowned, the crown of the realm." Among the orders of imperial chivalry, he instituted that "of the iron crown;" the arms of his Italian realm, in which was that symbol of the ancient royalty, were emblazoned on the imperial shield; but he positively refused to accept the old and honourable title which would have identified his sovereignty with the far-off glories of the Lombard kings; a determination still more strange, as the title was one which belonged in early days to the elective

¹⁰ Patent of the Emperor Francis.

emperor, to whose rights he was anxious to appear the successor. He had said, however, that he would not be king of Italy, and he determined to keep to the letter of his word.

This determination deprived the concession to the feelings of his Italian subjects of more than half its grace. The very selection of the substituted name was an unfortunate one. The genius of the Teutonic language delights in compound words ; their use is wholly foreign to that of the Italian ; the Lombards could not pronounce the name of their new realm without feeling that even in Italian it had a German sound. Bellegarde announced the imperial patent in a proclamation, in which he assured them that while the patent preserved to every commune its present rights, the future organisation of the kingdom would be suitable to the wishes as well as to the customs of the Italians. On the 24th of April followed the charter which regulated the details of these representative assemblies. The central congregation of Milan consisted of thirty-one deputies, that of Venice of twenty-five ; they were composed of two deputies from each province, and one from each royal city within the government. Milan had nine provinces and thirteen royal cities ; Venice eight provinces and nine cities. Each province had its separate assembly, consisting of members varying according to its proportions from eight to four ; of the deputies from each province one must belong to the nobility, and one to the unennobled class ; the royal cities were unrestricted as to the class which should represent them. A property qualification was required, but not of a very burden-

some amount ; the deputy of a province must be a proprietor of lands of the annual value of 2000 scudi, about 25*l.* ; the deputy of the royal city was qualified by personal property to an equal amount. The mode of election was somewhat complicated. The half of each assembly went out of office every three years ; and upon each of these triennial occasions, every commune in the province had the privilege of nominating two candidates, one noble and the other not. The names were returned to the provincial assembly, who selected from the entire list of nominees three nobles and three burgesses, whose names they returned to the central assembly. From these lists, the central assembly selected one, generally the first on the list ; they had, however, the power of rejecting the whole list, and sending back to the provincial assembly for a new election. The one person whom they did select was submitted to the emperor for his sanction ; he had the absolute power of rejection, until a name was submitted to him which met with his approval. The royal cities returned their three names direct to the central council, without any nomination of the communes or intervention of the provincial assemblies. The provincial councils were elected in a similar manner, the approbation of the governor being substituted for that of the emperor.¹¹

In this complicated contrivance of election, the functions of the communal councils, the only popular assembly acting in the entire system, were merely nominal. In some of the provinces the number of communes amounted to 180, and a list of candidates,

¹¹ Farini, "Storia d'Italia," vol. i.; "L'Austria in Italia," Bianchi-Giovin

in which each of these communes had the power of proposing, virtually left the choice in the hands of the council who had so wide a field for selection. The small number of the provincial council, varying, as has been said, from four to eight, offered not the slightest guarantee of popular influence in these bodies. Even these, however, had only the power of recommendation: the final choice of the central congregation was subject to the veto of the emperor, and virtually the effect of the system was to compose all the councils of men who were really imperial nominees. Priests and government officials were ineligible, and the emperor reserved to himself the right of expelling any member who proved himself unfit for the trust.

Power, in the proper sense of the word, these councils had none; they were, strictly, the advisers of the governor; their duty was expressly limited to that of making suggestions, which the governor was at liberty either to follow or to disregard. Even the functions of advice were confined to the matters which belonged to the province of these councils. Under direction, and by the appointment of the governor, they attended to the distribution of local taxation, to the internal communications of the district, to the billeting of soldiers and the provision of their quarters, the superintendence of the public charities, and all similar details. The provincial councillors discharged their duties gratuitously; the members of the central council were paid. At every meeting of the latter the governor presided, and after hearing the opinion of the council on all matters which he chose to refer to them, his own determination was

decisive in the end. The duty of the provincial councils except where administrative functions were specially delegated to them, was limited to that of making representations to the central power. A clause in the charter specially conferred upon the central council, "the permission humbly to represent to his imperial majesty the wants, the desires, and the prayers of the nation in all the branches of the public administration, reserving to himself, on the other side, the right of seeking its advice whenever he thought fit."

To anything like true representative government the system established by this charter made no pretence. At the same time it gave to the nation an Italian council —it permitted, at least in theory, the expression of the national voice to be heard ; and to an honest and impartial governor it supplied advisers who might be informed upon the condition and the wants of the country. If it was not an approach to free government, it would, if faithfully acted on, have been a mitigation of the evils of foreign rule.

While this cumbrous process of election gave the shadow without the substance of popular representation, even in a council of advice, the institution of the office of viceroy was no real check upon the system which centralised all the powers of government at Vienna. The executive of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom was not the viceroy, but the governors of Venice and Milan. These acted under orders, not from the viceroy, but from the minister at Vienna ; the viceroy was a pageant, and the governors the mere instruments of executing the orders of the imperial court. With all these

defects the new charter was popular at Milan. That city at all events, was restored to the rank of a capital, and was to be blessed once more with the splendour and expenditure of a court. In the reference to the communes, people imagined there was the recognition of popular right ; in the viceroy they had the separate administration for which they had asked ; and before there was time to examine the details of the complicated system which was proposed, men had accepted the powerless vice-royalty as a national government, and the central and provincial councils as at least a modified grant of popular and representative institutions to the Italian subjects of the Austrian crown.

CHAPTER V.

Return of Pius VII.—Unexpected restitution of the Papal territories—Improbability of that event—Geographical description of the Papal States—Inquiry into the temporal power of the Pope—How did the Bishop of Rome become its sovereign?—How did he acquire the territories now constituting the States of the Church?—Alleged donation of Constantine—Its absurdities—Now universally admitted to be a forgery—Early origin of pontifical power—Gregory the Great—Iconoclast revolt—Effect of contest between Papal and Imperial power—Claims of the Popes to universal dominion—Prefect appointed by the Emperor—governed in his name—Celestine III.—Innocent III.—Rudolph of Hapsburgh renounces all sovereignty in Rome—The Emperor Charles IV.—Lawless State of Rome—The Barons—Their feudal fortresses—They seize on the ruins of ancient Rome—Four influences that contended for mastery at Rome—The emperor—The Pope—Republican institutions—The feudal barons—First struggle between Republicanism and Papal power—Tusculum and Rome—Election of Patrician—Appeals to Conrad—Arnold of Brescia—His life and doctrines—Revolt against the Pope—Pope Lucius II. is killed in a tumult—Adrian IV.—Banishment of Arnold—Frederick Barbarossa—His coronation—Arnold is burned—Alexander III.—His alliance with freedom—An Antipope—Popularity of Alexander—Re-establishment of Papal authority—Charter of Celestine I.—Appointment of senator—His powers—Brancaleone—His severity—Destruction of feudal fortresses—Punishment of barons—Withdrawal of the Popes from Rome—Retirement to Avignon—Decay of the city—Government by bannerets—Cola Rienzi—His sudden elevation and sudden fall—“The Good State”—Return of the Popes—Establishment of their absolute sovereignty—Conspiracy of Stephen Porcaro—His execution—General Reflections.

If Victor Emanuel was the first of the Italian princes to resume the ancient government in his capital, the

first to return within the limits of his dominions was the venerable pontiff who, elevated to the Papal chair in the midst of the troubles of the revolution, had endured all those vicissitudes from which, in the storms of that period, not even the spiritual chief of the Roman Catholic world was exempt. The misfortunes of Pius VII.—his forcible removal from his palace—his journey as a prisoner to France—his captivity in that country—the strange alternations of his fortune, have invested his history with the interest of personal adventure. His dignity in misfortune, his virtues and his meekness, won for his memory the respect even of those whose religious opinions refused all recognition of the office which he held. Among those who believed him to be the representative of divine authority over Christians, that respect assumed the character of veneration. It was yet to those who denied his spiritual jurisdiction that he was mainly indebted for the complete restoration of his temporal power ; and to the last moment of his life Pius VII. acknowledged the obligation which he owed to the Regent and cabinet of Protestant England for the support which they gave him in the negotiations which preceded the settlement of Europe in 1815.

No one of the arrangements adopted at the Congress of Vienna was more calculated to create surprise than that by which the Pope was restored to complete sovereignty over nearly the entire of his Italian possessions. By the treaty of Tolentino his predecessor had formally surrendered the north-eastern provinces of the States of the Church. They had been held by France at the time when Pius VII. had sanctioned by his

presence and his blessing the coronation of Napoleon. To have maintained their separation from the Papal dominions could hardly have been regarded as an act of spoliation ; while there were many considerations of policy which suggested the convenience of keeping these districts free from ecclesiastical rule. The Romagnese provinces, surrendered by the Holy See to Napoleon, were fairly placed at the disposal of the allies, by the right of conquest from France.

Of the four allied powers to whom the disposal of these provinces belonged, three were adverse to the religion of the Pope. The Russian sovereign was the chief of an ecclesiastical system, perhaps, of all the Churches of Christendom, the most directly opposed to Papal pretensions. Prussia represented the prejudices of a Lutheran sovereign and people. England made it an act almost of high treason to hold intercourse with the Pope ; her sovereign forfeited his crown if he married a lady of the proscribed religion ; her Church formularies, embodied in the statutes of her realm, characterised the pontifical power in terms as strong as Henry IV. or Frederick II. ever applied to an individual Pope : nay, every one of the ministers and senators of England was obliged on oath to declare his detestation of the worship of Rome. "No peace with Rome!" appeared to have descended from Elizabeth as the motto of the policy of Britain.

One Roman Catholic sovereign shared, it was true, the right of conquest with these three anti-papal powers. But these very provinces had long since been claimed by that sovereign for himself. His apostolic

majesty in 1799 had insisted on the annexation of these territories to his Italian domains. He had but one short year before the abdication of Napoleon bound England by treaty to support him in obtaining this acquisition. The imperial cabinet had subsequently engaged to Murat to divide with him the spoil. England had assented to this engagement. So far as the Romagnese were concerned, the question of the disposal of the Papal territories seemed irrevocably arranged.

The Pontiff who under these apparently hopeless circumstances was called on to maintain his claims, had been for years a prisoner in France. Released almost as an act of charity by Napoleon in the last days of his power, he made his way back to his territories—an aged and worn-out man—without a soldier in his service, without money and without friends. This old and apparently helpless monk yet reclaimed from the great powers of Europe the lands which a solemn deed of his predecessor had separated from the dominions of the Papal See ; and chiefly by the support of that Protestant England, who still refused to send an ambassador to his court, the Pope was replaced in the sovereignty of all his Italian possessions, with the exception of a small portion to the north of the Po, which all the zeal of his heretic friends could not rescue from the devout covetings of the apostolic defender of his rights.

The territories which formed the States of the Church interpose between the kingdom of Naples and the Northern Italian States. On the shores of the Adriatic

they extend from the Tronto to the Po. On the western coast they occupy the district which lies between the Tuscan frontier and that of Naples. Historically it is not easy to fix the precise limits of the divisions of which these States are composed. Close to the city of Rome itself, extending only a few miles to the north, but stretching to the Neapolitan frontier on the south, lies the district which formed its ancient Duchy, now known as the Campagna—that which may be termed “the liberties” of the imperial city. Upon the shore of the Tuscan sea, to the north-west of the limits of the ancient Duchy, lies a territory acquired by the bequest of the Countess Matilda, which is generally designated “the Patrimony of St. Peter.”

To the east of the Apennines, and along the shore of the Adriatic, lie the Marches of Ancona and Fermo, bordering on the Neapolitan States—the Duchy of Urbino—and the district round Ravenna properly known as Romagna. Northward of Romagna, extend to the Po the districts that take their names from the cities of Bologna and Ferrara. Between these maritime districts and the Duchy of Rome are the territories that constituted the ancient Umbria, forming in more modern times the Norman Duchy of Spoleto. The Sabine lands are nearer Rome. To the north-west of “the patrimony” is the country of Orvietano and Perugia, at one time forming a part of the duchy of Tuscany.

For the purposes of civil administrations these States have been divided into nineteen provinces—six of these provinces, Ferrara, Bologna, Ravenna, Forli, Urbino, and Velletri, are governed by cardinal legates, and are hence

popularly known as the Legations. The term Romagna is sometimes applied to all the eastern provinces, but the province to which that designation is properly applicable, includes only the district immediately surrounding Ravenna. The provinces beyond the Apennines, with the exception of the Marches, are more correctly known as the Romagnese.

The questions connected with the temporal dominion of the Pope have been made the subject of a dispute which has involved all the passions invariably attendant on a controversy which assumes even indirectly the form of a religious one. These passions have extended their influence not only to the discussion relating to the maintenance of that dominion, and the present character of the rule of the Popes, but even to the enquiries as to the early origin of their power. Yet, probably, upon examination, it may be found that as to the historic facts there exists no more of uncertainty or dispute than is to be found in most investigations of the same nature. That which does exist has principally arisen from attempts to find for the sovereign authority of the Popes, as it exists in modern times, a better title to legitimacy than the prescription, or possession, upon which almost all the sovereigns of the world are content to repose their claims.

In examining into the origin and growth of the temporal power of the Pontiff, we must remember that the inquiry involves, or rather means, two subjects perfectly distinct. One is the mode in which its bishop acquired the powers of a temporal sovereign at Rome, the other the manner in which the

territories which the Pope now rules were added to the Roman States.

For several centuries it was asserted that the Emperor Constantine on his departure for Constantinople had executed a formal grant by which he conferred upon the Bishop of Rome, the sovereignty of the city and of the provinces of the West. This alleged donation of Constantine is so irreconcileable with all the facts of history, or even with the actual position and the rights of the Roman emperors, that it is scarcely possible to conceive a state of ignorance so gross as that of the age in which it was accepted as a genuine document. It seems a mere vain pedantry to resort even to its gross anachronisms to disprove the genuineness of a document, which bears in every sentence the unmistakeable marks of an ecclesiastical fairy tale. It gravely represents, among absurdities too long to be detailed, the Emperor Constantine on his departure from Rome, conferring on the Pontiff his palace of the Lateran, the finest in the world, his diadem, his coronet, his mantle, his sceptre, and all his imperial robes, that in procession the Pope might walk surrounded with all the glory of imperial state. Not only the city of Rome, but also Italy, and all the provinces, cities, and palaces of the western region, are given in absolute sovereignty to the Pope. The pious emperor is made to declare that his sole motive in withdrawing the seat of empire from Rome to Constantinople is his conviction that it was not fit that any earthly monarch should have power in the city where the king of heaven had placed the priestly principality, and the head of the Christian world;

and, finally, if any person to the end of time should commit the enormity of disputing that donation, a wickedness which the emperor cannot bring himself to believe ever could occur, Constantine decrees that he shall be devoted to eternal flames and tortures—that he shall feel the vengeance of all the saints of God, especially Peter and Paul, both in this life and that which is to come—and finally he is to perish in tortures in the lowest hell with the devil and the wicked ones.¹

To such a document it was asserted and believed that the Emperor Constantine had actually set his hand. Grave and venerable Pontiffs rested their claims upon its grant, and emperors were solemnly called on

¹ The statement in the text is a very mitigated, because abbreviated, account of the absurdities of this extraordinary document. The only mode of giving a full account of them would be to transcribe it entire. It commences with a recital of the articles of the creed, which Constantine informs the world he had learned from Pope Silvester. It then narrates the emperor's cure of his leprosy by the miraculous bath, the appearance to him in a dream of St. Peter and St. Paul, his visit by their directions to Sylvester on Mount Soracte, and his recognition of the Apostles by their resemblance to the portraits which Sylvester showed him. Strange to say, it makes no mention of the miraculous appearance of the cross in the heavens, the only instance of miracle connected with Constantine for which anything like historical testimony exists. Nothing is too great or too small for this comprehensive charter—which regulates alike the most solemn mysteries of faith, the weightiest matters of the Pope's spiritual and temporal power, and the minutest ceremonies of the Papal Court. A definition of the Trinity is followed by a very edifying dissertation on the power of the keys. From these high matters the Emperor condescends to the regulation of the trappings of the Cardinals' horses, when they ride through the streets. The homage of holding the bridle is arranged, the Emperor declaring that he himself had acted as the Pope's groom—"frene ejus equi tenentes, pro honore beati Petri stratoris officium ipsi præbuiimus." Between its theological professions, its narrative of dreams and marvels, its damning clauses, and its amplified dissertations on the crowns and vestments of the Pope, and the power and splendour of the Papal See, it extends to a considerable length.

It is published in a complete form in the French work entitled, "Essai Historique sur la puissance temporelle des Papes," Paris, 1818, 2 Tom.

to confirm the donations of their imperial predecessor. There was a time when to doubt its authenticity was a theological error of the gravest kind, and among the earliest martyrs to religious persecution were some whose heresy consisted in questioning the genuineness of Constantine's donation.

This donation is now universally admitted to have been a clumsy forgery, and the efforts of writers in the Papal interest have been directed to show that with that forgery, or its fabricators, the Pontiffs of the period in which it made its appearance had no connection, and that those who relied on it in their state documents were themselves, like the rest of Christendom, imposed upon by the fabrication created by the mischievous ingenuity of some monk.²

We are compelled, therefore, to resort to other source than this donation to trace the manner in which the bishop of the city of Rome became in time its earthly sovereign and lord. It was by slow degrees, and from a combination of many circumstances, that in the city and republic of Rome itself the Pontiffs acquired that influence and power which at last made them its sovereigns. The acquisition of the temporal sovereignty of a city by its bishop was not in the early ages of Italian history an unusual occurrence. Over very many of them, their bishops became counts.³ Elected by the people, identified

² The clearest statement of the historical and internal proofs which beyond all question establish that this pretended donation is a forgery, will be found in the treatise of M. Gosselin on the Power of the Pope in the Middle Ages vol. i., English translation, p. 317. The work of this learned and able ecclesiastic may perhaps be considered as the authorised exposition of the view of the Papal advocates.

³ Hallam's "Middle Ages," vol. i.

with the city, and bound by their sacred profession to justice and mercy, we can well believe that they were appealed to as protectors against the violence of the feudal lords. The veneration attached to their office gave them a power which nothing else could supply ; and in days when the common consent of the people was sufficient even in the eyes of jurists to create the common law, the authority of the bishop as the ruler and governor of the city became established, not by any written charter or document, but by the higher title of the assent and voluntary obedience of the community.

Under the empire, from the days of Constantine, the bishops had exercised some share of temporal jurisdiction. The Theodosian Code imposed on them many civil authorities and duties. This, to some extent, may have facilitated the assumption of the lordship of a city ; but even in their proper episcopal office, there was quite sufficient to attract to them the obedience of the people.

That which took place in so many other cities, occurred also at Rome. Against the barbarian invaders the bishops appeared upon more than one occasion, as the protectors of the city, and succeeded in saving it by the sanctity of their character and the awe which it inspired in the hearts of their assailants. When, after the reconquest of Italy by Belisarius, the Byzantine emperors exercised a feeble authority at Rome, its bishops appeared upon every important occasion as the leaders and guides of the republic. Gregory the Great complained that the troubles occasioned by the Lombards obliged him to give up his weekly lectures on the

prophecies of Ezekiel, and that the necessity of attending to the affairs of the distressed city, left it in doubt whether he was discharging the duties of its spiritual pastor or of its earthly lord.⁴

In the days of the revolt against the iconoclast decrees of the Byzantine emperors we have seen the Popes appear as the leaders, the representatives, and the protectors of the Roman State. They were far, however, from assigning to themselves the position of its sovereigns; all their embassies were sent, and all their acts were done in the name of the Roman senate and people. In the coronation of Charlemagne, by which it was at one time asserted that the Pope of his own authority created the new empire, abundant testimonies prove that he acted as the representative and executed the will of the Roman people.⁵

The influence of the Pontiff, resting thus on the undefined traditions of antiquity, and on the religious veneration paid to his office, was a power of that nature which was of all others most fitted for an unobserved, but, at the same time, an indefinite increase. Its origin was remote enough to admit of its being surrounded with

⁴ "Ita ut esse incertum sit utrum pastoris officium an terreni proceris agat."—Works of Gregory the Great, *Migne's Patrology*.

⁵ The following is the official record of the coronation of Charles the Bald, which followed in its terms that of Charlemagne. The document illustrates the position which the Pope at that period, and for some centuries after, held at Rome.

"Elegimus merito et approbavimus et una cum consensu fratrum et coepiscorum nostrorum atque aliorum Sancte Ecclesiae Romanae ministrorum, amplique senatus totiusque populi Romani, gentisque togate, et secundum pristinum morem et secundam priscam consuetudinem, solemniter, ad imperii Romani sceptrum proveximus et augustali nomine decoravimus." (Act. Syn. Tic. apud Baronium).—*Coronation of Charles the Bald*.

fable ; its character sufficiently connected with the supernatural to invest it with a superstitious awe. It was authority and not sovereignty which the Popes possessed ; but that mysterious authority survived both imperial power and the republican institutions of Rome. A letter from Charlemagne is extant, in which he exhorts the Roman senate to obey the admonitions of the Pope, in terms which plainly show that he was addressing a body who, under himself, exercised the government.⁶ Spiritual obedience in time became temporal submission, and those who could, by means of their divine authority, command the councils of the magistracy were in truth the sovereigns of Rome.

The long and unintermitting contests with imperial power, which marked with almost unvarying scenes of strife the mediæval annals of the Papacy, if they were sufficient to prevent the establishment of any formal sovereignty in the Pontiffs, were not unfavourable in the peculiar circumstances of Rome to the increase of that undefined authority which was their real strength. The German emperor, who imposed a bishop upon the city, was interested in upholding and magnifying his powers, and was ever ready to punish any revolt against his authority, as an act of rebellion against himself. If the citizens succeeded in the popular election of a Pontiff, they were equally willing to exalt his dignity as a protection against imperial power.

It is not possible to fix with precise accuracy the period at which the Pontiffs first claimed the actual and uncontrolled sovereignty of Rome. When once they put

⁶ Letter of Charlemagne to the Roman Senate.—*Codex Carolinus.*

forward their lofty pretension to supremacy over all earthly sovereigns, they could scarcely admit in their own city the inferiority of Papal to imperial rule. Relying as they did upon the donation of Constantine, they asserted, by the very appeal to that document, a claim to the sovereignty over the city, which its fabricator thought proper to assign them. It was not, however, inconsistent with these pretensions to permit the civil government of the city to be administered in the imperial name. It was even convenient in days when the superstition prevailed, that the hands of a priest must not be stained even with the blood that is shed in pursuance of a judicial sentence. Certain it is that up to the days of Innocent III. the Prefect of the City administered its government in the imperial name.⁷

The assertion of Papal supremacy in the city was almost a necessary attendant upon the long struggle which was maintained to emancipate the See of Rome from imperial control. Its recognition followed the final defeat of imperial power.

Innocent III. may perhaps be said to be the first of the Pontiffs who directly asserted his sovereignty over Rome, when, in 1198, he exacted from the Prefect of the City an oath of allegiance to himself. Rudolph in 1276, made, as we have seen, a formal renunciation of all sovereignty in Rome,⁸ and when Charles IV., in 1346, followed this up by an agreement never to

⁷ Dr. Miley, a learned and able advocate of the theory of an early establishment of the sovereignty of the Popes, insists upon this as exonerating Adrian IV. from all share in the execution of Arnold of Brescia.—*History of the Papal States*, vol. iii. p. 90.

⁸ *Ante*, vol. i. p. 179.—*Pfeffel*, vol. i. p. 424.

accept an office in the city without the consent of the Pontiff,⁹ the imperial power was extinct. The king of the Romans had not one remnant of authority at Rome.

It must be remembered that the authority asserted by the emperors was not the only obstacle to the sovereignty of the Popes. They were resisted by other and far more formidable influences nearer home. The citizens of Rome claimed, and often asserted, their republican privileges. The great houses of the nobility attempted to rule the city by the weight of their feudal power. From the days when the descendants of Charlemagne ceased to reign, the authority of the Pontiffs had been precarious and uncertain in a city in which it was encountered not only by that of the emperor—but also by the spirit of republican liberty, which lingering still in the breasts of the Roman commonalty, occasionally animated with life and energy the forms of their ancient institutions—and, more formidable still, by that proud and restless nobility who defied in turns the people, the emperor, and the Pope.

It might be said, indeed, that for many centuries four different influences divided the authority over the city of Rome. That of the emperor, depending upon the uncertain prerogatives which he was supposed to inherit from Charlemagne and the Cæsars; that of its bishops, resting chiefly upon the veneration paid to their spiritual authority, partly on their personal character, but sustained also in no small degree by the vague traditions of their ancient sovereignty, which had acquired authority among the people; that of the

⁹ *Ante*, vol. i. p. 180.—*Pfeffel*, vol. i. p. 521.

democracy, still represented in those republican institutions which preserved the forms of ancient Rome ; and, lastly, the power of the great barons, which often made itself dominant over all.

In tracing the Papal history, we shall see that there is in that history a marked and well defined period when the pontifical power became a distinct and separate institution. So long as popular election existed, the Pope was, in fact, created by some one of the other powers ; either by the great barons when they were able to carry the nomination by violence or intrigue ; by the emperor at the times when his nomination prevailed ; or by the free choice of the citizens. When the right of electing the pontiff was placed by Hildebrand under the control of the clergy, still more when it was limited to a close corporation of that clergy—an electoral body in which all vacancies were filled by the nomination of the Pope—then it was that the Papacy appeared as a power in itself, distinct from and independent of the emperor, the people, and the barons of Rome. With this isolation of its position began its triumphs over all.

Few scenes of history constitute a stranger spectacle than that which is presented to us in the indistinct glimpses which we obtain of the domination of the great barons in Rome. A preceding chapter glanced at the frightful disorders which immediately preceded the establishment of the German power in the person of Otho the Great. Even the strong arm of the Saxon emperors failed to restore permanent peace to the distracted city. Their attempt to force Pontiffs of imperial nomination

upon the Romans, gave rise to a succession of tumults and revolts. Of many of these rebellions, although supported by the municipal authorities of Rome, it is quite plain that the aristocracy were the real instigators.¹⁰

Rome was the residence of numerous and powerful nobles, some few the descendants of the great families of antiquity—more of them attracted from the provinces by the greatness of the Pontifical city. In Rome, as in other cities of Italy, the feudal lords who became residents, erected mansions, which were in truth great fortresses frowning in menace over the streets. Some few of these towers stood in the frequented regions of the city—but it was among the ruins of ancient times that the strongholds of feudalism principally arose. In the dwindling away of the population of the city, the habitations of men receded from the quarter in which the great monuments of antiquity were mouldering into decay. These monuments were seized on by one or other of the great families. The mausoleum of Adrian became the fortress of St. Angelo, commanding the only bridge across the Tiber, and giving to its occupant almost the sovereignty of Rome. This great fortress, the castle of Crescentius, or the Cenci (the names were identical), was the stronghold from which the profigate Marozia dictated her commands to Rome. The castle in later times, of the Frangipanni, of the Orsini,

¹⁰ "Crescentius," the consul, who was sacrificed to the treachery of the third Otho (*ante*, vol. i. p. 72), was "Cencius," one of the great family of the Cenci. In the days of the first Otho, one of the same family led the revolt against the pontiff recommended by the emperor. The Crescentius of the days of the first Otho was the husband of Marozia.

and again of the Cenci, it finally became the possession of the Pope.¹¹ In the twelfth century the Coliseum was the fortress of the Frangipanni ; the donjon keep of the Colonna rose over the tomb of Augustus. In the retreats of the dismantled theatres—in the recesses of the ruined temples—in the courts of the deserted palaces of former times—were formed the fastnesses of men who issued from them to deeds of violence and blood. From the greater fortresses mailed barons came forth at the head of their followers to make war upon each other, or to oppress the plebeians of the town. In the smaller ruins were entrenched the bands that followed any of the lesser gentry who aspired to the dignity or the crimes of a feudal lord. In the year 1250 Brancaleone demolished one hundred and forty of these “ castles ”¹²—yet Martin V. found on his accession in 1417, forty-seven of them in one suburb of the city. The occupants of these fortresses, when not

¹¹ In the year 962, Luitprand thus describes the Castle of St. Angelo, then the fortress of Crescentius, or Cencius:—“ As you enter Roma, there stands a certain fortress, of structure not less wonderful for its strength than for its architectural perfection. In front of its portals there is, built over the Tiber, a bridge of most precious material, and a masterpiece of art. For one entering Roma or taking leave of it, there is no avoiding this bridge : over it he must pass. Except by it, there is no other way of getting across the Tiber ; and over this, except by permission of those who hold the fortress, there is no passing, either. But as for the fortress itself, not to speak of any other feature of it, its altitude is so great that the church, which is constructed on its summit, in honour of the Archangel Michael, prince of the celestial legions, is commonly known as ‘ Ecclesia Sancti Angeli, usque ad celos,’ or as one might render it, ‘ San Michele’s, in the Skies.’ ”—*Luitprand, Historia lib. iii. c. 12.*

¹² Eodem quoque anno senator Romanus Brancaleo videns insolentiam et superbiam nobilium Romanorum non posse aliter reprimi nisi castra eorum qui erant quasi spoliatorum carceres prosternerentur, dirui fecit eorundem nobilium turres circiter centum et quadraginta et solo tenuis complanavit.—*Matthew Paris, Hist. of Henry III., p. 975.*

restrained by the exercise of some vigorous authority, kept Rome in almost incessant tumult. They did not always respect the sacredness of the pontifical person—Boniface VIII. died of grief, caused by the indignity he suffered from an imprisonment at the instance of the Colonna—a bold sortie of the Cenci seized Hildebrand as he was performing the midnight services that ushered in the festival of the Nativity. The Pope was rescued by the populace from the Castle of St. Angelo in time to complete the interrupted service in the Church of St. Maria Maggiore, from which he had been carried off.

The presence of this lawless nobility is a feature in Roman history which presents itself almost unchanged through many successive centuries. To suppress their tyranny the first Otho marched to Rome. In the days of the residence of the Pope at Avignon, we find them still oppressing the city with their violence. During the greater portion of that interval all Europe was subject to the evils of feudal licentiousness. Everywhere the barons ground down their serfs, and in most instances, exercised a petty tyranny over the burghers of the small towns in the district which they oppressed. But this was something wholly different from the state of society which existed in Rome, where feudal strongholds frowned over the streets of a great city, and their owners issued with their retainers to overawe the senate, to carry by force an election, or to usurp the magistracies of the people. It might almost be said, that it was a state of society in which two distant ages and two opposite systems met, and in which the disorders of

both were combined. The “seditious” of the Roman forum were perpetuated in the violence of the feudal lord ; and the Roman baron of the Dark, or Middle Ages, who gathered his retainers from his country estate, and fortified his stronghold upon the site of the crumbling amphitheatre, represented in the Roman assemblies the Clodius or the Appius of the republican age. There seemed an allegory in the strange use to which the ruins of the old city had been put. The fortress of the barons had risen as a portion of these ruins, and the battlements of the feudal castles were blended with the arches and the columns that were the remnants of the edifices of ancient times.

Throughout all the disorders and tumults of the Roman state, the traditions of its republican government had never been lost. The names of the republic, the senate, and the ancient magistrates, had been retained. With the memories of the old freedom descended also those of the old supremacy of Rome. Of that supremacy the Papal and Imperial powers were still the representatives. The seat of dominion was still in the eternal city. There the supreme Pontiff of Christendom was enthroned ; there still the emperor received his crown. The Romans regarded themselves as the inheritors of the majesty of the “gens togata,” and believed that the Roman republic, the senate, and the Roman people, still rightfully owned as their heritage the sovereignty of the world ; when the Pontiffs ceased to be elected by the popular voice, and when they assumed the exercise of an independent rule, they were

soon involved in collision with the republican spirit and institutions of the people.

In the middle of the twelfth century, we find the first great struggle between Pontifical power and the spirit of municipal freedom in Rome.

In the contests between the Empire and the Papacy, imperial prerogative had been shaken at Rome. It was almost a necessary consequence of the pretensions put forward by the Roman See that the Popes should exercise more power in the administration of affairs, and in the period immediately preceding the accession of Frederick Barbarossa, they appear to have assumed the power of nominating the Prefect of the City, although that officer still performed his functions in the emperor's name.

That period, it will be remembered, was one in which the spirit of republican and national independence animated the Italian people. It was then that the cities of Northern Italy practically asserted those privileges which called Frederick into Italy to vindicate his imperial prerogatives against their growing power. In the cities of Lombardy, resistance to the German rule, and the spirit of municipal freedom were completely identified. In the effort to curb the prerogative of the emperor, the people protected the cause of popular liberty in the free towns.

In Rome, however, it was not altogether so. The decrees which withdrew the nomination of the Pontiff from popular choice, and established a distinct order of clerical electors, had separated the Papedom from the municipality of Rome. Just as the Pontifical authority

became isolated from the people, its claims of dominion increased. The power which the Emperor was losing the Pope gradually assumed, and thus while the Pontiffs were very ready to assert the immunities of the Roman city against imperial prerogative, they were equally jealous of that spirit of republican liberty which would vindicate the claims of popular sovereignty against Papal as well as against imperial power.

Accident precipitated the quarrel which these causes had long been preparing. A schism, in which two rival Pontiffs claimed the chair of St. Peter, weakened the authority of the institution itself. Upon the death of Honorius II. in 1130, the great family of the Frangipanni had been powerful enough to carry the nomination of a Pontiff under the title of Innocent II. The rival of their power was a converted Jew, who disputed with its ancient aristocracy the mastery of Rome. The son of Pietro Leone, or as he would have been called in England, Peter Levi, found a party among the Cardinals strong enough to give him the pretence of being legally elected Pope,¹³ and though the canonical decision was in favour of his competitor, the son of the rich Jew was able, either as Pope or anti-Pope, to possess himself of the church of St. Peter, and that which was termed the Christian portion of the city, while Innocent was driven with his baronial supporters to the ruined monuments of antiquity in which the feudal fortresses of the great families were placed. The Pontiff, who is generally

¹³ He had the majority of the cardinals in his favour—32 it is said, against 16 who supported the candidate of the Frangipanni. Innocent relied on an earlier election. His opponent impeaching that election as a surprise insisted upon the majority of votes in his own favour.

regarded as the legally elected sovereign of the Church, found refuge in the arch of Titus, while the anti-Pope occupied the church of the apostle.

The empire was in dispute as well as the Papacy, and when the emperor Lothaire visited Rome for coronation Innocent was obliged to place the crown upon his head in the church of St. John Lateran, because on the other side of the Tiber, the anti-Pope Anacletus, supported by Roger, king of Sicily, kept possession of the city and cathedral of the Popes. Hardly was the coronation over and the imperial troops withdrawn, when Innocent was compelled to fly from Rome, and it was not until eight years after his election that the death of Anacletus in the Castle of St. Angelo left his rival in possession of the Popedom ; in spite of a weak attempt to nominate a successor to Anacletus, the influence and eloquence of St. Bernard reconciled all parties to Innocent, and placed the man whom success had declared the true Pontiff in possession of the chair of the apostle. Even then a stormy destiny awaited him. He added his name to those warrior pontiffs who led their own armies in the field. From presiding at the Council of Lateran—a council which passed many ordinances for humanising war—the Pontiff passed almost at once to the command of an army—possibly to set in his capacity of general the first example of obedience to the humanising precepts which, in the character of bishop, he had enjoined. He commanded in person the troops which were sent to reduce Tusculum and other rebellious cities to submission. Like his predecessor, Leo IX., he led the armies that

invaded the Norman possessions in the South. Innocent was as unfortunate in his encounters with Roger as St. Leo had been with the former chieftains of his race, and the chances of war once more placed a warrior Pontiff a prisoner in the hands of a Norman king.

Over all these difficulties Innocent triumphed—it was reserved for a dispute as to Tivoli to displace his authority and call into action the republican spirit which was then rife in Rome as it was in the other Italian towns.

The jealousy between Rome and its neighbouring cities carries us back in imagination to the days of primeval Roman history, and the times of Tarquin appear to recur when, in the twelfth century of the Christian era, we read of war with Tivoli and Tusculum. There is more in this hostility than at first meets the eye, more perhaps than our information enables us to carry beyond conjecture. Even then Tivoli was the retreat of many of the citizens of the great city. It was the retirement of those Romans who, having acquired a moderate competence, desired to spend their days in the enjoyment of its classic tranquillity, remote from the distractions and free from the violence of Rome. The class of inhabitants who were collected within its walls were exactly those who had least sympathy with the feudal assemblies which generally usurped the name of the citizens of Rome, and we need not wonder if in the contest for the Papacy the son of the wealthy Jew found favour with its people in opposition to the candidate of the Frangipanni. The citizens of Tivoli held this city as immediate vassals of the Pope, and in the struggle with

Innocent they acknowledged the anti-Pope Anacletus as their lord. Even after the death of Anacletus, the Tusculans were only reduced to submission by the arms of the citizens of Rome. Upon the defeat of Tivoli, the Romans desired that the rebellious city should be utterly destroyed, so that its dangerous fortifications should no longer exist in the vicinity of Rome. The Pope insisted on preserving them. The real secret of the demand on one side, and the resistance of the other, was probably the knowledge that Tivoli, in the hands of the Pontiff, was a check upon the power of the unruly citizens of Rome. Exasperated at the Pope's refusal, the citizens assembled in the Capitol (A.D. 1142), and reconstituted the senate, giving to that body an elective constitution based upon the representation of the wards or regions into which the city was divided.

Innocent found that he had mastered all his previous troubles only to involve himself in the more formidable one of this new dissension with the citizens of Rome. He turned himself to an alliance with his old enemy the Sicilian king. He did not live to do battle with the newly-instituted senatorial power. Within a few months of its establishment he died. His end it is said was hastened by witnessing the triumph of that popular or at least republican movement which he felt he had not the power either to resist or to control.

Innocent died in the year 1143. Celestine II., his successor, is believed to have been friendly to the republicans, and there is some reason to suspect that popular influence had a share in his elevation.¹⁴ He

¹⁴ Celestine himself, in a letter to a friend announcing his elevation, tells

died in a few months. His successor, Lucius II., was killed in a tumult which he provoked by leading to the Capitol a mixed band of ecclesiastics in their robes, and soldiers with their arms, and attempting, at the head of this motley array, to seize the members of the senate assembled at their posts (A.D. 1144).¹⁵

Eugene III., whom the cardinals elected on the death of Lucius to fill that which had been proved to be the perilous elevation of the pontificate, made no attempt to reassert his authority in a city which he left immediately on his consecration. It was believed, indeed, that he made overtures of alliance to the Sicilian King, to obtain his aid in crushing the rebellious senate. That body had already more openly thrown off Papal authority by substituting for the prefect whom the Pope had appointed, a senator elected by themselves, in whose person they revived the ancient office of patrician, one that made him the representative of the Majesty of the State. At the same time they sent letters to the Emperor Conrad, inviting him to come to Rome to receive coronation and elevate the dignity of the Roman

him that he was chosen "Clero et populo acclamante partim et expetente."—*Epistola ad Venerabilem Petrum, Migne's Patrology.*

Although a contrary account is given in the life of Celestine, it seems probable that upon this occasion the people of Rome made a last attempt to exercise that privilege of interference which had never been taken away from them, and of which they were soon afterwards formally deprived.

Celestine had been a pupil of Abelard, and as Cardinal Guido di Castello and a papal legate, he had openly protected Arnold of Brescia, when under the ban of a council. His protection provoked an indignant remonstrance from St. Bernard.—*Milman's Latin Christianity*, vol. iii. p. 348.

There is at least a strange coincidence in the establishment of a republic at Rome, and the election almost immediately afterwards of the protector of Arnold as Pope.

¹⁵ Muratori, anno 1144.

senate and emperor to its ancient grandeur. In these letters the Pope was accused of conspiring with the King of Sicily against imperial power. The senate was represented as devoted in its loyalty. Conrad was too much occupied in Germany to attend to these representations, even if he had been inclined. Papal legates at the same time brought him the assurances of the friendship of the Pope—and while the messengers of the Pontiff were received with distinction and dismissed with honour, no notice was taken of the letters of the senate.¹⁶

In Rome itself the great mass of the nobility were on the side of the senate, whose revolt was in truth that of the feudal lords. But among that nobility the Pope had influential partisans ; among others, by one of the strange vicissitudes of family politics, the Frangipanni, then probably the most powerful of the aristocracy of Rome. Disappointed in the protection of the emperor, the senate were not unwilling to come to terms with Eugene, who had ventured to approach the city as near as Tusculum, already become the stronghold and refuge of the Papal power. From this he negotiated with the senate, and returned to Rome under a compromise by which he recognised the powers of that body, while they in turn abandoned the appointment of patrician, and agreed to the government

¹⁶ Conrad occupied at the time a disputed throne. He had after the coronation at Milan been compelled to abdicate in favour of Lothaire. On the death of Lothaire he resumed the imperial authority in Germany, but never received coronation from the Pope.—*Sismondi*, vol. i. p. 318. The letter of the senate, preserved by Otho of Friesingen, invites him to come to Rome for that purpose, and offers him support in restoring the ancient glories of Justinian and Constantine.

of the city by a prefect appointed by the Pope (A.D. 1147).¹⁷

It was in the issue of struggles like these—maintained through a long series of years—ending, indeed, only after the return of the Popes from Avignon, that the Papal power became finally established in the undisputed sovereignty of the city of Rome. The beginning of that struggle was marked by the infusion of a religious element, in which the fervour of a puritanic zeal came powerfully to aid the passion for political freedom. While Pontiffs were claiming dominion over all Christian potentates, and disposing of distant regions as the property of the Holy See; in Rome itself, their pretensions were confronted by the apostle of a doctrine which branded as a sacrilege and a crime the annexation of any temporal power to the office of a minister of Christ.

In the history of the war of investitures, we have seen the claims of papal power disputed in imperial manifestos, by appeals to the authority of the New Testament, and to the maxims of the early teachers of the Christian faith. In that long and fierce controversy a spirit of free inquiry was excited, which the Concordat of Worms could not quell.

Whatever were the faults of these ages, they were nevertheless times of earnest and deep conviction. Hildebrand attributed the evils that oppressed religion to the interference of the civil power in its affairs; and with a devotion and a zeal which has still left its impress on the history of the world, he gave up his

¹⁷ Muratori, anno 1148. Siamondi.

energies to the one task of establishing the independence, and more than the independence, the supremacy of the spiritual power. In the generation which followed him, there were those who with equal sincerity ascribed them to the assumption of temporal dominion, and the acquisition of worldly riches by the Church ; and a crusade was preached against the ambition and the wealth of ecclesiastics with a fanaticism of earnestness, to which even those it most violently assailed could not deny at least the merit of honest and disinterested conviction of the truth of the doctrines which it taught.

But they were times not only of earnest convictions but of great hopes and lofty imaginations. At the close of the tenth century the belief was almost universal that the world was coming to its end, and that with the thousandth year of the Christian era the earthly scene of the existence of Christianity would close. When the dreaded era had passed, and the earth still rolled on its course as before, another conviction appeared to seize upon the minds of the speculative, and a vague impression spread abroad that a new cycle of ages was beginning, and that some marked change for the better was approaching in the fortunes of the human race. The influence of these impressions was manifested in various and apparently widely severed forms. Hildebrand and those to whom he bequeathed the legacy of his high ambition, placed before their imaginations the grand vision of one great religious monarchy raised above all earthly power, uniting all mankind by the loyalty of a spiritual allegiance, and diffusing over the world through

all its various subordinate governments, the blessings of religion, justice, and peace. Men, perhaps of sterner faith and equal sincerity, earnestly believed that mankind were to be associated in one universal brotherhood by a return to the measures and principles of Apostolic purity and by establishing communities framed with the severe simplicity of religious and political republicanism. This was the faith which Arnold of Brescia preached, and which was held by many who after his day compromised it by their fanaticism or disgraced it by their crimes. But this was not all: under the shadow of the Capitol, and even of St. Peter's, there were not wanting those who seemed to recal the political superstitions of old Rome, and believed that the re-establishment of the ancient republic,—the revival of the senate, the magistrates, and the popular liberties of the days of Brutus and Cato, and the restoration of the sovereignty of the Roman people over Europe, were the destined means of regenerating the human race. It is wonderful how deeply this fanaticism seized on the Roman mind. It was the faith of the Roman republicans of the days of Adrian IV., upon which Arnold of Brescia found it easy to graft the stern notions of his own peculiar creed. It was this which gave its mysterious power to the phrase "the Good Estate," the watchword of Rienzi. Fifty years later it was the same hope that animated the first and less guilty of the conspiracies in which Stephen Porcaro attempted to reorganise the old republican institutions of Rome.¹⁸

¹⁸ There were those, at least in the next generation, who held the same faith in connection with the complete establishment of the imperial power. Dante's

It was only in an age when men were susceptible of such impressions—when the ideal triumphed over the actual, that the Crusades could have arrayed under the banners of the Cross the multitudes that visited unknown shores to recover from the infidel the Sepulchre of Christ. The cold judgment of a more calculating age can easily arraign the wisdom of the errand upon which these champions of Christendom were sent. But Peter the Hermit could only have preached with success to an unselfish generation, and in days when the higher instincts of our nature swayed the movements of men. In any estimate of these centuries we ought not to overlook the effect which the Crusades had frequently in directing to such an object, the religious enthusiasm and fervour which would otherwise have found very different employment nearer home. Peter might have been an Arnold or a Savonarola if his strong zeal had not found its full occupation in animating the devotion of Christendom to rescue the Holy Land from the desecration of the unbelievers.

Of all the forms in which an appeal was made to the religious fervour of the age, none seemed less compatible with its opinions and its prejudices than the doctrine of those who taught that the ministers of the Christian religion ought not to be endowed with wealth or rank. The common form of piety was a grant of land or money to the Church. The traditions of

treatise "De Monarchia" is nothing more than the expression of those lofty hopes when loyalty to the emperor had become a religion, and its devotees beheld in imperial power the means of the coming regeneration of human society. In the early and brief career of the Emperor Henry VII., his admirers saw qualities and indications which, if anything could do so, might justify such a belief in a nature as impressive and passionate as that of Dante.

centuries had invested a donation to the clergy with the character of an offering to God. The tomb of many a sinner was hallowed by the bequest which when dying he had made to the cathedral in which he was to be enshrined. To denounce the whole fabric of ecclesiastical endowment was not only to make war upon the priesthood, but was an attack upon a system with which the best feelings and the most sacred memories were interwoven. It was alike to assail the prejudices of the living, and disturb all the traditions that preserved the remembrance of the piety of the dead.

In Northern Italy first arose those who boldly preached the doctrine that the ministers of the Christian religion had departed from the principles of that religion when they became territorial lords. To deprive Churchmen of all their landed estates, and reduce them to the simplicity of a moderate competence, founded wholly on the tithes and on the voluntary offerings of their flocks, was the daring proposal that emanated from the bosom of the Church. Provoked probably in some collision between the privileges of an ecclesiastical lord and the spirit of republican independence, an attack was made upon the whole system which converted Christian bishops into territorial potentates. The preachers of this new doctrine met with an unexpected success. Whatever might be the merits of their theory, in denouncing the wealth of the clergy they could not want topics for effective and popular appeal. The contrast was an easy, and upon uneducated prejudice, a telling one, between the pomp and state of rich and lordly prelates and the poverty of the Apostles, or

even the condition of their master, who warned those who wished to follow him, that they must cast their lot with one who had not where to lay his head. The very first messengers of the Gospel were sent out with the emphatic injunction that they were to take neither scrip nor purse, as if specially to warn their successors against accepting the forbidden gift of earthly wealth. When Christians heaped possessions on their bishops, they forgot the saying that declared how hard it was for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of Heaven. These daring heretics did not hesitate to refer to the life of many a wealthy and luxurious prelate to prove, if proof were wanting, that Churchmen formed no exception to the rule. They scarcely needed the reference to assail the inconsistency of loading with riches the ministers of a religion which pronounced their possession to be the most dangerous obstacle to a pious life. They pointed to these ancient principles as recognised in the vows of poverty, by which some of the monastic orders were already bound. The renunciation of earthly wealth, which was the highest recommendation to divine favour in the monk, could be surely pressed as at least an act of Christian virtue on the bishop or the priest.¹⁹

¹⁹ These opinions, as to the evil attendant on the endowment of the clergy with territorial possessions, made many converts. Long after the days of Arnold the popular opinion was expressed in the words of Dante :—

“Ahi Constantine quanto male fu madre,
Non la tua conversion, ma quelle dote,
Che de te prese il primo ricco padre.”

“Ah Constantine, to how much evil grew
Not thy conversion, but that plenteous dower,
Which the first wealthy father gained of thee.”

Against the annexation of temporal dominion to any spiritual office, the protest was still more vehement. The apostles thought it inconsistent with their sacred calling, as leaving of the word of God and serving tables, to attend even to the dispensation of the charities of the Church. How were their successors imitating them who were busied in the temporal affairs of principalities and states? Peter and Paul were content to be subjects, their successors aspired to be sovereigns. The claims of temporal sovereignty were arraigned as a direct violation of the command of the Saviour, who expressly enjoined his apostles not to exercise the dominion which the lords of the Gentiles did. The narratives of the Gospel recorded incidents, the account of which appeared designed only for the purpose of teaching the Church to avoid the assumption of earthly power. Christ went into a desert place when he saw the multitude would take him by force and make him a king. In the mysterious narrative which represents Satan as offering to the Saviour the kingdoms of the world, their power and their glory, there was the foreshadowing of the temptation which was to assail the Church in the offer of earthly dominion, and the warning of the condition that attended the acceptance of the bribe. Upon grounds like these the preachers of reform declared not only that the claim of the clergy to rank and wealth was unwarranted, but that their possession was incompatible with the divine mission of the Church. Arnold of Brescia had his anathema as well as the Pope, and he formally declared that "neither bishop, priest, or monk could be saved if clogged, the

former with regal or lordly power, the latter with worldly wealth or goods."

The name of Arnold is indissolubly associated with the republican struggles of Rome against the establishment of the sovereignty of the Popes.²⁰ Born in Lombardy, he was educated in those republican principles which were then prevalent in Northern Italy. Entering on the monastic life, he learned in the austerity of its discipline to despise the attractions of wealth. He carried into religion the spirit of his republican opinions, and tolerated the despotism of priests as little as he did that of marquises or kings. Against the wealth and temporal power of the clergy he everywhere inveighed. A devout believer in the doctrines of the Church—blameless in his own life, rigid and self-denying in his habits—he was venerated by the people as a saint; and when he reasoned from scripture and from ecclesiastical history against the system which made the ministers of religion earthly potentates, admiring multitudes listened eagerly to his sweet although impassioned eloquence, and regarded him as an inspired missionary of heaven raised up to effect the regeneration of the Church.

Against these denunciations which were shaking their influence with the people, the bishops and clergy of Brescia appealed to the authority of the Pope. A council held in the Lateran in 1139, condemned Arnold as guilty of the crime of schism, but dealt mildly with

²⁰ For the history of Arnold of Brescia, reference may be made to Gibbon, chap. lxix.; Milman's Latin Christianity, book viii. chap. iv.; Baronius anno 1139; Muratori, for the same year.

one who was regarded as the disturber of the public peace. His punishment was only a sentence that he should be silenced as a preacher and that he should leave Italy. Arnold retired beyond the Alps, and remained at Zurich until the revolution at Rome appeared to offer him the opportunity of once more asserting his peculiar doctrines even in the city of the Pope.

The period of his arrival at Rome is not very accurately fixed. He was certainly there during the Pontificate of Eugene III., and probably to his presence, attended as he was by a goodly band of disciples who had followed him from Switzerland, we may attribute the disturbances which drove that Pontiff a second time from his see. Eugene died at Viterbo, without being able to re-establish anything more than a spiritual authority over Rome. His successor, Anastatius, in a short Pontificate of seventeen months, made no attempt to disturb the republican government. In December 1154, the Englishman, Nicholas Breakspear, was raised to the papal chair, under the title of Adrian IV.

The Pontiff who claimed all islands that had received Christianity, as the perquisites of the Apostolic see—who in virtue of this title bestowed Ireland upon the English monarch, was not very likely tamely to surrender the sovereignty of the city of Rome. He pronounced a sentence of banishment against Arnold, and demanded that the senate should carry it into effect. An accident gave him the opportunity of enforcing his command. One of the cardinals was slain in a popular tumult, and the Pope in consequence placed Rome

under an interdict. It was only withdrawn upon terms which made Arnold an exile.

The contest, however, was far from being at an end. Arnold had hardly left Rome to find shelter with a Campanian nobleman, when Frederick Barbarossa approached, at the head of a great army, to receive coronation from the Pope. Each party endeavoured to gain him to their cause. Three cardinals were sent from Viterbo, where Adrian was residing, to arrange the terms upon which the Pope would confer on him the crown. The republicans sent deputies with protestations full of expressions of zeal for the imperial prerogative. But Frederick had come into Italy to suppress the spirit of republican freedom. The Pope had the important boon of his coronation to bestow. The emperor rudely repulsed the republican deputies with haughty and insulting words. With some difficulty the terms of the coronation were settled. Graver matters of difference were postponed, and after reconciling himself to some of the ceremonies upon which Adrian insisted, Frederick received coronation in the Church of St. Peter. His coronation was managed by excluding the populace from the streets through which the procession passed, and on his return he could not escape fast enough without the walls to prevent a formidable collision between the citizens and the German troops, that had been doing duty as his guard.

Among the conditions insisted on by the Pope was the surrender of Arnold. His blood sealed the compact between Adrian and Frederick. The imperial troops forcibly carried him from the castle of his

protector, and surrendered him to the Cardinal-deacon, by whom he was handed over to the Prefect of the City. By him he was burned at the stake. The execution took place at the first dawn of the morning, and his ashes were dispersed in the stream of the Tiber, to prevent the superstition of the people from collecting them as the precious relics of a saint. The orders for his hurried execution are attributed by some writers to the Pontiff,²¹ while others assert that all the disgrace belongs to the officials of imperial rule.²²

The alliance between the Papacy and the empire was not of long duration. Even in the lifetime

²¹ Sismondi. Milman's Latin Christianity.

²² Miley's History of the Papal States. In this work the assertion of Sismondi, that Arnold was burned by Adrian IV., is treated as a groundless calumny upon the Pope.

The account given by Cardinal Baronius is this: When Frederick approached Rome, the Pope was at Viterbo. He summoned a council of a few trusty friends, among whom was the prefect of the city. At this council it was resolved to send a deputation of cardinals to meet the emperor, with two letters containing a statement of the terms upon which the Pope was willing to crown him.

"In quibus continebatur inter cetera ut reddet iisdem cardinalibus Arnaldum hereticum, in manus enim ipius devenerat, quem Vicecomites Campaniae abstulerant magistro Gerardo Cardinali Diacono."

"Rex vero, auditio Domini Pape mandatis, continuo missis apparatoribus cepit eundem de Vicecomitibus, aliisque perterritis eundem hereticum in manus Cardinalium statim restituit.

"Tandem in manus quorundam incidens, in Tuscis finibus captus, principis ad examen Frederici silicet reservatus, et ad ultimum a prefecto urbis ligno adactus, ac rogo in pulvrem redacto funere, ne a stolidâ plebe corpus ejus in venerationem haberetur, cinis in Tiberim sparsus est."

"Hic finis nefandissimi Heresiarchi urbis et orbis perturbatoris, quem et hisce carminibus Ligurius cecinit vates"—

"Judicio cleri nostro sub principe victus,
Adpensusque cruci, flammâque cremante solutus
In cineres, Tiberine tuas est sparsus in undas,
Ne stolidâ plebis, quem fecerat, improbus error
Martyris ossa novo cinerave foveret honore."

—Günther, *Annals of Cardinal Baronius, Anno 1155.*

of Adrian the ill-assorted truce was broken. The emperor would neither surrender the lands of the Countess Matilda nor give up his claim to sovereignty over Rome.

Frederick was crowned in June, 1155. In 1158 he came a second time into Italy to reduce the Lombard cities to subjection. Angry missives had already passed between him and the Pope. The Archbishop of Milan and the Lombard clergy supported the most extravagant pretensions of Imperial prerogative. Adrian plainly saw that this prerogative as claimed by the emperor involved the subjugation of the Papal See. In vain he endeavoured to obtain concessions on the subject from the victorious Frederick. The recognition of the right of St. Peter to appoint to all offices in Rome was refused. The emperor would not limit his right of "foderum" in Rome to the occasions of his coronation visits.²³ "By the Grace of God," said Frederick, "I am Emperor of Rome. If Rome be entirely withdrawn from my authority, the empire is an empty name." Adrian, while crushing republican freedom in

²³ The demands made by Adrian in reference to the city of Rome explain better than any long dissertation the position at that period of the papal claims to sovereignty at Rome. They were, that the Emperor should appoint no officer to act in his name without the sanction of the Pope—because the royalties of Rome, and the appointment of all magistrates, belonged to St. Peter.

"Foderum" was not to be exacted except upon the Emperor's coronation visit.

It will be seen that these proposals still recognised the nominal sovereignty in the Emperor. Government was to be carried on in his name, although all real power was to be given to the pontiff. After all, the proposed curtailment of imperial prerogative was not much greater than that which was effected by the privileges conceded to all Italian cities by the provisions of the Peace of Constance.

Rome, was compelled to appeal for protection to its spirit in the North. The Pontiff secretly made a league with Milan, Brescia, and Cremona, and it is said that he was about to support the cause of Italian independence by an excommunication against Frederick, when death removed from the pontifical throne the poor English scholar whose abilities had raised him to the highest dignities of the Church.

Adrian died in 1159. The contest which occurred at the election of his successor, and the events which followed it have already been described.²⁴ Those events once more identified the cause of the Papacy with that of Italy and freedom, and rescued the Holy See from the menaced collision with the fierce spirit of republican freedom. Paschal was enthroned in St. Peter's by the Imperial troops, but he was the German Pontiff forced upon indignant Rome by foreign arms—Alexander was driven into France, but the cause of the exiled Pontiff was that of Italy. The champion of Italian independence in the wars of the Lombard league, he shared the disasters and the dangers of the struggle, and he participated in the glories of its triumph. The fortress called after him Alexandria still associates with that proud struggle the name of the patriot Pope. When the glorious victory of Legnano had rolled back the hosts of German despotism before the free chivalry of Milan, it was Alexander who mediated at Venice between the Emperor and his revolted subjects. He it was who dictated the truce which gave present peace to the Lombard cities, and which led before its termi-

²⁴ Vol. i. p. 136, 137, 138.

nation to the complete recognition of their freedom and their rights.

The universal acknowledgment of his own Pontificate was among the least of his triumphs. Threatened by Frederick with the ban of the empire, the anti-Pope formally resigned his useless title, and Alexander amid the most extravagant enthusiasm of the citizens entered Rome as its undisputed Pontiff and its acknowledged lord—(A. D. 1178) but the champion of republican institutions in Lombardy could not well insist on their complete subversion at Rome.²⁵ The popular Pontiff appears to have been content with the homage which was paid him as the protector of Italian freedom,

²⁵ The character of Alexander III. appears so prominently in connection with the Italian struggle for municipal freedom that it seems to demand more notice than it is possible in a brief abstract to devote to that of most of the characters that flit across our page.

His title to be regarded as the friend of freedom does not rest solely on his exertions in favour of the Lombard league. If these exertions had not been sincere they would not have commanded the enthusiasm and gratitude which was exhibited by men who proved themselves perfectly capable of protecting their own rights.

A nobler memorial is to be found in the decree of the council which under his guidance and presidency declared that no Christian man ought to be kept in slavery. Remembering the prejudices and the customs of the age, and the extent to which the institution of serfdom was interwoven with the power of the great, we cannot withhold from this declaration in favour of human freedom the applause which it extorted even from the prejudices of Voltaire.

Nevertheless the pontificate of Alexander is stained by the persecutions of Peter Waldo of Lyons, and the applause which we bestow upon the asserter of civil liberty must be qualified by the remembrance of his disregard of the principles of religious freedom.

Popular belief has associated his name with one of those acts of arrogant insolence which are attributed to the Popes. The tradition is that when he was reconciled to Frederick at Venice, and when the emperor stooped to pay him the usual reverence, the pontiff placed his foot upon his neck, repeating the words "He shall place his foot upon the dragon, the young lion and the adder shall he tread under his feet." "Not to you, but to St. Peter, is this honour," is the reply attributed to the fiery Barbarossa. "Both to me and to

and to have left the senate in possession of the authority which had been confirmed even by the Emperor against whom the Pope had contended for the municipal liberties of Italy. That this authority was sufficiently extensive we may infer from the transactions with his successors. Alexander himself retired to Anagni, and with all his popularity, did not choose to endanger it by too frequent visits to Rome. During the twenty years that followed his death, out of five Popes but two were resident at their see. Velletri, Anagni, and Viterbo were the abodes of Pontiffs who could scarcely be called bishops of Rome. An Archbishop of Milan, elected to the Pontificate, retained his northern archbishopric, and fixed his residence at Verona.²⁶ In 1188, a citizen of Rome was elected Pope, and possibly it was the influence of his nativity which enabled Clement III. to obtain from the senate the recognition of his sovereignty, the abolition of the office of Patrician, and the restoration of St.

St. Peter," retorted the Pope, determined not to be cheated of his share in the discreditable triumph even in favour of the Apostle. Frescoes both at Rome and Venice preserve the memory of this tradition. Nevertheless the incident is believed by the best informed writers never to have occurred. Many of these stories were unquestionably invented by the ignorant adulators of Papal power; they did not perceive that by a not unrighteous retribution these stories were in future ages to rise in judgment against those to exalt whom they were fabricated.

Cardinal Baronius positively denies the truth of the story. The reasons for rejecting it are very well collected in a note to *Gosselin's History of the Papal Power; Kelly's translation*, vol. ii. p. 188.

Milman classes the story among many fables connected with Alexander's visit to Venice, as refuted by all the evidence of history.—*Latin Christianity*, vol. iii. p. 536.

It is entirely inconsistent with the moderation of the terms upon which Alexander effected both his own reconciliation and that of the cities with the Emperor.

²⁶ Milman; Sismondi; Baronius; Muratori.

Peter's Church with its domains to the Pope. The necessity of the last condition proves how completely the republican authority had been established at Rome.²⁷ On the accession of Celestine III. in 1191, a charter fixed the constitution of the senate and the government of Rome ;²⁸ the very next year the senate conferred their authority upon one individual, under the new title of Senator.²⁹ In 1197, Innocent III. obliged the Senator to take the oath of allegiance to himself.

In the Pontificate of Innocent, Papal authority seems to have been firmly established at Rome ; but in the long and troubrous conflict in which his successors were engaged with the second Frederick, we can well understand that but little of regular government prevailed. From the death of Innocent to the election of Charles of Anjou as Senator, the republican institutions maintained their authority independent of that of the Pope. The Pontiffs almost throughout the whole of this period, were absentees from Rome. We have already seen that on his return from his crusade, Frederick II. was received with enthusiasm by the senate and people of Rome, while he was not only under excommunication, but at actual war with the Pope.³⁰ The senator armed, like the podesta in other towns, with almost dictatorial powers, represented the authority of the senate. In the civil government of the city this officer was supreme. Gregory IX., in 1230, with difficulty obtained the exemption of all priests and visitors to the Pontifical court,

²⁷ Baronius, anno 1188.

²⁸ Sismondi, vol. ii. chap. iii. p. 82.

²⁹ Sismondi, vol. ii. chap. xiii.

³⁰ Ante, vol. i. p. 148.

from the jurisdiction of that officer. Innocent IV. was required by Brancaleone in rather peremptory terms, to return and fix his residence at Rome.³¹

As the Romans followed the example of other cities in conferring extraordinary powers upon their magistrate, they adopted also the rule of electing a foreigner to the office.

In 1252 Brancaleone of Bologna accepted the office of senator, with power exactly like that of the podesta,

³¹ "Brancaleone wished also to bring the Campagna of Rome to its ancient dependence; with this object, he sent ambassadors to Terracina to demand that the little town should swear to obey his orders, and to associate itself with the parliament, the army, and take part in the festivals of the Romans. Innocent IV. sent to the senator a Bull from Assisi, where he then held his court, to point out to him that the inhabitants of Terracina were immediate vassals of the Holy See, so that they were not bound to any service to the City of Rome; he advised him to recall his orders from respect to the Chair of St. Peter, and warned him at the same time that he would support the inhabitants of Terracina with all his forces if the senator continued to molest them."

"Brancaleone then determined to bring back the Pontiff himself to what he believed to be his duty; and the narrative of Matthew Paris brings out into the clearest light the independence of the Romans and their magistrate in regard to Innocent IV. "During the same time," he says, "as the Pope had been residing some months at Assisi, there was conveyed to him, on the part of the Romans and the Senator Brancaleone, the order to return without delay to the city of which he was the pastor and sovereign Pontiff. The Romans added that they were astonished to see him wandering here and there like a vagabond and proscribed person, abandoning Rome, his pontifical see, and the flock, for which he would have to render a strict account to the Sovereign Judge, in order to run after money. The senator and citizens of Rome intimated also to the people of Assisi their command no longer to receive a Pontiff who took his title from the See of Rome and not from Lyons, Perugia, or Anagni (places where the Pope had long resided). They insisted that the town of Assisi should send him away unless it wished its territory laid waste for ever. Innocent then perceived that if he did not return to Rome the town of Assisi would be destroyed by the enraged Romans, as Ostia, Porto, Tusculum, Alba, the Sabine territory, and lastly Tivoli, had been. He returned, therefore, to Rome more by force than good will and trembling with apprehension. However, by the orders of the Senator he was received with all honour."—*Sismondi*, vol. ii. p. 313; *Math. Paris, Hist. Angliae*, 1254, p. 757.

but with a stipulation,³² that thirty youths of the first families should be sent to Bologna as hostages for his safe return, and that his office should last for three years instead of one. Perhaps some light is thrown upon the nature of this stipulation, as well as upon the necessity which led to the appointment of a dictator, by the fact that in those three years he demolished 140 feudal fortresses in the city of Rome and brought more than forty of their noble owners to an ignominious death for some of those offences, in which they passed the narrow limits that separated the tolerated outrages of feudalism from unlicensed acts of brigandage and plunder.³³

The election of Charles of Anjou as senator was far from either destroying the republican spirit or putting an end to the turbulence of Rome. And when the Pope, in 1305, fixed his abode in France, however it may have been the influence of the French king that dictated the removal, there is little doubt that the long-continuance of the Papal court at Avignon was influenced in no small degree by the natural feeling which led the Pontiffs and the cardinals to prefer its calm and tranquil retreats to a residence in a city in which their lives were disturbed by constant tumults, and in which the recognition of their authority was precarious and interrupted.

Yet it was during this period of domestic weakness, when the Popes were unable to control the republican

³² Milman's Latin Christianity, book ix. chap. xv. p. 457; Gibbon, ch. xix.

³³ Milman; Gibbon; Dante; Sismondi, vol. ii. p. 312.

independence of the city, that imperial power surrendered to them the long disputed sovereignty of Rome. The disinterested goodness of Gregory X. was able to hush into momentary silence throughout Italy the passions of Ghibeline and Guelph, but was not able to restore the Pontifical supremacy in Rome.³⁴ It was at Lyons that he convened the council in which he sat at the head of 500 bishops (A.D. 1274), not to excommunicate a monarch, but to receive into communion the Greek emperor and the Greek Church—it was there that he passed that law which still regulates the election of the Pope. While he was at Lyons Rudolph was under his influence elected Emperor of Germany, and the formal cession of his legates gave up all claim to authority in the imperial city (A.D. 1273).³⁵ From that date, however their power might be controlled by the authority of a senate or the privileges of the people —however much it might be thwarted by the lawlessness of their subjects, the Pontiffs alone could claim to be sovereigns of Rome.

During the residence of the Popes at Avignon, Rome became a prey to disorders which almost threatened it with extinction. Abandoned by imperial rule, it was left by the Pontiffs from their luxurious retreat at Avignon, to the vicarial authority of a legate, who exercised no effectual control, and whose influence, if we are to credit the representations of Rienzi, was principally felt in the encouragement and support which

³⁴ Gregory, during his short, but as it has been justly termed, glorious Pontificate, made no attempt to reside in Rome. Immediately after his consecration he fixed his residence at Orvieto. He died at Arezzo.

³⁵ *Ante*, vol. I. chap. v. pp. 177, 178, 179.

he gave to the turbulent and licentious barons.³⁶ Rome preserved the form of her republican government ; but the enfeebled magistracy were unable to control the great lords. All that was dear in the homes of the humbler classes was at the mercy of their lawless violence.³⁷ Their fortresses and their mansions were claimed as privileged places into which law could not follow the criminal, and these feudal sanctuaries were the dens of every infamy and the refuge of every crime. In vain were the forms of popular sovereignty kept up. The city was at one period during this interval governed

³⁶ "Would that our pastor had been content with this scandal alone, that he should dwell in Avignon, having deserted his flock. But far worse than this he nurses, cherishes, and favours those very wolves, the fear of whom he pretends keeps him away from Rome, that their teeth and talons may be stronger to devour his sheep. On the Orsini, on the Colonna, on the other nobles whom he knows to be infamous as public robbers, the destroyers both spiritual and temporal of his holy episcopal city, and the devourers of his own peculiar flock, he confers dignities and honours ; he even bestows on them rich palaces, in order that they may wage their wars, which they have not wealth enough to support, from the treasures of the Church, and when he has been perpetually entreated by the people that as a compassionate father he would at least appoint some good man, a foreigner, as ruler over his episcopal city, he would never consent, but in contempt of the petition of the people, he placed the sword in the hands of some madman, and invested the tyrants of the people with the authority of senators, for the sole purpose as it is credibly known and proved, that the Roman flock thus preyed on by ravaging wolves should not have strength or courage to demand the residence of their pastor in his episcopal seat."—*Letter of Rienzi* ; *Milman*, book xii. chap. x. p. 515.

³⁷ *Milman's Latin Christianity*, book xii. chap. 10.—The state of Rome at this period is described with a melancholy sameness by writers too numerous to cite. One extract from Gibbon may sum up the entire.

"The blessings of peace and justice, for which civil society had been instituted, were banished from Rome—the jealous citizens, who might have endured every personal or pecuniary injury, were most deeply wounded in the dishonour of their wives and daughters, they were equally oppressed by the arrogance of the nobles and the corruption of the magistrates, and the abuse of arms or of laws was the only circumstance that distinguished the lions from the dogs and serpents of the capitol."—*Gibbon*, chap. lxx.

by bannerets,³⁸—an institution borrowed from the most democratic form of government in the Italian cities. The city itself fell into decay when the wealth of Christendom was no longer poured into its lap. There was nothing to sustain Rome as a great city, except the presence of the pontifical court. With the withdrawal of the multitude of visitors whom business or piety had attracted to the seat of the Pontiffs, it lost its great support. Its condition presented to anyone who could live elsewhere but little inducement to fix his residence in a city in which regular government could hardly be said to exist. Under the combined influence of these causes, Rome was dwindling almost to a village,³⁹ and during the Papal secession to Avignon, its population had fallen to 35,000; some say, but the statement is scarcely credible, to 15,000.⁴⁰

³⁸ The "bannerets," or confalioneri, were thirteen in number,—one elected by each of the thirteen quarters into which the city was divided. This form of government was established after Rienzi's death, but at what interval is not quite clear. The bannerets were in existence in 1378. They were the magistrates who in that year awaited on the assembled cardinals to demand that they should elect an Italian Pope on the death of Gregory X. It will be remembered that the tumultuous proceedings which ensued created the dispute as to the legality of the election of Urban VI., which was not the cause, or at all events, the pretext of the great schism of the West.—See vol. i. p. 181, note.

³⁹ "In the year 1443, when Eugenius IV. returned to Rome, the city was become a mere dwelling of herdsmen, the inhabitants were in no way distinguished from the shepherds and peasants of the surrounding country. The hills had been long abandoned, and the dwellings were gathered together in the levels along the windings of the Tiber—no pavements were found in the narrow streets, and those darkened by projecting balconies and by the buttresses that seemed to prop one house against another. Cattle wandered about as in a village. From San Silvester to the Porto del Popolo was all garden and marsh, the resort of wild ducks. The very memory of antiquity was fast sinking. The Capitol had become the hill of goats, the Roman forum was a corn-field. The Church of St. Peter was on the point of falling into ruins."—*Ranke's History of the Popes*.

⁴⁰ Spalding's Italy, vol. iii. p. 160.

In the midst of these terrible evils arose that strange individual whose memory is perpetuated in history as the *Last Tribune of Rome*. Flashing like the brilliant blaze of a meteor across the clouds and darkness that rested over the city, his career, like that of the meteor, left no trace behind. The brief but marvellous magistracy of Colà Rienzi scarcely demands a notice as exercising any permanent influence upon the fortunes of Rome. His seizure of power was in fact the result of a wild and sudden insurrection of the people to rid themselves of the intolerable tyranny of the barons. Assembling with a few followers at a late hour in a church, after spending the night in solemn prayer, he issued to the streets, and proclaimed the approach of a reign of peace and quietness, which he designated as "the Good State." The word flew among a populace worn by misery and ground down by oppression, and before the barons had ceased to ridicule the absurd exhibition of a fanatic, a tumultuous assemblage in the Capitol had proclaimed the republic, reconstituted the senate, and appointed Rienzi dictator under the title of Tribune of Rome (A.D. 1347).

For a few months Rienzi maintained himself in the power to which he had been so strangely raised. The mysterious watchword of "the Good State," the faith he preached in the immortal destiny of Rome, and in the universal dominion of the senate and people in a reign of justice and peace, sustained for a while the enthusiasm to which he owed his elevation. Throughout Italy the story of the revolution he had effected was disseminated, with all the accompaniments that superstition or the love of the marvellous could attach to it. The ambas-

sadors of distant States appeared to do homage to the miraculous restorer of the majesty of the Roman Republic. The intoxication of this success was too great for an intellect that would not seem ever to have been very strong. A more than regal magnificence displayed his vanity—indulgence in the pleasures of the table is said even to have given to his person the appearance of grossness. No title was too high, no magnificence too gorgeous, to express the majesty of the tribune, who assumed a state for which only insanity could supply an excuse. In the pride and pomp of receiving an order of chivalry, he proclaimed himself with wild gestures master of the whole world, and summoned both the Emperor and the Pope to appear before him. These extravagances soon led to the termination of his course. He fell as suddenly as he rose.

The Pope, who at first encouraged his movements, issued against him a bull of excommunication. The Roman barons were only too anxious to seize the opportunity of rebelling against the power that sternly punished their crimes. Rienzi was compelled to fly from Rome. After wandering through Europe in disguise, he surrendered himself to the Emperor Charles IV. By him he was sent in custody to Avignon to the Pontiff. The Pope deserved the name of Clement, which he bore. Struck by the misfortune, sympathising with the romance of the history of his strange captive he retained him in a mild imprisonment, of which the study of the Bible and Livy supplied the solace. Meanwhile anarchy increased at Rome, and Innocent, the

successor of Clement, believed that there was truth in the representation of Rienzi, who attributed these disorders to the practice of appointing the Senator from the members of those families whom it was his chief duty to control. He ventured on the bold expedient of conferring the office on Rienzi himself, and sending him to suppress the outrages of the barons, which had, after his departure, set all law at defiance. After an absence of seven years the exiled tribune reappeared at Rome (A.D. 1354), under the title of Senator, and armed with the commission of the Pope. The experiment, as might be expected, was a failure, and the once idolised leader of the populace, fell an inglorious victim to a tumult in the streets.

The Roman people, as we have seen, in 1378 compelled the cardinals to elect an Italian Pope. The schism which followed has already been described. During its continuance the Papal power was too weak to establish its sovereignty over turbulent, although enfeebled Rome. While their rivals held their court at Avignon, three Popes successively were appointed in the ancient city. They did not however reside in that city, which was nominally their See. After thirty-eight years of this schism, the Council of Constance gave to Christendom an undisputed pontiff. Martin V. entered Rome in triumph (A.D. 1417). The coins, on which for 300 years the arms of the senate had been impressed, now bore the effigy of the sovereign pontiff.⁴⁷ When her bishop was thus finally restored, when the Avignon schism was ended, and Rome saw once

⁴⁷ Spalding's Italy.

more resident within her walls a prelate who was the acknowledged chief of the Christian world—the city had suffered too severely from the absence of the Papal court to question the terms upon which it was to return. There was neither energy, nor even population in Rome. The Pontiff resumed his place in the Lateran as the absolute sovereign of the city. Liberty was extinguished in Rome, as in the other Italian towns.

Yet the spirit of republicanism survived. When the schism of the Council of Basle called Amadeus of Savoy to dispute once more the title of the Roman Pontiff, the populace of Rome asserted, although but for a brief period, their democratic form of government. Eugene IV. escaped in a galley on the Tiber amid volleys of arrows that followed it from the banks (A.D. 1433). After his flight the Papal troops still occupied the Castle of St. Angelo ; the military force of the Pontiff, for the first time in the history of Rome, suppressed a popular insurrection against his authority, and within five months the revolt was crushed, and Eugene restored as the sovereign of Rome.

The election of his successor Nicholas V. (A.D. 1447) was followed by the surrender of the claims of the rival Pontiff, and Nicholas became without dispute the spiritual chief of Christendom. Three years after his accession the last effort was made by the adherents of the republic to resist the lordship of the Pope.

In the year 1450, an attempt was made by conspiracy to re-establish republican freedom. Stephen Porcaro was engaged in a plot to seize the Pope,

and restore the ancient republic. Porcaro appears to have shared the fanaticism of Rienzi, and believed himself pointed out as the future regenerator of Rome in verses of Petrarch, for attributing the character of prophecy to which perhaps he may be more easily forgiven than he can be for the rashness that appropriated that prophecy to himself.

The judgment of the world will find in these dreams of a wild and reckless enthusiasm no excuse for an insurrectionary plot that fails. That failure stamps it as rebellion, and "in that foul dishonouring word" every evil is summed up. Porcaro's first attempt was punished by the merciful Pontiff with banishment from the city. A second and a more dangerous conspiracy could scarcely be passed over with similar leniency. Porcaro and nine of his associates were convicted and condemned to death (A.D. 1452), and the first execution for high treason against the Pontiff emphatically proclaimed that the Pope was in very truth the master and sovereign of Rome.

It was the last struggle of popular freedom against Papal power. It was the last exhibition of that old Roman turbulence which had disturbed by ceaseless tumults the repose of pontifical authority almost from its earliest institution. A long and nearly uninterrupted period of tranquillity ensued, and Rome became a city in which it was pleasant for the Papal court to dwell. In 250 years which passed from the days of Nicholas to those of Pius VI., but one Pontiff was exposed to the miseries and perils which had been the ordinary lot of the earlier occupants of the Papal throne. Those perils

came from no republican or insurrectionary source. The sovereign, who in the days of the Reformation was the pious champion of Papal orthodoxy, consigned, from motives of territorial ambition, the Pope to a prison and Rome to pillage. The Pontiff had dared to join in a league against the dominion of the stranger on the Italian soil ; his weakness in deserting it did not preserve him from the fate that befel him as an Italian prince ; and the last struggle of Italian liberty and her final subjugation to the yoke of the foreigner, were marked by the spectacle of an imprisoned Pontiff, and the abandonment of his city to the licence of ruffians who called themselves the soldiers of the Most Catholic King.⁴²

From the days of Charles V. we have seen that the Papal power shared the tranquillity and the enervation which fell upon the Italian States, and nowhere was the luxurious indolence of that soulless period more listless, nowhere the slumbers of thought and spirit more profound, than at Rome.

In the imprisonment of Clement VII. the Papacy had borne the last perils of Italy's departing vitality ; in that of Pius VI. it seemed destined to confront the first that attended the convulsion in which the energy of the nation was roused from its long and death-like dream.

LIST OF THE POPES.
FROM THE DAYS OF CHARLEMAGNE.

A.D.

795 Leo III., a Roman.

Crowned Charlemagne emperor,

A.D., 800.

A.D.

816 Stephen V., a Roman.

817 Paschal I., a Roman.

824 Eugenius II., a Roman.

| A.D. | A.D. |
|--|---|
| 827 Valentius, a Roman. Died in less than two months after his election. | Son of Sergius III. and Marozia. Died in prison. |
| 827 Gregory IV., a Roman. | 936 Leo VII., a Roman. |
| 843 Sergius II., a Roman. Rome taken by the Saracens. | 939 Stephen IX., a Roman. |
| 847 Leo IV., a Roman. Built the suburb round St. Peter's, afterwards known as the Leo- nine city. (Between Leo and his successor or some chroniclers have placed JOAN.) | 943 Martin III. Called by some Marinus II. |
| 855 Benedict III., a Roman. Anastasius, antipope. | 946 Agapetus II. |
| 858 Nicholas I., a Roman. | 956 John XII., Ottavian Conti. Nephew of John XI. Deposed by |
| 867 Adrian II., a Roman. Had been married; his wife and daughters murdered. | Otho; killed in a brawl. He was the first who changed his name on his assumption. |
| 872 John VIII., a Roman. | 963 Leo VIII. Styled antipope by some; ap- pointed by Otho the Great. |
| 882 Martin II. Called by some Marinus I. | 964 Benedict V., a Roman. Elected by people; banished by emperor. |
| 884 Adrian III., a Roman. | 965 John XIII., a Roman, Driven from Rome; reinstated by Otho. |
| 885 Stephen VI., a Roman. | 972 Benedict VI. Was killed in the tumult of Crescentius. |
| 891 Formosus, bishop of Porto. Deposed after his death. His body taken from its grave, mu- tilated, and flung into the Tiber. | 973 Domnus II., a Roman. |
| Sergius, antipope, and after him Boniface, styled by some VI. | 974 Benedict VII., of the Conti family. Constant struggles with antipope. |
| 896 Stephen VII., a Roman. This Pope mutilated the dead body of Formosus; he was him- self strangled in prison. | 983 John XIV. Put to death by Cardinal Franco. |
| 897 Romanus, a Tuscan. Died after four months. | Franco, antipope, by the name of Boniface VIII. |
| 897 Theodorus II., a Roman. Died in less than a month. | 985 John XV., a Roman. Died in a few months; banished by |
| 897 John IX. of Tibur. | Crescentius, restored by Otho. |
| 900 Benedict IV., a Roman. Put to death by Duke of Friuli. | 986 John XVI., a Roman. Put to death by Gregory V. |
| 903 Leo V., a native of Ardea. Killed by Christopher. | 996 Gregory V., a German. Driven from Rome; restored by Otho. |
| 904 Sergius III. The favourite of Marozia. | Crescentius put to death by Otho III. |
| 911 Anastasius III., a Roman. Died suddenly; suspicion of poison. | 999 Sylvester II., Gerbert, native of Auvergne. |
| 913 Lando, a native of Sabina. Died suddenly; suspicion of poison. | 1003 John XVII. |
| 914 John X., a Roman. Promoted by Theodora from Arch- bishopric of Ravenna; died in prison. | 1003 John XVIII., Phasianus, a Ro- man. Abdicated. |
| 928 Leo VI., a Roman. Died in seven months. | 1009 Sergius IV., a Roman. |
| 929 Stephen VIII., a Roman. Supposed to have been murdered. | 1012 Benedict VIII., of Tusculum, of the Conti family. |
| 931 John XI. | 1024 John XIX., a Roman. Brother of the preceding; ba- nished by the Romans; re- stored by Conrad. |
| | 1033 Benedict IX., Theophylact of Tusculum. |
| | Nephew of the preceding, de- posed, restored, and banished again. |

| A.D. | A.D. |
|------|--|
| 1044 | Antipope, Sylvester, bishop of Sabina. |
| 1044 | Gregory VI., Gratianus, of Rome. Purchased his elevation; abdicated; Benedict, Sylvester, and Gregory, three rival Popes; deposed by Henry III. and a council. |
| 1047 | Clement II., Suidger of Saxony (bishop of Bamberg). Appointed by Henry; died in twenty-three days. |
| 1048 | Damascus II. (Popo, bishop of Brixen). Appointed by Henry. |
| 1049 | Leo IX., Bruno of Alsace, bishop of Toul. Appointed by Henry; taken prisoner in battle by Normans. |
| 1055 | Victor II., of Swabia, bishop of Eichstadt. |
| 1057 | Stephen IX., Frederick of Lorraine, abbot of Monte Casino. |
| 1058 | Benedict X. By some styled antipope, abdicated. |
| 1059 | Nicholas II. of Burgundy. Decree vesting election of Pope in Cardinals. |
| 1061 | Alexander II. of Milan. Cadilaus antipope; bloody battles in Rome; Honorius held St. Angelo for four years. |
| 1078 | Gregory VII., HILDEBRAND. Died in exile; sack of Rome by the Normans. Guibert, antipope, assumed the name of Clement III. |
| 1086 | Victor III., a native of Beneventum. Rome in possession of Guibert. |
| 1088 | Urban II., a native of France. |
| 1099 | Paschal II., a native of Tuscany. Imprisoned by Henry V.; driven from Rome. |
| | Antipopes, Albert and Theodoric. |
| 1118 | Gelasius II., a native of Gaieta. Driven by Imperialists from Rome; died a wanderer. |
| 1119 | Calixtus II., son of the Count of Burgundy. |
| 1124 | Honorius II., Cardinal Lamberto, bishop of Ostia. Banished from Rome and restored. |
| 1130 | Innocent II., a Roman. |
| | Commanded his armies in person; taken prisoner by Normans. Republic of Arnold of Brescia. Anacletus, antipope. |
| 1143 | Celestinus II., a Tuscan. Died in a few months. |
| 1144 | Lucius II. of Bologna. Killed in popular tumult. |
| 1145 | Eugenius III. of Pisa. Left Rome immediately on consecration. |
| 1153 | Anastasius IV., a Roman. |
| 1154 | Adrian IV., Nicholas Breakspeare, an Englishman. Execution of Arnold. |
| 1159 | Alexander III., Cardinal Orlando Bandinelli of Siena. Fled into France; restored triumphantly after the success of the Lombard league. Cardinal Octavian, antipope, by the name of Victor. Cardinal Guido, antipope, by the name of Paschal. Calixtus, antipope. |
| 1181 | Lucius III., Cardinal Ubaldo of Lucoa. |
| 1185 | Urban III., Uberto Crivelli, archbishop of Milan. Retained his archbishopric. |
| 1187 | Gregory VIII. of Beneventum, Died in two months; absent from Rome. |
| 1188 | Clement III., Paul, bishop of Frascati. Gave constitution to senate. |
| 1191 | Celestinus III., Cardinal Hycinthus, a Roman. |
| 1198 | Innocent III., Cardinal Lotharius of Signia. Obliged Prefect to take oath of allegiance to Pope; guardian of Frederick II. |
| 1216 | Honorius III., Cardinal Savelli of Rome. |
| 1227 | Gregory IX., Cardinal Hugo of Anagni. Rome invested by Frederick; constant dispute with emperor. |
| 1241 | Celestinus IV. of Milan. Died in a few days. |
| 1242 | Innocent IV., Cardinal Sinibaldo Fieschi of Genoa. Council of Lyons; deposition of Frederick. |
| 1254 | Alexander IV., Cardinal Rinaldo Conti of Anagni. Brancaleone, senator of Rome. |

A. D.

1261 Urban IV., James, Patriarch of Jerusalem, a Frenchman.

1265 Clement IV., Guy of St. Gilles in Languedoc.

1272 Gregory X., Tebaldo Visconti of Piacenza.

1276 Innocent V., Cardinal Peter, a native of Tarentaise.
Died immediately on consecration.

1276 Adrian V., Ottobono Fieschi of Genua.
Died in a month after election, before his consecration.

1276 John XXI. of Lisbon.
Killed in three months by falling of a roof.

1277 Nicholas III., Cardinal Orsini of Rome.

1281 Martin IV., Cardinal Simon de Brie, a Frenchman.

1285 Honorius IV., Cardinal James Savelli of Rome.

1288 Nicholas IV., Cardinal Jerome of Ascoli.

1294 Celestine V., Pietro da Morrone of Abruzzo.
Abdicated.

1295 Boniface VIII., Cardinal Benedetto Caetani of Anagni.
Imprisoned by the Colonna; died of vexation.

1303 Benedict XI., Cardinal Nicholas Boccasini of Treviso.
Suspected of being poisoned.

1305 Clement V., Bertrand Archbishop of Bordeaux.
Removed the Papal See to Avignon.

AVIGNON POPES.

1316 John XXII., James of Cahors in France.
Nicholas, antipope, in Italy.

1334 Benedict XII., James Fournier, a Frenchman.

1342 Clement VI., Peter Roger Beaufort of Limoges in France.
Days of Rienzi.

1352 Innocent VI., Stephen Aubert of Limoges.

1362 Urban V., William Grimard, a Frenchman.

1370 Gregory XI., Peter Roger, a Frenchman, nephew of Clement VI.
Restored the Papal See to Rome.

A. D.

SCHISM OF THE WEST.

Avignon Antipopes.

1378 Clement VII., Robert of Geneva.

1394 Benedict XIII., Pedro de Luna.
Deposed by Council of Constance.

Roman Series.

1378 Urban VI., Bartolomeo Prignano, a Neapolitan.

1389 Boniface IX., Peter Tomacelli of Naples.

1404 Innocent VII., Cosmo Migliorati of Sulmona.

1406 Gregory XII., Angelo Corrari of Venice.
Abdicated at Constance.

Third Series.

1409 Alexander V., Peter Philargius of Candia.
Elected by Council of Pisa in opposition to Benedict XIII. of Avignon and Gregory XII. of Rome.

1410 John XXIII., Cardinal Balthasar Cossa, a Neapolitan; Deposed by the Council of Constance for his crimes.

REUNION OF CHURCH.

1417 Martin V., Otho Colonna, a Roman.
Elected at Council of Constance upon the deposition of the three rival Popes.

1431 Eugenius IV., Gabriel Condulmero, a Venetian.
Schism between the Pope and the Council of Basle; driven from Rome.

Felix, Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, antipope.

1447 Nicholas V., Cardinal Thomas of Sarzana.
Conspiracy of Poccaro.

1455 Calixtus III., Alfonso Borgia, a Spaniard.

1458 Pius II., Eneas Sylvius Piccolomini of Siena.

1464 Paul II., Peter Barbo of Venice.

1471 Sixtus IV., Francis della Rovere, a Genoese.

1485 Innocent VIII., Gianbattista Cibo, a Genoese.

| A.D. | A.D. |
|---|---|
| 1492 Alexander VI., Rodrigo Lenzoli Borgia, a Spaniard. Poisoned. Infamous for his crimes. | 1605 Paul V., Camillo Borghese of Rome. |
| 1503 Pius III., Pietro Todeschini Piccolomini. Died in a month. | 1621 Gregory XV., Alessandro Ludovici of Bologna. |
| 1503 Julius II., Julian della Rovere, a Genoese. Made war upon Venice; led his armies in person; conquered Romagna. | 1623 Urban VIII., Maffeo Barberini, a Florentine. |
| 1513 Leo X., Giovanni de' Medici. Son of Lorenzo the Magnificent. Reformation. | 1644 Innocent X., Gian Battista Pamphilii of Rome. |
| 1522 Adrian VI. of Utrecht. Preceptor of Charles V. | 1655 Alexander VII., Fabio Chigi of Siena. |
| 1523 Clement VII., Giulio de' Medici. Nephew of Lorenzo, imprisoned; sack of Rome by Constable Bourbon. | 1667 Clement IX., Giulio Rospigliosi of Pistoia. |
| 1534 Paul III., Alessandro Farnese of Rome. Convoked the Council of Trent. | 1670 Clement X., Emilio Altieri of Rome. |
| 1550 Julius III., Giovanni Maria Giocci of Rome. | 1676 Clement XI., Benedetto Odescalchi of Como. |
| 1555 Marcellus II., Cardinal Cervini of Montepulciano. Died in a month. | 1689 Alexander VIII., Pietro Ottoboni of Venice. |
| 1555 Paul IV., Gianpietro Caraffa, a Neapolitan. | 1691 Innocent XII., Antonio Pignatelli of Naples. |
| 1559 Pius IV., Giovanni Angelo Medichini of Milan. Closed Council of Trent. | 1700 Clement XI., Gian Francesco Albani of Urbino. |
| 1566 Pius V., Michele Ghislieri of Alessandria in Piedmont. | 1721 Innocent XIII., Michel Angelo Conti of Rome. |
| 1572 Gregory XIII., Hugo Buoncompagni of Bologna. | 1724 Benedict XIII., Vincenzo Maria Orsini of Rome. |
| 1585 Sixtus V., Felice Peretti of Montalto, in the March of Ancona. | 1730 Clement XII., Lorenzo Corsini of Florence. |
| 1590 Urban VII., Gian Battista Castagna, a Genoese. Died in a few days. | 1740 Benedict XIV., Prospero Lambertini of Bologna. |
| 1590 Gregory XIV., Nicola Sfondrati of Milan. | 1758 Clement XIII., Carlo Rezzonico of Venice. |
| 1591 Innocent IX., Gian Antonio Faccinetti of Bologna. | 1769 Clement XIV., Gian Vincenzo Ganganelli. Born near Rimini; suppression of the Jesuits. |
| 1592 Clement VIII., Ippolito Aldobrandini, a native of Fano. | 1775 Pius VI., Angelo Braschi of Cesena. Died a prisoner in France. |
| 1605 Leo XI., Alessandro de' Medici of Florence. Died in a month. | 1800 Pius VII., Gregorio Barnaba Chiaramonti of Cesena. Imprisoned by Napoleon; restored in 1814. |
| | 1823 Leo XII., Annibale della Genga, native of Romagna. |
| | 1829 Pius VIII., Cardinal Castiglioni of Cingoli. |
| | 1831 Gregory XVI., Mauro Capellari. Born at Belluno. |
| | 1846 Pius IX. Giovanni Maria Mastai Ferretti, born at Sinigaglia, May 13, 1792. Bishop of Imola. |

CHAPTER VI.
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History of the Acquisition of the Papal States—Documentary evidence—Its character—Donation of Pepin—Charter of Louis Debonnaire—Bequest of the Countess Matilda—Patrimony of St. Peter—The Emperor Lothaire—Frederick Barbarossa—Henry VI.—Otho IV.—Pope Innocent III.—Grant of Rudolph—Condition of the Romagnese Provinces—Their princes—Cardinal Albornoz reduces them to subjection—His death—War between the Pope and Florence—Revolt of Romagna—Cardinal Robert of Geneva—His cruelty—The Breton Condottieri—Massacre at Cesena—Election of Urban as Pope—Alexander VI—Cesar Borgia created Duke of Romagna—His attempt to reduce it to subjection—Seizure of Papal territory by Venice—War with Venice—Fall of Borgia—Pope Julius II.—He heads his army in person—His character—Reduction of Romagna—League of Florence—Gradual surrender of inferior lordships and free cities—Bologna—Its history—Stipulations for preserving its rights—With Nicholas V.—With Alexander VI.—With Julius II.—Acquisition of Urbino—Of Ferrara—Transfer of the House of Este to Modena—Acquisition and alienation of Parma—Claims of the Papal See to Tuscany—How far realised—General Reflections.—Note on the election of the Popes.

IN the last chapter we have attempted to trace the progress of events by which the bishop of Rome gradually acquired in that city the authority which finally made him its absolute and undisputed sovereign. A few pages must still be devoted to the inquiry into the manner by which that sovereignty was extended over the fairest provinces of Central Italy, those which at the outbreak of the French Revolution constituted the States of the Church.

In tracing the history of the territorial acquisitions

of the Holy See, we find ourselves occupied in subjects very different from those which would demand our notice in a similar inquiry as to any other state. We become involved in investigations as to the validity and effect of documents and deeds, which more resemble the examination of a title to private property, than the research into the mode in which territories were obtained by a sovereign state.

The character of the documents is not always to be relied on. The donation of Constantine is not the only one which bears the manifest marks of invention. There is, unhappily, truth in the sarcasm in which, with ill-concealed exultation, Gibbon tells us that in no inquiry connected with the early possessions of the Church can we avoid the entanglements that arise from dealing with falsehood. There was a period of the world in which the ingenuity, if not the piety, of monastic devotees appears to have exhausted itself in supplying the defects of history by the fabrication of grants which possibly they believed had been made, which at all events they were sure ought to have been made. These forgeries were not always consistent either with admitted facts or with themselves. But the age was an ignorant as well as a devout one, and its credulous piety accepted the fables, and overlooked the absurdities of these miracles of ancient munificence, with a faith as implicit and uninquiring as that with which it adopted the legendary marvels of the lives of the saints. The researches of modern inquiry, and it must be added, the candid rejection of these documents by the Roman Catholic writers of modern times, clear away from the

remote history of these territorial acquisitions much of the fable by which for centuries it was concealed.

The origin of the territorial sovereignty of the popes has been already referred to those transactions in which the territories of the Greek empire in Central Italy were seized by the Lombard kings, and recovered by Pepin; not for the Byzantine Cæsar, but for "St. Peter, the Church, and the Republic of Rome." Upon the use of the word "restitution" some writers have attempted to ground a theory, that even under the Greek empire they had been held by the Church. For

such a theory there exists no foundation. These provinces were wrested from the Roman territory by the Lombard monarch, and to the Roman territory they were restored. The fact that St. Peter, or his supposed representative, was substituted as the Roman authority for the imperial exarch, did not take from the transaction the character of restitution. The bishop succeeded to, or rather represented, the rights of the Roman republic—the name by which under all its varying forms of constitution, the Roman sovereignty was known. If any formal assent of the Roman people was necessary, we may readily believe that there was no difficulty in obtaining their consent to the vesting their restored territories in their bishop to whom they owed not only the recovery of Ravenna, but their own rescue from Lombard rule. Between the official of the Byzantine emperor, and their own ecclesiastical chief, it was hardly possible for the citizens of Rome to hesitate in their choice.

The exarchate of Ravenna and the district of the Pentapolis were the territory thus rescued by Pepin from

the usurpation of the Lombard king. In these provinces the pontiff took the place of the exarch. The exact limits of the exarchate were made the subject of controversy in later times.¹ It appears to have been identical, or nearly so, with the modern province of Romagna,² which acquired that name instead of its ancient one of Emilia, or Flaminia, to mark emphatically its re-annexation by Pepin to the Roman state.³ There were other possessions of "the Roman Republic" which had not passed under the usurpation of the Lombards. The duchy or prefecture of Rome itself, a district sometimes known as "the Holy Republic," occupied the Campagna to the south of the city ; to the north it extended but a few miles. The Sabine district was also subject to the prefect ; but still the hostile domain of the Duke of Spoleto interposed between the Roman territories and the imperial possessions on the Adriatic. On the shores of that sea the exarchate of Ravenna, and the district of the five cities, including all that country which afterwards formed the March of Ancona, constituted the dominions which the Roman empire had preserved in Central Italy from the former invasion of the Lombards.

The Duchy of Rome and the Sabine territory⁴ had

¹ Muratori—"De Regno Italiss. ejusque finibus."—*Antiq. Ital.*, tom. I, p. 56.

² If any reliance at all is to be placed upon ancient documents the provinces of Bologna and Ferrara were confirmed as part of the exarchate to the pontiffs by the early German emperors. These districts escaped the first invasion of the Lombards, but were added to the kingdom of the Pavian monarchs long before the iconoclast controversy. They still may have been included in the restitution which Pepin enforced.

³ Pollard Urquhart's Life of Sforza, vol. i. p. 19.

⁴ The Sabine territory is also mentioned in the charter of the first Otho, as forming part of the donation of Pepin.

continued under the authority of Rome; the Exarchate and the Pentapolis formed the subject of that which has been erroneously termed the donation of Pepin. When Charlemagne confirmed these possessions to the See of Rome, he is said to have added to them the Duchies of Spoleto and of Benevento, which, in the interim, he had wrested from their Lombard chiefs.

Whatever was the true nature of the rights of sovereignty conveyed to the Pontiff in these transactions, they would seem in practice to have been little more than nominal. The most valuable and most prized portion of the donations of Pepin were the wide and rich estates, over which the Church acquired a direct proprietary right. The lords of Romagna were, many of them, the very same barons who usurped by violence, in Rome, the control both of the city and the Papal See; and we may well believe, that in the provinces they were not likely to submit to any very effectual control. Among them the Pope appeared as their chief by the greater extent of his baronial lands; but his sovereign powers, if acknowledged at all, were of a very undefined nature. Free cities, feudal lords, and even the Archbishop of Ravenna, all asserted rights with which for centuries the see of Rome did not interfere.

A charter from Louis Debonnaire was said not only to have assured to the Popes the districts included in the grants of Charlemagne, but to have conferred upon them all Tuscan Lombardy, all Calabria, and Sicily, and Naples, together with Ferrara and Bologna, and the islands of Elba and Corsica; in a word, all Italy south

of the Po. Such a grant appears so manifestly framed to support the pretensions of later times, and is so entirely unsupported by any fact of possession, or even claim, that it may, at least in these extensive gifts, be classed with the decretals of Isidore and the donation of Constantine, among those strange contrivances not unusual in these ages, which have received the still stranger misnomer of "Pious frauds."

Several emperors confirmed to the Holy See the possessions of the exarchate, the Sabine land, and all that had been conferred by the donations of Charlemagne and Pepin. The enumeration of districts and cities in many of these unquestioned grants, was large enough and specific enough to include almost all that afterwards constituted the States of the Church—and some districts to which the Holy See has never yet succeeded in establishing its right. Without troubling ourselves with the controversy as to the true meaning of these grants, it must be acknowledged that the observation is a just one that they conveyed no real possession, and might well be regarded by those who made them as mere formalities. They contained, moreover, the reservation of imperial rights "salvā nostrā potestate et nostrorum posterorum," and whatever was the meaning either of the grant or the reservation, the exercise of undisputed sovereignty over these districts did not follow until a much later period in the history of the Papal See.

In the confusion that attended the obscure and doubtful titles of these remote periods we find, in the end of the eleventh century, the Countess Matilda inheriting in right of descent from her ancestors, and holding

as fiefs of the empire, very many of the districts which these early grants had conferred upon St. Peter. New and more extended claims to dominion arose from her celebrated bequest, or rather gift, of her possessions to the Church. Her great domains comprised the County, or, as it was even then called, Duchy of Tuscany, extending along the Tuscan sea to within a few miles of the city of Rome; and including Perugia and Imola within its limits; on the north it occupied all that is now the Duchy of Modena; to this had been added the district of Parma; while in the south with these territories she united the Duchy of Spoleto and the Marquisate of Ancona, although both had been, since the days of Charlemagne, nominally the possessions of the Holy See.⁵

The genius of Hildebrand exerted over the great Countess the influence which the union of intellect and devotion to the cause of the Church was calculated to acquire over a female mind that was perfectly capable of appreciating both. For the aged Pope Matilda entertained a veneration that was marked by a sincere and enthusiastic affection, and under his guidance she executed at Canosa, in 1077, a deed by which after her death all her possessions were to pass to the See of Rome. Matilda long survived her friend, and twenty-five years afterwards she ratified her first donation by a second deed, which was signed at Rome. A will is said to have been discovered by which she confirmed these

⁵ All these territories, including the Duchy of Spoleto and Marquisate of Ancona, were formally claimed by Pope Honorius IV. in right of the gift from the Countess Matilda.

dispositions immediately before her death. Critics the most hostile to Papal pretensions have admitted the genuineness of the deeds by which she disposed in a few short sentences of all her possessions of every kind, and gave to St. Peter and his successors all the worldly goods of which she had power to dispose.

It was asserted, and with truth, by the emperor, that those portions of her estates which she held by feudal tenure she had no right to alienate. Like most of the Italian princes, the Counts of Tuscany held domains by what was termed an allodial tenure, bound by no feudal right. The southern portion of Tuscany next the Duchy of Rome was held by this tenure. Allodial lands were known in Italy as "patrimonio," to distinguish them from estates held by service to a feudal lord. The districts lying between the Duchy of Rome and the Tuscan frontiers constituted the allodial lands or "patrimonio" of the great Countess ; and to this day the designation "Patrimony of St. Peter" perpetuates the memory of the right in which she conveyed these districts to the Apostolic See. It was, perhaps, the only part of her vast possessions to which her gift conveyed a valid title, although it appears to have escaped the attention of writers on this subject, that the Duchy of Spoleto never formed a part of the kingdom of Lombardy, and no origin was assigned of the feudal tenure under which she was assumed to have held it.⁶

⁶ "E gli eruditi sanno che Patrimonio vuol dire un bene allodiale come poderi case censi e non un bene signorile e demaniale come le città, castella e provincie dipendenti da principi."—*Muratori, Annali d'Italia, anno, 707.*

Allodial is elsewhere derived by Muratori from the German "All," and a Scando-Gothic word "lod" or "lood," signifying the profits or productions

The Countess Matilda died in 1115. The quarrel between Henry V. and Pope Paschal II. was not reconciled, when the rich prize of these vast possessions became a new subject of contest. Henry was the nearest relation and heir of Matilda, and he had a personal as well as imperial interest to protect. He refused even to recognise the gift of her allodial domains, and he entered Italy at the head of an army to enforce his rights. Paschal was driven from Rome. A new pontiff, of imperial nomination, crowned Henry a second time, and from prelates elevated to the tiara by himself no demand was made upon the emperor for a surrender of the lands included in the donation of Matilda.

On the coronation of Lothaire it would seem that the allodial possessions of Matilda, the Patrimony of St. Peter, were ceded to the Church. On that of Frederick Barbarossa, Adrian attempted, among other concessions, to extort from him the surrender of her feudal dominions. The attempt ended in a compromise, by which Frederick was permitted to retain them for fifteen years, engaging at the end of that period to give up to the Pope any of them to which he could establish his right—a condition quite vague enough never to be fulfilled.

Henry VI. had regarded all these provinces as

of a farm. "Patrimonium" or "allodiale" was opposed to "beneficium," which designated a feud.—*Muratori, Ital. Antiq.*, vol. i. p. 558.

This is the true meaning of the expression "Patrimony of St. Peter," which designates the district to the north-west of the city of Rome.

It is a mistake to interpret the words as meaning the inheritance; such a phrase, if applicable at all, would be equally so to any of the possessions of the Roman See.

unquestionably belonging to his imperial right. He granted the Duchy of Tuscany to his uncle ; in the Adriatic provinces he created a Duchy of Romagna for one of his German followers, a Duchy of Spoleto for a second, and a Marquisate of Ancona for a third.

The cruelties of which Henry was guilty in Sicily drew upon him the Papal sentence of excommunication, and excited against him the strongest feelings of indignation throughout Italy. The Tuscan league was formed, (A.D. 1197) nominally to sustain the cause of the Popes, in reality to prevent the emperor from destroying that independence which, on the death of Matilda, the cities of Tuscany had asserted. Just as Henry died the Papal throne was ascended (A.D. 1198), by a Pontiff whose character and ability eminently qualified him to turn a fortunate crisis to good account. The infancy of Frederick—the contest in Germany which ensued for the imperial crown—left the rights of the emperor in Italy almost unprotected. We have already seen Innocent avail himself of these circumstances to assert his sovereignty in the city. In Romagna and the Pentapolis he found his triumph still more easy. He sent into these provinces legates to claim the ancient rights of the Holy See. The people everywhere revolted against the usurpations of German power. The legates received the submission both of the cities and the lords. Some few tyrants, who had usurped their dominion, were expelled ; but generally no change took place in the government either of the provinces or the cities, which continued virtually independent. Upon the coronation of Otho IV., Innocent obtained

from him a recognition of the Papal sovereignty over these districts. Eleven years had been passed in the contest between Otho and his Ghibeline rival for the imperial crown, and when the chief of the Guelphs presented himself in 1209 for coronation at Rome, the Pope was able to obtain from him the recognition of the sovereignty which, both in the city and in the rural districts, he had assumed.

Innocent carried his claims to dominion to their utmost extent. He asserted the absolute sovereignty of the Pontiff over Rome. All that was included in the donation of Matilda he demanded as the right of the Holy See ; nor did he rest his right to extended territory solely on her bequest. Neither the disputed donation of Constantine, nor even that of Louis Debonnaire, appear to have been put forward by this prudent Pontiff. But the right of succession to the Greek empire and the grants of Pepin and Charlemagne formed the title upon which he chiefly rested, and Bologna, Ferrara, and even Parma and the district of Reggio, were all claimed as belonging to the Pontiffs, not only by the gift of Matilda, but by a far more ancient title, as forming part of the exarchate of Ravenna, and therefore included in the transfer of Astolph and Pepin, and in the donation by which Charlemagne confirmed the exarchate to the Pope.

Whatever were the professions of Otho when he sought for coronation, he afterwards refused to accede to the pretensions of Innocent. This refusal induced the Pontiff to put forward Frederick II. as a candidate for the imperial crown. The result of his success was

that desperate struggle in which the power of the empire in Italy was finally overthrown.

During the long and fierce contests which distracted the whole life of Frederick, and which ended years after his death in the overthrow of the House of Hohenstauffen, we could hardly expect to find any adjustment of the rival claims of the Papacy and the empire to the provinces of Central Italy. Neither pope nor emperor exercised over them any real supremacy. The cities were divided, as elsewhere, into Ghibeline and Guelph ; the feudal lords espoused one side or the other, as prejudice, or interest, or family traditions directed them. Many of these princes of Romagna accepted investiture of their honours from the Pope. Others adhered to the cause of the emperor. Some few were prudent enough to assure themselves by submitting to the form of investiture from both.

The elevation of Rudolph of Hapsburg created a new era in the history of the Papal claims. But it may with truth be said that also with that elevation a new empire began. With the downfall of the House of Hohenstauffen was broken the system which had been established by Leo and Charlemagne—that of a great confederation of Christendom, of which the Emperor was the temporal, as the Pontiff was the spiritual chief. The establishment of Papal independence severed the links which bound together the empire and the Church, and the very triumphs in which the Papal power asserted its separate and distinct sovereignty, were the destruction of that venerable polity by which its framers intended that all the Western World should be united in one great

confederation of Church and State. When the emperor resigned all power in Rome, the Holy Roman Empire survived only as a name.

Rudolph was elected emperor on the death of Richard Earl of Cornwall, in 1178. His election was part of the plan which Gregory X. had formed of reuniting all the Christian world in one common league for the overthrow of the Moslem power. Occupied solely in German politics, knowing nothing of Italy except in the superstitious dread with which he regarded all interference in its affairs, Rudolph easily surrendered to the Pontiff all his claims upon Rome and the provinces of the Church. His legates bore the renunciation to Gregory at Lyons, and a personal meeting between the emperor and the Pontiff at Lausanne confirmed the surrender, by which imperial prerogative formally withdrew from all conflict with the pretensions of the Church.

With the sudden death of Gregory passed away all the magnificent conceptions which the Council of Lyons seemed to have realised. Within a space of little more than six months three Popes were elected to the pontifical dignity, each following his predecessor to the grave with a rapidity that gave rise to the darkest tales of a superstitious age.⁷

Nicholas III. was in 1277 elected to the vacant chair. Upon his accession he found that the chancellor of the emperor had exacted the oath of allegiance from the

⁷ See table of the Popes. John XXI., the last of the three, was killed by the falling in of a roof in a magnificent chamber he had erected in the palace of Viterbo. The credulity of the age accepted the story which referred the falling of the roof to the immediate act of the evil one tearing down the pillars which supported it. The Pope was said to have been at the time engaged in magical incantations.

cities of Bologna, Imola, Faenza, Forli, Cesena, Ravenna, Rimini, and the towns of Umbria. Nicholas complained of this as a violation of the compact made with Gregory, and insisted on a new and more comprehensive deed, by which Rudolph formally surrendered all disputed territories to St. Peter. Corsica, Sardinia, and Sicily were included in this grant, which was solemnly attested by the signature of the great dignitaries of the empire.

Rudolph resigned all claims in the States of the Church as completely as he had done in Rome. Whatever were the titles and rights under which the Pontiff previously put forward pretensions to the provinces of Central Italy, all doubts were solved, and all defects were covered, by the comprehensive grant which was obtained from the weakness or the ignorance of Rudolph. All that was contained or supposed to be contained in the so-called donations of Pepin and Charlemagne, all that could be found in any charter, spurious or genuine, of the facile and good-natured Louis, all that had been given by the bequest of Matilda, were surrendered by the emperor in his horror of a collision with that power which had “consumed so many German kings;”⁸ and in the specific enumeration of cities and territories with which he was compelled to supplement and elucidate the sweeping gift of his charter are contained some, to which, even in the titles so indiscriminately confirmed, it would have been difficult for the advocates of the Popedom to find the foundation of a right.

Nicholas, one of the noble family of the Orsini, was known before his election as "the accomplished," and was regarded as the most cultivated gentleman of his age. Blameless in character, of great ability, and attended by all the gifts of high birth and exterior grace, he was eminently qualified to assert the Papal sovereignty over the territories from which imperial rivalry was thus removed. The result which on a former occasion attended the efforts of Innocent III., even more remarkably followed those of Nicholas III. Released from the obligations of their oath to the emperor, the cities everywhere readily took that of allegiance to the Pope. Throughout the whole of the Papal territories the supremacy of the Pope was acknowledged, and the pontifical legates, who were sent to every city and district, were able on their return to report the peaceful submission of all to the sovereignty of the Holy See.

But this, it must be observed, was the submission of cities and of lordships which, while they owned the Pope as their lord paramount, preserved a real and practical independence. Their relation to the court of Rome was the same as that which after the peace of Constance the cities of Lombardy held to the imperial crown. Nicholas made no attempt to interfere with the existing privileges and constitutions. The republics still continued free, and the feudal lords were virtually sovereigns within their own domains. In many instances a confirmation of freedom or privilege was granted as the condition of acknowledgment of the supremacy of the Pope. The great republic of Bologna, worn out by the dissensions of Guelph and Ghibeline within her walls,

submitted her differences to the arbitration of Nicholas; and a constitution was accepted from him in 1280, by which the nominal sovereignty of the Pope was acknowledged, but which was accompanied by a solemn guarantee of the freedom and self-government of the city. Never was there authority asserted by nobler means than that by which Nicholas exercised his new sovereignty over Romagna. His legates went upon a mission of peace and reconciliation. In every city the Guelphs and Ghibelines met before the Papal legates, and solemnly swore to abandon their feuds. In Bologna the great families whose dissensions had distracted the city were solemnly and publicly reconciled. A gorgeous ceremony convened the population at the gates of the palace, and in the presence of the prelates of the surrounding country, 500 of the principal citizens took an oath to live together in amity. The leaders of factions, long separated by a deadly hostility, embraced, and the sovereignty of the Pontiff was inaugurated as a reign of universal brotherhood and peace.

Nicholas had his faults. He provoked discontent in Romagna by confiscating some of the possessions of its nobles on the pretence of the heresy of their owners, and conferring them upon his own relations. His brother he created Count of Romagna, and his nephew he appointed Cardinal Bishop of Ostia. The latter was the great instrument in the reconciliations, and it was said that in every city where the Cardinal restored peace the Count contrived to usurp authority. Well, however, would it be for the world, if the steps of conquest were always those of peace, and if authority

were only acquired over mankind by teaching fellow-citizens to forget their feuds and live in amity with each other.

With the death of Nicholas in 1280, all his policy was reversed. Charles of Anjou, whose ambition Nicholas had sternly resisted, acquired the ascendancy in the College of Cardinals, and Martin IV., the new Pope, under the guidance of Charles, became the partisan of the Guelphs, and in the persecutions of the Ghibelines all the old animosities were revived. When the Pope, under the same French influence, withdrew to Avignon, the sovereignty, which the wisdom of Nicholas had succeeded in establishing, was lost. It must be remembered that even after the charter of Rudolph the Popes in many districts had only succeeded to that imperfect and scarcely acknowledged sovereignty which the emperors had exercised in these provinces as in other parts of Italy. Free cities existed within their limits, some of which had obtained confirmation of their privileges from the emperors. Great feudatory lords, like the D'Estes at Ferrara, and the house of Montefeltro at Urbino, held possessions which made them sovereign princes. Inferior lords preserved their castles and their jurisdictions throughout a country, over which the emperor had not exercised even a nominal sovereignty.⁹ In the

⁹ The following independent States are enumerated by an accurate writer as existing in the fifteenth century in the present Papal territory :

| | | |
|---------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Ferrara | held as a Marquisate by the | D'Este. |
| Bologna | Seigneuryst | Bentivoglii. |
| Ravenna | " | Polenta. |
| Imola | " | Alidosii and Sforza. |
| Faenza | " | Manfredi. |
| Forli | " | Ordelaffi and Riarii. |

tyrannies and distractions of their petty governments these provinces were subject to evils even worse than those which afflicted the rest of Italy. Nowhere were the contentions of Guelphs and Ghibelines more fierce. Nowhere were cities more torn by the violence of their internal feuds. Even in distracted Italy, these Romagnese provinces were notorious for their disorders. Romagnol faith became, like that of Carthage, a byword to express perfidy and deceit. The miserable occupants of the country were ravaged in the wars which the lords were in the habit of waging against each other—the inhabitants of the towns were involved in the persecutions that followed each revolution in the ascendancy of Ghibeline and Guelph. From one and only one evil of the declining days of Italy these districts were exempt. Their nobles were bold and warlike as well as perfidious and cruel. They fought their own battles, and scorned to employ the services of mercenary troops. The exemption was perhaps compensated in the balance of evil by the

| | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| Cesena | Seigneur by the | Malatesta. |
| Rimini | " | Malatesta. |
| Pesaro | " | Malatesta and Sforza. |
| Fano | " | Malatesta. |
| Urbino | Dukedom | Montefeltro. |
| S. Angelo | Seigneur | Brancalone. |
| Citta di Castello | " | Vitelli. |
| Perugia | " | Baglioni. |
| Assisi | Republic. | |
| Foligno | " | |
| Spoletto | Dukedom, not hereditary. | |
| Camerino | Seigneur by the | Varana. |
| Fermo | " | Fogliani. |
| Ancona | Republic. | |
| Sinigaglia | Seigneur by the | della Rovere. |
| Mercatello | Countship | Brancalone. |

—Dennistoun's "History of the Dukes of Urbino," vol. i. p. 17.

result. Italian “companies of adventurers” were formed in these provinces, and the Romagnol lords became themselves the captains of condottieri.¹⁰

It might indeed be said that the grant of Rudolph gave to the Pontiffs a sovereignty not unlike that which the donation of Adrian conferred in Ireland upon the English king, a nominal dominion over a country divided among a number of independent principalities, over which the centralising influence of the lord paramount was gradually made supreme. A work which was effected only by slow degrees and at considerable intervals of time.

Once free from all competition of the imperial power, the Pontiffs possessed without dispute this nominal sovereignty over provinces, in which the barons and the cities had the real government. The process by which the central authority crushed in time these petty jurisdictions, was nearly the same in the Papal dominions as that by which the result has been accomplished in other States. There was the same lawlessness to be suppressed. In the accomplishment of this the same crimes and cruelties were perpetrated, and neither in the character of the instruments by which the subjugation of the country was effected, nor yet in that of the means which were used, can the Papal government boast any exemption from the disgrace and the guilt by which so often sovereign power has established its dominion on the ruins of municipal and local independence.

It was during the residence of the Papal Court at

¹⁰ Mariotti's “History of Italy.”

Avignon that the first effort appears to have been made to convert this nominal sovereignty into an effectual control over the Papal States. About the period when Rienzi in Rome essayed to curb the licentiousness of the barons, Clement VI. made an attempt to reduce Romagna to order (A.D. 1343). His attempt under Hector Durfort failed, but his successor, Innocent VI., renewed it. Cardinal Egidio Albornoz was sent there as Papal legate, with a commission to establish the Papal authority (A.D. 1353). All historians bear witness to the skill, and many of them to the unscrupulousness, with which he played off the jealousies and rivalries of the cities and the nobles to attach them, or subject them, in turns to the Papal rule.¹¹ It must at the same time be acknowledged, that he often attained his object by the simple expedient of offering good government to the oppressed. Cities admitted Papal vicars to gain protection against their tyrant lords. Bologna escaped from its subjugation to the rule of the Visconti by accepting a free government from the legate of the Pope. Eleven years were spent in these efforts, and the Papal treasures freely dispensed ; but when subsequently, in 1367, Urban V. came to Rome, the haughty cardinal was able to answer the Pope's demand for an account of the money he had received, by sending to him a waggon laden with the keys of the cities which had surrendered to his rule.¹²

¹¹ Percival's Italy, vol. i. chap. v. part 2; Raynaldi, *Annales, 1353-1367.* Matteo Villani; Sismondi, vol. iv. p. 300.

¹² "Albornoz, on his arrival in Italy, found only the two castles of Montefiascone and Montefeltro in obedience to the Pope. When Urban came to Italy all the cities of Romagna, of La Marca, of Umbria, and of the Patrimony were

The submission of Romagna was not of long duration ; the French legates appointed by the papal court at Avignon were unpopular with the Italians. An attempt to reduce Florence under the papal authority involved the See of Rome in a war with that republic, and the Florentine troops marched into Romagna, displaying the word "liberty" on their banners.

The oppressions of the Papal legates had provoked an almost universal insurrection against ecclesiastical rule. The cardinal legate fled from Bologna in disguise. The Visconti, all-powerful in Lombardy, encouraged the revolt of the Papal States. Naples and Florence united with Milan in the attempt to free Romagna from the government of the absent pontiffs. Lucca, true to her Ghibeline traditions, added her strength to that of this new league. Even Viterbo raised the banner of freedom. In vain it was that Sir John Hawkwood and his band of English adventurers were taken into the pay of the Church. Massacres at Forli and Faenza failed to terrify into submission the refractory Romagnols. Their resistance became more determined with the cruelties by which it was attempted to coerce them, and within a few days the population marked their detesta-

in obedience to the Holy See. The Pope having asked the Cardinal for an account of the money which he had expended during his long administration, he sent him in answer a carriage laden with the keys of the towns and castles which had submitted to him. Immediately after Urban's return to Italy Albornoz died at Viterbo, the 24th of August, 1367. He carried with him the regrets of the court of Rome and of the people, who in consideration of his rare abilities, overlooked the strange union of the functions of a military commander and a prelate.—*Siomondi*, vol. iv. p. 377.

"The town of Orvieto had recognised Albornoz as its direct lord; at the death of the legate it ceded itself to the Pope by deliberation of its general council, without any reservation of its liberties.—*Chronicles of Orvieto*.

tion of the atrocities of Hawkwood by an almost simultaneous rising. In the short space of a week eighty cities, fortresses, and castles had united themselves to the ranks of those who had cast off allegiance to the Pope.

Albornoz was dead, and the violent counsels of his successors knew only one method of reclaiming the people to the submission they had cast off. Cardinal Robert of Geneva represented the Papal authority in the revolted provinces, and under the advice of this violent and sanguinary man, Gregory XI. despatched into the Roman States a ferocious band of mercenary Bretons, to act under his command, A.D. 1376. The company of Bretons was the last of the companies of adventure that existed in France. Raised principally in that province of France which still bore the name of Britain, its ranks were also largely recruited by Englishmen. The company of Sir John Hawkwood, reinforced by these new adventurers, reduced some few towns of Romagna to a temporary submission, but at the cost of cruelties which have left an indelible stain upon the perpetrators.

The atrocities of Robert of Geneva are still remembered with horror; repulsed from Bologna, he sent a message to the inhabitants that he would yet bathe his hands and feet in their blood. Crespelano, Oliveto and Monteveglia were pillaged by the Bretons and then given to the flames. The inhabitants of Pesaro were put to the sword by these ferocious brigands, who fought under the banners of the Church, and were commanded by one of its princes.

The treatment of Cesena is the transaction which

marks the annals of this period with the deepest stain of blood. The Bretons had been admitted to winter quarters in the city, and by their insults to the inhabitants provoked a conflict, in which 300 of the mercenaries were killed. The rest were driven into one quarter of the town. They were re-admitted to their old quarters upon a distinct promise of an amnesty. Scarcely had the gates been opened to them when the Bretons commenced an indiscriminate butchery of the unsuspecting inhabitants. Hawkwood and his English were sent for to Faenza, and commanded to join in the intended massacre. The Englishman hesitated, but the cardinal exclaimed, "I will have blood." The scenes that followed were those of barbarous and inhuman slaughter. All the chronicles of the period are filled with hideous details of these sanguinary atrocities, which on such occasions have too often revealed the tiger-like ferocity that lurks in the nature of man. Innocent infants were dragged from their cradles to be dashed against the walls or to be strangled or impaled before the eyes of their mothers. The vengeance of the Bretons for their comrades was glutted in gore ; the streets were filled with the bodies of the slain. In the midst of these horrors, contemporary historians tell us, was heard the voice of the cardinal himself issuing his orders—" Kill, kill them all." The sanguinary commands were almost literally obeyed. Priests fled in vain to the churches—no protection was found in the monastery or the convent. All were put to the sword without regard to character, or sex, or age. Five thousand of the inhabitants were butchered ;

the few who escaped are said to have owed their lives to the humanity of Hawkwood's adventurers, who contented themselves with the booty of the houses, and aided their wretched inmates to escape.¹³

¹³ "Le cardinal avec une atroce perfidie devoua Cesene a un massacre universel. Non content de lacher ses feroes Bretons dans la ville, il appela encore Hawkwood, qui avec les Anglais etait a Faenza; et comme ce capitaine hésitait a concourrer a ce crime, le cardinal lui dit: 'Je veux du sang, du sang.' Pendant que le massacre durait, on l'entendit souvent crier, 'Tuez les tous.' En effet personne ne fut épargné. Les Bretons saisissaient par les pieds les enfants a la mamille, et ils écrasaient leurs têtes contre les murs. Les prêtres, les religieux, les vierges consacrées aux autels, tout furent passée au fil de l'épée: cinque mille personnes perirent dans cette horrible boucherie."—*Sismondi*, vol. iv. p. 422.

The worst and most horrifying portions of this description are fully borne out by chronicles above suspicion. *Chronicon Estense*, p. 500; *Poggio Bracciolini*, tom. ii. p. 236; *Chronicon Riminense*, tom. xv. p. 916. *Chronicon Sanese*, p. 253. They justify the observation quoted by Cardinal Baronius, that a vengeance so savage and atrocious would have disgraced, not to say a Prelate of the Church bearing the commission of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, but Herod or Nero.

Cardinal Baronius quotes the record of these authorities from St. Antoninus.

"Ut vero Robertus verborum lenociniis civilem tumultum compescuerit, ac deinde insigni crudelitate excitis Anglis Cæsenates nullo statis sexus discrimine ferro conciderit, describit sanctus author subjectis verbis: 'Arcem in eâ munitissimam tenebat Gebennensis; qui veritus ne civitas ad hostes deficeret, indignationem dissimulabat, nihilque sinistrum de Cæsenatum facto loquebatur; sed eos multa perpessos indigne, merito simul necessarioque ajebat arma corripuisse: verum ea deponere tandem et ad sua redire suadebat. His verbis confisi Cæsenates arma deposuere. Accitis autem propere Anglorum copiis, et cum Britonibus conjunctis, per ipsam arcem eas contra populum inermem deceptumque immisit. Britones vero irati cædem suorum ulisci properantes, neque statim neque sexui pepercerunt, miseram et innocuam multitudinem trucidantes crudelissime. Angli autem cum eis magis insisterant rapinæ civitatis, unde et Cæsenates ipsos admonebant ad fugiendum e civitate, vix enim aliqui alii evaserunt nisi a civitate recessentes: tauta fuit crudelitas Britonum, ut et lactentes de cunis extraherent, capita eorum ad parietes contundentes, aliquos alios strangulantes, reliquos perforantes, ipsos occisos alligantes ad ostia domorum. Strate plene erant cadaveribus et sanguinibus. Juxta patres reperiabantur filii interempti; secus germanos fratres eorum; et cum uxoribus viri. Numerus autem occisorum fuisse dicitur tria millia, secundum aliquos quinque millia. Dominus autem Robertus dux exercitus ecclæsiae hæc fieri sinebat quasi non curans, forte sperans civitatem vacuam remanentem ad ejus dominium perventuram, siut postmodum accidit. Et ubi Britones hoc egerunt in vindictam, ut inde ab aliis civitatibus

These cruelties but made the resistance of the Florentines and their allies the more determined. Gregory was neither a cruel nor a bad man, and his conscience was ill at ease when there reached him in his tranquil retreat at Avignon the rumours of the atrocities which were committing in Italy in his name. Reproaches were uttered by some of the bishops in his neighbourhood against the absence of the chief bishop from his see. The inspired fanaticism of a woman urged her to perform a pilgrimage from Florence to Avignon, to implore the Pope by his presence to give peace to Italy. St. Catharine of Sienna—the fame of whose sanctity had spread to the remotest regions, and on whose person it was implicitly believed were repeatedly seen the mysterious marks which attested the extasy of her contemplations—appeared before Gregory to entreat his return to his see. In spite of the opposition of his cardinals, the Pontiff set out on his journey to Rome. Universal enthusiasm greeted him as he sailed up the Tiber. An attempt to make peace with Florence was left to be completed by

timerentur, citiusque se eis traderent, ne paterentur talia; oppositum inde sequutum est: nam tanto horrore omnibus Italicis hoc fuit, ut magis animarentur ad repugnandum eis, ne aliquando devenirent ad manus tam immatum ferarum. Et si legatus ad hoc illos induxit, ut dicitur, cum tamen sub jurejurando promisisset Cessenatibus securitatem, ut deponerent arma ne dum prælatum ecclesiasticum, vice tenentem vicarii Jesu Christi, sed Herodem et Neronem dedecuisse tam sevissima sclestaque vindicta."

Baronius indignantly remarks that this very cardinal—"this man of blood"—was a short time afterwards elevated by the schismatic cardinals to the chair of the Anti-Pope. Robert of Geneva, under the not very appropriate title of Clement VII, was the author of the great schism, the first of the Avignon Popes.

"Hæc fuere Roberti egregia illa facinora quæ postea Cardinales apostatas ad virum sanguinarium, promptumque ad omne scelus, creandum anti-Papam indicto Clementis illi nomine permoverant."—Baronius, anno 1877.

his successor. It is some evidence that the Pontiff disavowed the sanguinary policy of his legate, that in the short interval which elapsed between his arrival in Italy and his death, he granted a charter, still preserved in the archives of Bologna, confirming the liberties and the independence of that city.

Gregory died soon after his arrival in Italy. But the mission of St. Catharine had not been in vain. The Pope was restored to Rome. On his death the conclave was held in the pontifical city, and Urban VI., an Italian cardinal, was nominated as his successor. The election of that successor provoked the great schism of the West, and while rival Popes at Rome and Avignon disputed the right to the tiara, the authority of neither was respected in the Italian States. The self-government of Bologna was recognised in solemn charters, both by Martin IV. and Nicholas V. Eugene IV., to obtain even a partial recognition of his authority in Romagna, was compelled to purchase the services of the first of the Sforzas by granting him the investiture of the Marquisate of Ancona.¹⁴

The history of the free cities within the Papal States does not differ from that which has already been sketched in the general account of the rise and fall of the Italian municipalities. Several of the cities now subject to the dominion of Rome had been members of the Lombard league. Like their more northern allies, they had municipal constitutions which had come down through the vicissitudes of centuries from the traditions of Roman freedom ; like those, in the absence of supreme authority,

¹⁴ Dennistoun's "Dukes of Urbino;" Pollard Urquhart's "Life of Francesco Sforza."

they were able to assert a practically independent government, and Bologna, Ferrara, Perugia, and Imola, had their privileges and rights as well defined and as carefully guarded as those of Padua or Verona. The same vices and factions which destroyed freedom elsewhere prevailed in the Emilian towns and those of Southern Tuscany, and the captains of the people became the lords of Ferrara and Bologna as they did of Milan and Mantua.

Ferrara became subject to the lords of the house of Este, and continued in subjugation to them until the extinction of that family placed the city under the direct government of the Holy See. Bologna, of all the Italian cities has preserved the clearest accounts of the vicissitudes of its freedom. Those vicissitudes present something like an epitome of the history of Papal conquests, and even if modern events had not added a special interest to the story of the second city of the Papal States, that story were worth recording as representing in its main features that of many a city within the dominions of the Church.

Bologna, more manifestly than most of the Italian towns, could trace its municipal institutions to the citizenship of Rome. At an early period it obtained from the empire the recognition of its rights. In one of the early years of the twelfth century a charter of the Emperor Henry V. confirmed to the Bolognese some privileges of practical sovereignty, including the right of a civic militia and of coinage, which the peace of Constance, many years after, wrung from the humbled Barbarossa for all Italian towns. The charter of Henry

in all probability was granted as the price of the adherence of Bologna to the imperial standard in the dispute for the inheritance of Matilda between the empire and the Pope.

The Bolognese were true, nevertheless, to the cause of freedom, and when Frederick I. attempted to invade the privileges of the Italian cities, Bologna became one of the most active and prominent members of the Lombard league. In the struggles between the Papacy and the empire it continued steadfast to the cause of the Popes. It was in a battle with the Bolognese that Hensius, the son of the second Frederick, was made prisoner, and in the long struggles with the Ghibelines, Imola and all the cities of Emilia were compelled by the arms of the republic, to submit to the dominion of the Guelphs.

Bologna occupied in Emilia the same position that Milan did in Lombardy. If it was inferior to the capital of the north or to Florence, in manufactures—if it yielded to Genoa, or to Pisa in commerce—it far exceeded these and all Italian cities in the glories of that university which gave it its epithet of “learned,” and from which no small portion of its greatness and its wealth was derived. It is scarcely possible to believe that there is not exaggeration in the accounts that are given of the number of students from all parts of Europe who were at one time receiving their education in this far-famed school.¹⁵ To the influence of this great university we may possibly trace the almost undeviating adherence of the city to the interests of the Holy See.

That influence was not sufficient to prevent the exist-

¹⁵ Fifteen thousand, according to Simondi, vol. iii. p. 348.

ence within its walls of the factions that elsewhere distracted Italy. Here, as in other cities, the rival bands of Guelphs and Ghibelines ranged themselves under opposing families. The Lambertazzi were the leaders of the Ghibelines, the Geremei of the Guelphs. Italian history is everywhere interwoven with romance. Upon the historic page the events of real life stand out in all the colouring of human passions and human crime which glows in the most impressive pictures of the novelist. Fiction supplies nothing to impress the imagination so powerfully as the doom of Ugolino in the tower of Famine. Some of the noblest efforts of dramatic genius have found in the records of Italian story the incidents to which even that genius could add nothing more calculated than the recital of the facts to command the impulses and sway the sympathies of the human heart. In Bologna occurred a tragic scene, almost the counterpart of that which has immortalised Verona in the loves of Romeo and Juliet, and the hatreds of the houses of Capulet and Montague. The passion formed by one of the Guelph Geremei for the daughter of the chief of the Ghibelines led to a revolution at Bologna, a revolution which caused in its immediate result the first acknowledgment by the city of the sovereignty of the Roman See.

The story as related in the chronicles of Bologna is a short one. Imilda, the daughter of the Ghibeline chieftain, had given her heart and her affections to a scion of the house to which all political and all hereditary principles ought to have taught her the lesson of uncompromising hatred. Her lover, who

visited her in secret, was surprised in one of their stolen interviews by her indignant brothers. He was stabbed in her chamber, and the narratives heighten the effect by representing that the wound was inflicted by a dagger steeped in the deadly poison, the secret of which the Crusaders had learned from the Old Man of the Mountains in the East. The victim was dragged by his murderers to one of the corridors of the mansion, where Imilda traced him by the marks of his life-blood. In the agony of her grief she attempted to recal his ebbing life by sucking, like Eleanor of England, the poison from his wound ; she succeeded only in imbibing its deadly venom into her own frame, and two corpses lay in the passages of the lordly mansion of the Lambertazzi.¹⁶

An attempt to conceal the bodies was detected, and the baffled effort gave to the transaction an appearance blacker even than the reality. The populace, in whose imagination the incidents were heightened by every exaggeration, demanded vengeance on the murderers. The Lambertazzi endeavoured to strengthen themselves by alliances with Modena and the Ghibeline towns at enmity with Bologna. The issue was decided by civil war ; a bloody combat, that made the streets of the city for four days run with blood, terminated at last in the expulsion of the Lambertazzi from Bologna. The whole Ghibeline party were implicated in this ruin. One sweeping sentence of banishment exiled twelve thousand citizens from their homes. Those homes were pillaged and levelled to the ground, and a confiscation of all their property enriched the coffers of the

¹⁶ *Chronicon Bononiense.* *Sismondi*, vol. ii. p. 488.

state, now exclusively given up to the management of their foes.

This banishment of the Ghibelines occurred in 1273. The exiled citizens took refuge in the neighbouring cities, and under the guidance of Guido of Montefeltro were on the point of reducing Bologna beneath their sway. It was this unnatural war which was ended by the mediation of Pope Nicholas III, in 1279, and in the reconciliation which ensued, the supremacy of the Pontiff over Bologna was by both the parties recognised. The brother of the Pope was named as their podesta by the citizens grateful for the restoration of the blessings of domestic peace.

Acknowledging the supremacy of the Pope, the city still preserved, like many others of the Romagnese, its municipal independence, and Bologna can boast of a longer and more uninterrupted enjoyment of freedom than fell to the lot of most Italian towns. In 1327 it surrendered its liberties to the legate of the Pope, who was appointed lord of the city. A few years of this government ended in a revolt (A.D. 1334) and in the disorders which followed, the rich family of the Pepoli contrived (A.D. 1338) to assume the mastery of the state.¹⁷

In 1343, when first Hector Dunfort appeared in Romagna, two brothers, the Pepoli, who were lords of Bologna, aided him with a contingent. The treacherous imprisonment of one of the brothers at the time when he was a guest in the camp of the Papal legate, determined the lords of Milan upon a transaction as singular as any which even the annals of Italy record. The principal

¹⁷ Sismondi, vol. iii. p. 463.

citizens were sent to Florence as a deputation to negotiate with that republic a peace which was to have the effect of restoring Bologna to the jurisdiction of the Pope. Their absence was planned to enable the Pepoli to carry out an engagement into which they had entered for the sale of Bologna to Visconti the Archbishop of Milan, who was already making himself master of all Northern Italy. The populace were indignant at the bargain, but in the absence of their leaders they contented themselves with mere demonstrations of rage. Fifteen hundred of the troops of Visconti took possession of the town, and when the ambassadors returned from Florence they found the sale was completed and Gian Galeazzo Visconti already acknowledged as lord of Bologna. Almost immediately followed the strange reconciliation between the Pope and the rebellious Archbishop, which ended in a second purchase of the betrayed Bolognese. The Pontiff received 100,000 florins for granting investiture to Visconti as their lord. An equal sum is said to have been spent by the wily Archbishop in winning over the courtiers of both sexes who surrounded the Pope. The keys of the city were dutifully surrendered and as graciously returned, and Visconti held Bologna as a fief of the Holy See, and by an annual tribute of 12,000 florins.

The dominion of the Visconti continued until 1360. In that year Cardinal Albornoz contrived to obtain from Galeazzo Visconti, then the tyrant of Bologna, a surrender of the city to the Papal See, and weary of the oppression they had endured, the citizens of Bologna accepted with unusual joy their restoration to that

which they had only known as the mild and liberal government of the Church.

Their joy was but of short duration. Strange rulers succeeded to Albornoz in 1377. Their ancient liberties were not restored. The oppression of the legates sent from Avignon drove them, along with the rest of the Romagnese, into revolt. On the 20th of March, 1376, a revolution was effected. The Papal legate, indebted for his life to the protection of its leaders, took refuge in a convent. A republic was proclaimed, and Bologna joined the league of Florence in asserting the liberties of Central Italy against the Church.

The Bolognese sternly resisted the efforts of the Cardinal Robert of Geneva. To his demand that they should submit to the authority of the Holy See, they replied that never again would they admit within their walls those by whom they had been betrayed and deceived. They defied him when he threatened that his next visit would be to bathe his hands and feet in their blood, and the massacre of Cesena, instead of terrifying them into submission, but animated their resolution to resist to the last.

The power of the Church was on the point of falling before the formidable combination which the oppression of the French legates provoked. It was only preserved by the appearance of Gregory himself at Rome. The Pontiff repudiated the blood-stained policy of his inhuman representative. The first result of his arrival was a peace with Bologna, signed at Anagni, on the 21st of August, 1377. By this treaty, which may be regarded as the foundation of the relations between Bologna and

the Papacy, the citizens agreed to receive a Papal Vicar, but, on the other hand, the Pontiff conceded to them privileges which left them in possession of the self-government which they prized. The tranquillity which this constitution gave them did not last. In the weakness of the Papal power which followed the secession to Avignon, the authority of the Papal Vicar was entirely disregarded. Bologna was the scene of all the factions, the plots, and the intrigues which marked the politics of Italian towns. The feuds of rival factions resulted as usual in the exile of one and the ascendancy of the other ; the exiles regained their country by intrigue, and finally in the result of civil discord, one great citizen made himself master of the state.

Gian Bentivoglio was the citizen who then contrived to usurp the government of his native city. His reign was of short duration. In 1401 he proclaimed himself lord of Bologna ; the very next year he was assailed by the army of Gian Galeazzo, the newly constituted Duke of Milan. The Bolognese civic militia refused on the field of battle to fight for the tyrant, and Bologna was added to the Romagnol acquisitions of the Duke of Milan. The ascendancy of Visconti was as short-lived as that of Bentivoglio, and in 1403 the Bolognese once more found refuge from domestic tyrants and from foreign oppression in submitting to the more liberal government of the Papal See.

A century, however, elapsed before Bologna was reduced to permanent submission to Rome. This interval was distinguished by revolts against the Papal authority, establishing for periods more or less protracted,

republican government, varied by submission to the lordship of the Bentivoglii.

Whenever the Popes regained their ascendancy in the city, it was by granting charters which recognised its municipal self-government. Several charters are extant of Martin V., in which the old form of government by Ancients, by Gonfalonieri, and by the Masters of the Trades, is distinctly recognised. In the archives of Bologna is still preserved one from Nicholas V., dated in the year 1447, in which all the ancient privileges of the city are solemnly guaranteed—a government in accordance with its own municipal laws is secured—the separation of the municipal exchequer from that of the Apostolic Chamber is provided for—the election of all officers by the people is confirmed, and finally the city and the provinces that had submitted to it, are permitted the privilege of defending themselves by an army of their own.

The charter of Nicholas received the sanction of a Papal Bull, and the privileges and liberties of Bologna were placed under the protection of the anathema—the usual penalty attached to every Papal Bull—which threatened all who would dare to infringe their liberties with the vengeance of the Almighty, and the apostles Peter and Paul.¹⁸

Nor is this the only instance in which the liberties of

¹⁸ "Nos igitur conventiones capitula et pacta hujusmodi pro eorum subsistentia firmiore, ex certa scientia, auctoritate apostolica, tenore presentium confirmamus et presentis scripti patrocinio sancimus. Nulli igitur hominum licet hanc paginam nostrae confirmationis et munitionis infringere vel ei temerarie contraire. Si quis vero hoc attentare præsumperit, indignationem omnipotentis Dei et beatorum apostolorum ejus Patri et Pauli se sciatis incursum."—*Bull of Nicholas V. Bullarium Romanum.*

Bologna were guaranteed under the authority of the leaden seal and the penalty of the Apostles' wrath. It were tedious to trace the changes and chances of Bolognese politics through all the vicissitudes of the troublous times that preceded the conquest of Romagna by Cæsar Borgia and Julius II. But the official collection of the pontifical acts informs us that in the very first year of his pontificate Alexander VI. confirmed by another bull the privileges which Nicholas V. had guaranteed to the faithful city of Bologna,¹⁹ and the bull of Julius II. in 1503, in addition to the last one of Alexander, recites similar charters of Calixtus, of Pius, of Paul, of Innocent;²⁰ and if the anathema of the Church could add security to the Bolognese charters, they are both by Alexander and Julius fortified by the menaces of Divine and Apostolic vengeance upon their impugners.

On the 11th of November, 1506, Pope Julius made his triumphant entry into Bologna. Although the constitution of the governing body was changed by entrusting the executive government to a senate of forty members holding their places for life, but upon each vacancy nominated by the Pope, Bologna still preserved its municipal government. Yet from this period it ceased to be reckoned among the sovereign states of Italy, and its citizens contented themselves with that semblance of freedom which was left to them under the solemn charters by which successive Pontiffs had professed to secure their independence.

Bologna, in the days of its republican grandeur had

¹⁹ Bullarium Romanum : Coquelines.—*Bull of Alexander VI.*, 1492.

²⁰ Bullarium Romanum : Coquelines.—*Bull of Julius II.*, 1503.

extended its dominion over a wide extent of territory in its neighbourhood. With the subjugation of the chief city, and upon the same conditions, all the country that had been subject to the republic, submitted once more to the authority of the Pope. By means somewhat similar, the Papal authority was established over the whole of the Romagnese provinces.

Under the constitution finally conceded by Julius, the Bolognese continued, to the period of the French revolution, to enjoy, in harmony with submission to the Papal See, a large amount of nominal, and no inconsiderable share of real, independence. Their last revolt gave occasion to the change which vested the government of the city in a senate of forty, in which all vacancies were filled up on the nomination of the Pope ; but as the members of that body, once nominated, held their places for life, they were independent of the power by which they were created ; and the short duration of the pontifical reigns supplied some security against the creation of a party in the senate to carry out the designs of the Pope. In the senate were vested the appointment of all municipal officers. A Papal legate was nominally the governor ; but he was bound in all respects to follow the statutes of the city, and not to take any step except with the assent of the civic authorities. A still more stringent stipulation provided for the removal of any legate whom those authorities might represent to the Pontiff as having become obnoxious to the Bolognese. In everything, except the right of electing the senate, the people of Bologna were virtually independent. In a separate exchequer, in the privilege

of a civic militia, in the prerogative of coining money, Bologna possessed some of the powers which are generally held to mark most peculiarly a sovereign state. At the Papal Court a regularly accredited minister represented the republic as an independent power. With these privileges, with the guarantee of the observance of her ancient laws, Bologna, in submitting to the protection of the Pontiffs, may yet be said to have preserved her independence to the last.

In following the fortunes of Bologna, we must not forget the history of the subjugation of the other provinces of the Papal States.

Their condition between the return of the Popes from Avignon and the conquests of Cæsar Borgia and Julius II., illustrates strikingly the state of Roman society and the influences with which Papal power had to contend. The country close to Rome was almost entirely under the dominion of two powerful families, the Orsini and the Colonna. The Orsini on the north were masters of "the Patrimony;" the Colonna lorded it over the Campagna and the Sabine land. The Orsini were the leaders of the Guelphs, the Colonna of the Ghibelines. The minor nobility ranged themselves under the banner of one faction or the other. Constant and bloody encounters desolated the soil. Agriculture was driven from the plains. The vineyards were torn up in the destructive ravage of some predatory baron—fire and sword laid waste the labours of the husbandman. The farmhouse disappeared from districts in which no unprotected home was safe. A few fortified villages and the castles

of any of the gentry who were rich enough to dwell in defended mansions, were the only habitations of men. Even the primeval brushwood that skirted the country, and which is believed by many to have stayed the advance of the mephitic vapours, was consumed in the burnings of these revengeful forays. Certain it is, that the *malaria* of the desert crept in its poisonous march over the abandoned plain ; and the blank desolation of that plain to this day bears witness against the crimes that banished industry and population from its surface.²¹

In the other provinces, although equal desolation did not follow, an equal anarchy reigned. In many of the cities of the Romagnese, republican institutions existed ; in others, persons who had been placed there as Papal Vicars, assumed the position of sovereigns, subject only to a tribute to the Pontifical treasury, which was promised, but never paid. The valley of the Tiber was occupied by the lordships of Perugia and Citta di Castello, both of which had been seized on by adventurers. All the States of the Church were covered, in fact, with petty sovereignties. Venice had taken advantage of the decline of Papal authority to acquire influence, and even territory, in Romagna. In 1441 the Venetians had obtained Ravenna from the family of the Polenta by fraud, and soon after Cesena had been wrested by them from the Malatesta.²²

Nothing could be worse than the state of many parts of the country under the tyranny of their lords. The

²¹ Sismondi, vol. viii. p. 182.

²² Sismondi, vol. viii. p. 183, has given us an elaborate statement of the political condition of the Romagna, at the period of the grant to Caesar Borgia. The general result is stated in the text.

princely races of Romagna had, in fact, given to their subjects frequent examples of parricide, poisoning, and treacheries of every sort. The higher nobility too deemed vengeful cruelty a proof of independence ; and even in the villages hereditary hatred was cherished by the leaders of contending factions and gratified by savage atrocities. Numerous bands of cut-throats were ever ready to be employed in aggression or defence, and enmities were seldom satisfied so long as one of any age or sex survived of the detested House. We are assured that when Arcimboldo, Archbishop of Milan, and Cardinal of Santa Prassede, went as legate to Perugia and Umbria, he found there a nobleman, who after dashing against a wall the heads of some of the children of his foe, and strangling their mother who was pregnant, nailed to the door a surviving infant in trophy of his revenge. This atrocity did not appear to his neighbours anything strange.²³

Such a condition of these provinces almost justified the employment of any means to reduce under regular government the country that was the scene of these frightful disorders.

To the profligate ambition of Alexander VI., it presented the means of aggrandising his favourite and guilty son. A principality was formed, under the title of the Duchy of Romagna, of which Cæsar Borgia received the grant. Its confirmation was obtained with difficulty even from the debased and subservient cardinals.

²³ Sismondi, vol. viii. p. 187. The vices of the Romagnol princes had become a bye-word. Dante's Inferno, Cantos, 27 and 33; Dennistoun's "Dukes of Urbino," vol. i. p. 285; Macchiavelli's "History of Florence," vol. i. p. 280; Ferrari, *Revolutions de l' Italié*. Vol. iv.

nals of whom the consistory of Alexander was composed. The object of subjugating the province was pursued by the means which the character of Borgia might lead us to expect. Perfidy and murder were the instruments of his success. The family of Borgia were of the faction of the Guelphs. The Guelph chieftains were employed to crush the Ghibelines, only to find themselves in turn betrayed by their faithless ally. The friends of to-day were the victims of the enmities of to-morrow, and poisonings and assassination removed those whether friends or foes who stood in the way of his designs.²⁴ Yet these, it must be remembered, were crimes against the princes, not against the people. Loaded with personal infamy, as is the memory of Cæsar Borgia, he was not destitute in his lifetime either of popularity, or of the qualities by which it is attained. From policy or from inclination he endeavoured, as he betrayed and murdered these petty tyrants, to give good government to the people whom he rescued from their cruel rule ; and the progress of his arms in Romagna was hailed by the commonalty as the triumph of their deliverance from intolerable oppression.²⁵ The Pontifical See, and it must be added,

²⁴ For the history of the crimes committed by Cæsar Borgia in Romagna, see Percival's "Italy," chap. viii. part 1; Dennistoun's "Dukes of Urbino," vol. i. p. 370, *et seq.*; Sismondi, vol. vii. p. 300; Muratori, *ad annos*; Macchiavelli, Appendix to "The Prince." Relation of the murder of Vitelozzo, Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Cardinal Pargoli, and the Duke de Gravina, committed by Cæsar Borgia, commonly called Duke Valentino.—*Works of Macchiavelli*, English Edition, p. 405.

²⁵ "Alexander having determined to aggrandise his son, at the expense of the dominions of the Church, judged with reason, that if he could make himself master of the petty states of Romagna, the people would forgive him all the crimes, and cruelties, and treacheries which would only strike at their

the people of Romagna, profited by these crimes of which Borgia was not destined to reap the advantage.

Supported by all the power and influence of the French King Louis XII., who conferred on him the title of Duke of Valentinois, Cæsar Borgia seemed on the point of realising the ambitious project of his father, and establishing the dynasty of Borgia over the States of the Church. The death of Alexander interrupted the completion of his designs. The new Pontiff at first appointed Borgia the standard-bearer of the Church. Pius, the immediate successor of Alexander, died in a few months, and Julius II., though raised to the Pontificate by the cardinals whom the interest of Borgia was able to command, soon took the opportunity of getting rid of his dangerous ally. The inroads of the Venetians supplied the occasion for demanding from him a surrender of the fortresses he held to the Papal troops; and this once accomplished, he was dismissed from his post and cast into prison.²⁶ Ferrara was still held by the Venetians, who had obtained it by treachery in 1441. The armies of the republic seized on Forli, Imola, and other towns in the Romagnese. The fiery Pontiff placed himself at the head of the Papal army, conducting personally the sieges, and directing the battles of the campaign, in which Romagna was once more subjected to the Papal rule.²⁷ The Venetian seizure of the Romagnese towns

old masters, provided that their state became more tranquil and gave them the blessings of justice and peace."—*Simondi*, vol. vii. p. 203.

²⁶ Borgia met a more honourable fate than his crimes deserved. After escaping from two or three dungeons, he fell on the battle-field warring in the army of Navarre against Spain.

²⁷ *Simondi*, vol. viii. p. 360; *Muratori*, anno 1564-8; *Baronius*.

was the chief motive which urged the hasty and passionate Julius to forget his strong Italian feelings, and unite for a time with the powers, which he designated as barbarians, in that league of Cambray, which nearly brought the proudest of the Italian States to ruin.²⁸

Few scenes of history present us with a stranger spectacle than that of this Pope. At the age of seventy, with his sword in his hand, he led his troops across the frozen ditches to storm the breach in the walls of Mirandola, and throughout the long and fierce campaign with Venice, he shared with the soldiers both the hardships and dangers of the camp. It was said that his nature made him a warrior, and his destiny a priest. His own ambition was to be remembered for his military renown. In directing the details of the statue which Michael Angelo was preparing for the town of Bologna, he desired the artist to substitute a sword for a book.²⁹ But it was in the grand design of his own

²⁸ The league of Cambray, formed in 1508, between the kings of France and Spain, the Emperor Maximilian, the Pope, and the Dukes of Mantua and Ferrara, had for its object the stripping of Venice of all her possessions on the mainland. Before joining the league, Julius attempted to effect an accommodation with the Venetians by inducing them to surrender to him the cities of Romagna which they had seized. The Pope added to the terrors of the armies of combined Europe those of excommunication against the republic. Julius, who was at heart devoted to the cause of Italy, soon saw the mistake he had committed. On winning back the Romagnol cities, he became reconciled to Venice, and placed himself at the head of the first Holy League, the object of which was to "drive the barbarians from Italy." He was immediately involved in war with France, and driven himself from Bologna by the approach of the French armies, who seized that city, and overran for a time the Papal States.

²⁹ In fifteen months Michael Angelo completed a colossal statue of Julius, which was erected in the Piazza of Bologna. While inspecting the model, the Pontiff remarked the energetic attitude of the elevated right hand, and asked of the artist whether he intended it as that of benediction or anathema.

monument, on which in his lifetime he employed Michael Angelo, that his passion for the glory of a conqueror was most strangely displayed. The instances are rare in which men of active spirit have occupied their thoughts in the preparation of their tombs. We read of the hermit who hews his sepulchre in the rock, in the loneliness of an isolation that is to survive his own existence ;—of the sombre devotion of the recluse, who deepens the melancholy solemnity of his contemplations by placing before his eyes the anticipated appliances of the grave. The anchorite has darkened the gloom of his solitude by keeping in his cell the rude coffin in which his lifeless remains are to be laid. But far different from this was the spirit in which Julius designed a gorgeous sepulchral memorial, the execution of which he would not trust to the affection or the gratitude of those he left behind. The noblest genius of the age was associated with the Pontiff in forming that design. Michael Angelo and Julius himself were jointly engaged in planning a monument which would be worthy of the glory of the Pope, and fitted for a place in the unrivalled temple of the new St. Peter's, which, under the same auspices, was rising on the site

Michael Angelo had been thinking of the soldier and not the priest. "Holy father," he answered, "it is in the attitude which will remind the Bolognese to be reasonable." The Pontiff understood, and acquiesced in the reply. The next question came from Michael Angelo; it was whether he should place a book in his Holiness' left hand. "No, no," replied Julius, "I do not profess to be a theologian, give me a sword."

Four years after its erection this colossal statue was melted down by the Bolognese in their next revolt against the Pope under Bentivoglio. The metal was cast into an enormous cannon, upon which ultimately the name of the pontiff was inscribed.—*Gregorovius, Les Tombeaux des Papes Romains* (French translation of the German work), p. 143.—*Dennistoun's Dukes of Urbino*, vol. i. p. 120.

of the ancient church.³⁰ A monument of colossal dimensions was to leave room for no less than forty figures to be grouped round the gorgeous sarcophagus in which the mortal remains of the warrior priest were to repose. Eight figures in chains were to represent the subjugated provinces, and perpetuate the memory of the conquest of the Papal States. Several of the figures had already been executed when Julius died. The parsimony or the jealousy of his successors prevented the erection of the complete monument, in which he had intended that the memory of his triumphs should be preserved. The figures designed to represent the enslaved provinces were dispersed to other lands, and the cenotaph in the church of St. Peter in Chains, of which the warrior Pope had been the Cardinal, perpetuates his military character only in the stern fierceness of feature which the genius of the immortal sculptor has imperishably preserved.³¹

³⁰ Julius II. formed the plan of erecting the new Church of St. Peter, of which he laid the first stone (A.D. 1510). It has been said that he first thought of a new church upon perceiving how entirely disproportioned his own monument would be to the old basilica in which it must be placed.

³¹ The original monument as planned by Julius and Michael Angelo was to have been eighteen feet in height, and twelve in breadth. The sarcophagus was to have been supported by the figures of Heaven and Earth, and forty statues were to have formed the group round the last resting-place of the pontifical warrior. Julius died before the execution of the design was completed, and it was not until the days of Paul III. that the monument in a reduced form was erected as a cenotaph in the church of St. Peter in Chains. The statue of Moses stands not inappropriately beside the couch of the pontiff who led the armies of the Church. Its magnificence enables us to judge how much art has lost by the non-completion of the original design. It was the Duke of Urbino who defrayed the expense of the cenotaph. Twelve of the forty statues had been completed. Three—those of Moses, Leah and Rachel were placed in the cenotaph. The fate of the fourth is unknown. Of the eight intended to represent the enchain'd Italian provinces—two are in the Louvre, four in the garden of the Pitti Palace, and two more

Yet resting under the vault of St. Peter's, the Pontiff who laid the first stone of that church, and who reduced the Papal States to submission, needs no marble memorial over his grave. "Si monumentum quæras, circumspice," may be applied to him in a double sense, not only in the noble aspect of that wondrous dome—but far as the eye could wander from its summit over plains and valleys that were peacefully submitting to the dominion of the Church, the monument of Julius was to be seen. Julius II. deserves the title of the founder of the Roman States. Brave and energetic in war—(the eulogy on a Pontiff is a strange one)—he used his victories with moderation. He forgave the Bolognese the insult they had offered him in melting down his statue. If he reduced the petty fiefs under the direct government of the Church, the change was one that brought the blessings of good government to the people. He carried out the policy of Borgia without Borgia's crimes, or Borgia's selfish and sinister aims. He fought to aggrandise not his own family, but the Church, and he left to the cities that submitted to his arms no inconsiderable amount of freedom and independence. It would be a very harsh judgment which would arraign the one act in which his conquests were made to benefit his own relatives. The male line of the house of Montefeltro became extinct by the death of Duke Guido. The duchy of Urbino lapsed in the strictness of feudal tenure to the Roman See. But

(a group of two combatants) in the Hall of the Five Hundred at Florence.—*Gregorovius, Tombs of the Roman Popes, note by Ampere* (French Translation), p. 150; see also an account of this monument in *Dennistoun's Dukes of Urbino*, vol. iii. pp. 362—367.

the nephew of the last duke was also the nephew of the Pope. The College of Cardinals assented to the grant of the investiture to the young man who was thus the founder of the Ducal House of della Rovere. Five days before his restless spirit passed from the scenes of earthly warfare the Pope added to the possessions of the new Duke of Urbino the fief of Pesaro, which had also lapsed to the Holy See. The services which the duke had rendered in the subjugation of Romagna amply justified the gift, and the hereditary Vicariate of Pesaro, though subject only to the annual tribute of a vase of silver, was probably not much more than a liberal recompense for the debts due to the Duke of Urbino which the Papal treasury was unable to discharge.

Tried by the rules according to which men of all persuasions would now be disposed to judge the conduct of a Christian priest, it is difficult to say that Julius, as a Pontiff, deserved the eulogies which Bellarmine and other ecclesiastical writers have pronounced upon him. Even estimating him without reference to those functions with which his military exploits do not altogether accord, it cannot be denied that his rashness and impetuosity marred the effect of the great abilities which he unquestionably possessed. But this very impetuosity was the result of an ardent sincerity of spirit, the impulses of which always carried him to what was generous and just. If our notions of professional propriety are shocked as we read of a Pontiff leading his army, we must remember that no cruelties ever disgraced his warfare ; his sword was drawn in the cause which he believed to be that of

right, and if we cannot altogether reconcile to our modern ideas the spectacle of a Pope directing an assault, it may at least diminish our surprise when we remember that he ascended the throne exactly at the period when the spiritual character of the Church was most forgotten, and that he led his battalions to the conflict in days when the general indifference of society to religion could scarcely appreciate the incongruity, which the sensitive believer in Christianity instinctively discerns between the character of the soldier and the priest.

We may after all give some credit to the courage which scorned to avail itself of the shelter of his order, and we cannot but admire the intrepidity of the old man, who carried with him, sore against their will, his three attendant cardinals to the cottage before Mirandola, where he had fixed his own quarters, exposed directly to the fire from the walls. If a strong will and fiery passions made him personally imperious, of his deep and genuine attachment to the principles of civil liberty there can be no doubt. In his own conquests he respected the privileges of the towns.³² With his ambition

³² "Old as Julius was, worn by the many vicissitudes of good and evil fortune experienced through a long life of the fatigues of war and exile, and most of all by the consequences of intemperance and licentious excesses, he yet knew not what fear or irresolution meant; in the extremity of age he still retained that grand characteristic of manhood, an indomitable spirit.

"He had ever sought to present himself in the character of a liberator—governing his new subjects with a wise benignity, he secured their attachment and even devotion."—*Ranke's History of the Popes*.

The statement which attributes to Julius a constitution injured by excesses is said by others to be founded in mistake.

"Julius II, who could not endure any opposition or any resistance, and who carried to extremes his despotism of rule, had yet at heart a respect and love for liberty. He wished to secure it for Italy. He revolted at the idea of

to establish the temporal dominion of the Church, he associated the passion to see his country free from a foreign yoke. To "chase the barbarians" from Italy was the dream of his dying hour. He did not hesitate to express his indignation at the subversion of the constitution of Florence by the Medici, and his earnest hope that both in Genoa and in Tuscany he would yet see the old freedom of their republican constitutions restored. The scene is recorded in which he energetically expressed his hope that he would live to free Naples from the Spanish oppression.³³ In these generous aspirations the friends of freedom may find an excuse for the ardour which carried him in his old age to guide the bravery and share the dangers of his troops. He was the last of the Popes of the middle ages, of the men of strong will and resolute ambition. He was, too, the last of those who sympathised with the cause of Italian nationality and freedom.³⁴ If his fiery spirit could have warded off

seeing that country under the domination of the stranger. His most passionate desire was to deliver it from the yoke of the barbarians as he called the Transalpine nations. He knew the power of civil liberty. He wished to re-establish the independence of the republic of Genoa, and to preserve that of Venice, though he was the first to create the storm which overwhelmed it. He respected the liberty of Bologna and the other cities in the states of the Church. He began by giving them a republican government under the protection of the Holy See. It is true that when he afterwards found opposition in these towns his rage knew no bounds; he saw in this an act of rebellion, and he punished it by the deprivation of the liberty which he himself had granted, and which he regarded as the first of blessings."—*Siemondi*, vol. ix. page 155.

³³ "Cardinal Grimani having said before him, that the kingdom of Naples was always under the dominion of strangers, striking his staff against the ground, he passionately exclaimed that if heaven spared his life he would soon see Naples freed from the yoke of strangers."—*Siemondi*, vol. ix. p. 152.

³⁴ Julius II. died in 1513. His successor was John de Medicis, Leo X., whose pontificate was marked by the rise of the Reformation.

The influence has been already pointed out which the spread of the reformed

death, or the days of his Pontificate been extended beyond the allotted period of man's life, he might have left to Italy a memory associated with prouder achievements than that of consolidating, if not founding, the state which formed from his time the temporal kingdom of the Popes.

The conquests of Julius established the sovereignty of the Pontiffs over all the territories that from his day to the French revolution constituted the Papal States. But even beyond those he wrested from his enemies, territories to which the Church had asserted a more doubtful claim ; Parma, Placentia, Modena, and Reggio submitted to his arms, the two last continued under Papal dominion until Leo X., in 1515, agreed to yield the Duchy of Modena to the Duke of Ferrara, the ally of Francis I. Parma and Placentia, in the troubles that ensued, were more than once lost and won. They were finally alienated from the Papacy by Paul III.

While Julius had thus made himself undisputed lord of the States of the Church—while he established good government by sweeping away many of the petty feudalities—he left still, especially in the cities, a large number of the inferior sovereignties untouched. Several of the cities still maintained free government, but they did so by charters from and under the authority of the

doctrines exercised upon the position of the Papacy, in relation to civil liberty (vol. i. p. 208). But in reference to the question of Italian freedom we must not forget that by the elevation of a Medici to the Papal throne the Papacy became directly allied with one of the families who were usurping the rights of the free Italian towns. That the imperial arms should force the tyranny of the Medici upon Florence was one of the conditions of peace between Charles V. and Clement VII. The final extinction of the liberties of Florence and the subjugation of Italy to the stranger were consummated at the same time.

Pope; the great lords of Ferrara and Urbino held many years longer their princely state, as feudatories of the Holy See.

In the progress of time the whole of these territories were brought under the direct government of the Holy See. It is not necessary to trace with minute detail the various occasions upon which city after city and lordship after lordship became subject to the complete dominion of the Pontiffs. Bologna retained to the days of the French invasion the modified independence which Julius had left it. Ancona went through the vicissitudes of a free city and of subjection to the lordship of the Sforza and the D'Estes, to whom the marquisate was at different times granted by the Popes. The Dukes of Urbino of the line of Della Rovere continued to hold large possessions as fiefs of the Holy See until, in 1624, the male line failing, the last duke entered into an arrangement by which on his death all his territories, except his allodial possessions, were surrendered to the Pope. Ancona may be said to have lost its free constitution in 1532; Perugia in 1540. The most important of the Papal acquisitions was that of Ferrara. In 1598 its duke Alfonso died, naming as his successor an illegitimate member of his family. The Pope claimed the reversion as lapsing to the feudal lord upon the extinction of the legitimate line. The emperor, less strict or less watchful in enforcing his rights, permitted the nominee to take possession of the Duchy of Modena, which the House of Este had held as an imperial fief.

Thus finally, and after the lapse of centuries, had the

Pontiffs succeeded in establishing their sovereignty over almost the entire of the Italian territories, which under so many varying titles they had claimed. The exarchate of Ravenna owned their sway ; the restitution of Pepin and the donation of Charlemagne had their full effect. The gift of the Countess Matilda was not indeed altogether realised. Florence, and a great proportion of the Tuscan duchy never acknowledged the dominion of the Popes. But “the Patrimony” had long belonged to them in undisputed ownership, and even of the Duchy of Tuscany, which she held by feudal tenure of the emperor, they had succeeded in asserting their title to many districts which the Countess had no right to alienate. Imola and Perugia became a portion of the Papal domains. At one period, indeed, the Popes had carried their rights to almost the full extent of the great Countess’s bequest. The duchy of Parma we have seen admitted to belong to the See of Rome, only, however, to be alienated by that unprincipled transaction which consigned it as the principality of the family of the Farnese.³⁵ Perhaps even in the rest of Tuscany there may be said to have been a compromise of Papal claims when Charles V., at the instance of Leo X., established his relatives, the Medici, as grand-dukes of Florence in the sovereignty of the state.

At a later period on the extinction of the families of Medici and Farnese, the reigning Pontiff claimed both Tuscany and Parma, especially the latter, as reverting to the Holy See. The last dispute between Papal and Imperial right was ended, the last controversy on the

³⁵ Vol. i. p. 215, note.

bequest of the Countess Matilda was determined when the German diet, in spite of the Papal protest, declared the duchy of Parma a lapsed fief of the empire, and confirmed its cession to the Spanish Bourbons.³⁶

Thus have we seen in the Papal States the same revolutions which marked the progress of Italian society elsewhere. Free cities vindicated the rights of independent sovereignty, abused the privileges of freedom, fell under the tyranny of petty lords, and finally yielded to the dominion of a central power. Ferrara, Bologna, and Rimini were members of the Lombard league; Imola and Perugia of the Tuscan. Tivoli maintained its private war with Rome, and Ferrara surrendered like Milan her liberties to a captain of the people. Over a confused and tumultuous aggregate of discordant authorities, that of the Papacy gradually asserted sovereign rights. Nor does it appear to have materially altered the mode of their establishment that these rights were rested upon ancient and venerable grants, and supported by sanctions alleged to be divine.

So long as imperial power disputed, or rather denied the Papal claims in Central Italy, its provinces do not seem to have differed in any material respect from the others that were nominally subject to imperial rule. Governed by no real or effectual control, every little local authority assumed the exercise of sovereign power. Municipal privileges were enlarged into rights of political independence. Free cities became self-governed republics. Feudal lordships were aggrandised into sovereign principalities. In these communities all the passions,

³⁶ See *Post*, chap. viii.

the crimes, and the feuds which distracted the rest of Italy, prevailed. The factions of Guelphs and Ghibelines were perhaps arrayed against each other with more deadly hatred because the controversy in which they originated more directly affected themselves.

When imperial power finally withdrew from the contest, and Rudolph resigned his pretensions in favour of the Popes, the situation of the principalities and cities of these provinces was altogether changed. Instead of a distant and unpopular lord paramount, they had to deal with a power whose seat was close at hand, ever watchful to assert its rights and whose claims were supported by the homage which was paid to the religious character with which its representative was invested. Those rights of sovereignty which in the hands of the German emperors had scarcely commanded a nominal acknowledgment, in those of Italian pontiffs became a true and real government. Every year the sphere of the emperor's authority had been lessened; every year that of the pontiff was increased. The annals of imperial history are the records of lordship after lordship, and city after city, emancipated from its control; those of Papal power, of one republic and one principality after another surrendering its independence. Nothing could more clearly illustrate this than that which occurred on the extinction of the legitimate line of the Italian House of Este. The Pope asserted his title by escheat to the broad and fair domains which that House had possessed as feudatories of the Holy See; the principality which was held from the emperor passed unquestioned to the illegitimate descendant in

whose representatives it continued to the present time. Ferrara and Modena may serve as the illustrations of the mode in which one power asserted while the other neglected its rights.

In the gradual reduction of the Papal States to complete submission, we have seen to a great extent the operation of the same causes which elsewhere produced similar results. In many instances the submission of the people was obtained by the prospect of good government; in others by the promise of freedom. Innocent III. established the first pontifical sovereignty by arraying on its side the spirit of patriotism and the hatred of oppression. If Albornoz was said dexterously to have played off the passions of rival powers against each other, there is no doubt that among the feelings to which he appealed was the desire of the commonalties to escape from the tyrannies of their lordly oppressors. As we proceed, the page darkens with the perfidies of Borgia and the cruelties of Robert of Geneva. It appears the law of human progress that everywhere the consolidation of states should be accomplished by deeds which history must brand as crimes. Whatever be the ultimate value to human society of the extinction of the turbulent existence of the petty chieftainries of ancient times, yet everywhere—from the plains of Muscovy to those of Romagna—the elements of local independence have been trampled out in blood. Even the consolidation of English power has not been exempt from the operation of this law. The killing of the Welsh bards was a massacre which no one can defend: in many a sanguinary atrocity

the reduction of the Highland clans to obedience to civilised order was enforced, and the Papal grant of Ireland to the English crown was made effectual by intrigues as dexterous as those of Albornoz, by perfidies as dark as those of Borgia, and by deeds as cruel as those which marked the course of Robert of Geneva through the Papal States.

Nor were these states reduced to obedience without the incidents of war with the neighbouring powers. A conflict between Florence and the Pope followed the attempt to annex some of the Tuscan cities to the dominions of the Church. We are startled at finding the Pontiff himself at the head of the army which waged his war in Romagna against Venice. In the personal command of that army by the fiery, but warm-hearted Julius II., we meet with the last remnant of those ages when in a literal sense the Church was militant ; when the character of the bishop was merged in that of the count ; when in the wild disorders of the times, the monastery, or even the church, was the fortified stronghold, and many a bold prelate led his armed retainers to the conflict in which he did battle for his feudal rights.

In the city of Rome itself we have endeavoured to trace the gradual growth of Papal authority from the days when Gregory the Great complained of being withdrawn from his prophetic expositions to discharge the duties of an earthly lord. Rome, it will be remembered, was not the only city in which the bishop had acquired temporal power, or become the sovereign lord of tributary lands. In Germany especially many prelates were

great lords or sovereign princes. The ecclesiastical electors of Mayence and Treves and Cologne held the rank of kings. The bishoprics of Salzburgh, Wurtsburgh, Liege, and many others, were states as independent as Nassau, or any of the free towns, and even in England a Bishop of Durham, with the rank of Count Palatine, exercised many of the powers of a sovereign prince.

From these instances Rome is distinguished only by the higher rank of the prelate, by the greater importance of his position, and above all by the elements of constant strife which attended the establishment of his power. The very weakness of imperial authority left Rome exposed to be torn by the apparently opposite influences of feudal lawlessness and democratic license. The result was that between these elements and the constant encroachments of imperial aggression, Rome for a long time can scarcely be said to present an interval of perfect tranquillity. Few, indeed, were the Popes whose happy lot it was to pass their pontificate in tolerable peace. The history of the Holy See is a history through many of its centuries, of strife and tumult. The eye that runs down the list of Pontiffs added to the last chapter cannot fail to be arrested by the frequency of the annotations which record the troublous life, or even the violent death of the occupant of the Papal Chair. The observation does not apply merely to those dismal times when death in a prison or by violence was the common lot of the Pontiff; when the body of one whom a natural death had saved from the vengeance of his persecutors was dragged from his grave to receive the sentence of deposition at

the bar of a synod, and then be flung mutilated and dishonoured into the stream. In times of comparative tranquillity, the life of the Papal power was full of tumult and trouble. Now it was the emperor who sent his army to Rome to force his anti-Pope upon St. Peter's chair. Now it was the Roman populace or nobility who succeeded in driving from the city the prelate whose canonical election the emperor had succeeded in carrying. Again it was the fierce spirit of Roman turbulence that chased the Pontiff from the Lateran to some more secure and more tranquil retreat. Many a city gave refuge to the Bishop of Rome when he could find no rest in that of his own episcopal throne. Viterbo, Assisi, Tusculum, Anagni, Ravenna, have all been the residences of Pontiffs obliged to pitch their tent away from Rome. Many a Pope has been beleaguered in the Castle of St. Angelo, or fled like Hildebrand from the horrors of an invading army. From Charlemagne to Charles V. 120 popes had occupied the Papal throne, and of this number not one half had been permitted to spend their lives in tranquillity, and to die in peace at Rome.

Yet it was throughout all these tumults, through that which seemed a struggle for its very existence, that the See of Rome exercised over far-off nations that influence and authority which placed it above all earthly powers. The kings of distant realms were deposed by Pontiffs who could not command order in the streets of their own city. Popes, who had to fly from their own palace in the Lateran, absolved the subjects of mighty monarchs from their allegiance. It might be said without exag-

geration, that the decrees which shook the mightiest potentates were issued from a throne that seemed seated on the restless heavings of a volcano. Hildebrand, who declared all earthly monarchs to be subject to the spiritual sceptre of the Pontiff, died in exile. Alexander III. had been driven from Rome, and left an anti-Pope in the possession of St. Peter's, before he compelled Henry of England to do penance at the martyred Becket's tomb; and Innocent III. was obliged to pass by stealth to that council of Lyons, in which he pronounced against Frederick II. the decree of deposition which was, in truth, the prostration of the once proud imperial power.

In days, on the other hand, when Rome bowed down in tranquil and loyal devotion before the Papal throne, when the States of the Church submitted with reverent obedience to the Pontiffs' undisputed sway—in these days the influence of Papal power in Christendom was least felt. The times of its weakness at home were those of its strength abroad. When the Pope had most the authority of a prophet in distant countries, he had least honour in his own.

In closing this review of the rise and origin of the Papal sovereignty, it must be remembered that it has been confined to the aspect of that sovereignty as an Italian power—we have traced the history of the Roman bishops as sovereigns of the Roman States. The enquiry into the influence and effects of the Papal power on human society, and on religion in the dark and the middle ages—interesting and important as it is, would be far beyond the object and the limits of these pages.

Equally remote from that object is the discussion, ever so incidentally, of the great question of the validity of the claims of the Popes to spiritual jurisdiction over mankind. Even from inquiries like those to which these chapters have been devoted it may not be possible entirely to separate that question. Those who disbelieve in the divine authority of Pontifical supremacy, will see in the weaknesses, the frailties, and the vicissitudes, that have attended it, the characteristics of an earthly power. Those, on the other hand, who have faith in its divine mission, will find, with Cardinal Baronius, in the strifes and tumults that have surrounded its progress—in the dangers that have beset its path—in the vices by which individual Pontiffs have been disgraced, the evidence of a superintending power which has preserved the Papal chair from such perils, and rescued it from such evils—to perpetuate its existence when so many of the powers which disputed its supremacy had fallen. These claims are rested upon titles that long preceded the establishment of its earthly power. They were as valid in the hiding places of the catacombs or the caverns of Soracte, as in the halls of the Lateran or the aisles of St. Peter's; and even their historical examination must be conducted by an appeal to records earlier than those which our limited inquiries have called on us to explore.

In times when the question of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope is agitating cabinets and nations, the narrative of its early history possesses an interest perhaps too nearly allied to the passions which such a controversy evokes. And yet, after all, there is little in that early history which can really influence the

decision. It is not by the circumstances which attended in remote ages the acquisition of their power, no matter how blameable or how unexceptionable, that the existing rights of dynasties are to be tried. The power of the English sovereign in Ireland must rest on grounds very different from the title which the donation of Adrian conveyed. The justice or the injustice of the claim of William the Norman to reign over England is not thought of as an element in the right of his descendants to the crown.

In defence, indeed, of the inviolability of the Papal sovereignty, arguments have been advanced which no historic evidence can affect. It is said that it is essential to the discharge of the spiritual duties of the Pontiff, that he should not be the subject of any state, and that whatever be men's opinion as to the nature of his power, it is of importance that the prelate who is acknowledged by millions of Christians as their common chief, should possess the independence which can only belong to the position of a sovereign prince.

On still higher grounds it has been urged—and the argument is not peculiar to the advocates of Papal rights—that all that has ever been given to the Church is consecrated to God, and that the possessions or the sovereignty once so devoted cannot be touched without the guilt of sacrilege; and the highest sanctions of religion are invoked to protect from all profane interference the dominions which the piety of former ages annexed to the office of the Pope.

These questions are glanced at to show how far removed they are from the humbler enquiry to which

these chapters have been devoted. But even those who take a more practical view of the Papal dominions must feel that as far as its character can influence the question of its right, the character of that dominion, like that of all earthly rule, must be determined, not by an historic inquiry into its early origin, but by its effect upon the happiness and well-being of the people whom Providence has subjected to its sway ; and that, if the Papal power be subject to all the responsibilities, so, on the other hand, it is entitled to all the protection from prescription or possession which practically belongs to the sovereign authorities of states.

It may be that the view which has been presented of the chequered history of the Pontiffs is not one that will satisfy either the violent opponents or the impassioned adherents of Papal power. There are some who, in the history of that power, expect to meet with nothing that is not perfect and divine. Others there are who look for nothing that is not of a character directly the reverse. Unaffected by our prejudices the facts of history remain. The passions of this generation are forming the history of the present and influencing that of the future. But neither passion nor prejudice can change the unalterable past. In the records of that past we may perhaps all learn the lesson that no human institution, no institution which is to be carried out by human agency, is exempt from the universal law that good and evil shall be mixed in all earthly things. The most determined opponents of Papal power may safely do homage to the stern integrity and the earnest devotion of Hilde-

brand, or respect the mild dignity of Pius, the last prisoner in France. The most implicit believers in the divine character of that power cannot refuse to reconcile with that belief the condemnation of the evil passions which men, whose names are still breathed with horror, have borne to the Papal chair.

In reference to that which more immediately concerns the object of these volumes—the influence of the Papal power upon Italy—in former chapters attention has been called to some of the effects which that power has in earlier times produced. In the more minute inquiries into its history, there is nothing to vary or affect that general statement, unless, perhaps, so far as they more clearly show that in its struggle with imperial power the Papacy was sustained by an alliance with the spirit of Italian nationality, and that whatever may have been the real effect of the contest or the position assumed by Pontiffs in later ages, it was in the name and by the strength of Italian independence, that Popes of former days defeated the attempted subjugation of the Roman See to German power.

ELECTION OF THE POPES.

To complete the history of the growth and vicissitudes of Papal power which the last two chapters are intended to present, it is necessary that we should review the changes effected in the form of Pontifical elections, changes which far more than any external influence altered and modified the character of that power.

It has been already stated that in the early ages the election of the Bishop of Rome, like that of all other bishops, was the act of the whole body of the community over whom he was to preside.¹

¹ A brief reference has been already made in the first volume (page 63) to this subject of the popular election of bishops, one of the most important that presents itself in any inquiries into the ancient constitution and even doctrine of the Christian Church. The subject is one that scarcely seems to have attracted the attention it deserves, perhaps because these inquiries have been generally left in the hands of Churchmen, and undertaken with objects or pursued with prepossessions which gave them but little sympathy with the conclusions which seem to follow from the establishment of the historical facts, that bishops, in the early ages of the Church, were chosen by the laity.

A full examination of this question, although it is one, it will be remembered, not of theological but of historical inquiry, can hardly be expected in these pages. It is perhaps more necessary to direct attention to the importance of the consequences that follow from the fact, than to cite testimonies to support it. It would not be difficult to adduce a continued and clear series of proofs, establishing with a clearness scarcely to be expected upon a question of such remote antiquity, the constant and invariable practice of the Christian Church through the thousand years that followed its institution.

Without attempting anything like an elaborate production of these proofs, it may not be out of place to refer to a few.

The remarkable instance of the account transmitted to us of the election of a bishop of Rome in 254, will be found mentioned in a subsequent note. The plain directions of the ancient canons, known as *Apostolice*, in another. The stream of testimony from the early ages is continuous and explicit. In volumes containing a history of the Italian bishops, under the title of "*Italia Sacra*," the records of popular elections are too numerous for quotation; a few of them it will be sufficient to cite.

Terracina, A.D. 362.

"*Sanctus Valentinus defuncto avito a clero et populo ejusdem civitatis episcopus electus fuit.*"

Florence, A.D. 376. Zembria.

"*Non solum a clero at etiam ab universo populo solemniter ad apicem pontificatus electus est.*"

"*Nec vero licuit ei reniti vel obsistere istiusmodi electioni quum ut prefatus sum ita consensu et annisu omnium suorum concivium fuerat postulatus ad ejusdem ecclesiae gubernacula ut palam daretur intelligi sanctum divinitus eum ad ejusmodi officium fuisse invitatum.*"

In 557 a council of Paris decreed

"*Nullus civibus invitis ordinetur episcopus—nullus nisi ~~Quem~~ populi et clerorum electio plenissima quassiverit voluntate.*"

In 860 Pope Nicholas I. issued this decree to the Archbishop of Ravenna.

"*Episcopus per Emilianam non consecretur nisi post electionem cleri et populi.*"

We have already seen that when Charlemagne established that empire

The ancient canons are full of protestations against any attempt to force a bishop upon a reluctant community. The canons known as the Apostolic Constitutions, contain the most express directions that the bishop should be elected by the entire people. They expressly enjoined that at his consecration the bishop presiding should question the assembled congregation whether the bishop elect was the object of their choice, and should only proceed with the ceremony on receiving their assent.* These canons are no

which was designed to reconstruct society, and to unite the invaders that had overrun Europe, with the ancient system of Christianity and civilisation, in the very charter of its institution, was prominently inserted the provision, that "in accordance with the sacred canons" bishops should be chosen by the free election of the clergy and people, according to the statutes of the canons relating to each diocese.—Vol. i. p. 64, note 29.

An admirable tract, published by Granville Sharp, in 1784, contains most of the above authorities. It adds to them the high testimony of Archbiishop Usher, that even after the Norman invasion of England, the citizens of Dublin and Waterford elected the bishops of those Irish sees.—*Granville Sharp, Treatise on the Congregational Courts of the English.*

* These Apostolic Constitutions profess to be drawn up by the Apostles themselves. In relation to these, however, and many similar documents of this period, we must remember that the faith of these ages expressed itself in the language of metaphor, and in the license of ecclesiastical imagery, documents were often framed in the name of the Apostles, without the slightest intention to deceive. Of this character certainly was the letter from St. Peter, drawn up with the most minute attention to scenic propriety, which Pope Zacharias wrote in the name of the Apostle to Pepin and Charlemagne.

In these strange Constitutions each apostle is supposed in turn to promulgate a canon upon the subject which might be said peculiarly to belong to himself. St. Peter thus prescribes the mode of consecrating bishops.

"Ego igitur Petrus dico ordinandum esse episcopum ut omnes pariter antea constituimus, scilicet de quo in nullo ore sit querela, at qui sit a cuncto populo ex optimis quibusque electus."

"Quo nominato et placente populus in unum congregatus una cum presbyteris atque episcopis presentibus die dominica consentiat. Qui vero inter reliquos episcopos princeps est percontetur presbyteros et populum an ipse sit quem praesesse petunt, et illis annuentibus rursus percontetur"—

Then comes a solemn enquiry as to their belief in his fitness and the blamelessness of his life, not by way of testimony to the person selected by others, but as a solemn asseveration of the purity of their own previous choice.

"Et cum tertio annuerint et dignum esse assensi fuerint, petatur ab omnibus ut praebeat signum assensus, et libenter praebeat andiantur."—*Constitutions attributed to the Apostles: Labbe's Concilia*, vol. i. p. 458.

These canons are among the most ancient written laws of the Church.

doubt untruly attributed to the Apostles; but at the same time they expressed that which at the time of their promulgation was the received usage of the Church.

Historical evidence abundantly proves that the same practice prevailed in the election of the Bishop of Rome.² The very language of the decrees that restricted popular privilege establishes it beyond question. We have no record of the mode in which the suffrages were taken, but the probability appears to be that the control of the election was vested in some presiding officers, originally some of the clergy, and upon them devolved the responsibility of seeing that no one was named as bishop who had not the assent of the community at large. In Rome at an early period

It is almost superfluous to cite further authorities, yet one more may be quoted.

“Nullus invitatis et non potentibus ordinetur episcopus, ne plebs invita episcopum non optatum contemnatur aut oderint, et fiat minus religiosa quam convenit, cui non licuerit habere quem voluit.”—*Epist. Leonis ad Anastasium. Decretals of Isidore.*

³ An accident has preserved to us upon indisputable authority an account of the mode of election of a bishop of Rome in very ancient times. So early as the year 252 a dispute occurred as to the legality of an episcopal election at Rome between Cornelius and an opponent named Novatianus—a follower of the doctrines of Novatus.

St. Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, in testifying to the legality of the election of Cornelius, thus describes the mode in which he was chosen.

“Factus est autem Cornelius episcopus de Dei et Christi ejus iudicio, de clericorum pene omnium testimonio, de plebis quea tunc adfuit suffragio, et de sacerdotum antiquorum et bonorum virorum collegio.”—*Epistola S. Cypriani ad Antonianum.*—*Migne's Patrology*, vol. iii. p. 770.

Cardinal Baronius, in commenting on this, excepts to the word suffragium, and contends that the part taken by the laity was not strictly speaking that of “suffragium,” but of “iudicium,” expressing their assent or objection to the choice. He appears to think the bishop was then designated by some supernatural indication of the divine will.

“Nimirum quod divinum providere solent justicium et suffragium Deo quem vellet elegi signo aliquo admonente apostolico more.”

“Qui igitur Dei iudicio prelectus videretur, coacto presbyterio, hoc enim nomine sacra illa comitia dicebantur—rogabantur singulorum sententiae.”

“Eorum autem vota et testimonium explorabantur qui plebis totius vicem representarunt.”

On the authority of St. Cyprian he tells us that the custom was to invite to the meeting of the presbytery at which a bishop was elected, any bishop who might happen to be in the city at the time, with the privilege of voting.

“Admittebantur sequi ad eadem comitia si qui aderant tunc in urbe opiscopi cum prerogativa suffragii.”—*Baronius*, A.D. 254.

after the establishment of Christianity the presidency devolved almost as of course, upon the representatives of the sovereign. From the very principle of naming as bishop one acceptable to the whole community, a veto in the sovereign might not unnaturally follow, although it is doubtful whether the confirmation by the emperors amounted to anything more than the approval of the regularity and validity of the election.

The solemn manner in which Charlemagne pledged himself to maintain the ancient canons and the freedom of episcopal elections,⁴ makes it exceedingly improbable that over that of the Bishop of Rome he asserted more than a superintending control. In the disgraceful nominations that followed the extinction of his dynasty, the election of the Pontiff became a purely secular and political affair, and there is at least some reason to believe that the feudal lords who then usurped the power of appointing the Pontiff, proceeded to the length of denying the right of the clergy at all to interfere.

The research of Muratori has discovered the fragments of a council held at Rome in 863, by which it would appear that attempts were made to exclude the interference either of the bishops or the inferior clergy. This seems to be the true offence against which the anathema of the canon is pointed, and it is significant that it is immediately followed by one prohibiting under the severest penalties the offering of personal violence to a bishop.⁵

⁴ Capitularies of Charlemagne.—*Ante*, vol. i. pp. 29—64.

⁵ The following is the tenth canon of this council as preserved by Muratori:—

“Si quis sacerdotibus seu primatibus nobilibus seu cuncto clero hujus sancte ecclesie electionem Romani pontificis contradicere presumpserit sicut in concilio Beatisimi Stephani Papae statutum est, anathema sit.”—*Muratori Ital. Rer. Scriptores*, tom. ii. part ii. p. 128.

By the discovery of this canon, Muratori believes that he has fixed, in opposition to Baronius the genuineness, and in opposition to Pagius the date of the decree, cited by Gratian as one of Pope Stephen's, without distinguishing to which of the Stephens it belongs. That decree, which is plainly referred to in the canon, is thus cited by Gratian:—

“Quia sancta Romana ecclesia cui auctore Deo presidemus, a pluribus patitur violentias Pontifice obeunte, quae ab hoc inferuntur quid abeque imperiali notitiis pontificis sit consecratio, nec canonico ritu et consuetudine ab imperatore demissi inter sint nuncii qui scandala fieri vetent. Volumus ut cum instituendus est pontifex, convenientibus episcopis et universo clero

A decree has been preserved which is supposed to confer upon Otho the Great the right of absolutely nominating the Pontiff, and upon this interpretation its authority has been questioned by high authorities.* A closer examination of its wording leads to the conclusion that it was intended to grant to the emperor the right of controlling the election, and to make his confirmation essential

elegatur presenta senatu et populo qui ordinandus est, et sic ab omnibus electus, presentibus legatis imperialibus, consecretur."

It is plain that the *comitia* constituted by this decree for the election of the Pontiff, consisted of the *bishops*, the entire clerical body, the *senate*, and the *people*. All were to take part in the election—"ab omnibus electus."

The anathema of the canon of 863 was pointed against those who denied to "the priests," the "primates nobiles," or the entire clerical body, the place in the election which the decree of Stephen assigned them. The inference is obvious, that attempts were made to effect this exclusion—attempts which we can easily conceive made by the turbulent and licentious barons, who would be well disposed to resent the interference of the poor and humble *religiosi*, who were all classed under the title of "clerus." It was passed immediately before the worst scandals of Papal election. Cardinal Baronius observes, that in the official records of the elections under the influence of Theodora and Marozia, the form which recorded the assent of the clerical body is omitted.—*Baronius in anno 912.*

A constitution of Lambert, King of Italy, one of three crowned as emperors by the Pope, followed the decree of Pope Stephen in the year 906.

"Pontifax, convenientibus episcopis et universo clero, senatu et populo expetente, legatur; atque iter in conspectu omnium celeberrime electus ab omnibus, presentibus legatis imperatoris, consecretur."—*Goldast's Imperial Constitutions*, vol. iii. p. 297.

Those who wish to trace further the history of the decree of Pope Stephen, may consult Gratian, c. 33, dist. 5; Muratori's *Observations on the Canon of 863*; Baronius, anno 816 and 897, and the criticism of Pagius.

* The decree is cited in two different places by Goldast. It was enacted by Leo IX., in a Roman synod immediately after his own election, upon the deposition of John XII. The decree of the synod begins by declaring that Otho should have the same privileges that Adrian had conferred upon Charlemagne.

"Othoni ** spirituali in Christo filio nostro ejusque successoribus hujus regni Italise, in perpetuum tam successorem eligendi quam summae sedis apostolice pontificem ordinandi facultatem concedimus."

"Ita demum asserimus quod nemo deinceps eujuscunque gradus aut conditionis aut dignitatis seu religionis eligendi regum vel patricium seu pontificum summae sedis apostolice, aut quenque episcopum ordinandi habeat facultatem, sed soli regi Romani imperii hanc reverendam tribui facultatem regi uptote necnon et patricio Romano. Quod si a cuncto clero et universo populo quis elegatur episcopus non nisi a dicto rege laudatur et investietur

to its validity: The right of interference with pontifical elections exercised by the German emperors was justified both by the example of the Frankish emperors and the earlier precedent of the Caesars of Rome and Byzantium. It was nevertheless a usurpation upon the rights of the Roman people, but that usurpation never went the length of destroying the form of the ancient election which was always maintained in the clergy and people of Rome. When a century later the power of nomination was conferred upon the Emperor Henry III., it was not by destroying the form of election, but by a compact with the senate ratified by an oath, by which that body engaged that the candidate nominated by the emperor should be elected. A similar compact is alleged to have taken place with Otho I. Under the influence of such a compact the Roman electors were in the same position as the members of the English chapters who elect indeed their bishop, but in doing so, are compelled under the penalty of premunire to vote for the candidate recommended by the sovereign.

The period was a short one during which the Roman people thus absolutely surrendered their right. Even the imperial confirmation was constantly evaded, and not unfrequently with success; and the general rule of Pontifical election was that the Bishop of Rome was chosen openly by the suffrages of the clergy, the senate and the people.

From this mode of nomination the election of the Pontiff was gradually restricted to a close and secret conclave, by excluding the laity, by limiting the suffrage to a select body of the clergy, and lastly by enacting that the election should take place in a secret assembly held with closed doors.

The first clerical interference with the popular right of election is attributed to the decree adopted at the second council of Lateran in the year 1057. That decree was drawn up by Hildebrand in the pontificate of Nicholas II.⁷ It is vague enough in its reservation both of popular and imperial rights to

et consecretur."—*Goldast's Constitutiones; Guerra's Epitome Bullarum.*

However large the powers conferred upon the emperor by this decree at first appears, it in reality, as apparent from the clause last quoted, conferred on him nothing more than the prerogative of confirmation and the right of regulating the pontifical elections.

⁷ The following is that which appears the most correct version of this celebrated decree.

"We decree and appoint that on the death of the present Pontiff of the

be susceptible of being acted on so as to effect their exclusion, and this appears to have been its practical result: yet in its fair interpretation it did not exclude the laity from interference in the Pontifical election. It prescribed the order rather than altered the substance of the election. The *religiosi* who are mentioned in it were the members of the several societies, not all of them monastic, who were associated for the purpose of devoting themselves to pious works. The cardinals were to control the elections, but the right of the laity was still, although vaguely, recognised; and the decree itself seemed rather directed against tumultuous and violent proceedings than against the privileges of the community at large. A century elapsed before the precedence thus given in Pontifical elections to the cardinals became an exclusive right of voting in that body.

The term cardinal had at the time of this decree a meaning very different from that which it now bears. Every cathedral church had its cardinal clergy; and the most probable interpretation of the word is that it designated those who had benefices which attached them permanently to the mother church. Seven suffragan bishops were thus subordinate and permanently attached

Catholic Roman Church, the cardinals shall in the first place, weighing the subject with the most serious consideration, proceed to a new election, regard being had to the honour and reverence due to our dearly beloved son Henry, who is now styled King, and who it is hoped will hereafter by the gift of God become emperor according to the grace which on the mediation of his Chancellor Guibert, we have granted to him and to his successors who shall have obtained a like privilege from the Apostolic See. Taking all precautions that the pest of simony do not contaminate their proceedings, let religious men together with our most serene son Henry, take the lead in conducting the Pontifical election, and let others follow.

"If any of her members be found worthy of the honour, let the choice be made from the Church of Rome herself, but if not, let a worthy person be taken from any other church. Should the perseverance of depraved and impious men have so far prevailed as that a fair, honest and uncorrupt election cannot take place in Rome, let the cardinals and bishops, with the religious, the clergy and the Catholic laymen, few as they may be, receive the power of electing a pastor for the Apostolic See, whenever in concert with our invincible King they may think it convenient, and if when the election is made, the storms of war or violence of malignant men should render impossible the customary enthronement in the Papal chair, the person elected shall nevertheless enjoy as a true Pope full power of exercising the government of the Roman Church, and of administering her affairs."—*Bowden's Life of Gregory VII.*, vol. i. p. 200—*Migne's Patrology*—*Nicholas II.*—*Privilegia et Epistolar.*

to the See of Rome. This number has since been reduced to six. The cardinal presbyters were, and still are, nothing more than the incumbents or parish priests of the Roman parish churches, and the cardinal deacons, in Rome as elsewhere, were the heads of charitable and pious establishments connected with the cathedral.⁸

There seems, however, little doubt that whatever was the virtual import of this decree, its practical effect was to give to the clergy the nomination of the Pope, and generally the clerical election appears to have been acquiesced in without any attempt on the part of the laity to assert even that subordinate place which was reserved to them by the constitution of Nicholas. It was during the period of the republican struggles at Rome in the days of Arnold of Brescia, that the laity were formally excluded from all interference in the Pontifical elections, and that the right even of clerical suffrage was restricted to the cardinals. There is no very clear evidence of the exact period at which this change was effected. The author of the generally received life of Cælestine II. attributes the exclusion of the laity to Innocent II. upon the breaking out of the dispute between the Pontiff and the senate. Cælestine, he states, was the first Pope who was elected without lay votes.⁹ Cælestine himself, in his letter to the Abbot of Cluny, describes his election as one in which the laity took part. That letter, however, is perfectly reconcilable with the fact, that they were legally excluded, and policy would have dictated to those who excluded them the prudence, on the first occasion, of disarming opposition by the selection of a popular Pontiff. Certain it is that, between the accession of Innocent II. and that of Alexander III., both the laity and the general body of the clergy were excluded by formal decrees from all share in

⁸ Muratori, *Antiquitates Ital.*, vol. v. p. 153; Thommasin, *Vetus et nov Eccles. Discip.*, part i. lib. ii. cap. 15.

⁹ "Juxta constitutionem Innocentii predecessoris, sub qua populus omnino a pontificis electione arcebatur, primus sine ullius populi suffragiis electus fuit, teste Ornuphio, propter civile bellum quod a Romanis senatum restituere satagentibus imminebat."—*Vita Cælestini*—*Mansi Concilia*—*Migne's Patrology*, vol. 180.

Cælestine's own account in his letter to Peter, the Abbot, and the Monks of Cluny, does not exactly accord with this.

"Notum igitur facimus delectioni vestre quod domino nostro bonæ memorie Papa Innocente, 8 Kal. Octobris defuncto, et in Lateranensi ecclesia cum maxima cleri et populi Romani frequentia tumulato, cardinales, presbiteri, et diaconi, una cum fratribus nostris episcopis et subdiaconis, clero et

the election, and the contest, in 1159, between Alexander and Victor, was determined by the votes of the cardinals alone.¹⁰

In 1162 Alexander promulgated the decree which made it necessary that two-thirds of the cardinals should concur to give legal validity to the election of a Pope.

The cardinals for some time conducted the election in an assembly open to the people. In 1274 the Council of Lyons ordained that the election should take place in a secret conclave under regulations still followed, which exclude the cardinals engaged in it from all intercourse with the external world.

Thus was completed a revolution which unquestionably changed the whole character of the Pontifical elections by transferring the control of the nomination of the Pontiff from the community of Rome to a select body of dignitaries, upon whose choice or appointment no popular influence can make the slightest effect. Few revolutions had so completely changed the whole principle and character of a government as that which was thus effected in the Roman Church.

The change effected in the cardinals was as great. From the time when they were entrusted with the exclusive nomination of the Sovereign Pontiff, they virtually ceased to be the clergy of the city of Rome. They became the prince-electors of a great ecclesiastical and temporal monarchy, and the connection with the bishoprics, the parishes, or deaconries of Rome, although still nominally maintained, was in reality lost in the higher dignity which the nominal possession of these offices involved.¹¹

populo Romano acclamante, partim et expetente, tertia die in ipsa ecclesia unanimi voto et pari consensu, me indignum, et prorsus tanto officio imparem, nescio quo Dei judicio, in Romanum pontificem concorditer elegerunt."—*Letter of Celestine to the Venerable Peter, Abbot of Cluni. November 6th, 1143.*—*Mansi Concilia xxi. 592.*—*Migne's Patrology*, vol. 180.

¹⁰ The probability appears to be that the formal exclusion of the laity and inferior clergy was effected by Adrian IV. among his triumphs over republicanism. The decree of Alexander III. recites statutes named by his predecessor to avoid scandals and disorder at the elections. The generally well-informed writers in Migne's "Encyclopædie Théologique," attribute in one place (tit. Cardinal) the exclusion to a decree of Innocent II.; in another (tit. Papa) following Gibbon and Moesheim, to the ordinance of Alexander III., requiring the election to be made by two-thirds of the cardinals. But independently of the evidence of Alexander's own election, that ordinance plainly assumes that the right of election was already confined to the cardinals.

¹¹ The last attempt at anything like popular election in Rome was in 1327,

The College of Cardinals now consists, when full, of seventy members, of whom six are the cardinal bishops of the suburban sees, fifty are cardinal presbyters or priests, incumbents of the parishes of Rome, and fourteen are cardinal deacons. All are nominated at the pleasure of the Pontiff, and they hold their offices for life: it is not necessary that the number should be full, and generally several places are kept vacant to give the Pope the opportunity of conferring the dignity whenever circumstances may make it expedient to select any candidate for promotion.

In the immediate church of Rome the cardinal bishops occupy the highest rank; but it does not follow that they must be the most exalted personages. The archbishop of the greatest metropolitan see may take his place in the conclave as cardinal presbyter, or even as cardinal deacon of the Church of Rome.

Neither is it necessary that any cardinal should hold an ecclesiastical rank above that of the order to which he is admitted. A cardinal bishop must hold the episcopal rank, but of the cardinal presbyters, none need bear a rank above that of a priest.¹² Many of them do not so, and instances are not rare, even in modern times, in which Popes have been elected who were consecrated bishops on the day of their coronation.¹³ The fourteen cardinal deacons may and ought regularly to fill their places without being admitted to priests' orders. In addition to this, the Pope has the power of nominating laymen to fill the Roman benefices which confer the title to the place of cardinal presbyter, and although regularly the party so nominated is bound to take priests' orders within six months, a dispensation from the Pope can authorise him indefinitely to postpone the obligation. Many of the most distinguished members of the Conclave have never taken the irrevocable vows of a priest. Consalvi died in deacon's orders; and instances have sometimes occurred of cardinals thus circumstanced who have renounced their ecclesiastical character—a step open to every one but priests—and lived after their retirement as laymen and as married men.

when the Emperor Louis, while under excommunication by John XXII., induced the people, by a show of popular election, to choose Peter Corvara as anti-Pope.

¹² The custom of appointing bishops to be cardinals was one of the abuses requiring reformation, pointed out in the report of the commission to Pope Paul III. in 1537.—See the document, *Madden's Life of Savonarola*. Vol. ii. p. 269.

¹³ This was the case with Gregory XVI.—*Cardinal Wiseman's Recollections*.

In a body thus constituted is invested the exclusive and, but for one singular exception, the uncontrolled right of electing the sovereign of the Roman Catholic Church.

The forms that attend the election of a Pontiff have often been described. The rules prescribed by the Council of Lyons are still observed; among them that enjoining the rigorous imprisonment of the cardinals is undeviatingly followed. Three days are occupied in preparation for the funeral rites of the deceased pontiff. Nine are devoted to the performance of those rites in St. Peter's. On the evening of the ninth day, the cardinals proceed in solemn procession to one of the Papal palaces in which the election is to be held. Formerly it was the Vatican, but upon recent occasions the Quirinal has been used. The seclusion of the latter palace, and the number of separate suites of apartments which are within its precincts, make it peculiarly fitted for the abode of the conclave during the period of their withdrawal from all communication with the world.

On the evening of the entrance of the cardinals into the palace all entrances to it are carefully built up. One narrow wicket serves as the medium of necessary communication, of the admission of any cardinal who may arrive late, or of egress for any whom illness may compel to depart. This wicket is closely guarded by sentinels, who are either bishops, or judges of some of the tribunals, who watch in turns, day and night, every possible avenue to the palace—bound by a solemn sanction to admit no unauthorised communication to be held with any of their illustrious captives. Within the palace walls each cardinal is allotted his apartment or cell, and permitted to have two attendants, who must share his imprisonment until the election is over. All letters addressed to him are opened by the Secretary of the Conclave; all that he writes are delivered open to the same functionary, whose duty is to see that they contain nothing referring to the election. A vigilance is exercised as cautious and unremitting as if an utter distrust was felt in the voluntary submission of the princes of the Church to the rules prescribed by its canons. When the dinner of a cardinal is brought each day from his own home to the wicket, the covers are carefully examined by the sentinels, and their scrutiny is extended to the compositions of the viands, which are subjected to a process to detect any concealed message that might be concealed under the crust of a pie, or even beneath the

wing of a fowl. The closeness of the examination is said to be justified by well-authenticated stories of communications thus secretly conveyed.

This imprisonment continues frequently for months. The cardinals never leave the precincts of their palace-prison until the election is completed. Their exercise is limited to a promenade in the square of the palace, and if modern usage has abated the strictness of those dietary regulations, which at one time prescribed a fare of gradually increasing austerity, their solitary meals have still little of luxury or of sociality. Each afternoon they assemble in the chapel of the palace and record their votes, until some one has attained the canonical majority of two-thirds.

Although elections may take place by that which is termed inspiration or by compromise, the regular and usual mode is by voting in written papers on which each person inscribes the name of the person he desires to see Pope. Inspiration occurs when by a sudden impulse, like that which prompted the multitude to elect Hildebrand at Rome, and Ambrose at Milan, the entire conclave unanimously vote for one and the same individual to be Pope. Compromise takes place when no candidate being able to attain the canonical majority, the nomination is referred to some persons selected to represent all the various parties of whom the conclave is composed. For the ordinary mode of election scrutineers are appointed, who receive the votes of the different members of the Conclave in a patten, and after examining them, read aloud the result. Another mode of election, by adoration, is that in which the requisite majority of the Conclave offer openly their homage to one of the cardinals as Pope; this is in truth but the substitution of open for secret voting. Its effect may be prevented by a demand for a scrutiny. In one memorable instance it was so with a different result.

If the scrutiny shows that two-thirds have not agreed, the voting papers are burned, and those outside can tell by the smoke ascending from a particular flue, that the meeting of that day has ended without the election of a Pope.

When finally two-thirds of the electors have voted for the same individual, the wall that is built across the gate of the palace is broken down. The first cardinal deacon appears on the balcony and announces the name of the new Pope and the assumed designation by which in Pontifical annals he is to be known.

The election of a candidate may be stopped by a strange privilege still more strangely exercised, which an undefined usage has conceded to some of the European courts. Austria, France, and Spain have each the qualified privilege of a veto. Portugal also claims it. The best informed Roman Catholic writers are unable to give any clear account of this privilege, which rests upon no written canon, and is the result of a tacit understanding rather than of any positive law. Each court can exercise its veto but once. It must be exercised in the course of the election itself, and within the walls of the Conclave. One of the cardinals represents each of these courts, and is privately entrusted with its wishes. As the votes in the scrutiny are read out, if the cardinal so entrusted perceives the election likely to fall upon an individual obnoxious to his court, he can interpose his veto before the objectionable candidate attains the requisite number. If the scrutineers once declared that any person had received two-thirds of the votes, his election would be canonically complete, and beyond the power of any veto to annul. It is said, however, that until this actually takes place, the vote of every elector is still in his power, and that those given for the prohibited candidate are supposed, upon the intimation of the prohibition, to be withdrawn. The privilege is not obsolete, but has been repeatedly exercised in modern times. Austria interposed at the conclave of 1800,¹⁴ and again in 1829 the same power, "in a note which was considered far from courteous," inhibited the election of Cardinal Sevoli, which was on the point of taking place,¹⁵ and in 1831 Gregory XVI. owed his elevation to the veto by which Spain negatived the election of the Cardinal Giustiniani.¹⁶

Whatever may be the merits of the change, or the power of the authority by which it has been effected, unquestionably such a mode of election is very different from that which existed when, under the presidency of legates of the empire, or even under the direction of the cardinal bishops and the guidance of the religious, the whole clergy and commonalty of Rome elected their bishops; widely different indeed from the form that must have existed when "the Apostolic Constitutions" ordained that no bishop should be consecrated until the whole congregation had declared that he was the pastor whom they sought.

¹⁴ Artaud, *Histoire de Pie VII.* Vol. i. p. 84.

¹⁵ Cardinal Wiseman's *Recollections*, p. 417.

¹⁶ *Idem.*

CHAPTER VII.

Accession of Pius VI.—French Invasion of Rome—Treaty of Tolentino—Removal of the Pope from Rome—His stay in Tuscany—He is carried to France—His Death—Conclave at Venice—Election of Pius VII.—His arrival at Rome—Cardinal Consalvi—His Character—Restoration of National Religion in France—The Pope crowns Napoleon—States of the Church annexed to the French empire—The Pope issues a brief of Excommunication—General Remarks on Excommunication—Imprisonment of the Pope—at Savona—at Fontainebleau—He assents to a Concordat—Retracts his assent—Departure from Fontainebleau—Arrival at Savona—Release from captivity—Leaves Savona for Rome—Interview with Murat—Retires to Imola—Triumphal entry into Rome—Mission of Cardinal Consalvi to Paris and London—His reception by the Prince Regent—His Memoir to the Allied Sovereigns—Reactionary policy of the Pope—Restoration of the Order of Jesuits—of the Monastic Orders—Measures of the Pontiff—Lucien Buonaparte, Prince of Canino.

PIUS THE SIXTH was elevated to the tiara on the death of the ill-fated Ganganelli (Clement XIV.) who survived for so brief a space of time the act by which he suppressed the Order of Jesuits. Elected on the 15th of February, 1775, he occupied the Papal chair for nearly twenty-five years.¹ After the misfortunes

¹ There is a superstition connected with the Papacy, that no Pontiff can survive the period during which St. Peter is supposed to have occupied the bishopric of Rome.

“ Pius VII,” writes Cardinal Wiseman, “ had nearly reached the years of Peter, which none of his successors have yet attained. . . . Twenty-four years is the term thus assigned as the bourne which none may hope to pass.”—*Wiseman's Recollections*, p. 157.

If this be accurate, Pius VI. had already broken the charm; at the time of

that darkened the close of his Pontificate, men remembered that omens of evil had attended his election. On being apprised of the result of the scrutiny in the Conclave which made him Pope, in extreme agitation he exclaimed, "The Conclave is at an end, but how unfortunate is the result of it to me." When he assumed the title of Pius VI., the Roman people thought gloomily on the superstition expressed in the line,

" Semper sub Sextis perdita Roma fuit."

When he had nearly reached the bourne which no Pope is to pass, these omens were verified. The tranquillity which had reigned for more than two centuries in the States of the Church was broken. The troubles of bygone times were revived in a war between the Church and France, and the Sacred City saw the banners of an invading army advance to those walls which, since the days of Charles V., no hostile visitant had approached.

Among the triumphs achieved by the arms of Napoleon during his first war in Italy, was the subjugation of the Papal States. In the close of the Italian campaign of 1796, the Papal troops were defeated in a general engagement with the French. Ancona was taken, with all the artillery of the Pontifical army, and on the 19th of February in the following year a treaty

his death he had completed the twenty-fourth, and advanced far into the twenty-fifth, year of his pontificate.

" In effect, Tarquinius Sextus provoked by his tyranny, the expulsion of the Kings from Rome. Urban VI. began the great schism of the West; Alexander VI. astonished the world by the enormity of his crimes."—*Historical and Philosophical Memoirs of Pius VI.*, vol. i. p. 26.

of peace was signed at Tolentino between the Pontiff and the Republic of France.

By the conditions of this treaty the Pope ceded to the Republic of France all the rights which he could claim over the town or territory of Avignon, or over the Venaissin county. He surrendered to the same power the districts known as the Legations of Bologna, of Ferrara, and Romagna. The March of Ancona was also ceded, but only until the conclusion of a European peace. There was still left to the Pontiff the sovereignty over the city of Rome and the districts immediately close to the city, those which bordered on the Tuscan Sea. This preservation of the remnant of its dominions was dearly purchased by the concessions made by the See of Rome. The subsidy which was wrung from the impoverished Papal exchequer was a grievous drain upon the resources of the Apostolic Chamber, but this was as nothing compared with the cost of the principle involved. The Republic of France, which had broken down the altars, confiscated the possessions, and sent to death or exile the ministers of the Church, was formally recognised. The government that had actually abjured Christianity was admitted to a treaty with the Vicar of the Lord. Nay, the Pontiff bound himself to supply munitions of war to its armies, and actually to find chargers to carry the infidel troopers of apostate France.³ There could scarcely be conceived a greater departure from all the principles that had hitherto governed the Papacy than a treaty of perpetual amity between the Pope and a

³ Eleventh article of the Treaty of Tolentino.

government of which every member was branded with the crime of a public apostasy from his Christian faith. As if to complete the humiliation of the Apostolic See, the very date of the treaty was expressed on behalf of the French in their own revolutionary notation, and the year of the republic, one and indivisible, was ostentatiously placed beside the Christian reckoning, which counts the years of our era from the redemption of man.⁴

But more even than this. The Pope and the Sacred College were made parties to the alienation of the possessions of the Church. The Legations were formally ceded to the French. It was not that the Pontiff silently acquiesced in the spoliation which he had not the power to resist. The surrender of these provinces was his own act, accompanied by all proper forms and ratified by all proper authority. "The Pope renounces for ever, and cedes and transfers to the French republic all his rights over the territories known by the name of the Legations of Bologna, of Ferrara, and of the Romagna ;"⁵ and not only so, but he bound himself and his successors to ratify and confirm a title, which, if the principles so often asserted were true, was a sacrilege, and an impious violation of the inalienable rights of God's Church.⁶

Even these ignominious concessions purchased but a short-lived and hollow truce.

Pius VI. had then reached the venerable age of four-

⁴ "Fait et signé au quartier général de Tolentino par les susdits plénipotentiaires, le 5 Ventose, an V. de la république française une et indivisible." —19th February, 1797.

⁵ Seventh article of the Treaty of Tolentino.

⁶ Treaty of Tolentino, 17th February, 1797.—*Recueil de Traité*s, p. 71.—*Marten et Cussy*, ii. 130.

score years. Napoleon and the French Directory only waited for his death to establish in Rome a republic on the model of that of France. The infirmities of the Pope had induced them to anticipate an early termination of his life. A dangerous illness made every one believe that the Pontificate of Pius was drawing to a close. His almost miraculous recovery disappointed the expectation of a vacancy in St. Peter's chair, and the impatience of the apostles of revolution could no longer brook the delay created by the tough vitality of the Pope. Pius, in their eyes, had forfeited all claim to forbearance by the obstinacy of living too long ; and, in spite of his venerable years, the determination was abandoned which had charitably resolved to let the old man die in peace. A revolutionary tumult at Rome, which ended in outrages committed in the palace of the French ambassador, supplied the pretext for the entrance of the French troops ; and just twelve months after the execution of the Treaty of Tolentino the tricolor floated on the summit of the Capitol. Rome was revolutionised (February 15th, 1798), and the aged Pontiff carried a prisoner from his palace to find a shelter with the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to whose dominions his captors permitted him to retire.

Another year had passed, when his conquerors once more disturbed his old age, and removed him from his retreat in the Carthusian monastery at Sienna, and carried him into France. On the 22nd of August, 1799, he died at Valence, a prisoner in a strange country, his death-bed attended only by his confessor.

The republican government at Rome existed but for

eighteen months. The troops of the restored king of Naples advanced in the month of August upon Rome ; they were repulsed by the French, but more formidable allies sustained the cause of the exiled Pontiff. English troops were at Civita-Veccchia. The Austrians seized some of the strongholds in the neighbourhood, and when the Neapolitan troops returned to the attack, Regnier, the French general, was obliged to capitulate. On the 27th of September, the convention surrendering Rome was signed. The city itself was to be occupied by the soldiers of the King of Naples. Civita-Veccchia was to be garrisoned by English troops. Three days afterwards the imperial city was surrendered to her new conquerors.⁷

The aged Pontiff was beyond the reach of all earthly cares before Rome had been recovered from the hands of its invaders. The officials of the King of Naples administered the affairs of the Pontifical city in the name of their sovereign. Austrian troops occupied jointly with the Neapolitan the city and the provinces of Rome, and it was generally believed that the defenders of the rights of the Papal See had secretly determined on a partition of its territories between themselves.

⁷ Previously to this, British troops had occupied Civita-Veccchia in 1794. The 12th Light Dragoons were landed there, and did duty in the Papal States for some time. Previous to their embarkation for England, Pius addressed a letter of thanks to the regiment, accompanied by the presentation of a gold medallion to each of the officers. On their landing, the officers were severally introduced to the Pontiff, who took one of their helmets and blessed it, praying that the cause of truth and religion might triumph over injustice and infidelity. In his letter of farewell, he assured them of "the unalterable regard he desired on every occasion to manifest towards the nation and to every individual Englishman."—*Cannon's Historical Records of the British Army.—Historical Outline of Political Catholicism.*

Some time elapsed after the death of Pius before steps were taken to elect his successor. In the month of November, under the protection of the Austrian emperor, a sufficient number of the dispersed cardinals assembled at Venice. The rule which prescribed the place of the death of the Pontiff, as that of their meeting to elect his successor, could not be obeyed. After a conclave which lasted for four months, they elected, on the 4th of March (A.D. 1800), Gregory Chiarimonti to the dangerous and precarious honours of the Papal chair. It was the influence or rather the address of Consalvi, the secretary of the Conclave, which carried his election. Austria, true to her policy of 1799, had previously interposed her veto against another candidate, on the ground that the emperor would not consent to the elevation of a subject of the King of Sardinia to the Papal throne.⁸

The new Pontiff assumed the title of Pius VII. Invited to take up his abode at the Vatican, he refused, until the Neapolitan and Austrian sovereigns had resigned the government of the Papal States to his representatives. Both sovereigns resisted for some time. At last they agreed to give up the government to the Pope ; while the Pope, on the other hand, consented that the troops of Austria and Naples should garrison the States.

In July, 1800, four months after his election, Pius VII. entered Rome ; he re-established the old system of government, but began his reign by a general pardon of all offences committed during the revolution. He

⁸ Artaud, " Histoire de Papa Pius VII.," vol. i. p. 84.

appointed as his secretary of state, Consalvi, elevated to the rank of cardinal, and to the abilities and wisdom of this extraordinary man he looked for advice and aid in all the difficulties of his arduous reign, and to the skill and address of the faithful minister the Papacy was indebted for the restitution, by the Congress of Vienna, of those provinces on the shores of the Adriatic, which Pius VI., by the Treaty of Tolentino, had consented to sever from the dominions of the Papal See.

Consalvi is unquestionably entitled to take a high place among the statesmen and diplomatists of the age. Lord Castlereagh has recorded his opinion, that at the Congress of Vienna the ministers of all the European powers were far exceeded in skill by the representative of the Pope. He was never in priest's orders, having been appointed to one of the seats in the Sacred College which can be filled by persons who are not priests. His powers of conversation are said to have been great. By his address he fascinated George IV., to whom, when Prince Regent, he came on an embassy from the Pope. Up to the period of his death the cardinal kept up a familiar and confidential correspondence with his royal friend. His information was extensive, and his tastes refined. In the later years of his life his house at Rome was the resort of all that was polished and intellectual in the society that visited that city. English visitors were captivated by the manners and won by the kindness of the accomplished Prince of the Church ; and not only the sovereign, but many of the proudest nobility of Britain were numbered among his intimate and attached friends.

His political opinions were far more liberal than those prevalent in the atmosphere by which he was surrounded. It was a time when, in the reaction against French principles, those of popular freedom were not anywhere in favour with sovereigns, or their counsellors ; in the minister of the Pope, it could hardly be expected that we should find an exception to the rule. It is still but justice to say that he restrained the reactionary spirit of many who surrounded him. To violent measures, or steps of harsh coercion, he was opposed no less from policy than from feeling ; and to the influence of his temperate and prudent advice, even more than to the natural amiability of the Pontiff, it may be traced that the domestic administration of Pius VII. was one of equity and mildness.

Just before the newly elected Pontiff entered Rome, the victory of Marengo had once more placed Italy under the dominion of the French, but no attempt was made to disturb the restoration of the Pontifical government at Rome. Already the wisdom of Napoleon had resolved on the restoration of a national religion in France. He expressed his satisfaction at the election of the Cardinal Chiaramonti, on the ground of his belief in his piety. When, a few months later, the treaty of Luneville gave peace to Italy, the sovereignty of the Pontiff was recognised. The Adriatic provinces surrendered by the Treaty of Tolentino, formed part of the newly erected Cisalpine republic ; but in Rome itself the Papal authority was undisturbed.

One of the first and greatest triumphs of the Pontificate of Pius was the truly Catholic one of the

restoration of Christianity in France. Immediately after the battle of Marengo, and before the Pope had returned to Rome, Napoleon made overtures to him on the subject ; these led to more formal negotiations.⁹ On the 8th April, 1802, the law passed the legislature of France, which established the concordat previously agreed upon between the first consul and the Pontiff. In the tedious negotiations which preceded the concordat, Consalvi visited Paris ; and although an unfortunate incident attended his appearance with unfavourable circumstances,¹⁰ his address was as successful in conciliating Napoleon, as it was subsequently in winning the good graces of George IV. The great object of his mission was attained. In spite of the manifest dissatisfaction of the army and the populace of Paris, the rites of the Christian faith were publicly, and with all the ceremonial of State, performed in the cathedral where the Goddess of Reason had been worshipped. In the ancient aisles of Notre Dame were heard once more the solemn chaunts of those Christian devotions which the daring presumption of the infidel anarchists had declared to be banished for ever from free and enlightened France.

The visit of Pius VII. to Paris to assist at the coronation of Napoleon, in 1804, was followed by results

⁹ Artaud, vol. i. p. 115.

¹⁰ Consalvi, when setting out for France, wrote to Sir John Acton, the Neapolitan minister,—

“ The interests of religion require a victim. I am going to see the First Consul. I am on my way to martyrdom. The will of God be done.”

The court of Naples made every effort to prevent the concordat with France. Sir John Acton gave the confidential letter of Consalvi to the French ambassador, by whom it was transmitted to Napoleon.—Artaud, vol. i. p. 181.

very different from those which were expected by the confiding simplicity of the Pontiff. To that journey, Consalvi had offered all the opposition in his power. Never before had sovereign been crowned by the Pontiff, except one who represented the Emperors of the West. "Even they," said Consalvi, "all came to Rome to be crowned by the Pope." For the first time in the history of the Holy See, the Pope was asked to appear beyond his own dominions, and in the capital of another state."¹¹ Napoleon was too powerful to be refused, and the Pontiff graced with his presence the ceremony of Notre Dame. On the 2nd of December, 1804, the Pope poured upon the person of Napoleon the consecrated oil, which made him one of the anointed of heaven. On the 17th of May, 1809, that same Napoleon issued from his camp at Schönbrunn the decree that annexed the States of the Pope to the empire of France.

Before that decree Pius was a prisoner in his palace. Ordered by the imperious mandate of Napoleon to declare war against England, and surrender his castles to be garrisoned by France, the Pontiff could only oppose to the overwhelming force that coerced him, a firm refusal to accede to these demands. When the French assumed the government of his capital, he offered no opposition himself. He enjoined his clergy and his people to offer none. He was not driven into abdication—nor goaded into any intemperate act. In passive resistance, the

¹¹ Bologna where Charles V. had been crowned by Clement VII, was within the Papal States. Bologna was selected because the recollections of the sack of Rome by his troops would have made Charles no welcome visitant to the populace of that city.

most formidable of all obstacles he could oppose, he left everything to be done by the violence of his aggressors.

On the 10th of June the formal annexation of Rome to the French empire was accomplished. A note in the morning had apprised the Pontiff that he was no longer sovereign of Rome. At noon on that day, amid the roar of artillery, the Pontifical flag was lowered from the Castle of St. Angelo, and the tricolor hoisted in its stead. In anticipation of this measure, a document had been long prepared, to which only the signature and the seal of the Pope were wanting; and on the same day Pius attached his signature to the brief—it is quite incorrect to call it a bull¹²—which, in a long protest, detailed the aggressions of the French, and concluded by declaring that the penalty of excommunication had fallen upon all who had been privy to the seizure of the territories of the Church. It was with some little difficulty that Cardinal Pacca induced Pius to attach his signature to this brief. He expressed no little anxiety lest the persons employed to post it should be discovered in the act—an event in which

¹² This document is universally spoken of as a bull of excommunication. It was not so. Bulls are distinguished from briefs or letters apostolic both in their commencement, their final sentences, and in their authentication. The bull commences with the name of the Pontiff, followed by the designations of Bishop and Servant of Servants of God, "Pius episcopus servus servorum Dei." The brief commences with the title of Pope "Pius septimus Papa." The bull is sealed with a seal of lead, the seal of the Papal Chancery; the brief with wax, on which is impressed the signet of the fisherman. Every bull concludes with the well-known formula, "Nulli ergo hominum licet," and the denunciation against all its gainsayers of the "displeasure of Almighty God and of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul;" a sanction not inserted in the brief; and, finally, the brief is written in the ordinary character, while the bull is engrossed in the more imposing form of the old Gothic letters.

he felt certain they would be shot. During that night Cardinal Pacca contrived to manage its publication without any of his emissaries being observed. The decree of Napoleon deposing the Pope was published in Rome on the 10th of June. At daylight on the morning of the 11th, the Papal brief appeared posted on all the usual places. This document did not mention any one by name. It contained a long and carefully drawn statement of the conduct of the French since the seizure of Rome by their troops on the 2nd of February, 1808 ; and at its close it proceeded to declare that all those who had been parties in any manner, either by act or by command, to the recent outrages committed against the Pope and the Holy See, had subjected themselves to the excommunication declared against the perpetrators of such acts, by the canons, and especially by the Council of Trent. A declaration to which, "if necessary," Pius providently added his own excommunication.

"By the authority of Almighty God, of the holy apostles Peter and Paul, and by our own authority, We declare that all those who after the invasion of this illustrious city and of the domains of the Church, after the sacrilegious violation of the patrimony of St. Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, undertaken and committed by the French troops, have perpetrated in Rome and in the domains of the Church, in violation of the principles of the Church, of the temporal rights of the Holy See, the outrages, or any one of the outrages which we have denounced in our two consistorial allocutions already mentioned, and in the numerous protests and remonstrances published by our order, we declare that those

who are thus designated, and moreover all those who have commanded, abetted, counselled, or aided them, and those who have ordered the execution of the aforesaid attempts, or who themselves have executed them, have incurred the greater excommunication, and the other censures and ecclesiastical penalties imposed by the sacred canons, and the decrees of the general councils, especially those of the Council of Trent, and if need be, we excommunicate and anathematise them anew.”¹³

Great indeed was the contrast between the language of this faltering condemnation and that in which the Pontiffs of the elder days had pronounced the sentence of excommunication against emperors and kings. “If need be we excommunicate them anew.” The anxiety was manifest to place all that was done upon the ancient canons. It was more than implied that the brief left the perpetrators of these outrages in exactly the same position in which they were before. They were excommunicated by the Council of Trent and not by the Pope, and the Papal declaration was nothing more than a republication of laws which did not need that sanction to give them force. Nay, even the offences intended to be included were not very accurately defined, and in the vague and hesitating denunciations of the brief there might be read the conviction of its framers that, for the present at least, the days of anathema and excommunication had passed away.

Still more remarkable was the avoidance cautiously maintained throughout the entire document of men-

¹³ Brief of Pius VII.: “Quum memoranda illa die.”—*Artaud*, vol. i. p. 131. Cardinal Pacca, “*Mémoire Historique*,” vol i. p. 60.

tioning any one by name. Those not acquainted with the distinctions of the canon law, might not at first understand how completely this omission altered the entire effect of the excommunication—deprived it altogether of its earthly terrors, and reduced it literally to a mere republication of the penalties already affixed by the canons and decrees—penalties which had only their effect in the spiritual and unseen world of faith.

The sentence of the greater excommunication, when formally and regularly pronounced against an individual, especially by the Supreme Pontiff, was attended by consequences which inflicted, even in this world, a terrible penalty upon its object. It was the separation of the person on whom it was passed from the community of Christians. It not only deprived him of all participation in those spiritual and invisible blessings which were believed to be attached to communion with the Church, but it entailed penalties which were appreciable by other faculties than those of the discernment of faith. To the person under sentence of excommunication no priest could administer any religious rite ; but more than this, it was criminal in any one, whether priest or layman, to extend to him the solaces of friendship, or even the courtesies and charities of life. To associate with him was to incur the very penalty under which he suffered ; even to remain under the same roof was forbidden, and to aid or to succour the ecclesiastical rebel, was an act of treason, or at least misprision of treason, against the Church and against God. With such a one Christians ought not so much as to eat. None were to bid him God speed. The temples in which

men met to worship must not be profaned by his presence. For him no prayer could be uttered by Christian lips, or breathed from a pious heart, except for his conversion from his impenitence. In countries that recognised the laws of the Church, the greater excommunication involved the virtual deprivation of civil rights. Cut off from religion, shunned by his fellow men, the subject of this terrible sentence was, like Cain, a wanderer and vagabond upon the face of the earth. He could rid himself of the ban only by submission, and that submission must be made personally to the Pope, who alone had power to absolve him from the curse. At the point of death alone could any inferior authority loose him from the Pontifical anathema, and the prudent caution of the canons prescribed that if pardon were thus granted when he was believed to be dying, and if perchance he recovered, the absolution so conditionally pronounced should be void. If he died unreconciled, the ban that attended him in life pursued him to the grave. No holy requiem or pious prayer could rise to heaven from the side of his unhallowed bier. Separated even in death from the faithful, his remains were laid, without priest or blessing, in unconsecrated ground. In the language of some of the anathemas that generally accompanied excommunication, he was buried with the burial of an ass.

Consequences like these involved in their very nature the necessity of a personal sentence before they could take effect. The laws of the Church might prescribe the penalty for a crime, but it was for the living and acting tribunal to affix by a judicial act that penalty

upon the criminal. A general denunciation of offenders was the promulgation of a law, and not the pronouncing of a judgment. A general decree of excommunication was almost as anomalous as would be a general sentence pronounced by a judge upon all rebels, of whom he named none. The Roman ritual accordingly contained the form in which the sentence of excommunication is, with "bell, book, and candle," to be pronounced,¹⁴ and by the direction of that ritual, letters were immediately to be despatched to all neighbouring bishops that they might apprise the people of the sentence, and warn them against incurring the guilt of holding any intercourse with the individual against whom it was pronounced.

When general excommunications became common, and above all, when synods and councils fancied they strengthened the penal safeguards of the Church by affixing the penalty of excommunication *ipso facto* to the embracing of certain heresies, and the commission of certain crimes, all the relations of life were thrown into confusion. No one could tell that the friend by whose side he walked was not by some secret act an outlaw from the pale of Christianity, with whom it was criminal for him to speak. The condition of the devout believer in the power of the Church was that of utter uncertainty and doubt. The very priest who united him in wedlock, who received his dying shrift, or who ministered to him the holiest rites, might be secretly under the ban of excommunication, and the sacraments on which he was relying as a means of grace might be

¹⁴ As to the form of the excommunication see note at the end of the Chapter.

but a profanation. The uncertainty extended to every act and affected the whole order of ecclesiastical things. The strong good sense of Martin V. saw the evil, and devised a remedy which casuists no doubt found means of reconciling with the nature of excommunication.¹⁵ A bull of that Pontiff, issued in the year 1420, declared that in mercy to the faithful, to avoid scandals and to quiet frightened consciences, no one should be bound either to avoid intercourse with, or to refuse the sacraments to, any person by reason of a general sentence of excommunication, whether enacted by law or pronounced by a living authority, but only when a sentence was clearly and distinctly pronounced against an indi-

¹⁵ "Ad evitanda scandala et multa pericula quae conscientiis timoratis contingere possunt, Christi fidelibus misericorditer indulgemus quod nemo deinceps à communione alicujus, sacramentorum administratione vel receptione, aut aliis quibuscumque divinis intus et extra, pretextu cajuscumque sententiae aut censura ecclesiastica à jure vel ab homine generaliter promulgata teneatur abstinere, vel aliquem vitare, aut interdictum ecclesiasticum observare, nisi sententia aut censura hujusmodi fuerit lata contra personam, collegium, ecclesiam, communitatem, vel locum certum aut certam à judice publicata vel denunciata specialiter et expresse, constitutionibus Apostolicis et aliis contrarium facientibus non obstantibus."

"For the avoidance of scandals and many perils which may befall frightened consciences we mercifully grant to the faithful in Christ that no one henceforward shall be bound to abstain from the communion of any one, the administration or reception of the sacraments, or any other divine ordinance, within or without, under pretext of any sentence or ecclesiastical censure by law or by man generally promulgated, or to avoid any one, or to observe any ecclesiastical interdict, unless a sentence or censure of this nature shall have been pronounced against any some certain person, corporation, community, church or place—such sentence specially and expressly published or delivered by the judge; any Apostolic constitution or others which make to the contrary notwithstanding."—*Bull of Martin V.*

The only exception was in the case of a person so notoriously beating a clergyman that the fact could not possibly be gainsayed or concealed. Such an offender, so manifestly and beyond all question falling under the censure of the canon, was not to be communicated with although not denounced, "*licet denuntiatus non sit.*"

vidual, a corporation, or a state, and that sentence plainly and notoriously promulgated by the judge. The distinction was at once established between excommunicated persons “tolerated” and those who were “denounced.”¹⁶ Against the latter the full penalties of the sentence were in force ; the former were left solely to its spiritual effects ; they suffered no loss of society, no deprivation of civil or even of ecclesiastical rights. Common sense triumphed over the infallible strictness of the canon law. Until the sentence was pronounced upon the guilty person by name, he was regarded as innocent for all the purposes of life. Even a bishop did not lose his jurisdiction, nor a priest his rights.

The decree of Martin expressly declared that it was not intended to give the excommunicated person any relief ; it professed to leave him in the same position as before, but that position was one of which no human judgment took cognisance, and however in the eye of faith the excommunication might affect his spiritual condition or his eternal destinies, among his fellow men he stood as if that sentence never had been incurred.

The gentleness or the policy of Pius shrunk from the severity of a personal excommunication. The brief

¹⁶ Migne, “Encyclopædie Théologique.”—“De la difference qui existe entre les excommuniés tolerés et ceux qui sont denoncés.”—*Theologie-Morale*, vol. i. Article “Excommunication;” Goosselin, “Power of the Popes.” Vol. ii. p. 88.

The extent to which “ipso facto” excommunications have been carried by the zeal of all churchmen is curious. There is a canon at this moment in force in the Church of England which subjects to the penalty of “ipso facto” excommunication, any one who affirms that the thirty-nine articles are not such as he may with a safe conscience subscribe; another which subjects to the same punishment any one who affirms that ministers and laymen, or either of them, may join together and make ecclesiastical rules, or submit to be governed by such rules, without the licence of the king.

which he issued was in truth nothing more than a political protest, and a republication of the canons which fixed a penalty upon those invading the possessions of the Church. That penalty was already imposed by law. That which alone belonged to the province of the living judge—that which since the decree of Martin V. was absolutely essential to enforce the punishment inflicted by that law—the judicial denunciation not of the crime, but of the criminal—the solemn declaration that any one individual had brought himself under the ban of the canons which were quoted—all that really constituted the sentence of excommunication — was wanting in the document in which the Pope was supposed to have directed against Napoleon the thunders which in former times had rolled from the Vatican against the imperial invaders of Apostolic rights.

The result was easily foreseen. Men were unaccustomed to the long disused forms of Pontifical excommunication, and at first the Pope's brief excited the same feelings as if it had been a personal sentence : but the difference was seen practically when everything, even in Church matters, went on exactly as before ; when men found to their surprise that no interdict closed the churches or suspended the ministrations of religion in France, the excommunication passed away from their thoughts. It was forgotten even by the Papal authorities themselves. Of all the multitude that must have been included in the “ designation ” of the Papal brief, not one ever came forward to be absolved from its anathema—yet no person regarded them as under its effects. The Pope entered into a concordat with

Napoleon, to which it was never objected that it was made with one under the ban of the Church. Cardinals attended the ceremony which united the Emperor to his Austrian bride—a profanation if they were admitting an excommunicated person to the sacrament of marriage. Prelates joined in the service for the dead which was performed when the ashes of Napoleon were brought to repose on the banks of the Seine and in the France he loved so well. Murat who was plainly within the terms of the condemnation, was admitted to a friendly interview with the Pope. Even the Pope himself appeared in his acts not to regard the brief of the 10th of June as practically fixing on any individual the pains of excommunication.

Except in the name, this mild proceeding had nothing in common with those tremendous sentences, by which the Church had once over-awed the lawlessness of evil and unsettled times ; sentences before which proud spirits quailed, and by which noble hearts were crushed ; but which, it must be confessed, in days of violence and crime, had often vindicated the rights of religion and humanity against impiety and wrong. The excommunications of Hildebrand were something wholly different from that which bore the name in the Letters Apostolic of the 10th of June. If we wished almost visibly to bring before our minds the mighty change that had passed over human society—the contrast perhaps between the rude, because the real and earnest, energy of the middle ages, and the hesitating compromises which are the triumph of modern civilisation—we have but to place the act of the Pontiff of the

nineteenth century beside the scenes of former days. It is impossible to contemplate without respect the picture that is presented to us of Pius calmly awaiting in the chamber of his palace the violence which he knew was coming—prepared beforehand with that long and carefully weighed protest, in which he pointed out the outrages of French invasion, and finally with mild dignity denounced the penalties of the Church's law against the perpetrators of these crimes. Even though in that denunciation he carefully avoided the mention of any name—we give full credit to the courage which braved in uttering it the displeasure of imperial might, and the carelessness of his own safety, which thought only of the messengers who were employed to give publicity to the brief.¹⁷ But to feel how immeasurable is the distance between this and the acts of the olden time, we have but to recall the image of Hildebrand as he slowly rose among the fathers in the Council of Lateran and with outstretched arm pronounced in that strange and passionate invocation of St. Peter, the few sentences in which he declared Henry cut off from the communion of the Church and unfit to rule over Christian men¹⁸—or of Innocent at Lyons when he uttered the anathema against the second Frederic, while assembled prelates flung their torches on the ground, and as they trampled out the flames in smoke, repeated the words of the Pontiff, “So be his light extinguished for ever.”¹⁹

¹⁷ Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca, Sir G. Head's Translation, Vol. i. p. 143.

¹⁸ *Ante*, vol. i. p. 108. | Milman's Latin Christianity, book vii. chap. ii. vol. iii. p. 154. See note at end of this chapter.

¹⁹ Milman's Latin Christianity, vol. iv. p. 180. *Ante*, vol. i. p. 150—159.

The truth was that excommunication in its high and proper sense, demanded for its employment against a sovereign an age of sterner convictions or of deeper superstitions than that in which the lot of Pius VII. had been cast. There were times when the denunciation of the Church produced effects which it was difficult for the proudest or the most powerful monarch to resist. If the personal anathema was disregarded, there remained that terrible sentence of interdict against the nation—a sentence which, for the sins of the sovereign, deprived his people of all the ordinances of religion. Questionable as may appear the justice of this vicarious punishment, no proceeding could be more effectual for its ends. The interdict brought the consequences of the ruler's obstinacy to every bosom and to every home—and the prince who might not fear for himself to brave the censure of the Church, was not unfrequently compelled to yield to the terrors of his subjects, who saw with consternation all the ordinary rites of religion suspended, their churches shut up—marriages performed in the porch or even in the churchyard, without gladness or joy—all the usages that had become interwoven with the hearts of the people stayed—the consecrated burial-places closed against the dead—the festivals unhonoured—the Sabbath without its mass—all the public observances of Christianity discontinued throughout the land.²⁰

This formidable power had grown from a com-

²⁰ In Milman's *Latin Christianity*, book ix. chap. v. (vol. iv. p. 87) there is a vivid description of the interdict issued against the realm of England in the days of King John. See also Lingard's *History of England*, vol. ii. pp. 816, 817.

paratively small beginning. In primitive times the jurisdiction was exercised of excluding any notorious or impenitent offender from the communion of the Church; but the first sentences of excommunication consisted of nothing more than the mere mention of the name of the offender and a caution to the people to avoid receiving him into communion.²¹ Gradually, however, this proceeding began to carry with it undefined terrors, and its effects were magnified by Churchmen, who found it a convenient instrument for restraining the violence of men upon whom religion could exercise an influence only through their fears. The delivery of the sentence itself began to be attended with circumstances which were calculated to strike terror into the heart. The ringing of bells, the quenching of torches, the violent dashing of stones upon the earth, were among the ceremonies employed to symbolise to the rude but susceptible imagination of uncivilised generations the terrors of the Church's ban. Maledictions were uttered in language fearful enough to be understood by the most ignorant, and even the fierce and the lawless trembled as they heard the terrible imprecations of temporal evil on the head of the impenitent sinner—imprecations of which the superstition of the age was sure to find a fulfillment in some real or supposed calamity which followed the steps of the condemned. Men shrunk in dread from the anathema which carried with it a blighting and blasting influence on their fortunes in this world, who would have trembled and disregarded it if they only shared the vulgar belief that

²¹ Migne's *Encyclopædie Theologique*. See note at end of this Chapter.

its condemnation doomed them to everlasting misery in the next.

When Hildebrand asserted for the Apostolic See the right of judging all the potentates of earth—when the sentence of excommunication was pronounced from its tribunal against the disobedient monarch as well as the meanest of his subjects, the question originated, whether the man with whom it was a crime for Christians to associate could possibly discharge the duties of reigning over a Christian nation. The conflict between that which has been termed temporal and that which is called spiritual power arose. The jurisdiction to excommunicate sovereigns became at once the deposing power of the Pope, and whether from the claims asserted as those of divine right, or from the maxims incorporated in what was then the public law of Europe as Roman Catholic writers have asserted,²² or, as may seem more probable, from the very nature of excommunication itself, it was contended and believed that the monarch who incurred and continued under that sentence forfeited his crown.

Had the pontifical excommunication been confined to those cases of flagrant guilt in which the common feeling of mankind could have gone with the judgment pro-

²² This view is that maintained in the able and learned work of M. Gosselin, "Pouvoir du Pape au moyen age." See that work, or the English translation by Rev. M. Kelly, of St. Patrick's College, Maynooth.

The same view—that the deposing power of the Pope over sovereigns rested, not on any direct claim by Divine right of the Papal See to a temporal jurisdiction, but on the public law of Europe, which regarded an excommunicated person as forfeiting the crown of a Christian kingdom—was adopted by Fénelon, and partly by de Maistre.

See, however, the terms in which Gregory VII. pronounced sentence of deposition against Henry IV. Note at the end of this chapter.

nounced even against a king, had the Church continued steadfast to the cause of the people and its anathemas been only directed against the tyrants and oppressors who disgraced the name of royalty by their lawless crimes, it is more than possible that these high pretensions might have been maintained, and the throne of the Pontiff become a tribunal to which the oppressed might have looked for deliverance and justice against the mightiest of their earthly tyrants. But this was not the case. The power of excommunication was used not to protect the interests of justice but to guard what were termed the rights of the Church. The very frequency with which it was resorted to for the most trivial causes—trivial at least as estimated in the great scale of morality and justice—made the once terrible sentence lose its effect. Successive generations of the Princes of Arragon lived and died under the ban, because they asserted their right to the crown of Sicily in opposition to the Papal nominee. Scarcely a generation passed away in Venice which did not witness the city under the sentence of the Pope.²³ In the hands of Pontiffs like Alexander VI., or even Julius II., the pontifical anathema became little more than one of the formularies with which the sovereign of the Roman States declared war. The re-action followed at no long interval. The whole power of the excommunication depended upon the respect which was paid to its authority. Even the interdict could not be enforced if the clergy chose, as in some instances they had done, to disregard it. The Reformation called into existence a new world in

²³ See list at the end of this chapter.

Europe—a world which supplied multitudes who would wholly disregard the most terrible censures of the Church. Secure in their temporal possessions, severed from that popular sympathy and alliance with the spirit of freedom which in early ages had sustained the struggles of the Church, content to take their place among the military princes of the earth, the Pontiffs who succeeded the Reformation no longer employed the power of which their predecessors had made such lavish use, and in the days of Napoleon and Pius VII. the pontifical excommunications had become wholly obsolete among the venerable relics of the past.²⁴

They were not the days in which it would have been prudent to revive them. The temper in which such an attempt would have been received may be understood from the fact that an assembly of the French bishops and clergy—following the precedent adopted after the excommunication of Henry IV.—declared the excommunication of the 10th of June to be null and void, among other reasons, as professedly founded on matters with relation to which no spiritual jurisdiction existed.²⁵ The precepts of earthly wisdom at least would have suggested to Pius the imprudence of testing by extreme measures the extent to which the loftiest pretensions of Papal prerogative had still their hold upon

²⁴ Up at least to the year 1773 the ceremony had been kept alive by the form of an annual excommunication of heretics by the Pope, in the reading of the bull, "In cœna domini," with the usual solemnities attending the anathema. This observance was discontinued in that year by an ordinance of Clement XIV. It is said by some writers to have been afterwards revived.

²⁵ Migne's "Encyclopædie Théologique," vol. xxxvi., "Droit et Jurisprudence," p. 365, tit. "Excommunication;" De Berrall, "Fragments relatifs à l'Histoire Ecclesiastique du dix-neuvième siècle," p. 167.

the hearts and consciences of men. And the policy rather deserves to be called prudent, than either temporising or fearful, which adopted the middle course, vindicating the honour and asserting the laws of the Church by a general denunciation of offenders, without venturing on the step of a personal excommunication, which would have irretrievably committed the alleged rights of the Papal See to a renewal of the contest it had once maintained with the House of Hohenstauffen.

The publication of this brief wounded the pride and the susceptibilities of Napoleon. By a strange, although not uncommon, inconsistency of character, he prided himself upon being the restorer of Christianity in France ; still more upon the sacredness with which he had been invested by coronation at the hands of the Pope. That he deeply felt the stigma, even of the general excommunication, is manifest from the pains which he took to obtain the disavowal of its validity from a clerical assembly. Upon other grounds the publication of the Papal brief excited the utmost indignation in the minds of the French authorities at Rome. It was regarded, not only by them, but by the world at large, as a bold defiance of the imperial power—an act of rebellion against the new sovereign of the Papal states. After vain endeavours to induce the Pope to withdraw it, it was determined to remove him from Rome, where his presence was inconvenient to the government established by the French.

The preparations for the removal of the Pontiff were made with a secrecy that concealed the intention from the population of Rome, but was not sufficient to prevent

some suspicion from reaching the inmates of the pontifical abode. At three in the morning of the 16th of July, the palace of the Quirinal was forcibly entered by the French troops, and, before the population of the city had awakened from their slumbers, Pius VII. was, like his predecessor, carried off a prisoner from Rome.²⁶ This step was said to have been taken by Miollis, the French general, on the advice of Murat, without any direct authority from Napoleon. The latter, like Charles V., professed to disapprove of the arrest ; but like him, he kept, notwithstanding, the Pontiff a prisoner in his power.

The captivity of Pius continued for nearly five years. The first three were passed at Savona, on the shores of the Gulf of Genoa, where he was detained in a palace that was virtually his prison. The head of the Church was closely guarded by French troops,

²⁶ The memoirs of Cardinal Pacca contain many curious incidents of the journey and the imprisonment of the Pope. The Cardinal was the companion of the Pontiff. They had not proceeded far from Rome when they discovered that the contents of both their purses combined amounted to thirty-five baiocchi, about 1s. 5d. The Pope was hurried away without even a change of dress.

During the Pope's captivity, Pacca, Consalvi, and others of the cardinals who incurred the displeasure of Napoleon by refusing to be present at his marriage with Maria Louisa, were prohibited by an imperial decree from wearing the distinctive colour of their rank, and were known as the Black Cardinals.

The historical memoirs of Cardinal Pacca have been translated into English by Sir G. Head. The reader may consult the few observations on the imprisonment of Pope Pius in Cardinal Wiseman's "Recollections," p. 35. General Radet, by whom the Pope was escorted from Rome, gave his account of the transaction in an exculpatory letter, which he addressed to the Pope after his restoration on the 12th of September, 1814. This letter is published at the end of Pacca's memoirs. See also the "Life of Pius VII.," by the Chevalier Artaud, already referred to,¹ and the Italian life, published at Rome by Pistolesi two years after the Pope's death.

while English frigates watched in the distance an opportunity to rescue him. On the 28th of June, 1812, he was removed to Fontainebleau, where, overcome by the persuasions of Napoleon, he gave to the concordat which the emperor pressed on him, an assent which he almost immediately retracted. On the 18th of February, 1813, he signed the articles by which he impliedly agreed to the resignation of his temporal sovereignty in Rome, and expressly assented to the emperor's demand to retain the nomination of bishops in France. Some of the cardinals who had been removed from Fontainebleau were now permitted to return to the Pope. But Napoleon when he gave this permission, did not calculate on the effect which the support of their presence and friendly counsels would produce. True to the traditions of their Church, they pointed out to their master that he had, in a moment of weakness, abandoned principles always deemed essential to the supremacy of the Holy See. If any of them had ever held the dogma of the Pope's personal infallibility, that belief vanished before the practical evidence that he had erred. Their remonstrances prevailed. With tears the Pope acknowledged his mistake, and on the 24th of March the imperial plans were disconcerted by the receipt of a letter at the Tuileries, in which the Pontiff renounced and annulled his former act, as one which he had no power to perform, and in attempting which he had committed a grievous sin.

This disavowal was unheeded. Napoleon on the next day published a decree declaring the concordat the law of the empire. The cardinals who were supposed to have

influenced the retraction, were removed from Fontainebleau, some of them to confinement in Paris. Others were dispersed through different towns in France. But a return to his solitude made no change in the last resolution of Pius, and the emperor set out on the campaign of 1813 without having been able to overcome the obstinacy of the Pope.

On the 9th of November, 1813, Napoleon returned to Paris from the fatal defeat of Leipsic. For the first time encountering the opposition of his own senate—surrounded by growing expressions of popular discontent—menaced in the beginning of the next year by the gigantic armies of the allies, who had already crossed the frontier of France—he determined on the release of the venerable prisoner who was still detained a captive in the chambers of Fontainebleau. The motives were strong which influenced him to such a course. The sympathies of Europe were attracted to the uncomplaining victim of imperial ambition. Men admired him the more for the moral heroism with which he had acknowledged the fault into which he had been betrayed, and the courage which more than atoned for that fault in its retraction. The Roman Catholic world complained of the protracted imprisonment of the Pope, not only as an indignity to the Father of the Faithful, but as a serious interference with the ministrations of religion in every land. The proclamation of the allied sovereigns, in pointing to that imprisonment, appealed to all the feelings which it was so well calculated to excite; and, as the armies of the heretic sovereigns of Russia, of Prussia, and England crossed the frontiers of France,

there was many a pious Frenchman who could not help wishing well to the arms that were to give freedom to the Pope.

Every effort was employed to obtain from the Pontiff some concession that might seem to give excuse for his release; all the arts of persuasion were exhausted, and even the winning graces of female diplomacy were employed to soften the obstinacy of the unyielding Pius. All was in vain. Every proposal was rejected, and every ambassador of either sex was gently, but firmly, repulsed.²⁷ The Bishop of Placentia was the last person employed to endeavour to obtain something like an indication of yielding from the Pope; but with him, as with all others, Pius refused even to enter on a discussion. "Let me die worthy of the misfortunes I have endured," was his pathetic appeal to the prelate who pressed him to make even a slight concession to the imperial demands.

"I have made one grievous mistake;" he said, "it is enough for my life." The bishop was compelled to return to the emperor, and report the failure of his mission.

On the following evening, that of Saturday, the 24th of February, the bishop came again to announce to the chief of the Church, that it was the emperor's pleasure that he should return immediately to Rome. He found the Pontiff seated alone in one of the chambers of that gloomy palace which had been appropriated as the home of his captivity. The announcement which he made at first excited the most dismal apprehensions in

²⁷ Artaud, "Life of Pius VII.," vol. i p. 200.

the mind of Pius. "I will go, then, with my cardinals," he said. The bishop assured him that, anxious as he was in every way to do him honour, reasons of the gravest nature prevented the emperor from permitting any of the cardinals to leave France.

"I will travel with no retinue—one carriage only shall go—the emperor reminds me that, after all, I am but a poor monk—I am not ashamed of it"—was the answer of the Pope; "I wish only to return to Rome to fulfil my pastoral charge." The bishop gently apprised him that the emperor had resolved that he should be accompanied by a colonel of the French army. Pius, assuming the haughtiness, or at least the dignity, of the Pontiff, declared that he would not suffer anyone to travel in his carriage. The conversation was interrupted by the entrance of a colonel of the imperial guard, who deferentially apprised him that by the emperor's orders he was to convey his holiness to Rome. An early hour the next morning was fixed for his departure; the Pope stipulated that before he left Fontainebleau he should be permitted to say mass. The officer continued in the room, and the Pope soon felt that his journey was to be that of a prisoner. He sent for the cardinals who were still allowed to be near him, and communicated the message he had received. They fell on their knees before their master, and with ill-restrained expressions of grief and alarm, received his parting benediction. In the hearing of the imperial officer, who was present throughout the interview, Pius laid on them solemnly his injunctions, which he committed to writing, to receive neither

favours nor decorations from the emperor ; to take from him no pension, and to accept no invitation from anyone connected with the court.²⁸ Early next morning the Pope was on his way, without retinue or attendants. The evening of that Sabbath day's journey closed upon him as he entered the city of Orleans.

Travelling as Bishop of Imola, and accompanied only by the officer who was his escort, the Pope by easy stages once more reached Savona. After remaining there for a little time, he received an imperial letter, dated the 10th of February, 1814,²⁹ which left him free to repair whither he pleased, and at the same time stated the intention of Napoleon to restore the papal territories to the position in which they were placed by the treaty of Tolentino.

The Pope, declining to enter into any stipulation on the subject of the restitution of his territories, availed himself, nevertheless, of his liberty, and leaving Savona on the 17th of March, he took the bold resolution of proceeding at once to Rome.

Murat, it will be remembered, was at this time in occupation by his armies of all the papal states. The pope reached the Austrian encampment on the banks of the Taro, where he was received with enthusiasm by the troops and by the people. The king of Naples was then in the very middle of his perplexities, and the arrival of the Pope, of which he heard only from public rumour, was not calculated to lessen them. Napoleon had stated that one of his motives for expediting the return of the Pope was the wish to add to the embar-

²⁸ Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca.

²⁹ Wiseman's "Recollections."

rassment of his faithless brother-in-law.³⁰ If this malicious object entered into his calculations, unquestionably they were not disappointed. Utterly confounded by the approach of his unwelcome visitor, he sent General Carrascosa to meet Pius, with secret instructions, if possible, to prevent him from persevering in his journey. Carrascosa met the Pontiff entering Reggio in a triumphal procession. A splendid escort of German cavalry composed his guard of honour. The carriages that escorted him formed a long line of procession, followed by multitudes of horsemen and persons on foot. Neapolitan officers and soldiers were in full uniform among the crowd, and as the procession entered the streets of Reggio, the horses were taken from the pontifical carriage, which was drawn amid shouts of enthusiasm through the town.³¹

Carrascosa in vain endeavoured to dissuade the Pope

³⁰ Letter of Napoleon, *March 12th, 1814, ante* p. 68, note 3.

³¹ Sir Archibald Alison, in his History of the French Revolution, attributes the release of the Pope to the provisional government which succeeded on the fall of Napoleon.

"On the 22nd of January, Pius VII. was conveyed away towards the south of France by Montauban and Castlenaudary. Yet even in this act of concession the grasping disposition of the emperor was rendered apparent. He delayed, on various pretexts, the passage of the supreme pontiff through the South of France, hopeful that a return of fortune to his arms might enable him to retain so precious a prisoner in his power. When Paris was taken by the allied armies he was still a prisoner at Tarrascon, near the mouth of the Rhone, and the final order for his deliverance proceeded from the provisional government which succeeded on the fall of Napoleon."—Vol. xviii. p. 34.

The mistake in this passage has originated in the fact, that on the 2nd of April the provisional government issued the following order:—

"The provisional government, observing with grief the obstacles which are thrown in the way of the return of the Pope to his own States, and lamenting this continuation of the outrages to which Napoleon Buonaparte has subjected His Holiness, gives orders that every obstruction to his journey shall instantly cease, and that on his way he shall receive all the honours that are his due.

from proceeding to Bologna, by representing that his majesty the king of Naples was there, and was not prepared to offer him that reception which he would wish. The Pope desired nothing from the king of Naples, except the opportunity of giving him his blessing. The general mildly suggested that there was a danger of not finding horses, unless previously ordered on the road. The pious Christians on the way would bring him horses, was the answer of the Pope; if not, he would proceed on foot. Pius, under the greatest suavity of manner, possessed great determination of character, and Carrascosa had only to return to the king, report what had passed, and earnestly advise him not to attempt to resist the popular enthusiasm in favour of the Pope.³²

Early the next morning Pius continued his journey to Bologna, and on arriving there immediately proceeded

The civil and military authorities are charged with the execution of this present decree."

At the time of issuing this order the Pope had already reached his own states. His interview with Murat on his way took place some time before any intelligence of Napoleon's fall had reached Italy.—*Colletta's History of Naples*, vol. ii. p. 180.

It does not appear that the Pope was detained at Tarrascon. His first resting place was at Savona. (*Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca*) Cardinal Pacca tells us that "at Tarrascon the Pope was passing across the Rhone by the bridge of boats that stretches across between Beaucaise and Tarrascon, and the population of both cities were vying with each other in their endeavours to show, by applause and acclamations, their deep sense of affection, when Colonel Lorgori, foaming at the mouth, and almost raving with anger, had the rashness to exclaim to the people, "What would you do if it were the emperor?" Upon which the bystanders, pointing to the Rhone, said, "Give it to him to drink," meaning that they would throw him into the river. The Colonel grew outrageous, and was proceeding to menaces, when one of the populace said to him, "Do you want a drink, do you?"—*Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca*, vol. ii. p. 304.

³² *Colletta*, book vii. chap. iv.

to wait upon the king. Their interview was a protracted one. It was finally arranged that Murat should immediately restore to the Pontiff Rome and the surrounding districts. The legations and the marches, Murat for the present was to retain in occupation of his troops. It is said that in this interview the Pope pressed upon Murat the payment to the papal see of the tribute for the kingdom of Naples, which had been now so long withheld. Some of his friends had urged upon the king the prudence of taking the opportunity of obtaining a legal sanction for his throne by receiving investiture from the Pope. Whether the Pontiff would have granted it may at least be doubtful ; but, apart from the uncertainty of the mode of its reception, there were many other reasons which made it prudent for Murat not to prefer the request.

In the debate on the restitution of the papal territories, Murat had the indiscretion to hand to the Pontiff a petition, which had been signed by many of the inhabitants of Rome, praying that they might not be placed under the government of the Pope, but incorporated instead with any of the secular Italian states. Perceiving that the original signatures were attached to the document which was handed to him, the generous Pontiff, observing that he did not wish to have any enemies among his subjects, without looking at the signatures consigned the paper to the flames.³³

Repairing first to Imola, the seat of his former bishopric, Pius divided several weeks between his old cathedral and the village of Cesena, his birthplace. He

³³ Colletta, book vii. chap. iv.; Artaud, vol. i. p. 372.

did not make his entry into Rome till the 24th of May. Every feeling of the people was excited in his favour. Weary of French oppression, they saw with joy the restoration of a native sovereign. Worn by the changes and tumults of the revolution, all persons longed for the repose that attends a settled order of things. The story of the generous destruction of the document at Bologna won the hearts of those who had signed it—the very persons most likely to be averse to his return. In the eyes of the devout believers in his divine powers, his imprisonment had clothed him with the glory of a martyr, his constancy elevated him to a hero, while his mild and patient endurance invested him with the virtues of a saint. The sovereign who resumed his government with such claims upon the sympathies of his people, could scarcely fail in being enthusiastically received. The fearless Pontiff took care to proclaim to the whole world, that he gave no assent to the alienation of any of his states. On the 5th of May he issued a proclamation from Cesena, in which he assumed the title of "God's Vicar on Earth;" he spoke of his temporal sovereignty as essentially connected with his spiritual supremacy, and assured his subjects that although at present he could not assert his authority throughout all the possessions of the Church, "confident in the inviolable character of his sacred rights, and relying on the justice of the allied sovereigns, he looked forward without doubt to the speedy restoration of all the heritage of the holy see."³⁴

To make this appeal "to the justice of the allied

³⁴ Annual Register, 1814; History, p. 40.

sovereigns" more effectual, Consalvi was sent to Paris to urge upon them the claims of the Pope to a full restoration of his ancient rights. From Paris he proceeded to London, where, in spite of the statutes of *præmunire*, he presented a papal brief to the Prince Regent, and was received with honour and distinction at Carlton House. The historian of his reception in England is no less a personage than the Sovereign Pontiff himself. In an allocution of the 4th September, 1815, Pius thus reported to the Consistory the incidents of Consalvi's mission.

"The cardinal having quickly reached Paris, and having discharged those duties which we had confided to him towards his most Christian majesty, and having been received with that interest and affection for us which it was natural to expect from his piety and religion, proceeded to London without delay, whither the other sovereigns, with the exception of our beloved son in Christ, Francis, Emperor of Austria, had gone. And here we cannot sufficiently express to you what feelings of joy and gratitude filled us on learning what occurred on that occasion in that most splendid city capital of so mighty a kingdom. For the first time since more than 200 years, a Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, and moreover a Legate of the Apostolic See, appeared publicly in that city, by the kind and generous permission of the government, adorned with the distinctive badge of his dignity in the same way as if he had been in this our own city.

"And further, when he proceeded to an audience of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to present our

brief, and express the sentiments of admiration, friendship, and attachment, which we entertain towards him, as well as towards that valiant, and in many respects illustrious, nation, he was received at the palace with such marks of benevolence and of kindness for us whom he represented, as could with difficulty have been exceeded. On which account, professing ourselves deeply obliged to that prince, and to the different orders that compose that generous nation, towards which we always entertained great goodwill, we most gladly seize such an opportunity to testify publicly our esteem and our lively gratitude.”³⁵

The paper drawn up by Consalvi, and submitted by him to the allied sovereigns, was a moderate and a skilful document. Carefully avoiding all reference to those high pretensions of papal right which he knew would find but little favour with any of those whom he addressed, he rested the claims of his master upon grounds more likely to ensure their success. He reminded the allies that the dethronement and captivity of the Pope had been caused by his refusal to take part with the French emperor—to close his ports against English commerce, or to expel English visitors from Rome. Those in whose cause he had suffered were bound by every tie of honour and justice to redress the wrongs which he had endured in consequence of that refusal. But on higher grounds still the Pontiff claimed from the deliverers of Europe the restoration of his ancient territories. Europe had been combined against Napoleon on the very principle of defending

³⁵ Cardinal Wiseman’s “Recollections,” p. 139.

public right and old established order against revolutionary aggression. No power in Europe was so identified with that ancient order as the Church. While the Papal See was not restored to its old condition, the revolution still triumphed over the most venerable of European dynasties.

The treaty of Tolentino could not be regarded as justifying any appropriation by the allies of the territories which it gave up. Extorted from an aged Pontiff by violence and overwhelming military force, that treaty could scarcely be relied on as entitling the opponents of Napoleon to divide among themselves the territories so yielded. Even in the strictest justice it was of no force; not long after its signature it had been cancelled by the French. On their seizure of Rome they declared it null and void.

Against the provision of the treaty of Paris, which guaranteed to the French government Avignon and the Venaissin, Consalvi made in this memoir a strong, and what would appear to be an unanswerable protest. These provinces were a purchase, paid for in money by the Pontiffs. They had been enjoyed for centuries under that purchase, and were invested with all the sacredness that could belong to the right of property. Their alienation had been effected by a mere act of revolutionary usurpation, which could not destroy the rights acquired by purchase and confirmed by long possession.³⁶

On the 23rd of June, Consalvi, supported by the influence of the English government, addressed this letter

³⁶ Memoir of Cardinal Consalvi, London, June 20.—*Arundel*, vol. ii. p. 391.

in London to the ministers of all the allied sovereigns. In the meantime the Pontiff at Rome was proceeding resolutely and promptly to undo the work of the revolution. Before he returned to his capital, he had entrusted the government to an Apostolic delegation, who, on the 15th May, had issued in his name a proclamation which removed all traces of the revolutionary state.³⁷ The Code Napoleon was abolished, and by one sweeping sentence the Pontifical civil and criminal law, as it formerly existed, was restored. Nowhere was reaction so thorough and so complete ; nowhere was there so much to be undone, and so much to be restored. No contrast could be greater than that which existed in Rome between the new institutions and the old. The government of ecclesiastics was once more established in the city of Brutus and Rienzi. The Pontiff and the Sacred College were absolute masters of Rome. In the indiscriminate re-establishment of all that was old, the use of torture and the Holy Office of the Inquisition were silently revived.

A rescript very soon followed, which prohibited the use of torture in the Inquisition, and also put an end to a practice which had never prevailed in the Roman States, but which had led to great enormities in Spain. This rescript forbade the Holy Office deriving any profit from the confiscation of the goods of those whom they condemned. On the 15th of August appeared a bull of momentous import, and which at any other time would have excited a deep sensation throughout Europe. It was one reviving the Order of Jesuits,

³⁷ Annual Register, 1814; History, p. 80.

which had been suppressed by Ganganelli (Clement XIV.) in 1773.³⁸ It appeared by the recitals in this bull, that the Jesuits had in the interim found strange protectors in two European sovereigns who stepped forward as the patrons of an order forbidden even by the Church. Paul I. of Russia had prayed in his zeal for the Greek Church, that his dominions might enjoy the blessing of the presence of Jesuits ; and early in his Pontificate, in the year 1802,³⁹ Pius had “ acceded to the wishes of so great and beneficent a prince.” He had, therefore, granted permission to “ some secular priests resident for many years in the vast empire of Russia, and who had been members of the Company of Jesus, as suppressed by Clement XIV. of happy memory,” to unite together in conformity with the laws of their institution. Three years afterwards a similar favour had been granted to Ferdinand of Sicily. The present bull revived and re-established the Order in the Pontifical and all other States, and the Letters Apostolic of Clement suppressing it were wholly repealed.

After the reading of this bull in the presence of a number of the Jesuits, they were admitted to kiss the Pope’s feet, and thus ended, said the *Diario Romano*, in reporting the occurrence, “ a ceremony eternally glorious and memorable.”

It soon appeared that in truth the Order had never been virtually suppressed. Whatever may have been

³⁸ Bull re-establishing the Jesuits.—*Annual Register*, 1814.

³⁹ Before this brief could have taken effect in Russia, Alexander was the reigning sovereign. The brief is dated the 7th of March, 1801. The assassination of Paul, and the consequent accession of Alexander, took place on the 23rd of the same month.

done in the thirty years that elapsed between their formal suppression by Ganganelli and the revival of their congregations in Russia and Sicily in 1804,—from the latter date the Company of Jesus had a legal existence in those countries,—and it would not have been difficult for men less fertile in expedients to use their establishment in the two nations as the means of secretly diffusing their Order over Europe, without violating the letter of the law. It was observed, indeed, that scarcely had the Pope reversed the enactment of his predecessor, when Jesuits everywhere appeared. The broken ranks of the Order were re-formed with a rapidity that to those who had supposed their organisation to have been extinct for nearly half a century, appeared to be accomplished by a miracle.

On the 14th November, the first reception of novices took place at Rome. Among those who entered the order upon that occasion was the son of the Marquis D'Azeglio, the Sardinian ambassador at the court of Rome.⁴⁰ A few years later the country of this novice furnished to the Company of Jesus a still more distinguished addition in the person of its ex-king.

Thus without opposition, and almost without observation, did an aged Pontiff, scarcely yet safe on his Pontifical throne, and depending for every square mile of his dominions upon the will of the sovereigns whom events had made masters of Europe—restore to its power and influence that mysterious institution whose secret movements had so long been the terror of sovereigns and courts. The re-establishment of the

⁴⁰ *Annual Register, 1814.*

Order was marked by a lofty indifference to the wishes of temporal rulers, whose rights in his first permission of their congregations in Russia and Sicily the Pope had professed to respect. In the Pontifical and all other states, without distinction, "the houses," "the colleges," and the "provinces" of the Order were sanctioned by the Pontiff's bull; and "all princes and lords temporal" were enjoined, "not only not to suffer that these religious may be in any ways molested, but to watch that they be treated with all due kindness;" and all those "who should have the audacious temerity to oppose any part of that ordinance," were solemnly warned in the usual language of Papal bulls, that they would "thereby incur the displeasure of Almighty God, and of the holy apostles Peter and Paul."

These high pretensions, put forward by one who called himself in the same document, "the servant of the servants of God," provoked no remonstrance from any crowned head. The Order which had cost statesmen so many intrigues to suppress, was revived. From a Pope, without almost the shadow of earthly power, was sent forth a missive, the influence of which was more or less to be felt in every nation of Christendom; and the captive, who had scarcely yet escaped from his imprisonment of years, revoked by a few words those "apostolical letters" of Ganganielli, the struggle to obtain the issue of which had engaged the attention and agitated the councils of every European court.

Momentous as was this step, it seemed scarcely to have excited attention. Europe was too much occupied in the attempt to undo all that had been accomplished

by the Revolution, to spare thoughts for that of which Pius was thus silently laying the foundation. The mysterious Order whose chief object was to carry through Christendom the maxims of implicit obedience to Papal authority, against which the conflict within the Church had been so long and so successfully maintained, was restored to its ancient power and splendour, without any further discussion than might be contained in some satirical squibs which were published in the city of Rome. It has been said that the step was taken with the full assent of the allied sovereigns, upon the representation that the aid of this active agency was absolutely essential to recover for religion that influence, the restoration of which could alone secure permanent tranquillity in Europe. By such arguments Consalvi overcame the scruples, and finally obtained the acquiescence, of Lord Castlereagh. Such was the effect of the reaction against the principles of the Revolution. Even Protestant England was willing to accept the assistance of the Jesuits in suppressing them.

However he may have been assured of the acquiescence of the great sovereigns of Europe, it is impossible, even for those most opposed to the policy which dictated the restoration of the Jesuits, to refuse an acknowledgment of the courage and decision which characterised the adoption of the step. In the rapidity and promptness of his reactionary measures, Pius VII. deserves, at least, the merit of perfect candour towards those with whom he had to deal. He resumed his throne without waiting for any sanction from the monarchs who had the absolute power of

disposing of his dominions. He proclaimed that he resumed it by a title far superior to all earthly right, and the acts in which he asserted the highest pretensions of Papal prerogative, were all issued before the Congress of Vienna had assembled, and when he had not obtained even the recognition of his temporal power.

The establishment, or rather re-organisation, of all the monastic orders followed rapidly the restoration of that of Jesus.⁴¹ An apostolic commission was issued to arrange the means of collecting "the religious dispersed in all quarters," an object which, in the language of the Papal brief, "many obstacles opposed, their houses and convents being despoiled of every necessary for their accommodation, and the greater part being left without revenue."

Throughout the Papal States, the system of government by ecclesiastics was completely restored. No concession was made to the laity who had so enthusiastically welcomed their sovereign home. Even some of the citizens of Bologna, when they ventured to plead for that free municipal government which had been guaranteed to them by the convention with Pope Nicholas, in the faith of which they had surrendered their city to that Pontiff, were warned that this was a subject to which it would be safer for them not to allude.⁴² In a word, everything returned to the state in which it had been in days which the French revolution had separated from the present by a chasm which was really that of centuries. Rome of 1815 was governed

⁴¹ Annual Register, State Papers, p. 442.

⁴² Gualterio, vol. i. p. 125.

by the very same maxims and institutions which prevailed when Pius VI. ascended the Pontifical throne.

An edict, denouncing the Freemasons and all secret societies, exposed many persons in the Papal States to severe penalties. The terrors of excommunication were added to temporal punishments. The members of these societies were invited to come forward and make disclosures to the government, notwithstanding the oaths of secrecy by which they were bound. The sovereign Pontiff found the full advantage of his double character of spiritual as well as temporal chief. Not only was he able to sustain the terrors of his State punishments by the denunciations of the Church, but, as supreme father of the faithful, to quiet the consciences of any of his scrupulous subjects by an authoritative assurance that their oath could not bind them in conscience to keep secret what the demand of their sovereign required them to disclose.

It was said by many that had Consalvi been in Rome, the reaction would have been less rigorous and complete. Probably he would not have considered it essential to the safety of the Pontifical government to suppress the French innovation of lighting the Roman streets with public lamps. An edict was issued to suppress them, and the city was left dependent, as of old, for its nightly illumination, upon the torches which blazed at the doors of the private houses, or those lights which the piety of devotees kept burning before the images of the saints. This primitive method of lighting the streets of a great city was defended upon the grounds that it was the ancient one, that it gave

opportunity for an affecting, as well as time-honoured display of the piety of the people, and lastly, that it put the government to no expense. Neither would he have sanctioned the arrest of seventeen persons on the charge of having six years before aided the French troops in the imprisonment of the Pope. In addition to those persons who were committed to prison on the charge, a nobleman of the name of Marescotti was confined a prisoner in his own house. This step was plainly a violation of the principle of amnesty expressly recorded in that stipulation of the Treaty of Paris, which provided that in all the countries ceded by that treaty, no one should suffer for anything that had been done under the government then existing. After a short confinement all the prisoners were released.

From another measure of still greater violence, the counsels of Consalvi saved the restored government of the Pope. In the conclave of cardinals the Pontiff was vehemently urged to declare void all the sales and alienations which had been made of the Church property in the Roman States. Upon the principles which regarded the property of the Church as solemnly consecrated to Divine purposes, and therefore dedicated by an unalterable right, those alienations were all plainly void. Consalvi wrote earnestly dissuading the Pope from a measure by which he assured him he would incur the displeasure of the allied sovereigns. Prince Metternich added his remonstrance, and the project was reluctantly abandoned by those who consoled themselves with the reflection that in leaving these possessions in the hands of men who were not their lawful

owners, they were not surrendering, but only forbearing to enforce, the rights of the Church. Those rights were inalienable, and the title of the Holy See, in the eye of right and justice, could not be affected by forbearance to enforce it any more than by the original grant.

In one instance a special confirmation exhibited to a member of the Buonaparte family the signal favour of the Pope. Lucien Buonaparte had left France, and renounced all the dazzling projects of ambition which the favour of the emperor held out to him, rather than consent to divorce his wife, and form one of those royal alliances which the emperor desired for his relations.⁴³

⁴³ The estrangement between Napoleon and Lucien originated in the stern adherence of the latter to his early liberal opinions. Lucien left Paris in 1804, and continued for some time to reside in Milan, and subsequently in Rome. When Rome was violently seized by Napoleon, Lucien escaped from Leghorn, and attempted to pass to the United States of America. Driven by a storm to Cagliari, he could not obtain permission even for his family to land, and in vain solicited from the British minister the renewal of a passport, or rather safe conduct, given him years before to enable him to perform the voyage to America without interference from the British cruisers.

Finally, taking refuge in Malta he was brought thence to England, where he continued to reside until the fall of Napoleon in 1814.

He then returned to Rome and obtained there the grant of Canino from the Pope. He was a party to the plots formed for the restoration of Napoleon, and after his landing in France, he contrived secretly to meet him in Paris when the reconciliation between the brothers was completed.

The part taken by him at the period of Napoleon's abdication belongs to the history of France. After the fall of Napoleon he was permitted to return to Rome, where he once more was favourably received by Pius VII. On leaving Rome for Paris he had assured the Pontiff that in the event of the re-establishment of Napoleon's power, no injury should follow to the dignity or the possessions of the Papal See.

In refusing to accede to the proposal to put away his wife, he steadily rejected the brilliant offers that were made to him, including that of the Duchy of Parma for his eldest son. He would not yield even to the arguments of his uncle, the Cardinal Fesch, who endeavoured to reconcile his conscience to the proposed repudiation by declaring authoritatively that his existing

Retiring to Rome, he had purchased the estate of Canino, situated on the borders of Etruria. This estate was confirmed to him by a special edict of the Pontiff sanctioned by the College of Cardinals ; and to mark his sense of the services he had rendered to himself in his captivity, Pius elevated him to the rank of a Roman prince by a title derived from the estate, which by a now unexceptionable title was confirmed to himself and his heirs. The Prince of Canino died in 1831. His son still enjoys the rank and the estate.

The vicissitudes of the eventful life of Pius VII. had not yet drawn to a close. After the return of Napoleon from Elba, the brief triumph of Murat again made him an exile from Rome. The determination of the congress of Vienna restored to him almost the entire of the former possessions of the Church, and he entered Rome once more to end his days in tranquillity in the palace of the Popes.

These events belong to other chapters. The discussions that preceded and the protests that followed the decisions of the Congress will be told in the pages devoted to the narrative of its proceedings. The effects upon its subjects of the restoration of the Papal dynasty must be judged from the history of the years that followed.⁴⁴ From the venerable associations of the

marriage was not a binding one.—*Mémoires Secrets sur la Vie de Lucien Buonaparte.*

⁴⁴ Recent events have of necessity attracted attention to the character of the Papal government in the years that have passed since the restoration of Pius VII. Without anticipating that which must be the subject of other chapters—the reader may be referred to some at least of the sources from which a careful inquirer may on this subject glean the truth. For the impeachment of that government the pages of *About* supply the most accessible

sacred city we must turn for a while to trace the fortunes of another state, invested with an interest that in some respects at least is scarcely inferior to that which attaches to Imperial Rome.

materials—together with the representations made to the Papal Court by the powers of Europe on the 21st May, 1831, and the manifesto of the Italian patriots in the same year, and the diplomatic circulars issued by the provisional government of Romagna since the recent revolt of the province.

The history of the Roman States from 1815 to 1846 has been written by Farini, and translated into English by Mr. Gladstone. This work merits the eulogy bestowed on it by the translator not only for "ability and sagacity," but for its dispassionate and judicial calmness in reference to Roman affairs.—*Preface to Gladstone's Translation of "Farini's Roman State."*

In favour of that government the report of the Count De Rayneval, the French envoy at Rome, dated May 14th, 1856, must be carefully read. Strange to say, the Papal authorities acknowledge themselves indebted for the best and ablest defence of their administration to an Irishman and a member of the British senate. In perusing the work of Mr. Maguire "On Rome, its Ruler and its Institutions," the reader may at least have this reliance, that even if prepossessions may have influenced the judgment or coloured the views of the writer, its pages certainly present the truthful record of the impressions produced by personal observation upon himself.

NOTE.

"In the primitive Church the form of excommunication was very simple. The bishop declared to the faithful the names of the excommunicated, with whom he forbade them all intercourse. About the ninth century the fulmination of the excommunication began to be accompanied with ceremonies proper to inspire terror. Twelve priests held each a lamp in his hand, which they threw upon the ground and trampled under their feet. After the bishop had pronounced the excommunication, they rang a bell, and the bishop and the priests uttered the anathemas and maledictions."—*Migne's Theological Encyclopædia. Dogmatic Theology; article, Excommunication.*

¹ The *Pontificale Romanum* thus describes the form in which the anathema or greater excommunication was pronounced.

"The pontiff (that is the person performing pontifical functions in the ceremony), being arrayed in his stole, a violet-coloured hood, and a simple mitre, assisted by twelve priests holding lighted candles in their hands—seats himself on the faldstool before the high altar or in any other place at his own discretion, and there pronounces and promulgates the anathema in this form."

"Whereas N——, at the instigation of the devil, forgetting by apostacy that Christian profession which he made at his baptism to love and fear, hath dared to desolate the Church of God, to plunder the possessions of the Church, and by violence to oppress Christ's poor—we therefore, in our anxiety, lest by the negligence of the shepherd he should perish, for which we should have to give account in the dreadful day of judgment before the chief shepherd our Lord Jesus Christ, as the Lord himself terribly threatens saying, 'If thou shalt not warn the sinner of his iniquity his blood will I require at thy hand,' have admonished him according to the canons a first, a second, and a third, and even a fourth time to overcome his malice, inviting him to reformation, satisfaction, and repentance, and chiding him with paternal love. But he alas! alas! (proh dolor!), despising our healthful admonitions refuses to make satisfaction to the Church of God, which, puffed up with the spirit of pride, he has injured. By the precepts of the Lord and his apostles we are taught what we ought to do with prevaricators of this nature, for the Lord says 'if thy hand or thy foot offend thee cut it off and cast it from thee'—and the Apostle says, 'Take away the evil from among you,' and again, 'If any man who is called a brother be a fornicator, or a covetous man, or a worshipper of idols, or a drunkard, or an extortioner, with such a one do not eat.' And John the beloved disciple forbids us even to salute such a one, saying, 'Receive him not into your house nor bid him God speed, for he who biddeth him God speed is a partaker of his evil deeds.' Fulfilling therefore the commands of the Lord and his apostles, let us cut off by the word of excommunication from the body of the Church this rotten and incurable member which receives no healing, lest the rest of the members of the body may be infected as it were by poison, by pestilence or disease; therefore because he has despised our admonitions and frequent exhortations, and because when thrice called to repentance, according to the precept of the Lord, he hath scorned to come,—because he hath not thought on or confessed his fault,—nor, sending ambassadors, has made any excuse or asked for pardon, but, hardened in heart by the devil, perseveres in the wickedness which he commenced, as the Apostle saith 'according to his hardness and impenitent heart to treasure up for himself wrath against the day of wrath:—

"Himself, therefore, and all his accomplices and abettors—We, by the judgment of Almighty God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and of Blessed Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, and of all saints; also by the judgment of our own humbleness (medioeritatis), and by the power of binding and loosing, which is given us by God both in heaven and earth, separate from the receiving of the precious body and blood of the Lord, and from the society of all Christian men. From the thresholds of the Church, both in heaven and earth, we shut him out, and we decree him to be excommunicated and accursed, and we adjudge him damned with the devil and his angels and all reprobates, to everlasting flame, until he shall awake from the snares of the devil, and return to reformation and repentance, and satisfy the Church of God which he has injured, delivering him to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit may be saved in the day of judgment."

"And all answer, 'So be it, so be it, so be it;' which being done, the pontiff

and the priests ought to throw on the ground the burning candles which they hold in their hands."—*Pontificale Romanum: Urbani Octavi. Rome, 1756.*

This would appear to be the only authentic form given to the world under the sanction of the supreme authority of the Church of Rome, but its use would appear to have been by no means imperative; and long before the publication of the *Pontificale* many forms had been supplied by the bishops and others who pronounced sentences of excommunication. A malediction, more or less terrible, would seem generally to have been added to that sentence very much at the discretion of the person pronouncing it. Stephen Baluze, a French antiquary of the highest repute, Professor of Canon Law in the Royal College, published in 1677 a collection of *formularies*, in which are contained no less than nine different forms of excommunication which had been used on different occasions.

In most of these the curses denounced in the Jewish law and in the Psalms are repeated and invoked upon the offender. The mildest example of these imprecations is in the form adopted at a council of Limoges, in which two archbishops and ten bishops took part in excommunicating certain men of Baldwin, Count of Flanders, for the murder of the Archbishop of Rheims.

"Cursed be they in the city, and cursed in the field. Cursed be their granary, and cursed their gleanings; cursed be the fruit of their belly and the fruit of their land, their herds of kine and their flocks of sheep. Cursed be they in their coming in and going out. May they be accursed in the house, and vagabonds in the field. May their bowels gush out (*intestina in secessum fundant*) like those of the treacherous and miserable Arius. May all the curses come upon them which the Lord declared by Moses he would send upon the people that went astray from his law. May they be anathema maranatha, and perish in the second coming of the Lord. May they have, moreover, all the maledictions which the sacred canons and the Apostolic decrees pronounce upon murderous and sacrilegious men. Let no Christian say to them, God speed; let no priest perform mass for them, or if they are in sickness presume to receive their confessions, or to give them the holy sacrament even in extremity unless they repent, but let them be buried with the burial of an ass, and be as dung on the face of the earth, and let them be an example of shame and malediction to this and all future generations, and as these candles thrown from our hands are extinguished to-day, so may their lamp be extinguished for ever."

The truth appears to be that these imprecations were added according to the taste or the violence of the person using the weapon of excommunication, and not according to any universally prescribed formula. Among the forms cited by Baluze is one in which an angry archdeacon anathematizes a rival who had usurped his stall, and who probably was its rightful occupant, as the canons of the cathedral are included in the curse for supporting him.

Imprecations of this nature expressed nothing but the impious and angry passions of those who uttered them.

Among the forms preserved in the collection of Baluze is the memorable one which, in the minuteness and detail of its grotesque imprecations, from which no part of the body and no occupation of life is omitted, was believed, not

unnaturally, to have been invented by the novelist as a burlesque upon the anathemas that were really pronounced.

It appears, nevertheless, in the collection of Baluze exactly as it does in the pages of Sterne. Baluze does not inform us where he found it, and heads it merely as another form of excommunication different from the foregoing. A tract, published in the eighth volume of the Harleian Miscellany, attributes this frantic elaboration of curses to an English bishop Ernulphus. Rochester is said to have had the honour of his episcopate, and at the time of the publication of the tract (1681), it was alleged that the original formula was still extant in the Leger book of Rochester Cathedral, and in the custody of the Dean and Chapter.

The collection by Baluze is published in the 87th volume of Migne's Patrology as an appendix to the *formularies of Marculfus*.

The bull of Paul III., excommunicating Henry VIII. (A.D. 1535), desires the bishops to announce the excommunication with the standard of the cross, the ringing of bells, the lighting of candles and the trampling them on the ground, and the other ceremonies accustomed to be observed in such cases.

The earlier one of Julius II. against Louis XII. (A.D. 1510), in addition to the ceremonies of the standard of the Cross, the ringing of the bells, and the lighting and extinction of the candles, desires the anathema to be published by the several bishops, "cum trinitate lapidum projectione."

In the Papal bulls of excommunication themselves no malediction is either contained or prescribed. Innocent at the Council of Lyons excommunicated Frederick II., with the ceremonial of extinguished torches. But no such accessories marred the solemnity of the sentence which Gregory VII. pronounced upon Henry IV. When the Council of the Lateran had advised the Pope to proceed to the excommunication of Henry, the Pope rose from his seat and thus spoke:—

"Blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, incline, we beseech thee, to us thine ear, and hear me, thy servant, whom from infancy thou hast preserved, and whom to this day thou hast saved from the hands of wicked men, who have hated and still hate me for my fidelity to thee. Thou art my witness, with our lady the mother of God, with thy brother the Blessed Paul, and with all saints, that thy Holy Roman Church called me, against my own will, to its governance, that I have not thought it robbery to ascend thy seat, and that I would rather have finished my life in wandering, than have seized that seat in a worldly spirit for the glory of this earth. Through thy favour, and not for anything that I have done, I believe that it hath pleased and still doth please thee that the Christian people specially committed to thee should obey me in thy stead. Through thee I have received from God the power of binding and of loosing in heaven and earth. In full confidence in this, for the honour and defence of the Church, in the name of Almighty God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and by the power and authority of thee, St. Peter, I interdict King Henry, son of Henry the Emperor, who in his unexampled pride has risen against the Church, from the government of the whole realm of Germany and of Italy. I absolve all Christians from the oaths which they have sworn or may swear to him, and forbid all

obedience to him as king. For it is just that he who impugns the honour of the Church should forfeit all the honour which he seems to have; and because he has scorned the obedience of a Christian, and has not returned to the Lord from whom he had revolted, by holding communion with the excommunicated, by committing many iniquities, and by despising the admonitions which, as thou knowest, I have given him for his salvation, and by separating himself from the Church, trying to rend it in twain, I bind him therefore in thy name with the bond of thy anathema, that all the nations may know and acknowledge that thou art Peter, that upon thy rock the son of the living God hath built his Church, and that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."—*Milman's Latin Christianity*, vol. iii. p. 155.—*Bowden's Life of Gregory*, vol. ii. p. 109.—*Migne's Patrology—Acta Gregorii*, vol. cxlviii. p. 790.

Such was the first sentence of excommunication ever pronounced against an emperor by a Pope. The record of the words thus spoken was sent throughout the world to inform all Christian people "in what manner and for what crimes the blessed Peter had bound the king with the bond of anathema;" the only prayer that was asked from Christians was no invocation of curses on the excommunicate—they were asked "to implore without ceasing the mercy of God until he should be pleased to turn the hearts of the impious to repentance, or to show, by frustrating their wicked intentions, how blind and foolish they were."

Very similar was the form in which, in 1080, the same Pontiff once more excommunicated Henry, "declaring him excommunicate and bound with the bond of anathema." Even in this second sentence, which conferred the imperial crown on Rudolph, the only prayer of evil to Henry is that "he himself and his partisans in any warlike encounter may be found powerless, and never obtain the victory." "Against Henry may the sentence be executed so speedily that all may know his fall not to have been wrought by chance, but to have been accomplished by the Apostle's avenging power. Let him be confounded unto repentance, that so his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord."—*Bowden's Life of Gregory*, vol. ii. p. 270.

Whatever men may think of the spirit or the pretensions of Hildebrand, they can appreciate the difference between sentences like these and the imprecations with which Ernulph cursed the unhappy object of his wrath.

Gregory VII. can scarcely be cited as an authority for the theory that "the deposing power" was the law, not of the Church, but of Europe. In the name of Peter and Paul he takes the kingdom from Henry, and confers it upon Rudolph. "So act then, holy fathers," he says, addressing the council, "that all men may know and understand that if ye have the power of binding and loosing in heaven, ye have also that of giving and taking away, according to the merits of their holders, kingdoms, principalities, dukedoms, lordships, and all the possessions of men."

"If ye shall judge angels who govern the proud princes of this world, what must not be your power over their servants."—*Idem.*

LIST OF SOVEREIGNS EXCOMMUNICATED.

The following, although not a complete list, contains most of the excommunications which were pronounced by the Popes against Sovereigns and States:—

| A.D. | Pope. | Sovereign. |
|------------|--------------------|--|
| 1074 . . . | Gregory VII. . . | Robert Guiscard, Duke of Sicily. Casting off his feudal allegiance to the Pope. |
| 1077 . . . | " | The Emperor Henry IV., in the Council of Lateran, for disobeying the decree as to investitures. Henry deposed. |
| 1080 | " | Boleslaus, King of Poland, for murdering a bishop during his performance of divine service. |
| " | " | Robert King of France, for marrying within prohibited degrees. France under interdict. |
| " | " | Henry again deposed. Imperial crown conferred upon Rudolph. |
| 1096 . . . | Urban II. | Philip I. of France, for divorcing his wife Bertha and marrying Bertrade. |
| 1106 . . . | Paschal II. . . . | The Emperor Henry V., for compelling the Pope to concede to him the right of investiture. |
| 1128 . . . | Innocent II. . . . | Roger, Count of Sicily, for supporting the anti-Pope, Anacletus. |
| 1147 . . . | Eugenius III. . . | King Stephen of England. |
| 1155 . . . | Adrian IV. . . . | William the Bad of Sicily, making war against the Pope. |
| 1166 . . . | Alexander III. . . | The Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, for his support of the anti-Pope Victor. |
| 1179 . . . | Alexander III. . . | William King of Scotland. |
| " | " | Scotland placed under interdict. |
| 1191 . . . | " | Alphonso, King of Castile, for illegal marriage. |
| 1198 . . . | Celestine III. . . | Leopold, Duke of Austria, for imprisoning Richard I. of England on his return from the crusades. |
| " | " | The Emperor Henry VI., for his cruelties in Sicily. |

| A.D. | Pope. | Sovereign. |
|------|----------------|--|
| 1210 | Innocent III. | The Emperor Otho IV., for not giving up the possessions of the Countess Matilda. |
| " | " | Philip Augustus, King of France, for putting away his queen and marrying another. |
| 1211 | " | France under interdict for twelve months. John King of England. England under interdict for four years. John deposed. The crown conferred on Philip Augustus of France. |
| 1228 | Gregory IX. | The Emperor Frederick II., for not going to the Crusade. |
| | | A second time. |
| 1243 | Innocent IV. | The Emperor Frederick II., a third time. |
| 1245 | " | The Emperor Frederick II., a fourth time at the Council of Lyons, for alleged impiety and divers crimes—for opposition to Papal power. |
| 1271 | Gregory X. | Emperor Rudolph of Hapsburgh. |
| 1281 | " | Michael Palseologus, the Greek Emperor, for refusing to submit to the Pope. |
| 1282 | Martin IV. | Peter III. of Arragon, for asserting a title to the kingdom of Sicily. |
| " | " | Conradin, grandson of Frederick II., for asserting his right to Naples. |
| 1287 | Nicholas IV. | James of Arragon. |
| 1297 | Boniface VIII. | Frederick of Arragon, for invading Sicily. |
| " | " | Philip the Fair, King of France, for aggression on the Church. |
| 1324 | John XXII. | The Emperor Louis of Bavaria. |
| " | " | Matthew Visconti, Duke of Milan. |
| 1372 | Gregory XI. | Barnabas and Galeazzo Visconti, for occupying Ferrara and Bologna. |
| 1497 | Alexander VI. | Charles VIII., King of France. |
| 1506 | " | Gian Bentivoglio, Lord of Bologna. |
| 1510 | Julius II. | Louis XII. of France. |
| " | " | Kingdom placed under interdict. All bishops and priests were ordered to publish this excommunication in France, with the ceremonies of the standard of the cross, the lighting and extinguishing of candles, the ringing of bells, and the thrice throwing of stones,—“trina lapidum projectione.” |
| 1521 | Leo X. | Alphonso, Duke of Ferrara, for joining Louis XII. |
| | | Francis I. of France. |

| A.D. | Pope. | Sovereign. |
|------------|--------------------|---|
| 1527 . . . | Clement VII. . . . | Henry VIII. of England, for divorcing Catherine and marrying Anne Boleyn. |
| 1535 . . . | Paul III. . . . | Henry VIII. of England, for apostasy. His subjects released from their allegiance. Excommunication to be published with the standard of the cross, extinction of candles, ringing of bells, and all usual forms. |
| 1550 . . . | Julius III. . . . | Henry II. of France, for protecting the Duke of Parma. |
| 1551 . . . | " . . . | Octavian Farnese, Duke of Parma. |
| 1558 . . . | Paul IV. . . . | Queen Elizabeth of England. |
| 1586 . . . | Sixtus V. . . . | Henry IV. of France, for heresy. |
| 1597 . . . | Clement VIII. . . | Cesare, Duke of Ferrara. |
| 1623 . . . | Urban VIII. . . | Octavian Farnese, Duke of Parma. |

The excommunications pronounced against the Italian republics were even more frequent than those against sovereign princes. These almost invariably carried with them the sentence of an interdict. Most of the Ghibeline cities had been repeatedly the subject of this sentence—but not unfrequently the wavering of the Guelph cities provoked a similar condemnation. Milan was excommunicated by Innocent III for refusing the iron crown to Frederick II., when he was the favourite of the Holy See. Bologna, Ferrara, and Ancona, and almost all the independent cities of the Papal States were frequently the subject of excommunication to reduce them to their allegiance to the Popes. Even San Marino was included in such a sentence by Innocent IV.

Pisa as might be expected from her Ghibeline traditions was frequently the subject of the Pontifical anathemas, upon one occasion by Pope Alexander IV., in 1256. The general attachment of Florence to the Papacy was not sufficient to protect it from the occasional infliction of the penalties of an interdict. In 1376 Gregory XI. followed up such a sentence by sending letters to all nations forbidding any intercourse with the Florentine traders in their ports.

Venice was, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the particular object of the Pontifical wrath. No less than five excommunications were issued against the republic in the space of less than 200 years. The resistance of Venice is the most memorable instance of opposition to the Papal claims. In works of great power and ability the authorities of the republic disputed the right of the Pontiff to excommunicate for temporal causes, and the terrors of an interdict were met by a law which compelled the clergy to perform divine service as usual under the penalties of high treason. The last excommunication against Venice was that of Paul V. in 1606, in consequence of a law which forbade the establishment of new religious houses without the licence of the state.

CHAPTER VIII.

Tuscany—Ancient and Modern Greatness of Tuscany—Counts of Tuscany—Gift of the Countess Matilda—Independence of Cities after her Death—Tuscan League—Greatness of Florence—Manufactures—Agriculture—Rise of the Medici—Alexander declared hereditary Grand Duke—Disposal of Tuscany by parties to Quadruple Alliance—Protest of Cosmo the reigning duke—Of Gian Gaston—Statement of the question—Death of Gian Gaston—Succession of Francis of Lorraine—Testamentary Protest of Gian Gaston—The Grand-Duke Leopold—His Reforms—Draining of the Maremma—Ricci bishop of Pistoia—His attempted Reformation—Observations on Leopold—His neutrality—His intended Constitution—The French Revolution—Violation of Tuscan Territory—Surrender of Tuscany by Peace of Luneville—Kingdom of Etruria—Restoration of the Grand Duke.

IN the month of September, 1814, Ferdinand, the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, returned to his capital and resumed possession of those territories, which twelve years before he had been compelled to give up to suit the convenience of his imperial relatives in their new arrangements with Napoleon. In the April preceding Murat had surrendered Tuscany to commissioners, who received it in the name of the grand-duke. Scarcely had Napoleon fallen when the dynasty of Ferdinand was restored.

Rich in the fertility of its soil, blessed with a salubrious climate, and overshadowed by the ranges of the Apennines, which add the grandeur of the mountain to

the picturesque scenery of its garden cultivation, Tuscany, in the advantages of climate and situation, equals the most favoured regions of Italy. In the historic recollections of the heroic days of Italian freedom, the records of Florence, of Pisa, of Lucca, and Sienna, vie with the noblest traditions of the republics of the middle ages. As we trace its history back to earlier times, a still deeper interest attaches to the land of those ancient Etrurians whose descendants still dwell in the valley of the Arno, and on the slopes of the Apennine hills.

No nation in Europe can boast an earlier origin, or prove its civilisation at a period more ancient. In these respects none but Greece approaches it. History can tell us nothing of the earlier days of that Etrurian people, who were great and civilised when not a single building marked the site of Rome.¹ Speculation fails even in conjecture as to their origin, while still the admiration and wonder of the world are attracted to the remnants of art of the ancient Etruria, attesting a civilisation which must have existed in the far-off days of remote antiquity. Since the recovery of Italy from the desolation of its barbarous invaders, there has been scarcely

¹ "It is truly marvellous how little the page of history has recorded of this ancient people (the Etrurians), far more ancient and more civilised than the Romans themselves, who seem to have toiled in the destruction of every trace and relic of their predecessors, proving Rome to have been not the friend but the foe, not the promoter but the destroyer, of civilisation and art. But there, under the soil of the Roman Campagna, there, deep beneath the soil of many centuries, that have witnessed the rise and fall of dynasties and empires, are those sepulchres, beyond counting, where the bones and ashes of those bygone generations slept to witness to the present age the existence of a people and a civilisation that have lived and died in ages more ancient than the records of history."—*Rev. M. H. Seymour's Pilgrimage to Rome.*

an age in which the descendants of the Etrurians have not shown themselves worthy of their ancient fame. The cities of Tuscany vied with the proudest and the most powerful of Italy. The rule of the Medici, whatever may have been their crimes, has imperishably associated the name of Florence with the glories of art. No city has supplied so many illustrious names to the proud roll of Italian genius. The capital of Tuscany was the birthplace of Petrarch, of Boccaccio, and of Dante; Florence can claim, too, what some may consider the questionable honour of reckoning Macchiavelli among her sons. Leonardo Da Vinci and Michael Angelo illustrate her proud pre-eminence in the annals of imitative art, while science can never forget the obligations which it owes to the city in which Galileo first drew breath.

Tuscany, upon the fall of the Roman empire, passed under the dominion of the Gothic and the Lombard kings. Florence is said to have been utterly destroyed by the barbarians, and to have been rebuilt by Charlemagne. The whole district including much of the territory now belonging to the Papal states, was granted by him to feudatories, who, as counts of Lucca, and dukes, or marquises, or counts of Tuscany, held these possessions as fiefs of the Italian crown. The Marquisate was enjoyed by a branch of the great family of Este, an illustrious race that in Italy gave dukes to Ferrara and Modena, in Germany to Bavaria and Brunswick, and, finally, sovereigns to the British isles.²

² Muratori, "Antiquities of the House of Este;" Gibbon, "Antiquities of the House of Brunswick."

The marquises of Tuscany were among the great lords of Italy, and exercised in the days succeeding the Carlovingian rule a prominent influence at Rome. One of them was the husband of Marozia. The last representative of this family was the Countess Matilda, the friend of Hildebrand.

The celebrated gift of this lady to the Church, placed the cities of Tuscany in a position somewhat different from that of the other Italian towns. Without submitting entirely to Papal authority, they could yet assert their independence of that of the emperor. The Lombard cities in their struggle with the empire, contended against the prerogatives of their acknowledged lord. Those of Tuscany denied altogether their subjection to imperial rule. Hence it was that we do not find these cities associated with the noble struggles of the Lombard league. They had a quarrel and a resistance of their own. Many years after the peace of Constance they entered into a new confederacy among themselves,³ and the Tuscan league, although nominally formed to uphold the privileges of the Papal See, was in reality a combination to resist imperial pretensions over Tuscany itself.

Florence was the chief of this confederation ; Lucca, Sienna, Pistoia, Perugia, and Arezzo,⁴ were members.

³ Pignotti's "History of Tuscany;" Delécluze's "Florence et ses vicissitudes."

⁴ This statement is applicable to the original constitution of the Tuscan League. Some of these cities afterwards sided with Pisa and the Ghibelines.

The Tuscan League was formed in 1197. The cities engaged in it bound themselves not to recognise any one as emperor, king, or duke of Tuscany without the approbation of the Roman Church, and to defend the rights of the Church whenever they should be attacked ; also to aid the Pope in recovering any part of his patrimony, or any territory which he might claim, except such

Pisa refused to enter into it, influenced by a jealousy of Florence ; but Pisa was amply indemnified for her Ghibeline predilections by obtaining from her imperial patrons, charters which fully recognised the rights and liberties of her citizens.⁵

“ *Mirum quam citd libertate recuperata respublica crevit.* ” These Tuscan republics soon acquired a prosperity which exceeded even that of the Lombard towns. Nowhere, perhaps, at that period of the world, was there the same population supported in equal affluence and comfort in a space so small as that of the Tuscan states. Florence, in 1300, had a population of 100,000. This city, at one time, commanded by its bankers and money-dealers the exchanges of every country in Europe. The ships of the Florentine republic sailing from Leghorn⁶ were seen in every port, its merchant princes were known in every trading city. Even through the obscurity that rests over the history of Pisa, we know that it took equal rank both in commercial and political importance with Genoa and Venice. The republic of Lucca was one of the few of the Italian communities that had preserved their ancient institutions at the period of the French revolution. The extinction of the independence of Sienna was by a surrender to the superior power of the Florentine state.

of it as should be in the possession of any of the confederates.—*Sismondi*, vol. ii. p. 86.

This engagement was plainly the result of a compromise by which the Pope forbore to press his own claims on Tuscany, and an inducement to the cities to resist those of the empire.

⁵ These privileges are fully stated by Sismondi, vol. ii. p. 88, and also the applications made on behalf of the Pope to the Pisans to join the Tuscan League.

⁶ In 1421 Leghorn was purchased by Florence from the Genoese.

In manufactures as in commerce, the Tuscan people achieved great success. That of silk was the earliest, but in the beginning of the thirteenth century the weaving of woollen cloth was introduced by a body of artisans, banished from Milan, who associated themselves in a religious order, called the Humiliati. The wool was imported from Spain,⁷ from Flanders, or even from England.⁸

Two hundred and seventy-two factories employing in 1340 thirty thousand persons, exported cloth of the annual value of two millions of our money. Florence, in the fifteenth century, had all the marks of a great trading and mercantile city. No less than eighty bankers or money dealers had their establishments within its walls. Some of these amassed fortunes that placed them on a level with princes. The annual coinage of its mint reached the amount in English money of 500,000*l.*⁹

The character of the city as a great seat of commerce and manufactures was emphatically marked by the prominence and importance given to the guilds of trade. The professional classes, the merchants, the artisans, were all associated into companies, with a regular constitution, and with corporate privileges and powers. Several of these bodies embracing the handicraft workers of a great manufacturing town were essentially democratic in their character; even those which were composed of the higher ranks of industry

⁷ Pignotti.

⁸ Spalding's "History of Italy," vol. i. p. 172.

⁹ Lord Brougham's "Political Philosophy," part ii., Florence.

and trade, gave to the middle class that position of importance which led to the preservation of liberty in Florence to a later period than in any other Italian city ;¹⁰ a liberty which fell at last before mercantile influence, and yielded to the power of a family who owed their political elevation to these very guilds of trade. To her manufactures, far more than either her commerce or the monetary operations of her bankers, Tuscany owed her greatness. They long maintained their superiority. The textures of Florence and Leghorn were known a century ago, wherever elegance in apparel was prized.

In modern times, however, it is in agriculture that Tuscany can still claim a superiority that entitles

¹⁰ The most remarkable feature in the constitution of Florence, and that which pre-eminently distinguished it as a city of trade, was the institution of its guilds, or *arts*, in which those who were engaged in professions, *arts*, or trade, were associated together in a manner resembling very nearly the constitution of the "city companies" of London.

These associations certainly were in existence in the early years of the thirteenth century, although it was not until 1266 that they acquired their full political importance.

Originally there were seven greater, and five lesser, guilds. The greater were,—1st, the lawyers and notaries; 2nd, the dealers in foreign wool; 3rd, the bankers; 4th, woollen-drapers; 5th, physicians and apothecaries; 6th, silk-merchants; 7th, furriers.

The five lesser were,—the clothiers, the butchers, the smiths, the shoemakers, and the builders.

The lesser were afterwards increased to fourteen in number, making in all twenty-one of these trade guilds.

Each of them had a council, and elected an officer called *consul*, who had power to determine disputes between members of his own guild. The guild had also its *gonfaloniere*, or *banneret*, who bore the standard of the company. When he displayed this standard, all the members of the guild were obliged to resort to it.

In the later constitution of Florence, the chiefs of six of the seven greater guilds (the lawyers were excluded) were, under the name of *priors*, entrusted with a large share in the government of the state.—*Hallam's Middle Ages*, vol. i. p. 240.

it to be called the garden not only of Italy but of the earth.

The mountain torrents which once brought with them devastation as they rushed from the heights of the Apennines, were stayed in their course by the contrivances of human industry, and the waters conducted in irrigating channels along the slopes. Earth has been carried to terraces high upon the rocks of the hills, or an artificial soil been formed by intercepting the alluvial deposits which were brought down by the streams.¹¹ Garden cultivation has thus in effect been extended to the steeps of what once were craggy and barren hills. Every perch of the soil, divided into an almost incredible number of small allotments, is compelled, by the toil of the frugal and industrious population, to yield its aid to the sustenance of man. Thousands of white-walled cottages peep through the foliage in which the glens that everywhere break the surface of the country, are clothed; and high upon the uplands of the Apennines are found pastures for extensive flocks of sheep, driven down, as in Scotland, to find winter sustenance and shelter in the vallies or the plains below.

Florence, the most powerful of the Tuscan cities, gradually reduced the others, with the exception of Lucca, under her rule. Her story is in many respects the same as that of the other Italian republics. The factions of Guelph and Ghibeline engaged the citizens in fierce and exterminating feuds. Florence may be said to have been the last of the mediæval republics to part with her free institutions. So violent at

¹¹ Chateauvieux's "Travels in Italy;" Spalding's "Italy."

one time was her democracy, so jealous their guard against aristocratic ascendancy, that, in 1266, a law was actually passed by which the members of noble families were absolutely prohibited from holding any office or appearing in the assemblies of the people. By a provision still more strange a power was given to the magistracy of adding to the list of the nobility any family who became turbulent or dangerous, and so disqualifying its members from taking any part in public affairs.¹²

Generally attached as it was to the interest of the Popes, that attachment in Florence arose from the fact that the Popes were their protectors against the power of the emperors. After the death of the Countess Matilda, vain attempts were made by the emperors to confer the Duchy of Tuscany upon feudatories who never were able to establish any dominion over the cities. Against these attempts it was that the Tuscan league was formed in alliance with the Pope, by which the cities gladly bound themselves never to acknowledge a Duke of Tuscany, except with the consent of the Holy See.¹³ The claim founded on the bequest of the Countess Matilda supplied a rallying

¹² These celebrated ordinances of justice (which among other provisions allowed the conviction of a noble upon common rumour), severe as they were, and entirely indefensible upon any ground, were yet unquestionably provoked by the violence and lawlessness of the nobles. The disorders created in Florence by the feuds of some of the great families, almost equalled those already described as existing at Rome. But it must be observed, that during that very period the city rapidly advanced in wealth, a very plain proof that the laws, although they might not prevent the sanguinary encounters of the adherents of rival families of the nobles, were yet sufficient to ensure protection to the industry and pursuits of the mass of the people.

¹³ See note 3, p. 194.

point against imperial might; the confederation of Tuscany succeeded in asserting the independence of the Etrurian republics, and preserved their liberty long after the more ambitious association of their Lombard neighbours had broken up in the enslavement of the cities that composed it.

In after times, when the claims of the emperor were surrendered to the Church, and when the legates of Popes residing at Avignon attempted to reduce Tuscany to submission—an enterprise attended with partial success—Florence led the opposition which vindicated freedom against Papal aggression. Excommunications and interdict could not break the spirit of the proud republic. Religious puritanism once more united with the spirit of political republicanism, and more than 300 years after Arnold of Brescia, Florence had, in the person of Savonarola, the Dominican friar, her reformer and martyr as well as Rome¹⁴ (A.D. 1498). The political

¹⁴ Girolamo Savonarola, a Dominican friar, born at Ferrara, in 1452, was among the most remarkable of the great men whom Italy produced. His lot fell upon evil days. Like the Catholic puritans of preceding centuries, he believed the worship of mammon to be the great evil of the Church. He added to his invectives against the universal corruption that prevailed, the most confident predictions of judgments from God that were coming upon Italy, upon Florence, and upon Rome. These denunciations did not suit the Pontificate of Alexander VI. The offer of a cardinal's hat failed to bribe into silence the fearless Prior of San Marco (the convent over which he presided in Florence). Means were found to destroy him. A Franciscan friar succeeded in alienating from him the veneration of a superstitious people, by a challenge to test their respective pretensions to inspiration by the ordeal of walking through the fire. Both parties found excuses to avoid the trial, but the popular impression was, that it was Savonarola who declined. His reputation once gone, he fell a victim to the powers whose enmity his righteous boldness had provoked, and on the 23rd of May, 1498, he was burned with two of his companions in the square of Florence.

Savonarola was not, however, a heretic. By many of the most eminent and orthodox of Roman Catholic writers he is spoken of as a zealous reformer of

struggles of the Tuscan capital were marked at intervals by the presence of men whose names are immortalised by nobler triumphs than political success. In the Florentine contests of Guelph and Ghibeline, and in the bitterness of his own exile, Dante Alighieri learned that personal intensity of feeling which gives such vividness and distinctness to the images of his marvellous representation of the punishment of the damned. Savonarola was among those who attempted to preserve the freedom of Florence in its expiring days, and Macchiavelli bore a part in the last struggle in which that freedom was overthrown.

Florence, through all the chances of external war and internal commotion—through the vicissitudes of contending factions and rival families—for there, as elsewhere, political parties were marshalled into clans—preserved, with scarcely an interruption, its republican and democratic institutions down to the establishment of the power of the Medici. Few and brief were the intervals in which the beautiful city of the Arno submitted herself to a protector, a tyrant, or a prince. In 1342 the Duke of Athens contrived his own election for life as Prince of Florence, but his tyranny soon provoked his expulsion. Once, indeed, the records of Florence tell us of the election of a king, but it was one of which the sternest of the covenanters or of the New England fathers would have approved. In 1528, when battling against the restoration of the profligate Medici,

the abuses of the Church. Pope Julius II. desired Raphael to place his portrait in the Vatican. "When he fell," said the Pontiff, "the republic of Florence soon followed."—*Life and Martyrdom of Savonarola*. By R. R. Madde, M. R. I. A.

supported by the combined power of the Emperor Charles V. and Pope Clement VII., the grand council of Florence chose the Saviour of Mankind as their king. It was said that against the aggression of the Vicar, they placed themselves under the protection of the Master. The election formally and regularly took place,¹⁵ and on the front of the old palace at Florence among nine scutcheons intended to represent the successive governments of Florence, the monogram of the Redeemer is placed, between the arms of the Duke of Athens and those of the republic.

When Florence submitted to an earthly sovereign, it was not, as in the case of other Italian cities, to a military adventurer, or to one of the great feudal lords. Of the families who had risen to opulence in mercantile pursuits, that of the Medici had long been among the first. In the beginning of the fifteenth century, Cosmo de' Medici, had acquired influence not only in his native city but throughout Europe by monetary transactions, in which he negotiated loans with many of its sovereigns. In Florence his enormous riches, the character of munificent charity which so often attends upon the wealth of a mercantile family, his splendid contributions to public objects, and even more than this, the employment which he gave in several great manufactories to the people, invested him with an influence which soon made him master of the

* The proposition was made by Nicholas Capponi, and submitted to the grand council, consisting of 1000 members. The narrator observes that it was impossible to obtain unanimity at Florence, and in the grand council the question was formally submitted to a scrutiny, in which twenty votes were recorded against it.—*M. Delecluze. Florence et ses vicissitudes.*

state. After some early alternations of fortune, in one of which he was exiled for a few months, he was able, without disturbing materially the forms of republican government, virtually to assume supreme power. When he died, in 1464, the gratitude or the adulation of the citizens inscribed the words "Father of his country" upon his tomb.

The influence he acquired he transmitted to his descendants. His son Peter, and his grandson Lorenzo, maintained their position as rulers of the Florentine state. The contrivance of a *balia*, or select body to whom were intrusted all the powers that ought to have belonged to the people at large, was sufficient to retain all authority in the hands of the ruling family. Rapidly its representatives made approaches to the forms of the sovereignty of which they enjoyed the reality. Contracting alliances with royalty while merely citizens of Florence, they affected regal state, and the subser-vience of his followers accorded to Lorenzo de' Medici the title of their prince. (A.D. 1480.) At the period of the invasion of Charles VIII., the cowardice of Pietro de' Medici, the son of Lorenzo, induced the citizens to banish him for his base surrender to the French (A. D. 1494). In 1512 the Medici were recalled, and another banishment, the last struggle of the Florentines for freedom, ended in their being forced upon them with increased power by the armies of Charles V. The republic of Florence fell in the election of Alessandro as its hereditary duke.

One of the family, Clement VII., then wore the tiara, and on his reconciliation with the emperor, he made

it part of the terms that his relations should be placed in the sovereignty of Florence. The legitimate line of the Medici was extinct with Leo X.—the honours of an illegitimate descent were shared by the reigning Pontiff and two others. One of these, Alessandro—to whom a questionable scandal attributes a filial relationship to Clement—the Pope determined to restore. Charles agreed that his troops should force him on the people. After the departure of the emperor, the Prince of Orange led against Florence an army, nominally in the pay and service of the Pope. The resistance of the Florentines makes glorious the last days of the expiring republic. It was in vain. One of the bastions of the city was opened to the Papal troops by treachery, and the invading army entered Florence. They professed only to suppress faction and restore freedom to the deliberations of the city. An assembly of the people was convened. The soldiers of the Pope surrounded the square in which it was held—a balia was appointed, by whom the office of Doge was declared hereditary in the family of Alexander de' Medici. A short time afterwards Alexander appeared at Florence with an imperial document, recognising this election, confirming all the antient rights of Florence, and recommending to the citizens a constitution which might terminate all differences and disputes.

This man was among the most profligate and cruel of the tyrants who disgraced so many of the Italian cities. His conduct led to his assassination by the hand of a relative; but another of his family succeeded to the sovereignty, and the rule of the Medici

continued through seven generations undisturbed. In 1569, the Pope took on himself, in a right which he asserted from the bequest of Matilda, to confer on the reigning duke the title of Grand-Duke of Tuscany. This was subsequently confirmed by the emperor to the son of the prince to whom it was granted by the Pope.

In 1718, the parties to the quadruple alliance assumed the right of disposing of the sovereignty over the Tuscan people. The family of the Medici was drawing to its close. Cosmo de' Medici, the reigning grand-duke, had one son, Gian Gaston, who was not likely to leave issue. Cosmo, it was true, had also a daughter, who was married to the elector Palatine; but it was alleged that Tuscany was held as a male fief, and that therefore, on the death of Gian Gaston, it would lapse to the emperor by escheat. Both Parma and Tuscany were similarly circumstanced, and the reversion of both was settled on Don Carlos.

The arrangement pleased no one. The last heir of the Farnese, oppressed by sloth and corpulence, manifested as much annoyance as he was capable of showing at this attempt to dispose of his dominions. It was more keenly felt by the Medici. The Pope protested against it, and insisted, with at least a show of justice as to Parma, that if these states escheated at all it was not to the emperor but to the Holy See. Even the Spanish court refused to acknowledge the arrangement, or to accept for the young prince, under the bonds of feudal obligation to the emperor, a sovereignty which he claimed in an independent right.

The claim of the emperor to dispose of Tuscany was

not acquiesced in without vehement opposition ; it gave rise to a controversy in which all reasoning and justice was on the side of the advocates of Florentine independence. Florence had been a free city, and her election of an hereditary doge, however much it may have changed her government, conferred upon the emperor no right which he had not before possessed. Upon the extinction of that sovereignty, it was for the people again to provide for the continuance of the government. The Medici held their title, not from the emperor, but from the people. Not a single imperial act could be adduced to sustain the emperor's claim, no investiture of any Dukedom of Florence had ever been given or received. With the full consent of the emperor, Alessandro de' Medici had assumed the dukedom by the election of the people. The language of the document in which Charles V. expressly confirmed the ancient rights of the people, was very different from that of a grant of their sovereignty ; and the subsequent imperial recognition of a higher title in their prince could not affect those rights.

In ancient times it was true that Tuscany had submitted to marquises appointed by imperial patents ; but even under these, Florence, and the other republics of Tuscany, had virtually administered their own government, and, by the peace of Constance, their position as free cities had been guaranteed. It was difficult to see upon what the emperor could now ground a pretension to dispose of a sovereignty, his claims to which had been thus solemnly abandoned. No answer could be given —no answer was given—to the argument of the last of

the Medici, who declared that his family had received the sovereignty from the people, and that on their extinction it reverted to the disposal of the people by whom it was conferred.

This was not all: although in the male line the family of the Medici was approaching extinction, the reigning duke had a daughter, and before the right of the emperor could be established, he must show not only that Tuscany was a fief, but also a male fief of the imperial crown. If he rested his claims on the character of the appointment to the office of Doge by the people of Florence, then plainly the reversion was in them. If he went back to ancient times, the answer was obvious that the Countess Matilda had inherited the fief of Tuscany, and that by the same right it should pass to the daughter of the reigning duke.

Cosmo de' Medici indignantly remonstrated against the attempt to dispose of his dominions. He convened the Florentine senate, and obtained a decree recognising the succession in his daughter, the Electress Palatine. The celebrated Father Lami was employed to compile a treatise, in which, as far as argument could accomplish it, he established the independence of the Tuscan State.¹⁷ A manifesto was issued to all the powers of Europe, in which the grand-duke protested against the proposed confiscation of the Tuscan territory as a violation of law and right, and declared the determination both of himself and his people to resist to the last the attempt to destroy their independence, trusting in the protection of heaven to a righteous cause.

¹⁷ Lami, "De libertate civitatis Florentiae ejusque dominii."—*Tractatus*.

Thus matters stood at the death of Cosmo. That event took place in 1723. He was succeeded by his son, Gian Gaston, who entertained an unnatural hatred for his sister, the Electress Palatine. He nevertheless repeated the protest of his father, but finally, on the 25th of July, 1731, overawed by the march of Austrian troops against his capital, he made an attempt to comply with the wishes of the allies, and at the same time maintain the independence of Florence. A deed was executed on that day both by himself and his sister, by which the succession was settled on Don Carlos, and the Florentine senate was again convened, formally to ratify the disposition.

When it subsequently suited the convenience of political intrigue to substitute the Duke of Lorraine for the Spanish prince, the grand-duke was forced to give an apparent acquiescence in the arrangement ; but before his death he deposited with the Archbishop of Florence his formal protest against the disposal of his territories by imperial power. In this document he denied the right of any one to barter away the rights and liberties of the Florentines, and declared that as his ancestors had received the sovereignty from the people, to that people alone it could revert.

Gian Gaston, the last of the Medici, died in 1737. On his death a formal decree of the German diet declared Tuscany to have lapsed by escheat to the imperial crown ; another sanctioned the grant of it to the Duke of Lorraine.

Such was the title under which Francis, Duke of Lorraine, the husband of Maria Theresa, received the

sovereignty of Tuscany, coupled, as we have seen, with a condition that it should never be united with the Austrian dominions. Whatever might be the validity of that title, it was acquiesced in. The classic land of Italian freedom and literature passed under the dominion of a stranger. The times were not those in which either popes or people or princes in Italy were prepared to assert their independence or their rights. The protest of the last of the Medici was allowed to moulder in the archives of the archiepiscopal palace—that of the Pope was disregarded. A new dynasty controlled the destinies of the Tuscan people, connecting by another link the fortunes of Italy to the Austrian rule.

The reader who has followed the early struggles of Papal with Imperial power, will observe with some interest, and perhaps surprise, that it was in the year 1737 that the controversy as to the bequest of the Countess Matilda was closed. After the lapse of 700 years, the Pope and the emperor appeared as disputants for her Duchy of Tuscany, and for the first time in the lapse of these seven centuries, the rights of the rival claimants were formally and finally decided. The imperial right prevailed both in Tuscany and Parma. In the former it prevailed not only over the Papal claim, but over the liberties of the Florentine people; and the imperial sovereignty against which the Tuscan league did battle was established in the grant which made over the Tuscans to the rule of the House of Lorraine.

In 1745, Francis was elected to the imperial throne of Germany. The treaty of the quadruple alliance,

prohibiting the union in one person of the Austrian and Tuscan sovereignties, did not apply to the empire. Maria Theresa was still sovereign of the hereditary dominions of Austria. Francis, although emperor of Germany, held the grand-duchy of Tuscany until his death in 1764, when, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, it devolved upon Leopold his second son. His eldest was disqualified as heir apparent to his mother's dominion.

Francis resided constantly at Vienna ; he visited Tuscany once, and then only for three months. With little taste, for public business, he left the affairs of Tuscany as he did those of the German empire, to be managed by his more bold and energetic wife, and the Italian state, of which Francis was nominally the independent sovereign, was really governed as a province of the dominions of Maria Theresa.

The reign of his son and successor, Leopold, forms an epoch in the Tuscan annals upon which historians are fond of dwelling, as one of prosperity and reform, and beyond all question Tuscany owes much to his wise and vigorous administration. His reign commenced with an attempt to remove from the industry of the people all restrictions which impeded their progress in agricultural prosperity. Feudal privileges were abolished ; those which involved the right of fiscal exactions were purchased by the state. To encourage the agriculture of the country, he introduced a system in the grand-ducal lands under which the peasant who reclaimed to cultivation any portion of the mountain or the marsh acquired the ownership of it for himself, and to this, and

to the complete removal of all taxes which pressed upon the labour of the industrious tiller of the soil, we may unquestionably attribute the marvellous advancement of Tuscan agriculture, and its encroachments on the barren heights of the Apennines, and on the unhealthy marshes of the Maremma. Encouraged by the certainty of reward, and freed from the burden of vexatious imposts, the industry of the people formed the cultivation that has crept up the sides of the Apennines, and covered their cliffs with terraced gardens and trellised vineyards.

To the great work of draining the Maremma he devoted his personal superintendence. Along the Etrurian sea, the land from the shore to the first slope of the Apennines is a low level plain, in the depressions of which the overflowing waters from the mountain torrents used formerly to lodge and stagnate, as is still the case in those parts which are unreclaimed.

In the immediate vicinity of Leghorn the wants and the wealth of a commercial city had converted these marshes into rich and cultivated fields, but a few miles south of that city began the dreary waste on whose surface flitted the same unwholesome vapours which charge with pestilence the Campagna of Rome. A tract of this nature, extending seventy miles from Pisa to the confines of the Roman States, from five to ten miles broad, between the shore and the base of the hills, presented to the eye of the improving sovereign an enterprise, to which the failure of his predecessors merely lent an additional stimulus. In good earnest he set himself to the task. In the plains below Sienna the

grand-duke himself was to be seen accompanying the engineers as they traversed the edge of the canal, or walked along the banks of that singular system of drainage, if it can be called so, by which gradually on the sands of the Maremma the ingenuity of man was depositing a rich alluvial soil.

This was accomplished by stopping the beds of the rivulets that descended from the mountains, and compelling their highest floods to scatter themselves over the whole surface of the plain. The waters, thus deprived of their impetuosity, deposited their sediment on the fields over which they were spread ; and when artificial drainage drew off the waters in early summer, it was found that one winter's floods had generally raised the soil several inches by covering the surface with a fertilising mould.¹⁸ A considerable extent was thus reclaimed in his own reign. He set an example, which both his subjects and his successors have followed. Many an acre of this once barren waste teems with luxuriant pasturage, waves with the oak and chestnut—or is even covered with fruitful and abundant crops.

But Leopold deserves other, if not higher praise, than that of the man who thus made many blades of corn to grow where the sterile earth had yielded none before. In addition to the abolition of all these feudal privileges which, in Tuscany as elsewhere, oppressed the cultivators of the soil, and the removal of all taxes which impeded the industry of the people, he improved the administration of justice, humanised the criminal code, and simplified the laws.

¹⁸ Whitemore's "Italy;" Simond's "Tour in Italy."

The administration of local affairs by the communes gave to the people of each parish or district at least a share in their management. At the port of Leghorn perfect free trade was established, and strange to say among its incidental advantages, Tuscan writers place the liberty of the press. Foreign books and foreign newspapers were imported as freely as foreign bales of goods ; and even before the outbreak of the French revolution, one reading-room in Florence was supplied with no less than fifty of the journals and periodicals of other lands. The government under which the publications of foreign countries were thus freely admitted had no object in restraining by any severe laws the liberty of discussion in its own.

In his improvement of the criminal code, Leopold abolished at once the torture—the secret mode of trial, and capital punishment. In his reform of the civil law, he first restricted, and afterwards wholly suppressed, imprisonment for debt, except in some rare cases, in which we are told that he was compelled, by mercantile jealousy, to reserve to the traders of Leghorn the power of enforcing their demands by this process. All exclusive privileges of the nobility were swept away—all their rights of jurisdiction abolished—and the authority of the supreme courts extended and increased.

In ecclesiastical matters his innovations were, if possible, still more bold. He suppressed several convents and applied their revenues to increase the number and raise the stipends of the ill-paid parish priests. All clerical privileges, as to exemption from taxation or jurisdiction, were abolished. Strict laws were passed

for regulating the religious orders ; and among other enactments for this purpose, was one subjecting them to the jurisdiction and control of the parish priests.

Finally, he abolished all the privileges of trading corporations ; but by this edict it must be remembered that he destroyed at the same time those Guilds of the artisans, which had formed so great an element in the ancient freedom of Florence. Just before he left Tuscany he had annulled all laws of entail, and even that of primogeniture.

In relation to ecclesiastical affairs, the most remarkable incident of his reign is the support and countenance which he gave to the celebrated Scipio de Ricci, the reforming bishop of Pistoia. Ricci was one of those who had resolutely set himself to correct the abuses of monasteries and conventional establishments. Embarrassed by the claims of exclusive jurisdiction, put forward on behalf of the superiors of their orders—he found his efforts but coldly supported at Rome. This prelate, originally designed for the Order of the Jesuits, and nephew of the last general of the Order, adopted in later life the doctrines which were held by the Jansenist fathers of the Gallican Church. In 1786, a synod of his clergy assembled under his presidency at Pistoia, adopted reforms in the church service, which soon gave rise to vehement controversies and disputes. This assembly decreed that there should be only one altar in each church, and that the liturgy should be read in the language of the country. While it did not prohibit the use of paintings

and images in churches, it yet resolved that those which had been found by experience to attract a superstitious worship from the people, should be removed; and it further enjoined every Christian to read the Holy Scriptures.¹⁹

To these decrees upon matters of discipline, adopted in the course of the same session, the synod added a solemn declaration that bishops were the vicars of Christ, from whom, and not from the Roman Pontiff, they derived their episcopal commission. This assembly even went so far as to deny the power of the Church to impose upon Christians any doctrines of faith, except those that were warranted by Scripture or authentic tradition. These reforms were followed by violent dissensions, in which most of the clergy and a large number of the laity sided with the See of Rome. Ricci maintained his ground until Leopold was called to the empire in 1790. He then yielded to the clamour which was raised against him, and finally resigned his bishopric. After the death of the emperor the proceedings of the Synod of Pistoia were formally condemned by a bull, issued in 1794; but it was only in the year 1805, that Ricci, worn down by years and infirmity, was induced, in a personal interview with Pius VII. at Florence, on the return of the Pontiff from the

¹⁹ An account of this celebrated Roman Catholic reformer will be found in the memoirs of Scipio de Ricci, by De Potter, published in French, at Brussels, in 1825, and translated into English by Thomas Roscoe from the French.

Several tracts and books upon both sides of the controversy were freely published at the time it took place. See, among others, the Bishop's pastoral letters of the 5th of October, 1787, and 18th May, 1788. The acts of the assembly of the 14 bishops of Florence concerning the Synod of Pistoia, and Ricci's apology, "Apologia contra la censura," &c.

coronation of Napoleon, to retract his opinions and submit to the condemnation which eleven years before had been issued by the Holy See.

In the laws and in the administration of Tuscany it is impossible to question the value and boldness of the reforms effected by Leopold. He was beyond all doubt a great and a wise lawgiver ; and when we remember the period at which these changes were accomplished, and reflect upon the slowness with which even under legislation influenced by public opinion, inveterate legal abuses are removed—we are compelled to give to him no ordinary praise for the wisdom and decision of the measures which effected at once such sweeping changes in the Tuscan laws. But at the same time he cannot be awarded that higher merit attached to the word reformer, which belongs to him who consolidates popular liberty, and thus preserves for all generations the security for wise and good legislation. The reforms of Leopold were all administrative. His system was one of arbitrary power—its end was to make the people happy, prosperous, and contented under an absolute government. When he destroyed the privileges of the nobles or the clergy, or even when he curbed the pretensions of the Papal See, in the very acts that lowered all other authorities, he elevated and exalted the power of the grand-duke. He left Tuscany without having founded one single institution to protect the liberty of the people, and he bequeathed to his descendants that inheritance of arbitrary power, which was sure to fall into the hands of those less wise and less liberal than himself—a heritage to which no race of human beings

ever yet succeeded without being deteriorated by the fatal gift.

It has been observed of him, and with justice, that his whole administration was calculated to destroy all public spirit in the people. Perhaps no government is so enervating to a people as an absolute one, which manages affairs wisely and leaves its subjects nothing to do, and at the same time nothing of which they can complain. The only thing that can infuse vigour into a people so circumstanced, the spirit of military ardour, was studiously excluded from Leopold's plan. The national army was disbanded—perpetual neutrality was declared a fundamental law of the Tuscan State. The possession of arms was actually forbidden, and so far did he carry his dislike to military display, that in the sketch of some laws which he left behind him, he proposed to forbid the preservation of pieces of artillery even for the purposes of curiosity or show. He desired to found in the valleys of the Arno, and in the glens of the Apennines, a peaceful, a tame, and a contented community, undisturbed either by the alarms of war or the dissensions of political strife.

His personal rule is not free from the imputation of adopting that secret system of espionage which, wherever it is employed, demoralises both the government and the people. He has also been charged with the fault of not permitting any one of his ministers to possess any real influence in public affairs. He arranged and directed everything himself, a system calculated to destroy, even in the limited circle of politicians, all energy and public spirit—as effectually as their exclusion

from political privileges extinguished it in the mass of the people.

It must not be forgotten that some years after the death of Leopold, a statement was published which contained the sketch of a representative constitution which it was his design to establish in Tuscany. The genuineness of this sketch has been questioned.²⁰ It is said to have been drawn up in 1779. If so, there seems no adequate reason to account for its not being adopted in the lifetime of Leopold, who reigned in Tuscany for eleven years after that date. It was probably nothing more than an imperfect sketch, never completely reduced into form. It must be admitted that it bears the marks of authenticity, the strongest of all, the internal evidence of being in exact harmony with that plan of a tame and unwarlike community which certainly it was the great ambition of Leopold to form.

In 1790, the death of his elder brother Joseph called Leopold to the hereditary possession of Austria, and at the same time the choice of the electors placed him upon the imperial throne. He left Florence with a regret he did not conceal, and was followed by the prayers and blessings of his people. His eldest son Francis accompanied him as the heir of his German dominions. Ferdinand, his second son, succeeded to his

²⁰ A very full memoir of this intended constitution was drawn up in the year 1805, by Gianni, a Tuscan senator in the confidence of Leopold. "Memoria sulla Costituzione di Governo immaginata dal Gran-duca Leopoldo, da servire all' Istoria del suo regno in Toscana." It is published in De Potter's "Memoirs of de Ricci," Roscoe's translation, vol. i. p. 163. In the same volume will be found extracts from writers taking a different and less favourable view of the policy and character of Leopold.

ducal throne. Ascending it in his father's lifetime, and under the shelter of his imperial protection, he adopted, as might have been expected, his father's policy. Fos-sombroni, who was his father's minister, continued to be his adviser to the close of his reign.

Leopold had, in 1778, laid it down as a fundamental maxim of Tuscan policy that Tuscany should never suffer herself to be drawn into war. In the glens of the Apennines he hoped to preserve in their simple independence a people as remote from the conflicts of nations as the Swiss were then believed to be in their Alpine vales. He did not, however, provide for them in a martial spirit that defence which is the best safe-guard of the liberties of the Swiss. Confident in the isolation of his dominions and in the moderation of their government, he left the Tuscans without an army for the defence of their native land. On the 1st of August, 1778, in a manifesto to all Europe, he published the law that "neutrality should thenceforward be for ever a fundamental institution of the grand-duchy."²¹

The adherence of the son to his father's maxim was proved in the wars of the Revolution; so also was the value of an unarmed neutrality when opposed to the fierce passions of war.

Ferdinand steadily refused to join any of the coalitions against France. When Napoleon entered Italy in 1796, he entertained him at Florence. Even when he was doing so, the neutrality of his territory was violated by the French troops. Leghorn was occupied by a division of Napoleon's army under Murat, and

²¹ Annual Register, 1778.

all the property of the English merchants found in the town or in the harbour was seized. The Grand-Duke could only offer a mild, and, of course, ineffectual remonstrance, against this violation of international law. In 1799 his whole territory was occupied by the armies of the Directory, the most unprovoked, as it was among the most iniquitous of the usurpations of the republic. The invaders were driven out by a successful insurrection of the people of Arezzo.²² During an armistice between France and Austria in the month of October, 1800, the troops of Napoleon occupied Florence, and, in spite of a daring resistance from the insurgent mountaineers, Sienna was carried by storm. Florence was occupied without resistance, and Leghorn again presented to the invaders the rich spoil of the English merchandise in its port. At the peace of Luneville, in 1801, to suit the convenience of his imperial brother, the Grand-Duke was compelled to cede Tuscany to the Bourbon Duke of Parma, an equivalent compensation being found for him in the German dominions of Francis.¹⁶

Tuscany then became the kingdom of Etruria, on the throne of which Don Louis, Duke of Parma, was placed. The sovereign of this new monarchy did not long enjoy his crown. He died in May, 1803, in the flower of his age, leaving an infant son to the care of his widow, his

²² The Grand-Duke left Tuscany on the seizure of his territories by the French; but it is said that during their short restoration to power, his agents severely punished those who had in his absence taken any active part. His commissary Sommariva was at the head of the insurrection, in which religious fanaticism incited the peasants to deeds of savage cruelty. Bishop Ricci was flung by the insurgents into a dungeon as a Jacobin and enemy of the Church.

¹⁶ Treaty of Luneville, Martens, vol. vii. p. 538.

cousin Maria Louisa, Queen of Etruria, daughter of Charles IV., King of Spain.

The death of the Duke of Parma and the infancy of his son, left the government of the kingdom of Etruria in the hands of his queen, a bigoted and despotic princess of Spain, surrounded by advisers to whom the very name of religious liberty was odious. Maria Louisa was with difficulty restrained from enacting against religious freedom the severest persecutions of former times. In Tuscany indeed the dominion of the French was reactionary in the worst sense of the word. The laws of Leopold were trampled down, and neither under the kingdom of Etruria, nor yet under the French empire, were any enacted better calculated to secure the freedom or promote the happiness of the Tuscans.

For four years this princess continued to govern the realm of her infant son. The power that created the new kingdom, soon found it convenient to destroy it. In November, 1807, she was informed that the king of Spain had ceded Etruria to France, and that she must at once prepare to depart for Spain. No offer was made to restore to the youthful prince his hereditary dominion of Parma, which he had given up in exchange for Etruria. It was vain to argue against an act of mere arbitrary force, or it might have been urged that the Bourbons of Parma were wholly independent of those of Spain, and that Charles IV. had as little right to dispose of the kingdom of Etruria as he had to give away the empire of France. Reasoning was as hopeless as resistance. When the queen reached Spain

she found there her family as unceremoniously deposed from its throne. Flying some time afterwards to Genoa, she attempted to escape to England, the land which she described as "the asylum of all princes in misfortune." Her design being discovered, she was arrested by the French police, and carried off to imprisonment in a convent in Rome.²³

On the 24th of May, 1808, an imperial decree annexed the Grand Duchy of Tuscany to the empire of France.

The principality formed for Eliza, the sister of Napoleon, was but a nominal government; and the Court, which the newly created princess held for some years at Florence, did nothing for the Tuscans except to introduce the dissipation of French habits, and spoil the proverbial purity of their language by accustoming the higher classes to the use of French. A very few years ago there were old persons living at Florence, who still mourned over the memory of sons whose ruin had been caused in early youth by the gaming-houses which followed to Florence the French attendants on its mimic court.²⁴

Early in the year 1814, Tuscany was handed over by Murat to the management of commissioners, appointed by the Grand-Duke. The Duke Rospigliosi, in the proclamation in which he announced the re-establishment of the ducal government, described Tuscany as the hereditary patrimony of the august house of Austria. In the name of the Grand-Duke he

²³ Memoirs of Maria Louisa Queen of Etruria, written by herself.

²⁴ Lady Morgan's "Italy."

abolished all the laws of the French government, with the exception of some few provisions of the Code Napoleon which were retained. The laws of Leopold were restored, with the exception of reserving to the government the nomination of magistrates, whose selection Leopold had entrusted to the municipalities themselves. The return even to Leopold's system of criminal trials was certainly no improvement in the administration of justice. But the Leopoldine laws were popular with the people ; they had become the symbol of their freedom, and were identified with their feelings ; and the son of Leopold the Reformer, was not unwise in restoring the jurisprudence which, whatever were its defects, had so long been the glory of his father's name.²⁵

Ferdinand himself resigned his German principality of Salzburgh, the indemnity given to him for the cession of Tuscany, and returned to Florence on the 17th of September, 1814 ; the reappointment of Fossonbroni as his minister, was regarded as a pledge to his subjects that he would still adhere to the liberal policy of the early years of his reign.

²⁵ A very interesting account of the Leopoldine laws and the present jurisprudence of Tuscany (as well as a compendious sketch of the rise of the Medici and the subsequent vicissitudes of Florence) is contained in the earlier chapters of Mr. White's "Italy in the 19th century."

SOVEREIGNS CONNECTED WITH ITALY FROM THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION,
WITH THE DATES OF THEIR ACCESSION.

AUSTRIAN SOVEREIGNS.

| | A.D. |
|--|------|
| Joseph II., Emperor of Germany | 1765 |
| Leopold II. | 1790 |
| Francis II. | 1792 |
| Abdicated the crown of Germany, 1806. | |
| As Francis I., Emperor of Austria, 1806. | |
| Ferdinand, Emperor of Austria | 1833 |
| Abdicated, 1848. | |
| Francis Joseph | 1848 |

SARDINIA.

| | |
|---|------|
| Victor Amadeus III. | 1773 |
| Charles Emanuel IV. | 1796 |
| Resigned his continental dominions, 1797. | |
| Abdicated, 1802. | |
| Professed as a Jesuit, 1819. | |
| Died, 1820. | |
| Victor Emanuel I. | 1802 |
| Restored in Piedmont, 1814. | |
| Abdicated, 1820. | |
| Charles Felix | 1820 |

House of Carignano.

| | |
|--------------------------|------|
| Charles Albert | 1830 |
| Abdicated, 1848. | |

Victor Emanuel II.

1848

TUSCANY. GRAND DUKES.

| | |
|---------------------------|------|
| Peter Leopold | 1765 |
| Ferdinand III. | 1790 |
| French occupation, 1799. | |
| Ferdinand restored, 1814. | |
| Leopold II. | 1824 |
| Ferdinand IV. | 1830 |

FRENCH DYNASTIES IN TUSCANY.

| | A.D. |
|--|------|
| Louis, King of Etruria | 1801 |
| Louis, his infant son | 1804 |
| Eliza Bacciochini, Grand-Duchess | 1806 |

PARMA.

| | |
|--|------|
| Ferdinand (Duke) | 1765 |
| French occupation, 1801. | |
| Empress Maria Louisa (Duchess) | 1814 |
| Charles II. (Duke) | 1847 |
| Abdicated, March 14, 1849. | |
| Charles III. | 1849 |
| Assassinated, 1854. | |
| Robert I. | 1854 |
| His mother, Louise de Bourbon, Duchess Regent. | |

MODENA.

| | |
|--|------|
| Ercole D'Este (Duke) | 1780 |
| Driven from Modena, 1796. | |
| Died at Trieste, 1803. | |
| French occupation | 1796 |
| The Austrian Grand-Duke, Francis IV. | 1814 |
| Francis V. | 1846 |

THE STATES OF THE CHURCH.

| | |
|---|------|
| Pius VI. | 1775 |
| French occupation, 1799 | |
| Pius VII. | 1800 |
| Prisoner in France, 1809. | |
| Rome incorporated with French Empire, 1809. | |
| Pius VII. restored, 1814. | |
| Leo XII. | 1823 |
| Pius VIII. | 1829 |
| Gregory XVI. | 1831 |
| Pius IX. | 1846 |

NAPLES AND SICILY.

| | |
|------------------------------|------|
| Ferdinand I. and IV. | 1759 |
| Driven from Naples, 1799. | |

NAPLES AND SICILY—*continued.*

A.D.

Again in 1806.

Restored as King of the Two Sicilies, 1815.

| | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|------|
| Francis I. | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1825 |
| Ferdinand II. | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1830 |
| Ferdinand III. | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1858 |

FRENCH KINGS OF NAPLES.

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|------|
| Joseph Buonaparte | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1806 |
| Joachim Murat | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1808 |
| Executed, 1815. | | | | | | | | |

LUCCA.

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|------|
| Prince Baciocchi | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1805 |
| Incorporated with France, 1806. | | | | | | | | |
| Maria Louisa, Ex-Queen of Etruria | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1815 |
| Charles Louis (Duke) | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1824 |
| Ceded to Tuscany, 1847. | | | | | | | | |

FRENCH KINGDOM OF ITALY.

| | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|------|
| The Emperor Napoleon (King) | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1805 |
| Eugéne Beauharnais (Viceroy) | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1805 |

CHAPTER IX.

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Congress of Vienna—General nature of a congress—Protocol of the four powers of September 22nd—Memorandum of Lord Castlereagh—Admission of France on an equality with the four powers—Position of Spain, Portugal, and Sweden—Caroline of Naples—Her journey to Vienna—Her sudden death—Italian questions at congress—Genoa—Succession to the Sardinian crown—Intrigues of the Duke of Modena—Claim of the King of Etruria—Question as to Naples—Discussion of Murat's claims—Proposal of Talleyrand—Letters produced from French archives—Declaration of Lord Castlereagh—France assembles an army in Dauphiny—Murat asks for a passage through Lombardy for his troops—Indiscretions of Murat—Landing of Napoleon in France.

THE treaty of Paris had provided that the sovereigns who signed it should immediately send representatives to a congress at Vienna, definitely to settle the arrangements that were yet to be completed. The autumn had far advanced before this august conclave met on the banks of the Danube. In the latter end of September, the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia reached the palace of Schönbrunn. Other potentates arrived in the same month at the imperial city. And in the beginning of October every one of the European states had a representative, many of them a sovereign, within its walls.

The narrative of the congress of Vienna belongs to the history of Europe. In these pages we have only to trace

its acts as they affected the fortunes of Italy. Never was there assembled a convention charged with mightier interests, or round which deeper passions gathered. The history of the world records nothing to exceed the dignity and importance of the deliberations, in which, day by day, the first diplomatists of Europe met at Vienna, to decide between those conflicting interests, the adjustment of which involved the government of millions of the human race. The externals of rank and splendour corresponded with the greatness of the occasion, and in the presence of the sovereigns, the statesmen, the generals, and the diplomatists of Europe, Vienna realised the description of a city in which were gathered “the kings, the mighty men, and the wise ones of the earth.”

Great, however, and dignified as was this congress of nations—like all other assemblies of the same nature, it was a mere conference between the representatives of certain powers who met to arrange by mutual negotiation affairs in which those powers had a common interest. Such a meeting is nothing more than a general and simultaneous negotiation. The body of diplomatists who assemble, possess no corporate character whatever—they neither constitute a parliament, a senate, nor a tribunal. Every person present is free to assent to, or dissent from, any proposal that is made ; the acts of any of the states that are represented in it acquire no more validity from being performed in congress than if they were accomplished without the intervention of such a meeting at all. No right exists or was ever assumed in the majority of those present

to bind the minority by their voice. The opinion of each representative is recorded, but every power is free to retain, and act on its own. The perfect independence of each of the states that take part in a congress is understood. None is bound directly or indirectly, except by the authorised acts of its own representatives. The decisions of a congress, if they can be called such, possess no authority whatever, except what they derive from the individuals who concur in them. Against dissentients they have no more weight than if they were resolutions adopted at a meeting, at which these dissentients were not represented. However much it might be desired that an Amphictyonic council or European senate could authoritatively decide the differences of states—no such tribunal has ever existed in any of the congresses that have from time to time been assembled. That of Vienna was like all others a meeting for negotiation.¹

It originated in that provision of the treaty of Paris

¹ To those acquainted with diplomatic usages and with the law of nations, it is scarcely necessary to state this proposition; but a contrary notion has been industriously circulated, to be traced probably to the days when despotic combinations claimed at Tropau, Laybach, and Verona, the right of making laws for Europe. That no such right exists in any number of states it needs no argument to prove, and the principle of rejecting any such right is one that ought to be religiously guarded as the only safeguard of the independence of nations. What is a violation of international law when committed by a single state, is not the less so because two or three others join in the crime.

In the earlier European congresses, the negotiations were all carried on by representatives assembled in the same town, but without any common sittings. This was the case at that of Munster, when all the documents passed through the hands of mediators, who proposed of themselves pacific modifications; at Osnaburg the negotiation was almost entirely carried on by notes.

At Nimeguen the representatives of the King of England and the Pope were mediators; the negotiations with each power were separately conducted.

At Ryswick, in 1697, the same course was pursued, the King of Sweden was

by which it was arranged that "all the powers engaged on either side in the war should send representatives to Vienna to regulate in a general congress the arrangements which might be necessary to complete the disposition of that treaty." England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, had already in that treaty agreed upon the general principles, and very many of the details of the arrangements. Some, and not unimportant ones, it was desirable, even with a view to their own unanimity,

mediator. The French and English plenipotentiaries finally adjusted between themselves the terms of peace.

At the congress which preceded the treaty of Utrecht, conferences did take place between four of the powers—France, England, Holland, and Savoy—the other powers communicated with them and with each other by notes.

At Aix La Chapelle the representatives of France and England came to agreement upon all the important questions between themselves.

At Teschen (1779) notes were principally employed.

At Rastadt, 1798, almost all the negotiations were carried on by notes, and the plenipotentiaries met only once or twice.

"The result of this review is," says Flassan, "that a congress is a free assembly of plenipotentiaries who treat by notes or in conferences, sometimes in common—oftener separately. A congress has nothing of the character of a supreme tribunal pronouncing its decision on the fate of other states, but a species of political council, in which the dominant powers endeavour by their influence to effect arrangements, and even by means of their overruling power, to bring about results important for the general order.

"The adhesion of the minority or of any one particular power can only be determined by considerations of prudence or interest."—*Flassan—Histoire du Congrès de Vienne*, vol. i. p. 5.

At the Congress of Verona in 1822 the Duke of Wellington refused the assent of England to the determination of the other representatives. To this conduct of England Europe was indebted for breaking up that system of despotism which, by means of congresses, the absolute powers had then manifestly attempted to establish over independent states.

The vast importance of the interests affected by the Congress of Vienna gave a species of sanction to the extravagant language in which the powers of congresses were spoken of. Nevertheless, that congress was nothing more than the meeting of the allies who had conquered Napoleon to enable them to agree among themselves on the disposal of the territories they had conquered, and to which they invited the presence of other powers whose interests might be affected by their resolves.

to postpone. But at all events the matters of which they had to dispose affected the interests of too many states of Europe to be finally arranged without a consultation with those representing each state.

The powers who were parties to the Treaty of Paris never meant by this invitation to a congress to submit their own conduct to the decision of those who have been termed the assembled representatives of Europe. They had already taken on themselves to dispose of the territories which were recovered from the dominion of France, and a secret article of the Treaty of Paris placed their right to deal with them upon a clear and distinct basis.

On the 22nd of September a protocol was drawn up by the representatives of Prussia, Russia, and Austria, with the concurrence of Lord Castlereagh, laying down the mode in which the business of the congress should proceed. This document was based upon the exclusive right of the four powers to deal with the territories surrendered by France. It was expressly declared that the four powers asserted the exclusive right of agreeing between themselves upon the distribution of the territories made disposable by the war and the peace of Paris, but that the other two powers, France and Spain, were to be admitted to state their objections if they had any, and to offer such advice as they thought fit. Even this limited interference was not to take place until the four powers had finally, and with a perfect agreement between themselves, resolved on the three points of the territorial distribution of the duchy of Warsaw, of Germany, and

of Italy.² Lord Castlereagh, on the part of England, in giving his assent to the proposed arrangement, reserved to himself the right of not being bound by the majority, and of avowing whenever necessary his dissent, while at the same time he expressed his opinion that the arrangements when brought forward should be open to free and liberal discussion with the other two powers as friendly not as hostile parties.

Mutual jealousies had already appeared between the allies of the treaty of Paris. Talleyrand had dexterously taken advantage of them to assert the influence of France; and finally it was agreed that the representative of that country should be admitted to take part in the deliberations which it had been proposed to confine to the four powers. Spain, Portugal, and Sweden were admitted to the position of offering remonstrance and advice. The plenipotentiaries of other states were consulted when the interests of those states were involved.

It must, however, through all these arrangements, be remembered, that the congress was still nothing more than a council of independent powers, any of whom were at perfect liberty to refuse to concur with the rest. The opinion of a majority in either of these committees, as they might be termed, whether of five or eight, possessed only a moral influence which might or might not be respected by the dissentients. Every power in Europe, the smallest as well as the greatest, was perfectly free to act upon any subject on which it had the will or the

² Memorandum of conference of four powers, 22nd September, 1814.—*Recueil des Traité*, p. 184.

power to assert its opinion either in negotiation or by arms. The rights of each nation, wherever they were affected, were arranged by separate treaties with that nation itself. Nineteen such separate acts were annexed to and sanctioned by the general treaty, in which seven of the eight principal powers who had been belligerents in the war accorded their assent to the new territorial arrangements.

Upon this principle all the proceedings of the congress were based ; this was the principle so carefully guarded by Lord Castlereagh, and which, in following the deliberations of the congress, it is necessary to bear in mind. It is now well known that the differences in the congress had assumed so serious a form that at one period all preparations were made for the appeal to the last argument of kings. War was in all probability only averted by the common danger to all of Napoleon's return. Under the pressure of that danger the disputes of the allies were hastily, if not wisely adjusted. Even then the king of Spain exercised his independent right of refusing his accession to the treaty by which all his allies agreed to be bound. That accession was only given by a separate treaty in 1817.

Although the admission of France to the conferences from which she had been previously excluded did not therefore give to her, in the ordinary sense of the word, a vote, which would have been a casting one, it placed that country, or rather her minister Talleyrand, in a position of influence in the councils, which may justly be called those of Europe. No man was better calculated than the ex-bishop of Autun skilfully to employ

that position, and in many of the final arrangements of the congress, the influence exercised by the French minister was more preponderating than even that of Metternich in determining the ultimate result.

According, therefore, to the arrangements of the congress as finally adopted, there was first a meeting of the representatives of France, England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia—the powers who, in the first instance, exercised the right of dealing with the territories of which disposal was to be made. Then a conference between the representatives of these powers and the ministers of Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, and finally consultations with any other of the European states who might be entitled to give an opinion upon any of the arrangements proposed. All, however, was based upon the treaty of Paris, and upon that secret article by which the four powers reserved to themselves the disposal of the territories which formed the proper subject of the deliberations of the congress.

There was one diplomatist—neither the least influential, nor the least able of the many who were assembled—who was permitted to occupy a position of some influence although representing a sovereign who would have found it difficult to establish grounds for his claim to have a voice in the settlement of any affairs except his own. At the express personal request of the Prince Regent of England, Consalvi, the Pope's representative, was admitted to a share in the general discussion of the allied powers.

Before the congress assembled, many of the questions relating to Italy had been finally settled. The annexa-

tion of Genoa to Piedmont had been, as we have seen, the subject of a secret article of the treaty of Paris. Tuscany and Piedmont had been already restored to their ancient sovereigns. The pontiff had resumed his throne in the city of Rome. It had been covenanted with Austria that the Ticino should be the western boundary of her dominions. Still, however, matters of the deepest importance to the future destiny of the country remained unsettled. Ferdinand claimed from his allies the restitution of all the territories of which French invasion had deprived him. Murat demanded the fulfilment of those obligations from Austria and England, on the faith of which he had entered into the league against Napoleon. The eastern provinces of the Papal States were still in the possession of Murat, and were sought for equally by Austria, by the king of Naples, and the Pope. The limits and extent of the Austrian possessions were not defined. If the Romagnese and the Legations were placed under Austrian rule, it would have been possible in exchange for this concession, to have taken from Austria some portion of her old dominions, and attained the object of strengthening Sardinia by annexing them to that crown.

The efforts made by some of these powers to influence the opinion of statesmen have been already described. Austria, in a memorable document, had formally claimed from Lord Castlereagh the fulfilment by England of the stipulations of the treaty of Prague;³ the minister of Sardinia had urged upon all the powers, and especially upon England, the necessity of increasing her

³ Memorandum of Prince Metternich.—*Ante*, chapter iii. p. 99.

territory and her strength ;⁴ and the representative of the pontiff had pressed upon the allied sovereigns in London those claims of his master, upon which he relied as establishing their obligation to restore to the See of Rome all that by the French revolution it had lost.

Among the visitors, whom the meeting of the Congress attracted to Vienna, was Caroline, the queen of Ferdinand, destined to close under her ancestral roof the scenes of her restless and guilty life. Banished by the peremptory determination of Lord William Bentinck from Sicily, she continued for a short time to reside at Zante. When she heard of the alliance entered into by her nephew and son-in-law with Murat, she resolved personally to visit Vienna, to remonstrate with her imperial relative upon the unnatural desertion of his own kindred. Age had not extinguished the energy, nor misfortune quelled the courage, of this extraordinary woman. Trieste was under the dominion of the French. But no difficulties deterred her from an enterprise on which she had once resolved. Attended by her son, the youthful Prince Leopold, she made her way to Constantinople by sea. The adventures of her journey were not destitute either of hardship or peril. From the city of the Sultan she found that difficulties impeded her journey overland. The days had not yet come when the waters of the Danube were navigated by the mighty power of steam. Hiring a small vessel at Marmora, she braved the storms of the Euxine at a

⁴ See vol. i. chapter vi. pp. 277—278. The memorandum of Count D'Agliè will be found in full at the end of this chapter.

season when the hardiest navigators do not pass without apprehension the portals of that treacherous sea. Narrowly escaping shipwreck in one of its tempests, she landed at Odessa, and passing through the friendly realms of Russia, she made her way in safety to the capital of her imperial nephew.

Her appearance at Vienna excited the feelings which might be expected to be displayed towards a queen of the imperial family in the circumstances under which she came. The spirit she had displayed, the dangers she had braved, and the misfortunes she had suffered, excited for her a sympathy in which all the scandals that had prejudiced her reputation were forgotten. She appeared in the character of a heroine; and when in performance of the strange devotion of her family, she descended to the vault of the Capuchins to weep and pray beside her mother's tomb, her journey became consecrated as a pilgrimage, and the courtiers of the Austrian capital saw in her only the pious and injured daughter of the imperial house.

Even in Vienna she was unable to restrain that fiery spirit which had so often led her into indiscretions that betrayed her secret thoughts. At the very time when she knew that the cruelties of her husband's reign were used as an argument against his claims, she boasted of the punishments she would inflict when Naples was once more her own. To some of the ministers of Austria she showed a long list of the persons she had determined, on her resuming the sovereignty, to proscribe.

Her longings for vengeance were never to be gratified. She was not destined ever again to enter Naples, or even

at Vienna to plead the cause of herself and her husband with those personages whom she hoped to influence by her address. On the 7th of September she died suddenly in the imperial castle of Hetzendorf, where, after a short stay at Schönbrunn, her residence had been assigned. The excitement of her position, and the fatigues of her journey, were too much for her nervous system, shattered by the use of opium, and preyed on by the guilty memories of her life. During her visit to Schönbrunn, her attendants, or even her visitors, were often startled by sudden cries of terror, or amazed by wild words which she addressed to some mysterious intruder, whom her scared imagination conjured up. In the corridors of the palace, spectres, invisible to others, beckoned her as she passed. On its long straight gravel walks, and under the shelter of the hedges of its old-fashioned gardens, the voices of unseen messengers summoned her by name. Probably, in the midst of terrors like these her spirit passed away. Her attendants found her dead in her chair, her mouth wide open, as if in the attempt to call for assistance, and her hand extended towards the bell-rope, which she had not strength to reach. Her death was attributed to the rage into which she was thrown on hearing, on the last evening of her existence, that the Russian emperor had declared that the events of 1799 made it impossible ever to restore to Naples its "butcher king."

Dying in the very spot where of all others we might have expected for the daughter of Maria Theresa the solemn observances of funereal pomp, she descended to

the grave without even the conventional mourning which attends the worst of royal personages to the tomb. The Austrian emperor would not interrupt by a court mourning the festivities by which his capital was preparing to receive its illustrious guests. In Sicily her imbecile and heartless husband treated her memory with the most cruel disrespect. Within a few weeks after he heard of her death, and while the chaunts of her obsequies were still echoing in many of the churches of the island, Ferdinand celebrated his nuptials with the Princess Partanna, a Sicilian lady of high rank, but still below that to which Bourbon and Spanish pride had restricted the alliance of their kings. The strange etiquette of continental despotism admitted such a marriage, but prevented one not of royal blood from assuming the royal title. His new bride was therefore content with a morganatic marriage, and still bore the title of Princess instead of that of queen. Her previous conduct would have supplied a far better reason for denying her the partnership of his throne.

Strange to say, the only place where even decent respect was paid to the memory of Caroline was within the walls of Murat's palace. When the intelligence of her death reached her rival and namesake, the court of Naples were in the midst of a series of entertainments at the country palace of the king. The festivities were suspended, and the court remained in strict retirement for a few days.

Thus died Caroline of Naples, for the long space of nearly fifty years the evil genius of the country of which in an unhappy hour she had been called on to share

the throne, and over which she virtually ruled. Her character has been sufficiently pourtrayed by the incidents recorded of her life, and it is one upon which there is little temptation to dwell. Among the Neapolitans her memory has borne the undivided obloquy of crimes, the odium of which should, at least, be shared with others, and if impartial history cannot qualify its condemnation of her acts, charity may gladly find a palliation in the unhappy circumstances in which she was placed.

The disposal of the throne of Naples was the Italian question which most occupied the deliberations and divided the councils of the Congress. But there were others which gave rise to discussions. The deputies of Genoa, who came to oppose the annexation of their country to Piedmont, soon found that they could only record their unavailing protest against a resolution irrevocably taken. They preferred, in the name of the Genoese, their last request, that the Sardinian monarch might assume the title of King of Liguria. The allies refused it upon the just grounds that while he governed Savoy as its duke, and Piedmont as its prince, they ought not to place the States of Genoa above these provinces, by erecting them into a kingdom ; Doge or duke was the proper title of the chief of their ancient republic, and it was that which their sovereign should most appropriately bear. The freedom of the port of Genoa, the maintenance of its university, equality of civil rights between the new and the old subjects of the king, were secured by stipulations,⁵ to which the

⁵ The stipulations upon these and several other similar subjects are very

Sardinian monarch was formally called on to give his consent.⁶

The annexation of Genoa to Sardinia gave the pretext for a proposal, not very earnestly pressed at Vienna, but which some years afterwards was more seriously renewed—that of a change in the laws which regulated the succession to the Sardinian crown.

Victor Emanuel had no son. Of his four daughters, the eldest was married to the Duke of Modena; Charles Felix, his brother, was unmarried; and by the Salic law, which had always regulated the descent of the succession in the House of Savoy, the crown upon the death of these two princes would pass to the Prince of Carignan, the representative of a junior branch of the reigning house. The plan of the Duke of Modena was to repeal this law, reserving the rights of Charles Felix, in which case the crown would have devolved upon the duchess.⁷ A pretext for this interference was found in the annexation of Genoa, the succession of which

minute and precise. Letter of Prince Metternich to the Marquis de San Marsan, 13th November, 1814. Protocol, November 13th and 12th of December, 1814.—*Recueil des Traité*, pp. 137 to 135.

⁶ Act of adhesion of Sardinian plenipotentiaries.—*Recueil des Traité*, p. 145.

⁷ If the principle of hereditary succession were held inviolable, and never to be disturbed by the interference of popular choice, the son of this Duke of Modena might advance far higher claims than those which his father thus put forward to the Sardinian crown.

Upon the death of the Cardinal of York, all the claims of the House of Stuart to the crown of England devolved upon Charles Felix, King of Sardinia, by virtue of his descent from Henrietta, Duchess of Orleans, the daughter of Charles I. Anne Mary, her only child, had married Victor Amadeus, the King of Sardinia. The eldest daughter of Charles Felix married the Duke of Modena, and transmitted to her son the heirship of the Stuarts. The present Duke of Modena is the rightful heir of Charles I.

The act of settlement excluded the descendants of Charles I., and settled the crown on the junior branch of the royal family descended from the

at least could be regulated by the allies, who ceded it as they chose. A less plausible argument asserted that as a large portion of the Piedmontese had been acquired in the reign of princes from whom the Carignan branch was not descended, these territories were not bound by any right in the present descendants of that branch; while finally, the right was claimed for the ruling King of Sardinia to alter, if he thought fit, the course of succession in his realm; and it was said the allied powers were perfectly justified in insisting, as a condition of the cession of Genoa, upon his exercising that right.

Princess Sophia, daughter of James I. But it is only the principle of exclusion first asserted in the revolution of 1688 that deprives the present Duke of Modena of the right to the English crown.

To one writing in the present year (1860), when the liberties of England have been so long established under the illustrious dynasty thus called to occupy the forfeited throne of the Stuarts, and when the claim of an elder descent may be classed with the historic fictions or curiosities of the past, these facts, nevertheless, suggest reflections that have their interest.

The coincidence is strange, that the same fortune should pursue the representative of the Stuarts in Modena which attended his ancestors in England; and that the eldest lineal descendant of Charles I. should find himself excluded from an Italian sovereignty by the establishment of the same principles of popular right which deprive him of his hereditary title to the English crown.

The remark may perhaps be permitted, that of all nations in the world England would have occupied the most anomalous position if she had been a party, directly or indirectly, to forcing upon the people of Modena the very sovereign whose claims to her own crown are set aside by the principle of respect for the national choice.

Those curious in family descents will probably be struck by the fact, that while the English crown passed by the effect of the revolution to the illustrious family of the Guelphs, a prince who claims to represent the same family is the only person who even on the principles of hereditary right can allege an elder title to that crown.

The pedigree of Charles Felix, showing his descent from Charles I., and the extinction of the line of all other descendants of that king, will be found in Charles Butler's works. Vol. ii. *Tract on the Germanic Empire. Proofs and Illustrations*, note 7, p. 23.

The queen of Victor Emanuel warmly seconded the proposal, and Metternich was prepared to support it with all his force ; but the artifices even of female influence failed in overcoming the determined negative of the king ; and, probably, to the resolute opposition of Victor Emanuel, the young Prince of Carignan was indebted for the preservation of his hereditary right.

Some little trouble was occasioned to the Congress by a claim, very earnestly pressed on by the Queen of Etruria to the duchy of Tuscany, on behalf of her son the infant Duke of Parma. Austria, it was insisted, had been a party to the treaty of Presburg, by which Tuscany was ceded by the grand-duke to the Duke of Parma. Compensation had been actually given elsewhere. No war either between Austria and Spain, or the Duke of Parma, annulled that treaty, which therefore still existed in full force. The subsequent seizure of the kingdom of Etruria by Buonaparte was a mere usurpation, which could not confer a title either upon himself or on any one else. The right of the son of Maria Louisa, whether under the title of King of Etruria, or Duke of Parma, was still undisturbed.⁸

Whatever plausibility, or even justice, might be in these arguments, the commissioners appointed by the allied powers to inquire into their validity, unanimously rejected them. The adherence to the agreement already entered into to settle the duchy of Parma on the wife of Napoleon deprived, during her life, the duke of his own hereditary states. Compensation, however, was found for him by erecting Lucca into a duchy in his favour.

⁸ Memoir of the Spanish minister.—*Recueil des Traites*, p. 168.

Upon his succeeding to his ancestral dominion by any event which would leave Parma free from the claims of Napoleon's empress, the territories of Lucca were to be united—at least their principal portions—to the Tuscan State.

It was, however, with reference to the throne of Naples that the most serious discussions arose. The death of Queen Caroline did not injure the prospects of Ferdinand. The youthful Prince Leopold sustained his father's cause with a discretion beyond his years. Murat was represented by the Duke di Champochiari and the Prince of Cariati. Ferdinand's ministers were the Count Ruffo and the Duke of Serra Capriola. It was not, however, either in his son or in his ministers that the legitimist monarch found the strongest support. Talleyrand is believed by many to have been influenced by motives of personal interest in the course which he pursued. Certain it is that the court of France seemed determined that Napoleon's marshal should not exclude the Bourbon prince from the throne of Naples; but Talleyrand pressed the opposition to Murat's claims with a perseverance that more than represented the malignity of his court; and the address and perseverance of the wily and unprincipled diplomatist, seconded by the rashness and folly of Murat himself, succeeded finally in triumphing over the manifest obligations of justice and right.

Remembering the engagements which were entered into with Murat both by Austria and England, it seems difficult to understand how any question could really have existed as to the obligation, at least of these

powers, to secure to him his throne. With Austria a direct treaty had been negotiated. A note had been delivered by the English minister, which on the part of the English cabinet, expressly sanctioned the Austrian engagement, assigning reasons on the part of the English Court for not executing a formal treaty, which manifestly implied that they were bound to the same obligations by every tie of honour and good faith. But this was not all ; Prussia and Russia had become approving parties to this agreement at Troyes, and afterwards at Chaumont, where they settled with Austria and England the mode in which the compensation promised to Murat was to be obtained.⁹ It seems difficult to conceive any engagement more binding upon all parties, in honour, in justice, and by all the principles of public law.

It was said, indeed, that Murat had not given to the cause of the allies in the campaign of 1814 that prompt and cordial support which they had a right to expect. The answers to this were many. His public withdrawal from the cause of Buonaparte and his espousal of that of the coalition, were the real consideration of the treaty, and nothing short of actual and proved treachery to its engagements could cancel the obligations contracted towards him. Solemn engagements cannot be annulled by suspicions and jealousies excited by the precise mode in which on one side or other the stipulations have been fulfilled.

If Murat had been hesitating and inactive throughout the month of March, he attributed this to conduct on

⁹ Colletta, book vii. chap. iv.

the part of his allies, which justified him in imputing to them the intention to break faith. But the answer to this charge was conclusive—no matter what might have been his conduct, the agreement with him was subsequently ratified both by the Austrian and English courts. The memorandum of Lord William Bentinck, authorised by the English cabinet, was dated the 1st of April, and it was about the same period that at Murat's urgent demand the ratifications of the Austrian treaty were exchanged. No one ever pretended that after the conditions were complied with, Murat had omitted to fulfil any duty to which his engagement bound him.

But in fact he could still more triumphantly allege that all the services which he had undertaken were fulfilled. All Italy, south of the Po, had been surrendered to his troops, and it was by him that Rome was restored to the Pope, and Tuscany to the grand-duke. His army was investing Piacenza when a convention between himself, Eugene Beauharnais, and Bellegarde, suspended the hostilities of the war. He had at least taken his full share in driving the French out of Italy, and it was mere cavilling to find fault with the manner in which he had rendered a service which was actually performed.

Against these plain and patent facts there could only be set the allegation that while he was thus openly co-operating with the allies, he was still secretly entertaining the intention of deserting them if a favourable opportunity arose—an allegation which even had it been proved, was of all others the most dangerous upon

which to rest as the foundation for the non-fulfilment of a contract. The allies had stipulated, not for his intentions, but his acts ; and even if it could have been shown that he was looking forward to deserting them in some possible contingency, that occasion never arose, and good-faith demanded that the design, however much to be morally reprobated, should be left in the category of those unfulfilled intentions which are not amenable to any human law. Murat never had been guilty of any act of treachery to the allied cause, and on the 4th of January the Duke of Wellington, who had replaced Lord Castlereagh in the Congress, gave his written opinion, that there was nothing in Murat's conduct which disentitled him to the fulfilment of the obligations which had been so solemnly entered into with him.¹⁰

Several memoranda were presented by his representatives to the Congress, in which clear statements and plain arguments appear unansweredly to establish his right.¹¹ An elaborate memoir of the events of the campaign of 1814 was drawn up on the part of Murat ;¹² a

¹⁰ Debate in the House of Commons, May 19th, 1815. *Hansard*, vol. xxxi. p. 278. The letter of the Duke of Wellington was published in the French papers.—*Moniteur*, May 14, 1815. Lord Castlereagh asserted that it was written in ignorance of the documents subsequently forwarded from Paris.

¹¹ These papers are all collected in *Hansard's Parliamentary debates*, vol. xxxi. p. 59.

¹² Historical Memoir on the Political and Military conduct of his Majesty the King of Naples to the peace of Paris, presented by his ministers to the Congress, December 7th, 1814. *Hansard*, vol. xxxi. p. 82. Madame Recamier informs us that these documents, submitted on behalf of Murat, were drawn up by Benjamin Constant. For this service Constant was offered the sum of twenty thousand francs and a decoration. He refused all recompence because Murat declined to accredit him as his representative to the Congress.—*Souvenirs, &c., de Madame Recamier*, vol. i. p. 276.

reply of General Nugent impeached its accuracy, but the impeachment was confined to those things which were, in truth, matters of suspicion, rather than of fact. Murat threw the blame of the delay in the campaign upon the remissness and incapacity of the Austrian commanders. It was only to be expected that they should retaliate by imputing it to the insincerity of the King of Naples in the common cause.¹³ It can scarcely be denied that if Murat's heart had not been wavering in that cause, he would in all probability have accomplished much more; but, setting apart the reasons assigned for this in the conduct pursued towards himself, the question of the fulfilment of the treaty was not to be tried by the report of a military commission inquiring into the activity displayed by any of the parties in the prosecution of the campaign.

On the other hand, the representatives of Murat pressed both Austria and England for a fulfilment of the pledges into which they had entered.

Talleyrand on the 13th December formally addressed a note to Lord Castlereagh, in which he demanded from England and from the Congress, a recognition of Ferdinand's title to the Neapolitan crown. It had been suggested that it was not necessary to make any declaration in Congress on the subject—leaving each party in possession to maintain their rights as they best could. Talleyrand protested against such a course as unworthy of the great powers. Upon the British representatives he pressed that in the war in which Naples had been wrested from Ferdinand, he had been the

¹³ Observations of Count Nugent in reply. Hansard, p. 97.

ally of the English crown. England had never recognised the title of the usurper, and it therefore followed of necessity that in the eye of England, Ferdinand was still the lawful king. Justice demanded the recognition of that right. In a formal note the French minister proposed that all the powers represented in the Congress should agree to recognise Ferdinand as King of the Two Sicilies, binding themselves never directly or indirectly to support any pretension opposed to his right. This Talleyrand argued was the only obligation which followed from the mere act of recognition. No party to that recognition would be bound actively to aid in his restoration, although any of them that thought proper might do so.

The meaning of this proposition was, that France should restore Ferdinand by force of arms, while all the other powers were bound to give no assistance or protection to Murat. The most extraordinary part of the note was that in which it was suggested that the engagement of Austria to Murat would be perfectly satisfied by her protecting the dominion of Naples from any attack on the side of the Italian continent. It was impossible, argued Talleyrand, to put any other construction upon the treaty into which Austria had entered; the Emperor of Austria could never be supposed to have given an absolute guarantee against the just rights of his uncle and father-in-law to a realm which he lost by making common cause with Austria; the obligation of Austria would be fulfilled by a declaration of the Congress that no hostile army should pass through Italy to the invasion of Naples.

Such was the miserable device by which the French plenipotentiary proposed to evade the solemn and distinct obligations which Austria had contracted to Murat. The act of Congress which he suggested was this:—

“ All Europe assembled in Congress recognises his Majesty Ferdinand IV. as King of Naples. All the powers engage not to favour or support directly or indirectly any pretensions opposed to the rights which belong to this title—but the troops which may be sent by any powers not Italian (*étrangères à l'Italie*) allies of his Majesty cannot be permitted to cross the Italian territory.”¹⁴

Austria rejected the scandalous subterfuge which was thus suggested as a cover—if indeed it could be called such—for a breach of faith; and finally a peremptory reply was given to Talleyrand that his Imperial Majesty could enter into no engagements inconsistent with those which he had already contracted with Murat.

These transactions occurred at the time when in the more important discussions of the conference, France and England were partisans of Austria against the Czar. Lord Castlereagh yielded to Talleyrand so far as to refer the question of Murat’s conduct to Lord William Bentinck. The reply of Lord William expressed his conviction that Murat had not been

¹⁴ “That document, which purported to be a letter from Talleyrand to the noble lord, was really of such a nature that at first he could not persuade himself to believe it genuine, from the base fraud it proposed. . . . In the expedients it suggested for attacking Naples and evading the pledge by which Austria guaranteed the throne of that kingdom to Murat, together with the preservation of the peace of Italy, it betrayed a character pregnant with such perfidy and baseness as the vilest wretch in society could scarcely parallel.”—*Speech of Mr. Horner, Hansard’s Debates*, May 2nd, 1815.

sincere in his adhesion to the allied cause, and that he had not honestly, or to the best of his ability, exerted himself for that cause. The English general did not consider the proclamation of the Sicilian prince at Leghorn as justifying the conduct of the King of Naples. It was not his duty, perhaps, to call attention to the fact, that after all this alleged failure of engagement, he had, by command of the English cabinet, placed in Murat's hands the pledge of his government to ratify the treaty with Austria, and that after this, in the few days which remained of the campaign, the king had vigorously, and in good earnest, committed himself against the French.

France, in the meantime, prepared to act on the policy of Talleyrand. An army of 30,000 men assembled in Dauphiny—a force obviously designed to carry out the threat of a Bourbon invasion of Naples. Murat met this menace by a requisition to the Austrian lieutenant in Lombardy to permit him to march through that country a force of 80,000 men; at the same time he desired his ministers at Vienna to insist upon his right to all the Italian territory south of the Po.

The Austrian government became seriously alarmed at the prospect that hostilities between France and Naples might kindle a conflagration which would probably place all Italy in a flame. The Austrian army was strengthened on the Po, and the emperor on the 25th of February intimated to the courts, both of France and Naples, in unequivocal language, that he was determined to maintain the tranquillity of Italy, and would hold as his enemy any one who ventured to disturb it.

One other resource was still left to the versatile malignity of Talleyrand. Count de Blacas, the confidential secretary of Louis XVIII. was employed to search the archives of the French court. Eight letters were discovered and sent to Vienna to establish the treachery of Murat. Five of them lent some countenance to the charge. One was a report forwarded from a French official at Ancona, who communicated to the French government, then that of Napoleon, expressions used by Murat in an interview to which he was admitted. The report was found on the restoration of the Bourbons, and transmitted by M. de Blacas to Lord Castlereagh. Murat had used language which implied that the time might not be distant when he would be fighting under his old banners again. Such were the devices by which statesmen attempted to get rid of the solemn obligation of a positive and distinct bargain.

The other four documents were—a letter from Eugene Beauharnais, in which he stated no fact, but gave his opinion that Murat had joined the allies before he heard of Napoleon's recent victories, and that when the intelligence of them reached him he repented of what he had done—one from the Princess Eliza, in which she complained of Murat's conduct in driving her from Pisa, as inconsistent with professions which he had previously made—and two draughts or copies of letters from Napoleon to Murat, in one of which he obviously replied to offers from Murat of alliance and support.¹⁵

¹⁵ Letter of Count de Blacas to Lord Castlereagh, 4th March, 1815.—*Eight enclosures, Hansard, vol. xxx. p. 146.*

Europe heard with amazement the subsequent charge, that some at least of these documents had been tampered with in Paris. Letters written by Napoleon in 1811 had been altered so as to make them appear of the date of 1814. Passages had been omitted and words interpolated so as entirely to alter the sense. After their quotation in the British parliament by Lord Castlereagh, a statement to this effect appeared in the *Moniteur* during the "hundred days," and the original documents were exhibited to any Englishmen who chose by ocular inspection to satisfy themselves of the fraud that had been committed.¹⁶

Assuming them to be genuine, as some of them certainly were, they established against the King of Naples nothing more than the vague expressions of regard for France, which he had imprudently used, but which did not amount to treachery to the cause he had espoused. Many of them were uttered under the irritation of the treatment which he had received ; all of them were reconcilable with fidelity to his engagement, when we remember his secret predilections, and the motives and influences that prompted his accession to the league against Napoleon.

They had, however, such an effect upon the English government, that in the end of January Lord Castlereagh communicated to the Congress that England did not feel herself under any obligations to maintain Murat on his throne, and that therefore the question of Naples might be dealt with upon general principles without

¹⁶ See the debates in Parliament, and Mr. Hobhouse's (afterwards Lord Broughton) "Letters from Paris during the last reign of Napoleon." Letter 17, vol. i. p. 381.

reference to any engagements supposed to bind the English court.¹⁷

Murat's own conduct was not calculated to conciliate the other powers whose opinion might influence the decision of the question. His enrolment of Lombard refugees in a separate regiment gave offence to Austria, and supplied at least grounds for the representations made by some of the Italian princes, that Italy never would be at peace with a monarch so restless and ambitious as Murat upon a revolutionary throne in the south. His demand for all Italy south of the Po, while it aggravated this feeling, was a peculiar cause of affront to the Pope, and Consalvi could scarcely be blamed for representing to the Congress the peril to which the tranquillity of the Papal States would be constantly exposed by the vicinity of so dangerous a neighbour.

There were other causes of quarrel on the part of the Papal authorities with Murat. To the request of the Emperor of Austria that he would restore the Marches of Ancona to the Pope, he had replied by a reference to the terms of the treaty of January, 1814, and by increasing the strength of his troops in the districts he occupied of the States of the Church. His consul at Rome was openly accused, if not convicted, of secret intrigues with the disaffected in the Roman States ; Murat refused the demand of the Pope for his dismissal. There was strong reason to suspect the Court of Naples of maintaining communication with the Carbonari in the Papal dominions. Naples was crowded with suspicious characters, supposed to be

¹⁷ Lord Castlereagh's letter.

identified with the discontents which were already manifesting themselves in France.

It might be said that these acts were either reprisals upon his enemies, which however indiscreet, were at least justifiable ; or acts of precaution against which the charge even of imprudence could hardly be alleged. When the Congress hesitated in ratifying the solemn engagements on which he relied, he could scarcely be blamed for seeking in the elements of discontent for materials to strengthen him in an European war. When the Bourbons threatened him with an invasion, no one could impute it to him as a crime if he placed himself in communication with that spirit of hatred to the restored dynasty in France, which most assuredly, if they had invaded him, he would have justly and successfully evoked for their destruction.

In spite of all these influences there is little doubt that, had the Congress come to its natural conclusion, Murat would have been left in undisturbed possession of his throne ;¹⁸ Alexander was on his side, Austria

¹⁸ The position of Murat at the Congress will be understood by the following extract of a despatch addressed by Sir Charles Stewart to his brother, dated from Vienna on the 9th of March. It was written when intelligence had reached Vienna that Napoleon had left Elba, but when all was uncertainty as to the point of his destination. Speaking of the conjectures on this subject, Sir Charles says :—

“ It is believed that if he is acting in concert with Murat, Naples would be the point where great forces might be assembled in a short time. But is it probable that Murat would meanwhile join him ? It would be an act of real folly. Murat has certainly a far better chance in remaining faithful to Austria, who is favourably disposed to him, and to the other powers who leave him to enjoy peaceably his crown—than if he forced them to declare against him. To this must be added the uncertainty he would feel as to the motive which prompts Napoleon to reappear upon the scene, and the necessity which the King of Naples would be under of obeying implicitly the direction of his old

had never disavowed or receded from the engagements she had made; and, whatever might have been the secret wishes of any of the great powers, none of them could have permitted France to renew a war in Europe for the sake of placing Ferdinand upon the Neapolitan throne. What might have been the future fate of Murat, had the conferences broken up in anger, is a question that must rest with the speculations which can only conjecture what might have been in that event the future of every European state.

In this position matters still were, when on the 26th of February, Napoleon left Elba, landing in France on the 1st of March: Murat's own conduct very soon decided all questions relating to the Neapolitan throne.

LETTER FROM COUNT D'AGLIE TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.

“Northern Italy comprises the entire district which extends from the Alps to the confines of the States of the Pope, and contains a population of about ten million inhabitants. It is washed on two of its sides by the Mediterranean and the Adriatic Seas.

master. It is impossible to believe that Murat would entice him into his power, in order thus to secure his own throne by delivering him up. This would be too great a treason. Yet there are those who adopt even this supposition rather than believe that Murat has consented to make common cause with Napoleon. There are a good many persons who say that if Buonaparte disembark there, it will supply them with a good excuse for ridding themselves of their engagements with Murat, to whom the emperor has given a promise in his own handwriting to maintain him on his throne.”—*Sir Charles Stewart's Despatch, March 9th, 1815.—Capetigue: “Les Cents Jours.”*

On another it is bounded by the long chain of the Alps, which separates it completely from the neighbouring countries. Beyond these natural boundaries, the differences of climate, of customs, of aspect, could not be greater. The country possesses a fertile soil, and is considered to be the most cultivated, and, perhaps the most industrious of this part of Europe. Nevertheless, a country which enjoys so many benefits, and which from its extent, its population, and its geographical position, should have occupied an important place amongst European States, possessed for a long time scarcely any weight in the political balance of Europe. We can easily discover the reason of this, if we glance upon a map which shows the geographical division of Italy as it was in 1792.

"Italy was then divided into nine distinct states, not including the smaller fractions, as the Presidii, the Republic of San Marino, and the Principality of Monaco, have been called. The evils of such a division require no comment. Such states had neither the strength nor the means necessary for keeping up a regular army; consequently they were insufficient for the defence of Italy, and unable to take part in the public affairs of Europe. A general confederation, although exposed to the dangers inseparable from that species of union, might, in a certain degree, have remedied the want of individual strength; but this remedy could not be adopted in Italy, whilst many of her states were subject to foreign princes, who were bound by relationship and politics to the interests of distant courts. How often have the Italians seen their country devastated by contests to which they were completely strangers?

"This was the condition of the greater part of Northern Italy, if we except the states of the King of Sardinia, which, though not of great extent, were larger than the others in this part of Italy. Upon this account, and also from the important situation of these states, the Princes of Piedmont enjoyed an important position, increased by eight centuries of valour, wisdom, and courage. The peculiar situation of the states of the House of Savoy, and the office of guardians of Italy, which was constantly filled by the Subalpine princes, had placed them amongst the powers of the second order—a position which could scarcely have been claimed by the extent of their territories. The advantage of the situation of these states consisted principally

in this, that the Alps guarded them upon the French side, whilst upon that of Italy, the weakness of the neighbouring states was such as to give no cause for anxiety.

“The House of Austria was truly a powerful neighbour, but not formidable either by the extent or the situation of her Italian territories. The Duchy of Milan, which she possessed, was separated and distant from her other hereditary states, the number of troops which she kept there in time of peace was too small to excite any apprehension. In time of war, the great distance took away all possibility of surprise, and left time to prepare for defence.

“According as the military system extended in Europe, and in proportion to the increase of the territories of France and Austria, those powers who desired to preserve the balance of power, and especially England, were most anxious to strengthen the state of the King of Sardinia, which they regarded as the principal support of the political equilibrium in central Europe.¹ Nevertheless, the experience of the last war with France in 1792, proved that her means were not proportioned to the importance of her position.

“The King of Sardinia resisted for five years the power of revolutionary France, and thus delayed for that period the calamities and misfortunes of Italy; for once the Alps were forced by the French bands, they would in less than a year have been masters of the rest of the peninsula. The fatal consequences of the victories of the general who then commanded the French army are sufficiently known; and all Europe may regret that the power to whom was confided the defence of the gates of Italy, had not greater and more suitable means for fulfilling her office.

“And here we must add, that during this unequal strife, the minor states of Northern Italy did not furnish either a man, or a single sou; and that the Court of Vienna, which had the greatest interest in resisting the French invasion, never ceased her demands for the cession of some fortress or province as the price of her aid.

“But great as were the evils of the ancient division of Northern Italy, that at present projected is much more injurious to Italy in general, and especially to the King of Sardinia. The politico-

¹ In all the great treaties negotiated during the past century, the House of Savoy obtained increase of territory in Italy.

geographical map of this part of Italy has only one division; upon one side is the portion occupied by the Austrian troops in the name of the Court of Vienna, upon the other, the states of the King of Sardinia, with their ancient limit of the Ticino. By one glance upon this map we may plainly see the destruction of all the Italian governments, except that of the King of Sardinia. In the old division the cause of the weakness of Northern Italy was apparent; in the present one, that of its slavery is so. We may ask, upon what grounds Austria, which does so little for the defence of this country, and has so many times during the last seven years abandoned, yielded, and bartered it, demands the greater part from all the national governments, whose spoils she would wish to appropriate, quadrupling the possessions which she had had before the war? As to the King of Sardinia, how disproportioned his states too would be to those of Austria in Italy, if the latter preserved all the territory now occupied by her troops? The influence which this prince possessed, as the greatest power in Northern Italy, would be entirely lost, and that which forms the principal strength and security of the state, would become a great danger. In fact, the position in former times was such that the King of Sardinia, as I have mentioned before, having nothing to fear from Italy, on account of the weakness of the neighbouring states, and the distance of the House of Austria, could devote all his care to the defence of that natural barrier of the Alps, which separated and protected Piedmont from France. Now all this is changed. The King of Sardinia cannot be free from anxiety with respect to Italy, because upon that side he is weakest and most exposed to danger. The enormous acquisitions of Austria, and the contiguity of her possessions, enable her to support in Italy in time of peace between forty and fifty thousand men, at least double the number of troops which the King of Sardinia can maintain in time of peace. Besides, the Piedmontese frontier on the side of Lombardy is quite unprotected—no fortress or encampment, no natural obstacle, opposes the advance of an army in these plains; it is enough to measure the distance on the map to be persuaded that Austria, by merely collecting the garrisons which she maintained in Italy could, in two days, lead to Turin a larger army than that with which the King of Sardinia could oppose her. During eight centuries in which the House of Savoy has reigned in

Piedmont, it has never been exposed to such dangers from Italy, as it would be by these new acquisitions of Austria. The existence of the Italian States, and above all that of the Venetian Republic, had always isolated the Spanish possessions, and, finally, those of Austria in Northern Italy ; and had, therefore, rendered them less formidable. The abolition of those states completely destroyed the *relative position*, from which the sovereigns of Piedmont derive consideration and safety ; and if the House of Austria succeeds in appropriating these spoils, we may see plainly to what a condition the rank and independence of the only Italian prince reigning in Italy will be reduced.

“ These observations upon the present condition of the states of the King of Sardinia acquire greater weight, if we consider how the defences of the French side may be weakened by the ultimate dismemberment of Savoy, and by the destruction of the fortresses which were situated at the principal gates of the Alps. The only remedy would be that of enabling the King of Sardinia to augment his army, by giving him an increase of territory and population : but if, in exchange for these, he was to leave that frontier of his states, which was guarded by the ancient arrangement of Italy, exposed to danger, it is plain that the means which he of old possessed for defending the Alps would be diminished. The annexation of Genoa to Piedmont is doubtless most important, because it completes the natural line of defence upon the French side, and opens a communication with the sea, but it does not serve in any way to strengthen the Italian frontier ; and if we take into account the dismemberment of Savoy, it does not add to those means which the King of Sardinia formerly possessed for defending Italy. Hence it follows that the sovereigns of Piedmont, finding themselves nearly inclosed by France and Austria, could only enjoy a *nominal* independence, and would be subject to annoyance in peace, and violence in war from one or other of the neighbouring states ; and perhaps from both, if the alliance which existed between these powers should be renewed, an event which in course of time is neither impossible, nor improbable.

“ Notwithstanding this, it is said, that the consciousness of the moderation of the French and Austrian governments should satisfy the King of Sardinia ; that, provided he observes neighbourly terms, he may live in peace, and fear nothing from the

two powers. But these assertions are unfounded, since even if we put aside all personality, and neglect serious indications to the contrary, in order to believe the intentions of those who now govern France and Austria to be good, no one can answer for those who may govern a few years hence. And is it credible that a prey now become so easy, should not, sooner or later, tempt the cupidity or the ambition of those who are near it?

"If, then, as we cannot doubt, it is for the general interest of Europe that that part of Italy, which lies at the foot of the Alps, should not be subject either to France or Austria; and that the ancient and illustrious House, which has reigned there for so many centuries, should continue to uphold the balance of political equilibrium; it is to be hoped that the powers, who are holding a congress to adjust the political edifice of Europe upon solid foundations, will not content themselves with establishing the independence of the sovereigns of Piedmont upon a basis as insecure as is the system now devised by some governments, and as are the present intentions of the men who administer them.

"The present division of Northern Italy suggests also a most important reasoning of another description. In fact the part of Italy now occupied by Austrian troops, either for Austria or in the name of some prince of the Austrian family, may be divided into three categories—1st, those countries which belonged to the Austrian family before 1702; 2nd, those which were afterwards given in exchange, or for other reasons; and 3rd, those which hitherto have not belonged to her by virtue of treaties. In the first list are the Duchy of Milan, and grand Duchy of Tuscany, and the Duchy of Modena; in the second the Venetian states to the Mincio, comprising Istria, given in exchange for the cession of the Duchy of Milan and the Low Countries—and the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla; in the third, Lombardo-Venetia, comprising the three provinces of Bergamo, Brescia, and Crema—the three Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Ravenna—the State of Lucca—and the State called that of the Presidii. From this we may see, that Austria not only again takes her possessions in Italy, but that she also retains the countries received in 1797 in exchange for the cession of these same provinces, and besides this, she occupies many important parts of Italy which never belonged to her, and to which no treaty gives her a right.

"Now it is doubtless very important to a general balance of

power, that Austria should retain the important position which she has so long occupied amongst European powers, and therefore it is wise and just that her rights should not be disregarded in the great changes which should take place, and that she should have equivalent compensation for the losses or cessions which general interest may require. But everything that passes these limits would be as contrary to justice, as to prudence.

“ Applying these principles to the present divisions of Italy, we may first observe, that if Tuscany is restored to the Grand-Duke Ferdinand, and the Duchy of Milan to the Court of Vienna, the House of Austria would possess exactly the same as before the war ; everything more than this, would be merely a gratuitous addition. In 1797 Austria gave the Duchy of Milan to France, and received in exchange the Venetian States as far as the Mincio—an enormous compensation, the Venetian terra-firma territory being three times as large as the Duchy which she possessed. Austria then yielded the Low Countries, and then the exchange appeared nearly equal in extent of territory. Soon after Austria obtained also Dalmatia and Istria, and besides this in 1802, received under the pretext of indemnity the entire territory of the bishopric of Trent and the district of Brixen between the Tyrol and the Italian frontier. In 1805, forced to make new cessions, Austria received in exchange the Principality of Salzburg, a considerable state lying between Austria Proper and the Tyrol. We may without hesitation, assert, that all these countries exceed in extent the Low Countries and the Duchy of Milan. If these acquisitions are considered in respect of *convenience*, which is of great moment in an affair of *compensation*, we can see how much more valuable they are than those countries given in exchange. In fact the Low Countries were completely separated from the Austrian monarchy ; and, especially of late, were but little attached to the Court of Vienna. The Duchy of Milan, although less distant, was also separated from the hereditary states—its territory upon all sides was without defence, if we except the fortress of Mantua, whose importance was diminished by its isolation from the rest of the territory. On the contrary there is not one amongst the countries acquired in exchange by Austria, which, besides the advantage of contiguity, does not possess peculiar advantages of situation. The Venetian provinces are bounded by Carinthia, Austrian Tyrol, and Carniola; besides,

they are as fertile and populous as any other part of Italy. Dalmatia and Istria are near them, and above all, they extend along the Adriatic; the territory of the Bishopric of Trent and of the district of Brixen put the Tyrol in communication with Venice. The principality of Salzburg is indeed not occupied by Austria at this moment, but it is of so great importance, that she will doubtless do all in her power again to obtain its mastership; it contains three hundred thousand inhabitants. It is plain then, that the compensations received by Austria far exceed in value the Low Countries and the Duchy of Milan, so that, any one who attentively considers the subject, will perceive that the exchanges of 1797 were most fortunate events for the Austrian monarchy. The entire subject assumes distinctness when it is remembered, that the government of Vienna pretended to think these compensations insufficient, and not equivalent to the Low Countries, endeavouring to preserve untouched their rights to the Duchy of Milan. Every impartial man may form an opinion of these intentions.

“Concerning the other parts of Northern Italy which are now occupied by the Austrian troops, the Legations, Lombardo-Venetia, the State of Lucca, and the State of the Presidii, it is sufficient to repeat that these States did not belong to the House of Austria in 1792, and by no treaty have they since belonged to her.

“The three Legations are almost equivalent to the Duchy of Milan; Lombardo-Venetia a little smaller; the State of Lucca contains two hundred thousand inhabitants; the territory of the State of the Presidii is small, but important to Tuscany.

“Let us pass on to the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza. These States being given to a Prince of Austria would complete the line of the confines of Piedmont, which would thus be shut out from the rest of Italy; in addition to this, the proximity of the States of Parma to the shore and to the Island of Elba, would be a constant source of anxiety and difficulty to the King of Sardinia. The Court of Turin has often been accused of eagerness for increase of territory, but if that of Vienna persists in her intention of retaining all the territories which it occupies in Italy, it will well deserve a similar reproof. The princes of the House of Savoy, placed between two powerful neighbours, who have their eyes constantly upon their States, have always been obliged to study means for strengthening and aggrandising themselves,

according as their neighbours do so, and as the military system acquired an extent unknown in former days.

"At present the Court of Turin, far from being moved by ambition, would be quite satisfied with the restitution of its old dominions, without any addition, provided the rest of Italy should be divided as it was in 1792. The old division, though bad, was at least not as dangerous to the sovereigns of Piedmont. But when an already formidable power announces the intention of appropriating the best and largest part of Italy, and of extending its dominions to the confines of Piedmont, the Court of Turin cannot be accused of cupidity for any efforts which it may make to obtain an increase of territory and of means proportioned to the danger by which it is threatened. In this case, aggrandisement is not ambition, but a security ; it is a means indispensable to independence.

"Upon the other side, the intentions of Austria cannot be justified by any motive of necessity, and do not in any way relate to her safety and independence. We may go still further, and affirm without hesitation, that the increase of which we speak, although considerable, would serve for no other purpose than to enslave Italy, and to destroy political balance in the middle of Europe without procuring any true and lasting benefits for Austria. This assertion, although it may seem strange, is supported by reason and experience. The natural boundaries, which separate Italy from Germany, are too decided ever to allow these two countries to form one nation. The inhabitants of the Italian provinces, subject to Austria, can no more assimilate with the Germans at the present moment than they could a century ago, when they came into possession of Austria. The consequence of this disunion of interests, sentiments and ideas, makes itself felt both in peace and war. The moderation with which the administration of these provinces must be conducted to avoid exasperating the inhabitants, will diminish the revenue in time of peace, and the want of any public spirit strengthened by interest will render them useless in war. The burden of these provinces must be perhaps the more severely felt as their possession always has been, and always must lead to war—a war from its very nature the most onerous for the government, on account of the inconvenient dispersion of their forces and the excessive expense which military operations entail in isolated territories,

in which no aid is to be hoped for from the people. It has been seen, and especially in late years, that after only a single defeat, the Austrian armies have been obliged to abandon their conquests in Italy.

"More than three hundred years ago, the Courts of Spain, Austria, and France, embraced a false idea, and thought it an honour to have, as they say, a footing in Italy. From that time up to the present, this degraded country has been the theatre of sanguinary wars. We cannot see that the possessions acquired by them at various times have procured for them any additional strength, or rewarded them for the blood and money, which they expended. The campaigns alone which Austria fought for the Duchy of Milan, cost her more than this province is worth. One would say, that in the present day, great States, and Austria especially, are too much aware of their true interests to sacrifice the repose and happiness of their people to old ideas, and that thus they will fulfil the noble office for which they are fitted, that of arranging the peace of Europe on a simple and natural basis, the only one which can guarantee its duration.

"The map subjoined to this shows another division of Northern Italy, drawn according to the design which the Court of Vienna communicated to the Court of Sardinia in 1809, and in accordance with the intentions then manifested by the Allied Powers, of strengthening the part of Italy situated at the foot of the Alps, adding to the States of the King of Sardinia, and *forming a good frontier both upon the French and Austrian sides*. The line followed on this map divides Northern Italy into two equal parts, and is almost entirely traced by the course of four rivers. It departs from the old limits of Lombardo-Venetia, crosses the Lake of Garda, and follows the course of the Mincio, until it falls into the Po near Governolo; whence it ascends the Po to Brescello, where the river Enza falls into the Po; it then follows the course of the Enza to its source in the Apennines. It then proceeds along the crest of the Apennines to the source of the Magra, and follows the course of this river to its mouth in the Mediterranean.

"The advantages of this line as a frontier, are great; it is supported on the north by the Italian Alps, on the south by the Apennines, and a great part of it is protected by the Lake of Garda, by the fortress of Mantua, and by the course of the Po,

so that it is the shortest line which can be traced across Northern Italy by following the natural boundaries. In all the great plain from Turin to the Mincio, there is no natural line of defence, and no fortress of importance, except Mantua.

“Following this plan, we should find in possession of the House of Austria the following States, which never belonged to her by right of treaty. I. The Three Legations. II. The State of Lucca. III. The State of the *Præsidii* and the Duchy of Guastalla.

“The part given to the King of Sardinia, including his ancient States, is nearly the fifth part of all Italy, containing about four million and a half inhabitants, less than a fourth of the entire population of Italy.

“As the fortress of Mantua, according to this plan, is in the part given to the King of Sardinia, it is worthy of notice, that in the Austrian division is that of Legnago, on the Adige, very near to, and almost opposite Mantua, a fortress which in 1797 and in 1802, was considered of great importance from the regularity of its works, which were then thought worthy of being increased and perfected.

“No observations are necessary upon this plan. It was drawn out in accordance with the ideas of the allies, in whose wisdom we placed unbounded confidence. We put forward no pretensions. This memoir has only in view that we may be placed in the same state of balance of power, in which we were in Italy before the French revolution overturned everything. This end cannot be attained, if Austria obtains all the additional territory at which she aims.”—*Letter of Count D'Agliè to Lord Castlereagh.*—*Farini, “Storia D'Italia,”* vol. i. p. 85.

CHAPTER X.

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Murat in 1815—His project of an Italian kingdom—His communication with the Italian patriots—Their assurances to him—He is informed by a special messenger of Napoleon leaving Elba—He assures the Austrian and English ministers of his fidelity to his engagements—Determines to raise the standard of Italian independence—Dissuaded by his queen—The French generals—Convenes his council—His statement and their advice—Acts in opposition to it—His army enters the Papal States—Flight of the Pope—Murat joins the army at Ancona—Attacks the Austrians at Cesena and at Bologna—His proclamation from Rimini—Representation of his ministers at Vienna—Austrian declaration of war—Assault upon St. Ambrogio—Declaration of Lord William Bentinck of English hostility—Murat is informed that both England and Austria had previously determined to recognise him—Retreats from the Po—Pursued by the Austrians—Battle of Macerata or Tolentino—Utter rout of his army—He retreats to Capua—His arrival at Naples—The bay in possession of an English fleet—His interview with the queen—His flight from Naples—Naples surrenders—Treaty of Casa Lanza—Violence of the Neapolitan rabble—Designs of pillage—Firmness of Queen Caroline—She takes shelter on board a British man of war—Her departure from Naples—Return of Ferdinand—His proclamations—His arrival at Baise—His triumphal entry into Naples.

BUT a short time since we left Murat and his queen in the midst of gaiety and splendour, surrounded by a brilliant court, presiding over scenes which bore no augury of ill, and welcoming to their royal hospitality the distinguished visitors of all nations. A few pages more will suffice to trace them both from those joyous halls—from the steps of their splendid throne—the one

to an unhonoured grave, the other to the lonely exile of widowhood and distress.

Wild as was the attempt in which, after Napoleon's return from Elba, the King of Naples lost his crown, we must yet judge of it both by his own character and the circumstances in which he was placed. For the space of three or four years the Italian mind had been strongly excited on the subject of national independence. The feeling was encouraged by the efforts of the allied powers to appeal to the national ardour of the people against what was termed the foreign domination of the French. The advice of Catherine of Russia was remembered, who in the very beginning of the French revolution had said that its principles could only be met by an appeal to the passions of country and of race. The sacred name of patriotism was everywhere invoked by those who sought to stir those feelings of man's nature, which are associated with the spell-like influences of his home, his people, and his native land. The chivalrous ambition of Murat found in these sentiments an object suited to its generous and daring spirit, and years before his fatal proclamation of Rimini there had floated before his eyes the splendid dream of emancipated Italy acknowledging himself as her king.

We have already seen that in the autumn of 1813 communications took place at Milan between Murat and the leaders of the secret societies which were then attempting to organise Italian patriotism in arms. In 1814, when the restoration of Austrian rule in Lombardy so cruelly disappointed the national hopes, these communications were renewed. The King of

Naples was assured that he needed but to raise the standard of Italian independence to rally round him thousands and tens of thousands of volunteers. More specific promises were given: the disbanded army of Italy would re-assemble as if by magic at his call; persons were named who were ready to bring whole regiments to the field. Battalions on paper represented an imposing array of patriot forces that were ready to take the field in their country's cause.

Contrasting these glorious promises with the miserable result, it is not necessary to suppose that the authors of these representations intended to deceive. These are the delusions by which the sanguine calculations of the leaders of popular movements almost always deceive themselves. The enthusiasm that leads men to embark in them is but seldom correct in its calculation of physical strength; men mistake the vehemence of their own conviction for the strong determination of popular will. The very nature of such a movement presents abundant temptations to any but the most cautious temperament to be led astray. Secret organisation does not admit of any test of the expectations that are formed. Promises must be taken for performance, and conjecture substituted for actual experience of facts. Hence it is that in every country, and in every age, men have relied on the *δυνάμεις ἐπιστολιμάναι* of revolt. Pompey is not the only chieftain of a cause who imagined that if he stamped with his foot armed legions would arise, but found in the day of trial that the legions did not come.

These calculations, however, were readily adopted

by the rash and vain-glorious monarch to whom they were presented. He saw in his sanguine imagination thousands of Italians following him to the field upon which a great kingdom was to be won.

While thus believing that he had only to proclaim himself the champion of Italian independence to place himself at the head of an army, he had seen with indignation the attempts made at Vienna to induce the allied powers to evade obligations which he had purchased by the surrender of the dearest feelings of his heart. His proud spirit chafed and fretted under the consciousness that he had turned upon Napoleon, and the mortification of finding himself deserted by those in reliance upon whose faith this sacrifice had been made. The events in France had taken him by surprise. In joining the alliance against Napoleon he had not calculated on the deposition of the emperor, still less had he dreamed of the destruction of the empire. These things, with the sight of France overrun by foreign troops, and despoiled of all for which the blood of her patriot armies had been shed, were spectacles which a marshal of the Empire could scarcely see with complacency. He bitterly reproached his own conduct for having lent himself to such results; and he was sincere in these expressions of vexation and regret, which his sister-in-law, the Princess Eliza, carried from her visit at the court of Naples to Napoleon in Elba. Beyond this it does not appear that there is any foundation for the statement that communications passed between him and Napoleon, or that he was at all privy to the plan of Napoleon's escape. So far from acting in concert with

Napoleon's plans—by making an attack upon Austria, he directly crossed the policy which Napoleon had laid down. We may therefore fairly presume that no previous arrangement had appointed him the part which he was to pursue, and Napoleon was not likely, without an object, to entrust to such dangerous keeping as that of Murat a secret such as that of his intended descent upon France.

When his mind was agitated by these mingled feelings, the intelligence reached him that Napoleon had actually left Elba, on that enterprise in which he staked everything upon regaining the imperial throne of France. It came to him direct from Napoleon.¹

The Count Colonna reached the palace at Naples late in the evening of the 4th of March, with information which he was charged to communicate personally to the king. The king and queen were entertaining a select circle of guests, when a message was brought to Murat that an envoy, with despatches of the utmost importance, desired at once to be admitted to his presence. The king retired to the royal closet to receive him. The queen was presently summoned to join him. Colonna was the bearer of a letter from Napoleon to Caroline, announcing his departure from Elba, and requesting that a vessel might be despatched from Naples to conduct the emperor's mother and sister to France. After a short absence, the king and queen returned, and Murat announced to the assembled courtiers, with evident marks of satisfaction, the intelligence which Napoleon's

¹ Colletta, Book vii. chap. v.—Vaulabelle, "Histoire des Deux Restaurations," vol. ii. p. 184, note.

messenger had just brought. After advising with the queen and his ministers, he sent the next day a special messenger to the courts both of England and Austria, in which he assured them that whatever might be the issue of Napoleon's enterprise, he himself would remain steady to the alliance he had formed.

Scarcely had these letters been dispatched when he wavered in the resolution which had dictated them. He heard of the flight of the Bourbons, and the enthusiastic reception of Napoleon by the army and the people. He foresaw that the armies of the allied powers would be engaged in a gigantic struggle with the efforts which Napoleon would be sure to make. Under such circumstances he fancied Italy an easy conquest ; once master of this he became a power with whom in the conflict of nations, any of the contending parties could only be too happy to treat.

He determined to place himself at the head of Italian nationality, and strike one daring blow for the chieftainship of the nation. In his then state of feeling this course presented to his uncertain and suspicious temper the almost irresistible attraction that he would be equally secure, no matter which party gained the ascendancy in the coming strife.

His ministers, his friends, the French generals, even his queen, Napoleon's sister, dissuaded him from such a course. Murat summoned his council, and then, for the first time, apprised them of the hostile indications in the Congress. By exaggerating these, and by glowing representations of the state of feeling in Italy, he earnestly endeavoured to bring them to an adoption of

his views. He exaggerated the strength of his own army, and the military resources of the kingdom to men as well acquainted with the actual state of facts as himself. He assured his astonished council that he had already opened correspondence with adherents in Northern Italy, whom he named. One had already enlisted twelve regiments, and had provided 12,000 muskets, which would be placed in his hands the very moment the standard of Italian independence was raised ; a second was ready to supply provisions for four regiments ; and a third, whose name he could not yet divulge, had already arranged with the disbanded soldiers of Eugene's former army at once to join the ranks of the Neapolitan troops.²

These statements were founded on reports made to him, by those who imagined that their promises would be realised. But, in his representations to his council, Murat would appear to have exceeded anything which even the most sanguine calculation of his informants justified. He was one of those men not unfrequently to be met with, who even in the greatest emergencies, and the most confidential consultations, are hurried by vain glory or impetuosity of temper, at the impulse of the moment, to mould the facts upon which they rely into such a shape as may best meet the exigencies of deliberation by suiting their vanity or their views. We can hardly impute the guilt of intentional deception to those who make statements, of which the principal object would seem to be that of imposing upon themselves.

² Colletta, Book vii. chap. v.

The council of Murat were not convinced. All they would agree to was a postponement of their deliberations until answers could be received from Austria and England ; and even to this they were only induced to assent by the strong representation of Murat that both these powers had expressed in Congress their determination to deprive him of his crown.

It has been insinuated that in the course he pursued, Murat was influenced by the secret advice and by the representations of men whom Talleyrand employed to seduce him to his ruin. After the landing of Napoleon the French government had other cares to occupy them, and could scarcely be suspected of the madness of endeavouring to add an ally to the cause of the invader. But among the desperate efforts which were made to effect Murat's ruin during the deliberations of the Congress, there is reason to believe that emissaries were employed to seduce him into acts of hostility to the allied powers ; and it is not improbable that some of the representations which were made to him from Northern Italy, were contrivances of Talleyrand to draw him on to an enterprise, the result of which must be his destruction.

In the end, however, his evil counsellors were in his own breast. Nothing could dissuade him from his purpose. Caroline earnestly implored of him to abandon it. His French generals, his French ministers, opposed it as strongly as did his Neapolitan advisers ; but with an obstinacy by which the vacillating appear sometimes to attempt to atone for habitual indecision, he persevered in spite of all advice. Without

re-assembling his council, without waiting for the answer from England or Austria, he issued a proclamation, and ordered his troops to cross the Papal frontier.

In the proceedings which followed it is not easy to acquit him of a duplicity so transparent that he could hardly have expected it to impose upon any one. From Ancona, the king, with the infatuation of those destined to destruction, wrote to his representatives at the Congress desiring them to repeat his protestations of fidelity to his engagements, and to state that in the chances of war he thought it necessary for the protection of his own interests to advance his armies to the Po.³ He appeared to be in a state of mind in which one overwhelming idea possessed his mind. He had set before himself the ambition of the sovereignty of Independent Italy, and in the contemplation of this gorgeous vision he was blind to all other considerations. To this vague and undefined speculation, to be realised he knew not how, he had sacrificed all practical means either of promoting his own interests or of serving any cause. When he sent those assurances from Ancona, we may, perhaps, believe that there was more sober truth than sarcasm in the estimate formed of him by Lord William Bentinck, when, upon another occasion, he said that the only excuse that could be made for his conduct, was the supposition that he did not know upon which side he actually was.

It was, however, impossible for any statements of his ministers, or even for any confusion existing in his own

³ Note of the Neapolitan ministers to the Congress, 8th of April.—*Hansard*, xxxi.—1815. Parliamentary Papers relating to Naples.

mind, to disguise from the world the true nature of his act. He had placed himself in a position of hostility to the allied powers of Europe. He asked the Pope's permission to march his army through his territory, and the request was repeated without eliciting any reply. As soon as the Neapolitan troops actually crossed his frontier, the Pope appointed a regency and retired, accompanied by most of the cardinals, to Florence. The flight of the Pontiff turned strongly against Murat the religious feelings of the people, already beginning to revive. As trifles sometimes influence important events, the dissatisfaction was increased by the near approach of Easter, when the crowds of strangers who had assembled at Rome, as well as the Roman population, were, by the absence of the Pope, disappointed in their high-wrought expectations of witnessing once more the gorgeous Pontifical ceremonials of Passion Week.⁴

Wild as may have been the intentions of Murat in leading his army into the Papal States, that act in itself did not commit him to hostility against his Austrian allies. It was in the month of February that Talleyrand had threatened him with an invasion from France, and that he himself had asked permission to march an army of 80,000 through Italy.⁵ On the 25th of February, the Austrian emperor had delivered his message both to Murat and the French king, declaring his determination not to suffer the collision of hostile forces on Italian soil. It was perfectly possible for the march of his

⁴ Colletta.

⁵ Note of Prince Metternich to Congress, April 10th, 1815.—*Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons*.

force to bear the construction which his ministers put upon it, and to be justified as a measure of precaution in the circumstances in which he was placed. Nay, even the annexation of the Papal provinces to his own dominions, might at least be excused by the provisions of his treaty with Austria.

He very soon deprived himself of these excuses, and by an unmistakeable act of hostility, made war upon Austria. On 30th of March his troops attacked the Austrian forces at Cesena. The Germans were driven, without offering much resistance, from the town. On the evening of that day he issued from Rimini his proclamation to the Italian people, which was against Austria a declaration of war.

“ Italians ! the hour is come in which your high destinies should accomplish themselves.

“ Providence summons you at length to be an independent nation. From the Alps to the Sicilian strait resounds one only cry—‘ The Independence of Italy.’ And by what title do foreign nations claim to wrest from you that independence which is the first right and first possession of every people ? Is it in vain then that nature has raised for your defence the barrier of the Alps ? No, no ; let us chase from the Italian soil all foreign domination. Every nation has a right to expand to its natural boundaries. Seas and inaccessible mountains—such are your boundaries. Eighty thousand Italians of the Neapolitan States march behind their king, and swear never to repose till after the deliverance of Italy. Italians of the other states second this unanimous design ! At length the national energy displays itself in the plenitude of its force.

“ Italians ! let us seek a remedy for so many evils. Form among yourselves an indissoluble union, and when by your valour you will have conquered your independence, let a government of your own choice, a representation truly national, a constitution worthy of the age and of yourselves, assure your liberty and internal prosperity.

“ I appeal to all brave men! Let them follow me to the combat! I appeal equally to all men who have profoundly meditated on the interests of their country, in order that they may prepare the constitution and the laws which henceforward shall govern Italy happy—Italy independent!”

He was soon made bitterly to feel how reckless had been the haste with which he had adopted suspicions, perhaps the treacherous suggestions of his enemies, and acted on the belief that England and Austria were determined to sacrifice him. Scarcely had he taken the fatal step of the Rimini proclamation and the attack on the Austrian lines at Cesena, when his trusted aide-de-camp Colonel Maceroni brought him from London, intelligence which ought to have reached him at a far earlier period. Very soon after the landing of Napoleon, Lord Castlereagh communicated to Tocco, the envoy (who, though not formally acknowledged, represented Murat at London), that a despatch had been sent from the English cabinet to the Duke of Wellington at Vienna, informing him of the resolve of the British government to enter into a new and formal alliance with Murat, and urging on the allies to do the same.⁶

The friends of Murat allege that carelessness, or even treachery, detained the messenger who was the bearer of this communication. It reached him when he had

⁶ *Memoirs of Maceroni*, vol. ii. p. 136—141. Maceroni tells us that a very few days after the issue of the proclamation from Rimini, and the attack upon the Austrians at Cesena, he reached the king, having travelled in all haste from London. He found the king still in ignorance of Lord Castlereagh's communications to his envoy or rather agent in London.

“ My readers,” he says, “ may well judge of the surprise, indignation, and regret with which poor Joachim was suddenly overwhelmed. Seizing his hair with both hands in a convulsive grasp, he lifted up his eyes and stamped his

irretrievably committed himself to that wild and reckless movement, which was destined to cost him both his throne and his life.

The intelligence of the attack upon the Austrian posts, and of the issuing of this proclamation, reached Vienna at the very time when his envoys were endeavouring in elaborate State-papers to prove that the advance of his army was marked by no hostile intentions, and was justified as an act of precaution against the menacing movements of France.⁷ A declaration of war on the part of Austria immediately followed. A paper, in which the ministers of the empire found it easy to justify this step, vindicated the fidelity of Francis to his engagements, and pointed out to Europe the faithlessness of his inconstant ally.⁸ The whole of the Italian army of Austria was ordered at once to march upon Naples; and a treaty was concluded with Ferdi-

feet in agony, exclaiming, 'O Tocco, Tocco, you have ruined me and your country! what a pretty washerwoman's business.' (*Quel miserable commérage*).'

The Italian patriots were not after all mistaken in distrusting the sincerity of Murat in the cause of their country's independence.

The fact of the communication from Lord Castlereagh does not rest on Maceroni's testimony. General Pepe mentions his having heard of it from the Duke of Campo Chiaro.

"It is essential to state in this place, that although the British government desired to unite the Two Sicilies under the Bourbon sceptre, as soon as it became acquainted with the return of Napoleon, the Duke of Campo Chiaro was informed that if Joachim would remain faithful to the allied powers, he would be recognised as King of Naples by England and the other allied sovereigns; and, moreover, that he should have secured to him a territory in the Marches of Ancona of 400,000 inhabitants which had been promised him by Austria. But when the Austrians were attacked at Cesena, all hope of any treaty with the King of Naples was abandoned. This was expressly told me months afterwards by Campo Chiaro."—*Pepe's Memoirs*, vol. ii. chap. ii.

⁷ Letter of Murat's representatives to Metternich, April 8th, 1815.—*Parliamentary Papers, Hansard*, vol. 31.

⁸ Manifesto of Metternich, April 12th, 1815.—*Ibid.*

nand, by which Austria engaged to use all her endeavours to recover for him his Neapolitan dominions.

The policy of the allies was one of conciliation, and the support of Austria to the restoration of Ferdinand was given only on a distinct engagement that he would recognise and respect the acts of the government that had, in fact, been established at Naples. The treaty was signed at Vienna on the 29th of April.⁹

It contained stipulations by which Ferdinand bound himself, in the event of his restoration to the throne of Naples, to grant a complete amnesty of all offences committed against his government—to guarantee the debts contracted during French rule—to respect their sales of national property—to make no distinction in the admission of his subjects to civil employment, to preserve the new nobility—and, finally, to continue their rank and pay in the military service to all officers of the Neapolitan army who would take the oath of allegiance to the restored dynasty.¹⁰

From this hour Murat had staked his all upon the success of his project of Italian independence. He was not long in learning the extent of the delusion by which he had been led astray. He had dallied too long with the sacred cause of Italian patriotism to win confidence for his adoption of it now. The proclamation in which he appealed to Italian nationality bore two signatures, and both were French! It was signed by Murat, and countersigned by his French general Millet. The

⁹ Recueil des traités, page 171.

¹⁰ See (Post 423) the exact repetition of the provisions of this treaty in those of the convention of Casalanza.

cry of the people, like the will of Providence, existed only in his own imagination. Scarcely a volunteer enrolled his name in the books which throughout Italy were opened to record the names of the patriots who were to swell the ranks of Murat and Italian freedom. If the enterprise of Italian independence was practicable in the hands of any, it was not so in those of Murat. "Unstable as water, he could not excel;" his vacillation precluded all faith in the success of any enterprise in which he was left to himself. But no rational calculation could have expected that the Italians could really believe in the cry of their national independence from the lips of one of the generals of the empire, least of all from those of Murat. They had learned by bitter experience the true translation of the revolutionary formula of Italian independence, and Murat had too often deceived his own subjects in his promises of a constitution, to command implicit belief in the assurances which he now held out to Italy at large.

The army which Murat led northward, instead of numbering 80,000 as he represented in his proclamation, certainly never exceeded 34,000. Some accounts represent it as not amounting to more than 25,000. Of this force one division was despatched into Tuscany. The grand-duke left Florence, and the Austrian troops retired at their approach. A panic, however, suddenly seized the advancing Neapolitans. Their general supposed that an overwhelming force was before them, and they returned to meet the king at Bologna, having at least performed the singular exploit of first seizing Tuscany from a hostile army, and submitting themselves

to be driven out of it, without in the entire operation striking a single blow.

The Austrian troops in the Legations retreated to the river Tanaro, where their generals prepared to make their decisive stand. Nearly 60,000 Austrians defended the banks of the Po. An assault upon a fortified position at St. Ambrogio was not without glory to the Neapolitan troops.¹¹ But a few days afterwards, on the 10th of April, the troops of Murat, under the command of General Pepe, were driven back by the Austrians, who now in their turn advanced, and in the city of Bologna the king called a hurried council of war.

The dangers which his recklessness had provoked, had burst upon him from all sides. Lord William Bentinck wrote to him from Turin that his unprovoked attack upon the Austrians at Cesena, had terminated the armistice between him and the English, and that all the force of England would be exerted in support of the Austrian cause. Murat received the intimation with surprise, and complained of it as a breach of faith. He could not understand that an attack upon England's ally released England from the obligation of the armistice ; and, strange to say, the contingency was one for which he was utterly unprepared, although the hostility of England at once exposed his capital to danger. The flower of his own army sent into Tuscany, returned ingloriously from the expedition with no other result than that of teaching him that he could not rely upon his troops. The forces which Austria had concentrated in Italy were more than

¹¹ Memoirs of General Pepe.

double the number of his own. An Austrian division passing through Tuscany, was in full march to the frontiers of his kingdom. On the side of Sicily the English navy and the troops of Ferdinand were making all preparations to invade him. The Italian volunteers, upon whom he had calculated, were not to be found. The Tuscan and Modenese regiments had ranged themselves with enthusiasm under the German banners. The king awoke from his dream of glory and of power to find himself surrounded with the stern realities of disaster and ruin.

Gloomy was the council before which Murat had to lay this dismal statement of his position. One of the generals, who has left his account of these transactions, has recorded his belief that a daring act of adventure might have retrieved the fortunes of the king ; that had he turned on his pursuers, who had incautiously divided their forces, a success would have really summoned Italy to arms.¹² No voice in his council was raised to offer that advice. A retreat to the frontiers of Naples was unanimously resolved on. This retreat was one that had all the disasters without any of the redeeming glories of war. It seemed the evil destiny of the once great monarch that his fall should be unattended by anything that could elevate it into greatness. A series of petty and mean disasters were his ruin. From town to town, and from post to post, he led his dispirited and demoralised army. An Austrian force inferior to his own pursued and harassed his retreating columns. At last, as they approached the confines of the Neapolitan

¹² Memoirs of General Pepe.

kingdom, an engagement which took place between Macerata and Tolentino, on the 4th of May, ended in a total and ignominious rout. After resisting an attack of their pursuers for a day, his battalions broke up during the night, and before the next morning dawn more than one half of the army were irretrievably dispersed.¹³

It were useless to trace through varying accounts the narratives of skirmishes that present no feature of interest, and which exercised no influence upon the general result. It may be forgiven to the patriotism of the Neapolitan generals who have described these scenes, that they attempt to redeem the character of their countrymen, by magnifying every petty resistance of some of the regiments into an act of heroism. It may be conceded to them, without sacrifice of fact, that badly officered, ill disciplined, and dispirited, some of the battalions of the army displayed isolated acts of splendid bravery in this disastrous retreat. The great fact must remain unquestioned. The whole expedition ended in a melancholy and shameful reverse. Destitute of provisions, the soldiers straggled from their camp in search of the plunder, upon which they were compelled to depend for their daily food. Their generals are said to have been incapable, and some of them are accused of having brought wilfully false reports to the king. At Macerata most of the troops broke up into a

¹³ Those who desire to pursue the details of a retreat which it is impossible to invest either with dignity or interest, may consult the narratives of Colletta and Pepe. The latter has found, in an account written by an Austrian eye-witness, the confession that at Macerata "the Neapolitan troops fought with the greatest courage, and became masters of positions exceedingly difficult to be taken."

disorganised rabble, and with difficulty Murat led to Capua a small remnant of an army, that could hardly be said to be defeated, because they were worsted without anything that deserves to be called a fight.

From Capua, on the 12th of May, the king sent to Naples a proclamation, granting a free constitution. To conceal the fact that this was wrung from him only in distress, he resorted to the miserable subterfuge of ante-dating it from Rimini, on the 30th of March; the artifice could have imposed upon no one. The proclamation reached Naples on the 18th of May, when his power was absolutely at an end.

The transparent imposition scarcely added to the contempt with which his proclamation was received; his enemies had been beforehand with him, and Lord William Bentinck dispersed proclamations throughout Naples and Calabria, in which he pointed to the fact that Ferdinand had actually granted three years before a free constitution to Sicily, and contrasted this conduct with that of Joachim, who had denied to his subjects even the modified benefits they were entitled to under the statute of Bayonne.

Misfortunes gathered thick and fast round the declining destinies of the king. From Prince Cariati, whom he had sent as ambassador to Vienna, he learned that the outraged sovereigns had refused to listen to any terms of accommodation; from France he heard that Napoleon, even before he was informed of his reverses, had bitterly censured the recklessness of his conduct; a recklessness, which he did not hesitate to say,

might yet prove the ruin of his cause. The English fleet was in the ports of Sicily, ready to land a large force near Naples, to co-operate with the advancing Germans, and replace Ferdinand on the throne. In his own dominions, popular feeling was against him ; the Bourbonists were in the ascendant, and the Carbonari, exasperated by his long withholding of the constitution, and influenced by the promises of Ferdinand, still more by the actual granting of the Sicilian constitution, had fixed their hopes of Neapolitan liberty upon the restoration of the Bourbon king.

On the evening of the 18th of May, the very day on which his proclamation appeared, Joachim Murat, having travelled from Capua in disguise, entered Naples on foot in plain attire and unattended. Recognised by some few persons in the streets, he was received by them with acclamations which he had hardly reason to expect.

Repairing to the palace he had that which proved his last interview with his queen. "We are betrayed by fortune," he said ; "all is lost." "Not all," replied the queen,—the true woman rising into nobility with the misfortunes of her husband,—"not all, if we preserve our honour and constancy." Murat yielded to the entreaties of his faithful wife, and resolved on leaving Naples and seeking shelter in France.

Captain Campbell, an officer in the British navy, had arrived in Naples a week before with a squadron consisting of his own ship the "Tremendous," the "Alc-mene" frigate, and the "Partridge." He threatened to bombard the town unless the arsenal and ships of war

then lying in the harbour were surrendered to him at once. Caroline, who had been left Regent, was compelled to yield, and through Prince Cariati, by her compliance with these demands, she obtained an engagement that the British squadron should not act against Naples.

She had yielded indeed, not to the strength of the British commander, but to the dissatisfaction growing rapidly in Naples, and to her perfect consciousness that the Neapolitans would not endure a bombardment of their beautiful city in the cause of Murat. When assured by her council that Campbell would certainly never venture to approach the town with the ships which he had with him, and that if he did, his vessels would be sunk by the fire of the double ranges of batteries on the shore ; she replied, that if the danger was a delusion, the panic in the city was a reality, that they could not afford to increase the number of their enemies, that if the British cabinet, by approving of the acts of the British commander ; should really sanction his violation of the armistice—that armistice which, like her husband, she insisted was still in force—they would only cover themselves with disgrace. “The only and sure protection against injustice was history.”

Murat, therefore, found on his arrival, his marine already surrendered to the English, and the flag of Britain floating supreme upon the waters of the bay : within forty-eight hours that flag was destined to be the protection of his noble queen against the savage fury of the rabble that had so often followed him with acclamations through the streets.

A mournful day was passed in the preparations for the final departure of the king. Already indications began to exhibit themselves of the temper of the populace, and it was thought prudent that Murat's departure should be managed so as to be unobserved. Two small vessels were engaged, which were to wait for him at Miniscola, a small village on the bay. His four children were to be sent to the fortress of Gaeta, and the heroic Caroline agreed to remain alone in Naples, with the authority of Regent, to discharge the last duties of sovereignty to the people and to herself.

The Duke di Gallo was commissioned, with General Colletta, to make terms for the surrender of Naples to the invading army. "Give up every thing except my honour, that of the army, and the safety of the people," was the brief direction of the fallen monarch to his ministers. It was settled that Murat should await at Miniscola intelligence of the result of the capitulation.

That day wore heavily away in the palace. When the shades of night closed in, Murat took his last farewell of the queen and his children, whom he was never again to see. As if with some sad presentiment of his fate, his children passionately clung to him, and were with difficulty torn from his arms. The carriage of his aide-de-camp was in waiting ; Murat contrived to drive away in it unobserved. Another carried the terrified and weeping children to the stronghold of Gaeta, and Caroline was left alone.

The Austrian army was already near the city. The

next morning, that of the 20th, the Duke di Gallo and Colletta met its commanders, and surrendered Naples to their victorious arms. Lord Burghersh, the English minister at the court of Tuscany, represented his country upon this occasion, and in the absence of the "commanding officers of the British sea and land forces,"¹⁴ he signed the military convention which accompanied the surrender, and to which the names of Colletta on the part of Naples, and Neipperg on the part of Austria, were attached. The articles were subsequently countersigned by Carrascosa and Bianchi, as generals-in-chief of the Neapolitan and Austrian armies.

The place of meeting was at the villa of a private gentleman named Lanza, near Capua, from which circumstance this convention was known as that of Casa Lanza ; by its provisions, the forts and castles were to be surrendered on the 21st, and Naples itself on the 23rd ; the garrison to march out with all the honours of war, and all foreigners and Neapolitans who applied for them were to be granted passports to leave the kingdom at their pleasure.

The English diplomatist signed only the military convention.¹⁵ The Neapolitan negotiators wrote at the foot of that convention the following as their demands :

1st. The conservation of the national arrangements of the Two Sicilies.

2nd. The maintenance of the public debt.

¹⁴ Ratification of Lord Burghersh ; Convention of Casa Lanza.

¹⁵ Despatches from Lord Burghersh ; London Gazette, January 17th, 1815 ; Annual Register, 1815 ; Appendix to Chronicle, p. 167.

3rd. The maintenance of all dotations and donations made by government since 1806.

4th. The maintenance of the sales of public property.

The Austrian generals adopted a safe course in dealing with these demands. They wrote below them an exact copy of the private treaty of the 29th of April, which the emperor had already induced or compelled the King of Naples to sign ; they are as follows :—

1st. No one shall be pursued or molested on account of his political opinions, or of his conduct prior to the re-establishment of King Ferdinand on the throne of Naples, at whatever time and under whatever circumstances they may take place. In consequence, a complete and entire amnesty shall be granted without any exception or restriction whatever.

2nd. The sales of the national property are irrevocably maintained.

3rd. The public debt shall be guaranteed.

4th. Every Neapolitan is qualified to hold any office, civil or military, in the realm.

5th. The nobility, both ancient and new, shall be preserved.

6th. All persons in the military service of Naples who shall take the oath of allegiance to King Ferdinand, shall be preserved in their rank, their honours, and their pay.

Below these stipulations the Austrian general wrote the significant words—

“ His majesty, the Emperor of Austria, gives to these stipulations his formal guarantee.”

Thus had the Emperor of Austria already secured for the Neapolitans more than their own negotiators now demanded ; the amnesty, the Neapolitan generals, with more pride than prudence, scorned to ask for, because they could not admit that they had done wrong. The guarantee for the army and the newly created nobility, they had not proposed, lest they might seem to stipulate for advantages to themselves.

Every effort was made by Colletta to obtain for Murat a safe conduct into France. This, as might be expected under the circumstances then existing, was refused. It could scarcely be supposed that the Austrians could guarantee the safe arrival at the army of Napoleon of so important a recruit. Bianchi, on the other hand, proposed that the ex-king should be escorted by a guard of honour to Austria, where his future situation would be decided. The Neapolitan envoys declared they had no authority to treat for Murat, and with regard to him the treaty was silent.

In the meantime the rabble of Naples began to make one of their characteristic demonstrations in favour of the Bourbon cause ; the life of Murat was openly threatened, but the prudence of the queen had placed him far from their violence. The palace in which Caroline remained was guarded by detachments of the Guard of Safety, who were obliged to remain incessantly under arms to protect the queen from the insults, and more than insults of the mob.

A display of heroism, by which she saved Naples from pillage, was the last act of her residence in the palace, which for seven years she had occupied as queen.

When the news of the surrender reached Naples, the Lazzaroni determined, before the entry of the Austrian army, to have a demonstration of their own ; under the pretence of rejoicing, they organised a systematic plan of violence and plunder. The pretended regard of the mob for the English did not prevent them from marking out for special pillage the houses of the English merchants and bankers, whose presumed wealth attracted the special regard of their friends. The firmness of Caroline saved Naples from the intended pillage ; sending for the chiefs of the National Guard, she spoke to them with a spirit and eloquence worthy of the wife of Murat and the sister of Napoleon ; she implored them not to permit the last day of the reign of Murat to be disgraced by the intended plunder. Animated by her voice and manner the National Guard unanimously turned out in arms—the mob, although strengthened by some fugitives from Capua, and the prisoners whom they had released from their dungeons, were held in check. On the 20th the fleet of Lord Exmouth had fortunately cast anchor in the bay ; five hundred marines from that fleet were sent into Naples at the request of the queen,¹⁶ to protect especially the menaced wealth of the English merchants, and finally, a detachment of an equal number of Austrian troops were invited, in anticipation of the day fixed for their entry, to aid in maintaining order.

Thus by the wise and prompt measures of the high-spirited Caroline, Naples was preserved from one of those riotous scenes of sack and plunder, from which

¹⁶ Despatch of Lord Burghersh, May 23.

its legitimate sovereigns have not always thought it necessary to protect the beautiful city. Disappointed in their hopes of a royalist demonstration, the angry Lazzaroni turned their attention to the ex-queen. Even under the protection of the troops, her life was not safe, and she sought refuge on board the English ship "Tremendous," to the side of which she was pursued by the infuriated Lazzaroni, who were only thwarted in their intention of personal violence by the cool gallantry of Captain Campbell and his sailors and marines. They endeavoured at once to manifest their own character and the intensity of their hatred by shocking her ears with the words of songs the most ribald and obscene.¹⁷

On the 22nd the main body of the Austrian army entered Naples, headed by Prince Leopold, who, on the 5th of May, had returned from Vienna, when the recognition of his father as King of Naples was finally arranged. Two days of rejoicing followed. The vessels in the harbour were dressed in the day with their gayest flags, at night with lanterns from the rigging. From a vessel bearing those emblems of joy, Madame Murat, no longer Queen Caroline, was a witness of the illumination with which the people of Naples celebrated the return of the Bourbons, and the downfall of her own and her husband's throne.

In her secret heart she sustained herself by the belief, which the sister of Napoleon still retained, in the victorious destiny of her imperial brother; to the few friends who visited her she complained that

¹⁷ Colletta—Lady Morgan's "Italy."

Colletta and Carrascosa had not at Casa Lanza complied with the commands of the ex-king, who had charged them to stipulate for some provision for his family; but added, that it was not of so much consequence, as in a few months, when Napoleon had driven the Austrians out of Italy, she would revisit Naples as its queen.¹⁸

It was in the confidence of realization of these vain dreams that she insisted on being taken to the coast of France. At the period of the capitulation she had asked for herself a passage to France, and it is said that Captain Campbell was actually preparing to send her to Antibes. Her mother, her sister the Princess Paulina, and her uncle Cardinal Fesch, who had been her guests, had already left Naples with the intention of proceeding to that country. Lord Exmouth peremptorily interposed and insisted on her sailing for Trieste.

On the 24th the "Tremendous" left the port of Naples for Gaeta—a fortress still in the possession of the adherents of the French. The British ship approached its walls upon a peaceful errand. It brought Caroline to receive her children from the protectors to whom she had sent them. Receiving them on board, the "Tremendous" stood back towards Naples. Soon afterwards it conveyed Caroline and her children to Trieste, where the Austrian emperor had offered her an asylum. She assumed the title of the Countess Lipona—Lipona the anagram of the city of which she had been queen.

¹⁸ Pepe's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. chap. 4.

On her way from Naples, the vessel which conveyed her met the squadron which was bringing Ferdinand in triumph to the Italian shore. The commander waited on her in her cabin to prepare her for the salute which would be fired in honour of the king, and begged that she would not be alarmed at the sound of the cannon. "The noise of cannon," she replied, "can never be strange or displeasing to the ears of a Buonaparte."¹⁹

All fittings of royal personages are not marked by the same chivalry which induced the Sardinian monarch when he fled from his capital to leave in his palace all the royal property.²⁰ Ferdinand had not hesitated to despoil the Neapolitan palace of its choicest stores,²¹ and the Countess of Lipona when she left it, brought with her many movable articles of value which it contained. A large number of packages were consigned to the care of the English naval authorities, under an engagement that they should be brought with herself. When she finally left Naples they were left behind on the strange plea that there was not room for them on board. They were subsequently seized by the Neapolitan government on the allegation that they were royal property. Caroline in vain appealed to the British government, to the care of whose officers she had confided them, and who she alleged were bound to return them to her safe. The King of Naples and even the King of Spain laid claim to some of the jewels, as belonging to their respective crowns. The Countess of Lipona insisted that they should be given up to her

¹⁹ Colletta.

²⁰ Vol. i. p. 259.

²¹ Vol. i. p. 322.

under the agreement which stipulated for the preservation of her personal effects. The value of the property left behind was estimated at nearly two millions of francs, and it seems unquestionable that the largest portion of it at least consisted of purchases made by Murat and his queen. None of it ever was restored, and the friends of the ex-queen exhausted every effort, without success, to obtain any compensation from the government either of Naples or of England.²²

While Caroline, still fixing her faith on the coming triumph of Napoleon, was passing over the waters of the Adriatic to the place of her exile, the dynasty of the Bourbons was resuming its authority in Naples amid displays of popular rejoicing, so general, that it appeared that the city contained none but partisans of their cause. On his entrance into Naples, Prince Leopold had published a proclamation from Ferdinand, assuring the people of the fulfilment of all that had been promised by the Austrian generals at Casa Lanza in his name. His manner was even more calculated to give confidence. He received the Muratist generals with marked politeness and favour, and took care to speak of Caroline Murat as a queen. Praising the bravery the army had shown in the short campaign against the Austrians, he invited Pepe to furnish him with materials for a short

²² Ferdinand had but little of generosity in his nature, or he might have surrendered the packages in consideration of the improvements made by Murat in his palaces. Under the direction of Queen Caroline they had been splendidly furnished and decorated. When the King visited them on his return, he could not conceal his delight at appropriating the results of Murat's expenditure and Caroline's taste. "Joachim is an excellent upholsterer," he cried, in vulgar triumph, while his admiring courtiers applauded the joke.—"His next tenancy will make them perfect," was the retort of the Duke of Calabria, whom his father's coarseness often wounded.

memoir, which he proposed to have circulated in London for the purpose of vindicating the military character of the nation.²³

Immediately on learning the flight of Murat, Ferdinand issued from Palermo the necessary orders for the conduct of the government. Informed that the people of Naples were disappointed by a proclamation which contained no distinct promise of a free constitution, such as had been already established in Sicily, he preceded his return by a second, issued just as he was leaving the Sicilian shores, in which he assured the Neapolitans that a free constitution should be theirs.²⁴ "The people," he said, "will be the sovereign, the monarch will only be the instrument of executing those laws which shall

²³ Pepe's Memoirs.

²⁴ Two proclamations were issued by the king; the first was dated May 1st, from Palermo.

"At length I re-ascend the throne of Naples. Everything concurs to make my return happy. Your unanimous wish recalls me. The general wish of the great powers does justice to my rights" . . .

"I return to the bosom of my dear family. I bring to it consolation and peace. I come to restore its ancient serenity, and to efface the recollection of all evils. . . .

"Neapolitans, come and throw yourselves into my arms. I was born among you. I know, I appreciate your habits, your character, and your manners. I desire only to give you the most striking proof of my paternal love, and to make the new period of my government the most fortunate epoch of the well-being and happiness of our common country. . . .

"I promise you that I will not preserve the least recollection of all the faults committed by any person without any exception . . . an impenetrable and eternal veil shall cover all past actions and opinions.

"With this view, I promise in the most solemn manner, and on my sacred word, the most complete, most extensive and general amnesty, and an eternal oblivion.

"I promise to preserve to all individuals, Neapolitan and Sicilian, who serve in the armies by land or sea, all the pay, rank, and military honours which they now enjoy.

"May God, the witness of the rectitude and sincerity of my intentions, deign to bless them with success."—*Annual Register*, p. 378.

The omission from this proclamation of all allusion to a constitution created

be decreed by a constitution the most energetic and desirable."

Landing at Baiae on the 4th, the king proceeded to the country palace of Portici, where he continued for several days, having invited all the generals of the army, including those of Murat, to meet him.

On the 17th he made his public entry into the capital, from which he had been absent for nine years. He was accompanied from Portici by Lord Burghersh. Immense crowds thronged the road all the way from Portici to Naples, and enthusiastically welcomed the returning monarch. He entered Naples, riding at the head of his own troops, together with the Austrian and the British. Shouts of loyalty greeted him in all the streets through which he passed. When he arrived at the palace the troops defiled before him, and the king was met at the entrance by the assembled nobility of the kingdom, who crowded round their

a little dissatisfaction in Naples. At the period of Ferdinand's landing another was issued, dated Palermo, May 20:—

"The cause of Murat is at an end. It was as shameful as it was unjust. Henceforward a new scene will be unfolded before your eyes. Peoples of Samnium, of Lucania, of Magna Graecia, and of Apulia, prepare to vindicate your rights. A stranger has destroyed them.

" Italians ! will you stain your hands with the blood of Italians ?

" A Prince is advancing to save you. His victorious eagles will only bring to your land peace, repose, and wealth—all that is the property of a citizen will be respected as a sacred thing.

" You also, docile children of the Sebeto ! meet him with the standard of peace—come to receive your father, your liberator, who is already beneath your walls. He has no aspirations but for your good—to secure to you a durable felicity. He will labour to make you an object of envy to all Europe—a government stable, wise, and religious is assured to you. The people will be the true sovereign, and the prince only the depository of the laws which will flow from the most energetic and best of constitutions."—*Gualterio, Documents*, p. 81.

sovereign with their homage and their congratulations, and conducted him in triumph through the portals of his kingly home.²⁵

This rejoicing of all classes was sincere. Men believed the proclamation that promised a constitution; and the amnesty was an established fact. Weary with civil dissensions, and tired of the hollow promises and real oppression of the revolution, every lover of his country turned with hope to a government under which it was believed that all Neapolitans might at last unite. Sixteen intervening years had dimmed the memory of the scenes that had followed his last recall. Many of those who witnessed them had passed away, and a new generation had grown to manhood to take their place. Those who remembered them remembered also that they had been the doing of the queen, and with the warm and hopeful feelings of the sunny south, they saw in the king whose return they welcomed, a sovereign who, freed from the control which had virtually governed the state, and taught by the lessons of adversity, would really consult the happiness and freedom of his people.

Thus in the sixty-fifth year of his age, after twenty years of the alarms and vicissitudes of the revolutionary period, was Ferdinand recalled to that dominion of which, fifty-seven years before, his father, Charles of Bourbon, had placed the sceptre in his boyish hand. What strange reflections would have crossed his mind, if on the day of that return he had thrown back his

²⁵ Despatches of Sir William A'Court, and Lord Burghersh; London Gazette, July 5th, 1815; Annual Register, p. 182.

memory across the intervening years to the day when, a little child, he stood in the centre of the assembled nobles, and bent to receive a father's blessing, with the solemn admonition, "to love his subjects, be faithful to his religion, to do justice, and love mercy," while that father placed in his hand the sword, the gift of Louis XIV., with which Charles himself had been sent to win the Sicilian crown. With what singular emotions must he have thought of those years in which he issued his royal edicts against the receipt within his dominions of Papal bulls, and when the chief struggle for the independence of his crown was the resistance to the *Chinea*, that annual tribute exacted by the Pope, of the white horse, richly caparisoned, and bearing a bag containing seven thousand ducats of gold.

The throne of Naples had been long since disposed of at Vienna. The madness of Murat left his cause without hope, and his friends without excuse. Alexander, were he disposed, had no one to propose against "the butcher king," and the treaty of the 9th of June formally recognised Ferdinand as king of the Two Sicilies. The title may have been a mere inaccuracy; if so, it was one in which consequences unfortunate for the cause of liberty were involved.

On one solitary spot was found a general still hardy enough to adhere to the fallen cause. Nothing could induce General Begani, who commanded the citadel of Gaeta, to give way. He surrendered only on the 8th of August, when Lord Exmouth sent him the intelligence of Napoleon's giving himself up to the

“Bellerophon.”²⁶ His bravery was respected in the terms of an honourable capitulation. He had maintained the cause of the fallen dynasty to the last ; and many days after Napoleon was a prisoner on board the English ship of war, the tricolor was still floating upon the turrets of the castle of Saint Orlando,—the only fortress in Europe from which it waved.

²⁶ Despatch of Lord Exmouth, August 9th, 1815.

CHAPTER XI.

Last days of Murat—His escape to Ischia, and thence to France—State of the south of France—Murat offers his services to Napoleon—The reply—Finds shelter in Toulon—Abortive attempt to escape—The Marquis de Rivière—Wanderings and sufferings of Murat—He escapes in an open boat—His landing in Corsica—His reception—Colonel Maceroni arrives with a protection from the Emperor of Austria—Murat rejects it—His descent upon Naples—Vessels dispersed by a storm—He is driven into the bay of St. Euphemio—Landing at Pizzo—His reception—Trentacapelli—Violence of the people—His seizure—He is imprisoned in the castle—General Nunziante—Order for Murat's trial—Military commission—His last hours—His last shrift—His execution—His burial—Alleged desecration of his remains—His hard fate—His family.

MURAT waited in a secure retreat to be apprised of the result of the negotiations with which he had charged his ministers.

On the evening of the 20th of May, the day of the treaty of Casa Lanza, attended only by a few faithful followers, he passed over in an open boat to the island of Ischia, where, after a day's delay, he embarked in a small vessel, which landed him at Fréjus on the 28th.

Intending to proceed direct to Paris, he found an unexpected obstacle to his progress in the state of that part of the south of France through which his road lay direct to the capital. A Bourbonist rising had already placed it in a state of civil war. Murat contented him-

self with writing to Fouché, offering his services to Napoleon. The letters could only have reached Paris just as the latter was setting out for Waterloo on the 7th of June. Afraid of the effect which the presence of Murat might produce upon the army, which was indignant at his conduct of the year before, the emperor desired Fouché to reply to the letter by advising Murat to remain at least for the present where he was.¹

Returning to a village near Toulon, he waited there until he received intelligence of the battle of Waterloo. His first exclamation was characteristic : "Had I led the cavalry the battle would have been won."² A vain-glorious opinion, which received, however, the confirmation of Napoleon's calmer judgment at St. Helena.³

¹ The story that has been told of Napoleon's sending a reply, "What treaty have I concluded with the king of Naples since the wars of 1814?" is inconsistent with many facts about which no question can exist. Napoleon had before this written to Murat apprising him of his leaving Elba—his father and sister had obtained an asylum, as requested, at Naples. If Napoleon used the expressions, they were not intended as the answer to Murat's offer, nor were they in fact communicated as such.

Sir Walter Scott observes, that the advice of Fouché, that he should wait in obscurity until the remembrance of his desertion had passed away, was very like that which enjoined the dishonoured ambassadors of David to tarry at Jericho until their beards were grown.

² In Corsica Murat repeated the same opinion—"How must the Emperor regret having refused me the command of the cavalry; two or three, perhaps one only, of the British squares broken, and the battle was surely ours. I could have broken their squares. I never charged one yet which I did not break—even the Russian squares—and no troops can stand more like posts of wood than the Russians. It is absurd to think that any line of men on foot, were their feet spiked to the soil, can avoid being knocked head over heels by a body of horses coming in contact with them at a real determined and unchecked gallop."—*Macron's Memoirs*.

³ At St. Helena Buonaparte attributed his rejection of Murat's services to the apprehension of the feeling his presence would excite in the French army. "I did not think I could carry him through, and yet he might have gained

The news of the battle of Waterloo was followed in the south of France by an outburst of royalist fury on the part of the populace, in which the most hideous excesses of violence wreaked the vengeance of an infuriated rabble upon all who were suspected of being partisans of the fallen dynasty. It will be remembered that on his passage through this district to Elba, Buonaparte was obliged to shelter himself from popular fury in the disguise of an Austrian officer. Bands of infuriated royalists now traversed the country, plundering the effects, burning the châteaux, and murdering the families of the imperialists. The French troops were obliged to retire from Marseilles, and the city at once became the scene of the most atrocious acts of violence and bloodshed. That nothing might be wanting to complete the horrors of these crimes, religious fury added its terrible fanaticism to the less guilty passions of political hatred, and a war of extermination against Protestants, who were supposed to be the friends of freedom of opinion, completed this rather singular demonstration in the cause of order and the king.⁴

A considerable French force still occupied Toulon, and refused for some time to submit to the authority of the Bourbons. Marshal Brune, upon being compelled to retire from Marseilles, led the garrison to augment that of Toulon, and within the walls of that city, and under the protection of his old comrades, Murat for some

us the victory, for there were moments in the battle of Waterloo, when to have forced two or three of the English squares might have gained it, and Murat was just the man for the work."—*O'Meara*, vol. ii. p. 95.

⁴ Alison's *History of Europe*, vol. xvii.

time at least, found shelter from the violence that made the surrounding district unsafe.

A British fleet, under Lord Exmouth, had taken up its position in the bay. Sir Hudson Lowe landed with a large body of troops to attack the city by land. Negotiations were commenced for capitulation. They were finally concluded on the 24th of July; although, for some unexplained reason, the actual surrender did not take place until the 1st of August. There is some slight cause for suspecting that Brune had, under one pretence or other, contrived the delay to enable him to provide for the safety of "the second soldier of France."

On the 13th of July, Murat from the citadel of Toulon, sent one of his aides-de-camp to Lord Exmouth, to solicit from the British admiral protection and a safe conduct to England. Lord Exmouth offered him protection on board the English fleet, but refused to give any pledge as to his ultimate destination until he had received orders from home. The king declined an asylum, the acceptance of which involved an unconditional surrender of himself as a prisoner to the English.⁵ Even before he left Toulon, it became manifest that he could not continue in its vicinity, while all hopes

⁵ The above account is taken from the despatches of Lord Exmouth and Sir Hudson Lowe. On the 18th Lord Exmouth writes:—

"On the 18th Marshal Murat, who is at Toulon, sent his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-General Rosetti, to propose his being received on board one of His Majesty's ships for protection and safe conveyance to England. In reply, I charged this officer to inform Marshal Murat, that if he chose to go on board one of the ships off Toulon to receive personal protection, it would be afforded; but that I could not enter into any engagement with him as to his destination, leaving that part to be settled by reference to England. I have this day heard that Murat finding, on the return of his officer, that he would not be received on board the British ship on the terms he proposed, has left

of passing across the interior to Paris in safety were at an end. From Toulon Murat had addressed letters to Louis XVIII., and to Fouché, still the minister to the restored Bourbons, as he had been of the “hundred days,” in which he requested that a safe conduct might be sent to him to proceed to Paris. He had written also to his aide-de-camp, Colonel Maceroni, who was in Paris, explaining to him his situation, and begging of him to appeal to the representatives of the allied powers to procure him an asylum. His friends at first thought of his remaining in the neighbourhood of Toulon in concealment, until an answer could be received. It did not need the intelligence of the murder of Marshal Brune to convince them of the danger of adhering to this plan.⁶

It was resolved that he should charter a vessel, and

Toulon, taking an eastern direction to Piedmont.”—*Despatch of Lord Exmouth July 18th, 1815.*

“The garrison of Toulon consisted of six regiments of the Line, a regiment of Marines, a detachment of three hundred cavalry, artillery veterans, and a battalion of half-pay officers and federalists, called, ‘Le Battalion Sacré,’ most of whom, with Marshal Murat and some of his adherents, were suffered to quit Toulon, and absconded, it is not known where, on the eve of the resolution being taken to hoist the white flag.”—*Sir Hudson Lowe, July 24th, 1815.*

“The non-performance of the stipulation as to the removal of Marshal Brune and the disaffected regiments, has occasioned a correspondence between General Sir Hudson Lowe, myself, and the Marquis de Rivière, which has this morning happily terminated by Brune delivering himself into the hands of the Marquis, to be sent with his aide-de-camp to Paris.”—*Despatch of Lord Exmouth, August 1st, 1815.—Annual Register, 1815.*

“Marshal Brune had been commander of the imperial troops in the south of France. On the 1st of August he had, as we have seen, “delivered himself up into the hands of the Marquis de Rivière, to be sent accompanied by his aide-de-camp to Paris.”

His friends earnestly entreated him to make the journey by sea to Havre; relying however on the protection of the Royalists to whom he had surrendered, he set out on the journey by land.

The very next day at Avignon he was recognised by that rabble whom

perform by sea the journey from Marseilles to Havre, from whence he might reach Paris in safety by land. Two faithful friends who had followed his fortunes in his exile, the Duke de Roccromana and his nephew Bonafoux, hired a small vessel for the voyage, and on an early day in August, all the effects of Murat were placed on board.

The Marquis de Rivi  re, under a commission from Louis XVIII., then represented the royal authority in the south of France. In 1804 this nobleman had been implicated in the royalist conspiracy against the government of the first consul. He had been convicted, and was included in the sentences which condemned Georges and others of his accomplices, to death. Napoleon had resisted Murat's strong entreaties for their pardon.⁷ The prisoner's wife obtained access to Caroline Murat, and, moved by her distress, that noble-minded woman flung herself on her knees before her brother, and refused to rise until she was authorised to carry back to the marchioness the message that her husband was pardoned.⁸

De Rivi  re is charged with being royalist enough to even the direct rule of the Pontiffs had failed to civilise, and barbarously murdered in the streets.

The official Gazette announced that he had committed suicide.

This inhuman murder was but a mild instance of the atrocities committed by the Royalist mob throughout the province. At Marseilles the wholesale massacres at last provoked the interference of the British fleet. At Nimes the unoffending Protestants were the victims of the most horrible outrages. On the remonstrance of the Duke of Wellington, the Duke D'Anjou at last interfered. For these hideous crimes, continued with impunity for weeks, not one single individual was ever brought to justice. All the prosecutions that were instituted ended in acquittals.

⁷ Alison's History, vol. vi. p. 365.

⁸ Maceroni's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 218.

forget even this obligation, in the duty of hunting down one whom the Bourbons desired to exterminate.⁹ It was considered prudent by the friends of Murat that he should embark secretly, and under cover of the night. The little vessel was brought near to the appointed spot on the beach, and her boat moved stealthily to the strand. By some accident the place of meeting was mistaken ; and while his friends were waiting impatiently on one part of the beach, Murat, at the distance of less than a mile, was peering anxiously along the edge of the white foam to discern any object that might tell him the promised means of escape were near. All night long he paced along the place which he imagined to be the rendezvous. His friends in the boat were, with equal impatience, waiting in the little creek into which they had put. Both parties were afraid to give any indication of their presence by a sound. Scarcely had the grey dawn of the morning appeared, when

⁹ Although de Rivière is charged with this by most writers who record these events—an incident is recorded by his chief accuser Maceroni, which may bear a very different construction.

"He addressed a letter to King Joachim, which he charged M. Joliclerc, special commissioner of police at Toulon, to deliver. In this letter he invited the king, in the most friendly and flattering terms, to put an end to the wretched life he was leading, and to confide in the good faith of his Majesty the King of France, as well as in the British admiral Lord Exmouth, who joined him in this invitation to surrender."

Maceroni calls this "a treacherous artifice" to discover his retreat, because on Murat's refusal to surrender, De Rivière ordered Joliclerc to seize him, as he knew his retreat. It is quite plain that when De Rivière sent the letter, he knew that Murat could be easily found. It is equally plain that the advice of the letter was the very best and wisest that could have been offered, and that when it was refused, the very best thing that could have happened to Murat would have been his arrest. Neither De Rivière, nor any one else, had the power of controlling the passions, or preventing the atrocities of the Royalists.

they were startled by the figures of royalist patrols. Murat fled to the wood-crowned hills that rose from the water's edge. The crew of the boat pulled rapidly from the beach, and returned to communicate to those on board the vessel their failure.

While they were still deliberating on the course they should pursue, their movements had been observed from the shore. A galley with custom-house officers put off, and under pretence of a search by them, the little vessel was stopped. The officers were accompanied by a large and armed party of the royalist volunteers; they searched for Murat on board, and vehemently uttered the most violent threats of vengeance against him.¹⁰

Disappointed in their expectation of finding their leader, they compelled the vessel instantly to put to sea, and the unhappy ex-king from the cliffs on which he stood, had the misery of seeing her white sails gradually lost in the horizon, his friends, as he supposed, deliberately abandoning him to his fate.

For three long weeks at least was the ex-king hunted among the woods, the vineyards, and the ravines, that fringe the shore to the eastward of Toulon. A reward of one thousand pounds was offered for his arrest, and although the French government had no pretence for instructing the police to capture one who had committed no offence against their laws, the royalist volunteers were indefatigable in their search. To stimulate the zeal of his pursuers, the report was industriously spread of

¹⁰ Maceroni states that the leader of this party was De Rivière himself. It must be remembered that this may have shown as much anxiety for his safety as for his seizure. The presence of De Rivière might have been very essential for this purpose had the king been apprehended.

the immense value of the jewels which he carried about his person, a report which had at least foundation in the fact of the precious stones adorning the sabres which constituted his only wealth. The life of the ex-king was that of an outlaw; without a home, and without even change of dress, he hid himself at one time for three whole days in the woods and vineyards with no other sustenance than that which their fruits and berries offered, and with no shelter but the covering of their boughs. Driven at last by hunger, he ventured to approach a solitary habitation, built high on the steep of the hill, and begged for bread. It was the dwelling of a retired officer of Napoleon's army, who recognised from his portraits the features of the Marshal. He generously gave him shelter; and for several days the fugitive remained in comparative safety, faithfully guarded by his host and an aged female who was the single domestic in his house.

Hence it was that the fallen monarch addressed to Fouché a letter dated the 22nd of August, “*Du fond de ma tenebreuse rétraite.*” This wretched and blotted scrawl was scarcely legible, either from the agitation in which it was written, or from his tears—detailing the misfortune of the departure of the vessel in which he was about to embark for Havre, it recited the miseries he was enduring to escape the dagger of the assassins who were hunting his life, and finally informed the minister that he was on the point of starting for Corsica in an open boat.

By some means his retreat was suspected. In the darkness of the night a party of royalist volunteers

approached the cottage of his protector. His escape was a narrow and an almost miraculous one. By mere accident his host was standing at the door of his cottage at a late hour of the night. His eye was attracted by the occasional gleaming through the trees of a light which was moving along the steep and narrow path which led to this retired abode. It was the flash from the lanthorn which the royalist party had not taken the precaution effectually to conceal. The indistinct sound of footsteps, evidently those of men stealthily approaching, was caught by his ear. There was time enough for Murat to be roused from his sleep, and to escape by the back door before the party reached the front. In the few minutes which intervened all traces of a third inmate in the little household were removed. The party minutely searched the house ; their investigations on the outside were not so careful ; in the garden some of them passed within a few paces of the spot in which, under some fallen vine branches, Murat lay concealed. The light of the lanthorn actually fell upon his face as they threw it round the garden : its bearers stood close enough for him to hear their angry imprecations upon the false information by which they had been deceived.

The hospitable though humble roof of the kind soldier could be his shelter no more ; but means had already been provided for his escape. Still keeping up a stealthy communication with his protectors, for one night and one day more he hid himself in the woods—the next evening placed him beyond the reach of his pursuers.

Among the few who had unavoidably become privy to his retreat, were two gentlemen residing in the neighbourhood, who had served in the French navy. Pitying his misfortunes, these generous men resolved to make an effort to save their country from the disgrace of the assassination of the soldier who had identified his name with her glory. They brought an open boat to the beach under the cliffs upon which stood the cottage which had been his shelter. Murat cautiously descended through the wood. He carried loaded pistols in an attitude of watchfulness, which he did not relax as he sullenly took his seat in the stern of the boat. He refused, as they pushed off, to taste the refreshments they had brought. "Are we then suspected," cried one of the brothers, "we, who are perilling our lives to save you?" Touched by the voice of sincerity, Murat laid down his pistols, and, embracing his preservers, burst into tears.¹¹

The little bark glided unnoticed from the shore, and as the hills of France receded from his view, the fugitive breathed more freely on the open waters of the sea. Their perils, however, were not yet past. Indications of a coming gale reminded them that their position in an open boat, upon the wide expanse of the Mediterranean, was not a safe one. They hailed a passing vessel, which proved to be bound to Toulon, and offered the master a large sum of money to carry them to Corsica. Supposing them to be pirates, the master turned his helm to run

¹¹ For this act, which violated no law, these gentlemen, together with another who assisted them, were subjected to a long imprisonment, and, if the account of Maceroni is to be depended on, were reduced to ruin by the persecution they endured.

them down, and while the skill of their steersman contrived to disappoint his charitable intention, their little boat did not escape without damage in the collision. With angry menaces on both sides, the vessels parted over the waves, and, as the gale began to blow heavily, the frail and now injured bark that bore the fortunes of Murat, would almost certainly have foundered, if they had not been taken up by the packet-boat plying from Marseilles to Bastia. The astonishment of the passengers was great when, in the unshaven and haggard man who stepped in almost tattered garments on their deck, they discovered the once proud marshal and king. The passengers principally consisted of persons flying, like himself, from the royalist atrocities which made the south of France unsafe, and receiving, even in his uncouth attire, the respect due to a king, Murat reached in safety the Corsican shores.

At the time at which the letter of the 22nd of August reached Paris, the asylum which Murat had asked for had been already arranged. His letters had been unanswered because it was believed that he had carried out his original intention, and his arrival at Havre was daily expected. On the receipt of his last letter, his friend, Colonel Maceroni, was despatched by Prince Metternich to the king, conveying to him the assurance of protection in the Austrian dominions, which the prince had previously signed.

In Corsica, the commander of the French garrison at Bastia, made an attempt to arrest Murat, who had retired to Vescovato, to the residence of an officer who had been on his staff. Unfortunately for the ex-king

the mayor of Vescovato, insisting that he had violated no law of France, determined to defend him. Even the adherents of the Bourbons joined with the Buonapartist in readiness to resist what they considered a violation of the rights of hospitality, and in a very few days Murat received, from all parts of the island, tenders of homage and proffers of support. A volunteer guard was formed round him, strong enough to make any attempt to seize him, with the force at the disposal of the French commander, hopeless. The islanders, proud perhaps like most persons in the seclusion of remote localities, of the advent of an illustrious visitor, paid to their guest all the honours due to royalty. The only exception found was in the relatives of his queen. The families connected with Buonaparte refused to join in any mark of respect to the man, to whose ungrateful treachery they attributed the downfall of their chief.

Unhappily for Murat, these exhibitions of sympathy and attachment addressed a fatal argument to the ruling weakness of his heart. "If," he said, "strangers thus gather round me, what would not my own subjects do?" Upon no better calculation than this, he determined to risk all in a descent on Naples, to which probably, a chief temptation was, that it was imitating that of Napoleon on France.

Two hundred and fifty followers agreed to share the destinies of the daring chieftain. Six small vessels were freighted for the expedition, and on the 28th of September everything was ready for the fatal start. On that very day, Maceroni, who had travelled post-haste from Paris, reached Ajaccio. Seeking at once an interview

with the king, he announced himself as the bearer of good news, and with joyful countenance and expressions of gladness placed in his master's hands, in the handwriting of Metternich, the safe conduct which, a few days before, he had so passionately implored.

“ His Majesty the Emperor of Austria will grant an asylum to King Joachim on the following conditions :—

“ 1st. That the king will assume a private name, and the queen having taken that of Lipona, the same is proposed to the king.

“ 2nd. That the king should reside in one of the cities of Bohemia, Moravia, or Upper Austria, or in the country, if he should prefer it, but in one of these provinces.

“ 3rd. That he shall pledge his word of honour not to quit the Austrian dominions without the express permission of the emperor; and to live as a private individual, subject to the laws of the Austrian monarchy.

“ By command of his imperial Majesty,

“ PRINCE METTERNICH.

“ PARIS, September 1st, 1815.”

It was too late. “ A prison then is to be my asylum,” he replied; “ they left me for a month to fall a victim to the daggers of the royalist assassins; they shall not make me their slave. I am still a king! Kings are not deposed by being defeated in arms, I have never abdicated, and I never will. I will strike for my kingdom—I can only die. It is too late. I have compromised three hundred brave islanders who are already on board these ships—I will not leave them to be the victims of Bourbon vengeance.” Strange mixture of vanity, of weakness, and of chivalry, which haunted him to the last. His vanity at least found some consolation in writing a formal reply refusing the proffered protection,

dated the 28th of September, addressed to M. Maceroni, envoy of the allied powers to King Joachim.

The very same night the little expedition bore Murat and his fortunes on the broad expanse of the Mediterranean sea.

For six days the flotilla held with favourable weather its southern course. It was intended that they should have landed at Salerno, a seaport some miles south of Naples, where in all probability they would have met with support enough to have made at least a formidable insurrection. Fate decreed otherwise. After they had passed Naples, a storm dispersed the vessels, and one of them, containing Joachim, was driven into the bay of St. Euphemia, not far from the Straits of Messina. With only twenty-eight of his followers, the king, on the 8th of October, landed at Pizzo, a small town on the shores of that gulf. Of all spots in the Neapolitan dominions, it was the one in which local circumstances most contributed to make the populace the partisans of the restored dynasty. It was one in which the unfortunate Joachim was doomed to encounter the malignity of private hate. Not far from the field of Maida—whose name the valour of British soldiers has identified with their own undying glory—Pizzo was in the centre of the districts where brigands had espoused the cause of the Bourbons, and where their excesses had been, by Joachim himself, with such fearful severity suppressed.¹²

It was Sunday, and the militia were exercising in the square, when Joachim dressed in a magnificent uniform, and covered with decorations and crosses,

¹² *Ante*, vol. i. p. 377.

leaped boldly from the boat which carried him to the beach. "Long live King Joachim!" cried some of his followers, but the cry elicited a very feeble response from some of the fishermen who stood listlessly on the beach. An unknown friend stepped forward from the crowd, and in a few private words with Joachim, warned him that certain destruction would follow his progress into the town; that he might find adherents in Monteleone, the capital of the district, which was about six miles off. He would only meet enemies in Pizzo.

Then it was that the Nemesis of the horrible atrocities which, in this very district, had stained with blood the reign of Joachim, appeared almost visibly to avenge those sanguinary deeds. The winds of heaven had driven the fugitive to the very shore, near which unoffending peasants had been shot down for the crime of carrying bread to the fields in which they pursued their daily toil—near which the domestic hearth of the cottage had been stained with the blood of women who had given shelter to their sister's new-born babe. Not far from the spot where he landed, fathers had been dragged at a moment's notice to an ignominious death for supplying bread to the wants of famishing and outlawed sons. The leader of the band that seized him, pursued him in revenge for kinsmen murdered under these enactments. The crowd that rushed like furies upon the captive monarch, were women whose sons, or brothers, or husbands, had perished in the inhuman proscription of Manhes, and the very law that was used as a pretext for his military execution

was one of his own edicts, under which the home of many an humble peasant had been left desolate—many a child made an orphan—and many a wife a widow. Upon the lonely strand of Pizzo, in his last struggle for life, Murat was met by the recollections of those inhuman laws by which in the days of his kingly pride he had consigned so many victims to a cruel death.¹³

The aspect of the people, no less than the friendly warning of the unknown, convinced the party of Murat how little sympathy they might expect at Pizzo.

The little band struck into the fields, intending to take a near way to Monteleone. The truth of the stranger's report was soon fatally proved. Trentacapelli, who was in command of the militia, had often performed brigand services for the Bourbons in the descents upon the Calabrian coasts. His two brothers had been executed under the severe laws of Joachim for the same crime. He quickly appeared in pursuit of Murat, accompanied by some of the militia and the authorities of the town. An immense mob collected upon the road, while others ran along the hills to reach the path to Monteleone to intercept the progress of the king. Some musket bullets already whistled round the heads of the little party. As his enemies succeeded in getting in advance, Joachim fled over the cliffs to the shore. The yells of his ferocious pursuers rang nearer

¹³ "It is said that a woman, who conceived herself aggrieved in the loss of one of her sons, executed as a bandit (probably not undeservedly) through his orders some years before, tore off one of the whiskers from his cheek in a fit of revenge upon the presumed author of her misfortune,"—*Honourable Keppel Craven's Tour through the Southern Provinces of Naples*, p. 324, chap. xviii.

and nearer in his ears as, with his followers, he ran and tumbled down the steep sides of the ravine, and scrambled over the rough rocks which guarded the shore. As he neared that shore he saw with consternation that the treacherous sailors were already setting the vessel out to sea ; they did so in order to seize the valuables left on board. Joachim, with some of the party, rushed to a boat which was lying stranded on the beach. All their efforts could not drag it to the water's edge. Trentacapelli was the first of the pursuers to come up. "Do you not know me, your king ?" cried Joachim, as the brigand seized him by the throat. "My king," replied the other, "is he whose colours wave on that castle," as he pointed to the flag of the Bourbons, that proudly waved from its keep. The party was soon overpowered, many of them were wounded. The king himself did not escape without loss of blood, and amid the jeers and execrations of the rabble—with difficulty rescued from their violence—while the decorations with which he was covered were forcibly torn from his person—Murat, with his friends, was flung into the dungeons which formed a portion of the old castle of Pizzo.

The local authorities instantly sent a despatch to Monteleone, to General Nunziante, the military commander of the district. A troop of horse was sent at once, under the command of Captain Stratti, to guard the illustrious captive, and General Nunziante himself soon followed with a larger force.

Both officers treated the unfortunate monarch with respect. He was brought from the dungeon to apart-

ments in the château portion of the castle, and by invitation of the king, the officers dined at his table, where they observed towards him the etiquette of royalty, and addressed him by the title, which no generous nature ever yet refused even to fallen royalty in distress.

When the intelligence of the capture reached Naples, opinions were divided in the councils of the king. Some of the ministers advised leniency : others said to the king, "If you let Murat live for twenty-four hours, send at once to Palermo to bespeak lodgings for yourself and us all." Ferdinand determined on visiting the attempt of his rival with death. A pretext was found in a law introduced by Joachim himself, for the repression of the brigand invasions of Calabria, which the Sicilian court had encouraged in the early years of his reign.¹⁴ Under this law, a military commission was at once despatched to Pizzo, not to try, but to condemn. The decree, signed by the king himself, expressly desired that, even for the purposes of religious consolation, but half an hour should elapse between the sentence and the execution.¹⁵

The apprehensions of the government would almost seem to be justified, if we give credit to the apocryphal,

¹⁴ The law was recited in the sentence of the court-martial, which by virtue of its provisions, condemned him to death as a public enemy.—*Colletta*, book viii. chap. i. (English Translation), vol. ii. p. 272.

¹⁵ "Ferdinand, by the grace of God, King of the Two Sicilies, we have decreed, and do decree, as follows :

"1st. General Murat shall be brought before a military commission, the members of which shall be named by our minister-of-war.

"2nd. Not more than half-an-hour shall be allowed to the condemned for religious consolation.

(Signed)

"Ferdinand."

or at least doubtful, stories which are told us by his friends, of hundreds of the peasants assembling to rescue him, but being deterred from their purpose by the cannon which were pointed at them from the ramparts of the castle. Within the walls of that castle no voice of friendly aid could reach the royal captive. He would not seem, indeed, to have anticipated the tragedy that was to follow. Once only he thought of escape. When he saw from the window the English flag flying from a gun-brig in the bay, he asked to be put on board the British vessel, on the ground that he had been placed by Metternich's letter under the protection of the allied powers. Three times he had refused the shelter of that flag. Twice at Toulon he had declined the offer. At Corsica again the commander of a British vessel had summoned him to surrender himself a prisoner to England. It was now too late. No banner of freedom was ever to wave over the head of the ill-fated monarch.

The fatal missive reached Pizzo late at night. The officers who were named as the military commission arrived at the same time, and the directions of the royal decree left no doubt of the errand on which they were sent. General Murat was to be "brought before them." The superfluous allusion to a trial was spared. The royal mandate went straight to the point. "Not more than half-an-hour shall be allowed to the condemned."

The victim of that mandate was calmly sleeping when it was placed in the hands of Nunziante. That very evening, his royal prisoner had astonished the general

by the statement, that the dispute between himself and Ferdinand might be settled by yielding to him Naples, while he was ready to confirm to Ferdinand the Sicilian crown. With such waking dreams he had retired to repose. The length and tranquillity of his slumbers appeared to denote that the visions of his sleep were as little burdened with images of terror and alarm.

On the morrow, the sun (the last that Murat ever was to see) had well nigh reached the meridian, while still Murat slept. His judges—if those appointed by such a mandate could be called so—were already assembled at the castle, and though no orders for a firing party had yet been given, the uneasy movements of the soldiers showed that they expected something more than usual to mark the hours of that day. The general, refusing to disturb his last repose, waited the awakening of his prisoner, and then respectfully informed him of the orders that had arrived. Murat at once understood their meaning. “I am gone,” he replied; “the order for my trial is the order for my death.” His eyes filled with tears, but he dashed them away, and asking permission to write to his family, he wrote to his queen that noble letter which, in the touching simplicity of its pathos, is almost sublime.

“**MY DEAR CAROLINE**,—My last hour has struck, within a few moments I shall have ceased to live, and you will have lost your husband. Do not forget me. I die innocent. My life has never been stained by an act of injustice. Adieu, my Achilles, my Letitia, my Lucien, and my Louise. Show yourselves worthy of me; I leave you without a kingdom, without wealth, in the midst of enemies. Be united and rise above misfortune. Look on yourselves as you are, not as you might be, and God will bless

your humility. Do not curse my memory. Know that my greatest misery is, in the last hour of my life, to be far from my children. Receive your father's blessing, receive my embraces and my tears. May the memory of your unhappy father be ever with you.

“ JOACHIM.

“ *Pizzo, 18th October, 1815.*”

Taking up a pair of scissors, he cut a small portion of hair from the luxuriant locks of which in happier times he had been proud. Folding it in the packet with his letter, he charged the general that it should be conveyed to his wife, and, giving way for a few minutes, he placed his head upon his knees and found relief in sobs, as in a few agonised moments he thought of all his recklessness had lost.

The agony was past, and he resumed the firmness of the hero, and the dignity of the marshal of a hundred fights—in that moment one higher than that of king. The laws of Naples awarded him an officer named by the government to defend him; he sternly refused to permit any defence. “ You cannot save me,” he cried, “ do not lower my last moments by an unavailing effort.” Before the court-martial, composed entirely of officers, men indebted to him for favours, he denied their jurisdiction. “ Private individuals,” he said haughtily, “ cannot be the judges of kings; if I am tried as a peer of France, the peers of France must be my tribunal; if as a marshal of the empire, then marshals must be my peers; before you can try me,” he added, and he glanced haughtily at his judges, “ many pages must be torn from the history of France.”

While the commission was sitting in another apart-

ment, Murat, after writing to his wife, waited calmly the coming of the priest. Fragments of his conversation in this interval have been preserved. "If Ferdinand and I could change places, I would not treat him thus. Why does he persecute me to death? Is it to avenge the tragedy of the Duke D'Enghien by another? I swear before that God in whose presence I shall soon be, that in that tragedy I had no part."

Asking to be left alone for a few moments he soon was ready to receive the visit of the priest.

Upon his last visit to Pizzo, in the pomp of his kingly power, he had made a magnificent donation to the church.

Masdea, the priest who had then knelt to him in acknowledgment of his gift, presented himself now to administer the last solemn rites of the church. Of what passed in that interview, nothing is known but the scroll which recorded the acknowledgment, written at Masdea's request, "I declare that I die a Christian."

The hurried shrift was over, and the president of the court-martial entered with his colleagues to read to him the sentence of the court. Reciting the law under which he was arraigned, and the unquestioned acts by which he had violated it, it condemned him to death; while, probably to meet the protest of Joachim against their jurisdiction over kings, it recorded almost insultingly that "Joachim Murat had, by the fortune of arms, returned to the private life to which he was born." He heard the sentence unmoved. His only request was that he might be permitted to take a last leave of his companions in misfortune. It was refused.

Cordially thanking Nunziante and Stratti, whose hands he warmly pressed, he walked with a steady step to a door which led out on a narrow terrace behind the castle. The twelve soldiers who were to execute the sentence were already there. He looked steadily at the muskets, refusing to permit his eyes to be bound. "Spare my face, comrades," he said with unfaltering voice. "Aim straight at my heart." In his hand he held the portrait of his wife and children, and as he gave the signal to fire, he turned on it his last look. The sharp ring of the musketry was instantly followed by his fall.

"Too near, too deadly aimed to err,"

the twelve bullets pierced his heart, and all that remained of the bold and chivalrous monarch was a bleeding and quivering corpse. So narrow was the space allotted to this tragedy, that he fell against the door of the apartment in which his companions were confined.

General Nunziante gave to that corpse a decent burial. He was interred in the very church which his munificence had so largely contributed to build, and his requiem was sung by the same priest to whom he had confided his last confession. No military honours were paid to his remains, but the general and officers attended the interment, and his coffin was carried by soldiers to the grave.

Let us hope for the honour of human nature it is not true that a few days afterwards that tomb was opened by the agents of the government, his head severed from his body, and sent in spirits to the palace at

Naples. Strong rumours were afloat among the people that Murat was still alive. It was said that the officers of the court-martial, all soldiers of his own army, had combined by a private execution to save him from death. These rumours disquieted the court, the infamous Canosa was sent down with instructions, if he found Murat still alive, to make sure at all hazards that the execution should take place. He insisted on opening the coffin to satisfy himself of the identity of the corpse. To set at rest the anxiety of his employers, he obtained and sent to them the ghastly evidence of the reality of the death of their dreaded foe.¹⁶

If credit is to be given to contemporaneous accounts, a desecration still more horrible awaited his remains. They tell us that after the body had lain several weeks in the grave, the mob of Pizzo, actuated by passions that can scarcely be called human, burst into the church, in the vaults of which he lay ; that the coffin was dragged from the vault, the decomposing body torn from the

¹⁶ Pepe in his *Memoirs* states the fact of the decapitation of the body, without the slightest intimation of doubt. The story was unquestionably at one time generally believed. It was made the subject of a newspaper romance by Alexander Dumas, and the extravagant representation of Ferdinand's keeping the dismal relic in his closet to the latest years of his life, threw discredit on the whole statement, and abundant reasons were found for disbelieving the narrative which was so horribly caricatured.

Nevertheless, the story as told in the text derives some probability from the fact, that the Neapolitan court were unquestionably disquieted by rumours that Murat had only suffered a sham death—that a dead body had been substituted for the living criminal, and that the ex-king was still alive. It is certain that in consequence of these generally circulated rumours, Canosa was sent down with instructions to ensure an execution in which there should be no mistake. Neither the character of Canosa, nor that of the court, make it improbable that he should have adopted the mode suggested of setting at rest the anxieties of his employers—and after all, it would have been nothing worse than has been done in all ages, both before and since Herodias asked for the head of her enemy in a charger.

broken coffin, and burned in the street :¹⁷ while the Syndic, who attempted to dissuade the people from this barbarous sacrilege, was denounced as a Muratist, and his life sacrificed to the fury of the rabble. The character of the country lends some probability to this hideous account : there is no country that teaches us so many lessons, proving that the evil passions of the human heart may be as fiercely excited in favour of the principles of despotism as for those of popular freedom, and that crimes as hideous as ever disgraced the advocates of democracy have been committed in support of constituted authority by the partisans of kings.

¹⁷ The Annual Register of 1815 contains the following extract of a letter from Naples, Dec. 5 :—

“A scene ensued last week at Pizzo, in Calabria, which would disgrace the most uncivilised hordes of barbarous savages. The inhabitants of Pizzo, the place where Murat was tried and shot, influenced by the demoniac spirit of revenge, or some evil propensity, determined to dig again from the grave the mutilated remains of their former king, for the purpose of burning them. The Syndic of the town, very properly, unwilling to sanction the passions of the mob, stimulated in so disgraceful a manner, expostulated with them, and endeavoured to dissuade them from so barbarous an act. Exasperated at even an attempt to dissuade them from an act which only the genius of evil could have suggested, they murdered the unfortunate Syndic, and dragging the body of Murat from the silent grave, they committed it to the flames with that of the ill-fated Syndic.”—*Annual Register, 1815, Chronicle*, p. 100.

Strange to say, this story, like that of the decapitation, at first receiving credit, was afterwards disbelieved. It is alluded to by Lord Byron in the lines—

“ And thou too of the snow-white plume,
Whose realm refused thee e'en a tomb.”—

Ode from the French.

The note to this passage—possibly one from the pen of Mr. Hobhouse—tells us that the general rumour was, that “Murat’s remains had been torn from the grave and burned.”

Local enquiries give no information, and probably the traveller, in spite of these two ghastly tales, will be content to believe, with the Guide-books, that the slab in the aisle of the church marks the spot where the remains of Murat still repose.

It did not need this last proof of their loyalty to entitle the people of Pizzo to the honours which royal gratitude hastened to confer upon them. The town was graciously permitted the privilege of being called a royal and most faithful town ; the honour was accompanied by a more substantial reward of a perpetual exemption from taxes ; and a collar of gold, with a medal, was presented to the municipality to be worn for ever by their chief magistrate, in memorial of the signal service that Pizzo had rendered to the king.

In strict legal right there is no doubt that Ferdinand was justified in visiting the unsuccessful attempt of his rival with death. Any man who makes within the territories of a state a demonstration hostile to its government must take the consequences of his act. If he is not protected by some authority recognised by international jurisprudence, he is just as amenable as any of its subjects to the laws of the country whose tranquillity he disturbs. But independent of the circumstances which attended his trial, the military execution of Murat was a straining of the principles which give to a government the right of exercising the last prerogative of sovereignty over a fallen foe. In the contest for a throne the limits are not always very accurately defined which separate enterprises protected by the laws of war from attempts which subject those who make them to the penal laws of the nation they invade. Had Murat defended Naples against the troops of Ferdinand, and been made prisoner, such an execution would have been a murder. If Ferdinand at any time during his retreat in Sicily had landed at Pizzo,

and been left deserted by his followers a prisoner in the hands of Murat's troops, the civilised world would have visited with one unanimous burst of execration the attempt on the part of the King of Naples to treat him as amenable to the brigand code. There was justice, after all, in the protest of Murat, when he said that he had been King of Naples, that he had never resigned his right, and that he was justified in recovering it by arms if he could. If instead of embarking for France he had retired into Calabria with his ministers and the remnant of his army, he might have defended himself in that very Castle of Pizzo to the last. "How is my position altered," he asked, "if I took Toulon or Corsica on the way?" The only answer was, that five months of undisturbed possession had given Ferdinand the rights of the *de facto* king. It is one of the cases in which right is might. But Ferdinand would have lost nothing in the estimation of mankind if he had spared the foe whom fortune placed in his power, and forborne to add another and the most illustrious name to the long list of victims whose deaths had already marked with so deep a dye of blood the annals of his reign.

No passion, it has been often remarked, is so cruel as fear. Ferdinand in his royal palace still trembled at the name of Murat in his dungeon. All his better feelings gave way before the argument that was dexterously addressed to his mean and selfish nature. "If Murat lives, engage lodgings in Palermo." The fortune of war condemned the bravest and most chivalrous of the heroes of the Revolution to die by the

command of the meanest and most cowardly of the Bourbon kings.

It is impossible to read the story of Pizzo without remembering the still darker one of Vincennes. The old castle, the narrow fosse, the forced trial and the hurried execution, seem almost the repetition of the very scenes of the tragedy in which the descendant of the Condés was sacrificed to the alarms of Napoleon. Even though it be true that the share of Murat in the transactions relating to the Duke D'Enghien was but a ministerial one, no wonder that so many have seen in his fate the arm of retribution for that foul murder almost visibly extended. In his dying hour it rose to his conscience, forced on his thoughts by all the circumstances around him. Almost his last breath was spent in a solemn denial that he was guilty of participation in that crime.¹⁸

To the mind susceptible of such impressions, these

¹⁸ At the time of the execution of the Duc D'Enghien, Murat was governor of Paris, and as such it was his duty to nominate the members of the court-martial who were appointed to try the unhappy prince.

"It was a consolation to Murat," writes Lamartine, "in this supreme hour, that he did not recognise a retribution of Providence in the proceeding of Ferdinand, and that he had protested against the assassination of the son of the Condés, unfortunate as himself and more innocent."—*History of the Restoration of the Monarchy*, vol. iii. p. 199.

Of Murat's share in that transaction the same writer elsewhere gives the following account.

"This was the period when Buonaparte, in pursuance of his Machiavellian views, which made him believe in the necessity of useful crimes, caused to be seized in a neutral territory, tried and sacrificed in one night, the young and innocent son of the Condés. Murat lent neither heart nor hand to this tragedy; his post as governor of Paris, and his family connection with Buonaparte, however, made people believe at the time that he had imbrued his hands in that innocent blood; but this was a calumny of ignorance. Having learned from rumours at the palace, and from Madame Buonaparte, that something sinister was plotting against a prince of the Bourbon family, he availed him-

associations are not needed to suggest in the story of Murat's downfall the faith or superstition which has often in all ages and countries connected great calamities with the presence of some unseen and fatal influence attending the steps of the man on whom they fall. The imagination that would yield itself to such beliefs might easily find in the incidents that beset the path of the King of Naples from the throne to the

self of the voice and influence of his young wife to dissuade Buonaparte from every measure which was not required by prudence and the safety of his government. He appealed to glory as well as pity. He was not initiated in any of the circumstances which preceded the attempt. His functions as governor of Paris required that he should designate the members of the court-martial, and he did so at the orders of the minister of war, without choice of their rank, and amongst the commanding officers of corps in the garrison of Paris. He might have looked for an acquittal, and he hoped without any doubt for a commutation of the sentence in the event of condemnation. He was either sick or affected to be so, during these fatal days, the better to keep his hand out of this snare; and he confined himself to sending at ten o'clock in the evening of the day of judgment his aide-de-camp, and Colonel Ravier of the 18th Regiment, to Vincennes, to furnish him with a report of the proceedings of the court-martial, as soon as it should be over. The aide-de-camp and the colonel were entirely ignorant, as all Paris was, of the arrival of the Duke D'Enghien in that fortress, and of the object of the court-martial which they were ordered to attend. They mutually questioned each other on the road, without the power of communicating their conjectures to each other. They were not the bearers of any letter, or of a single word from the governor of Paris to the judges or the superior officers of the castle. Their mission was simply to know what was passing, and to report it to their general. These two officers only learned for the first time in the court-yard of Vincennes the name of the prisoner; they were present at the judgment, and at the precipitate murder which made it more odious and more ferocious. They departed in dismay before daylight for Paris. Major Brunel (since a general officer), a young man of twenty, with a pure heart and a sensitive soul, entered the bed-chamber of Murat, and recounted what he had seen to him and his wife, who both uttered exclamations of surprise and horror in listening to it. They knew of the trial, but they evidently did not anticipate the execution, and both mingled their tears with those of the aide-de-camp. It is not thus that an accomplice receives the announcement of a crime. Murat was more than innocent of it; he was broken-hearted at it for his own part, and overwhelmed with shame for the glory of his brother-in-law."—*Lamartine's History of the Restoration, Bohn's Translation, vol. ii. p. 286-7.*

grave, the proofs of a power that was irresistibly urging him to his ruin. The fortune that bore him to so strange an elevation appeared as strangely to desert him. In January of the year 1814, his throne seemed secure, almost beyond the reach of fortune or of chance. The question then was, not how he was to retain his kingdom, but by what possibility he could contrive to lose it. No great misfortune marred, no signal catastrophe destroyed his prosperity. He fell in a series of petty mistakes, in which, if he displayed miserable imprudence, he met with still more miserable ill-luck. Innumerable accidents conspired with his own imprudences against him. The events of his fall might be described as a series of hair-breadth escapes from safety. Misfortunes which proved his ruin would have been avoided by the most common prudence, or their consequences averted by the most ordinary good fortune. Every incident was timed exactly at the moment when it most effectually contributed to his destruction. The letter which would have saved him on one day was sure not to reach him till the next. The intelligence that would have been harmless to-morrow was certain to come with fatal expedition to-day. The Sicilian proclamation excited his suspicions and stayed his movements just as he was about to enter on a decisive course of action. The fall of Napoleon itself occurred at the very time when it was fatal to his fortune. Had the intelligence reached Italy but three days later, Murat would have rendered services to the cause of the allies which would have made it impossible to have withheld from him his reward. Incidents which at the

time of their occurrence appeared trivial, exercised the most important influence on his fate, as if an invisible destiny were weaving round him those slender threads which singly the weakest hand could have brushed away, but which were yet together sufficient to bind the strong man to his fate.

Fallen from his throne—that evil destiny still seemed to track the steps of the unhappy monarch ; and in each turn of his fortune, to close up every avenue except the one that led him to his doom. If he could have passed through France to Paris—if he had been taken by the English, or had agreed to accept their protection at Toulon—if he had not missed the place of meeting on the shore—if the vessel that rescued him from the waves had borne him anywhere but to Corsica—had the safe conduct of Metternich found him still in his hiding-place in France—had there been an English force at Ajaccio strong enough to prevent his leaving the island—had any one of these, and many other contingencies, not happened precisely as it did, Murat, whatever might have been his fortune, would have escaped his miserable end. It seems scarcely the language of metaphor to say that everywhere his evil genius tracked his movements—inexorably pointing to that old Castle of Pizzo, and with unerring certainty directing the steps of the fugitive to that fatal strand.

It may not perhaps be said that these were anything more than the common coincidences of life—or that we see aught beyond the ordinary consequences of his own imprudence in the misfortunes which accumulated round

the path of the bewildered king. Yet the belief is an old one which represents this very imprudence as a portion of the agencies which accomplish the decrees of fate. The mind, in spite of itself, recalls the memory of the *Arv* of the ancients, that mysterious power which impersonated alike the avenging retribution that followed on the steps of crime, the evil destiny which sometimes marked the guiltless as the objects of its wrath, and the infatuation which brought upon men the ruin for which they were designed.

But the tragedy of Pizzo was more than the fall of an individual. Nothing could more emphatically mark how entirely the French ascendancy and the influence of the Revolution had passed away. On the shores of Calabria a few peasants repelled the descent of the chieftain, whose name had once carried terror and excited admiration throughout Europe. In an inglorious scuffle with women and rabble, the hero of many a far-famed battle was dragged captive to a village gaol. Within the realm of Naples a company of soldiers was sufficient to guard the platform upon which the man who, but a few months before was the sovereign of that realm, met his death. A tribunal of no greater dignity than that which would have tried the meanest bandit, pronounced sentence on the king ; and Murat was shot as a brigand, with no more of pomp and circumstance, and with less of popular excitement, than attended many a brigand's death. His was the only blood that was shed throughout Italy consequent on the restoration of her banished princes. But the one victim was great enough to represent the dynasty of the

Revolution ; and in the grave in which he was laid was buried the last of the ascendancy of the French.

It was not the first time in the history of Naples that an unsuccessful attempt of a claimant for the throne had been thus mercilessly punished. The fate of Murat recalls the memory of a still more cruel tragedy in which the brave and chivalrous Conradi¹⁹ had been sacrificed to the jealous fears of a tyrant who was told like Ferdinand, that while his rival lived his throne never could be secure.²⁰ Very near 550 years had passed since the October in which the descendant of a long line of princes had been dragged to his ignominious doom. It was on that same coast of Calabria that, flying for his life, he had been hunted down. Like Murat, he had made a descent upon the Neapolitan territory to assert his right to a throne which had been awarded to another by the Congress which thus assumed the power of disposing of kingdoms,²¹ but the title to which he never had resigned. Like Murat, he failed. He came, indeed, to assert the title of his fathers ; and he struck, on the hard contested battle-field, a blow for his father's crown ; but in all else, except in the youth and the illustrious descent of the victim, the record of cruelty is the same. A packed tribunal, a pre-arranged sentence, and a hurried execution, were the instruments of royal safety, or of royal vengeance, in 1278 as well

¹⁹ *Ante*, vol. i. p. 167.

²⁰ "Vita Conradi mors Caroli—Mors Conradi vita Caroli."—Sismondi, vol. ii. p. 463. Such was the advice given to Charles of Anjou : to Ferdinand, "If you spare Murat, take lodgings at Palermo."

²¹ See the Proceedings of the Council of Lyons, *ante*, vol. i. p. 159 ; Milman's "Latin Christianity," vol. iv.

as in 1815. The proceedings by which Ferdinand rid himself of the rivalry of Murat seem a mere repetition of those by which Charles of Anjou extinguished in his blood the claims of the last heir of Hohenstauffen.

The very same day upon which Murat died, the ship that was carrying Napoleon to his destination, came in sight of St. Helena ; and almost about the same hour when he fell behind the Castle of Pizzo, his companion-in-arms was looking, for the first time, upon the heights of the island in which he was to find a prison and a grave.

The wife and children of the unhappy monarch had found a retreat near Vienna in a home which the generosity of the Austrian emperor had procured for them. Everywhere Caroline was met by new announcements of the ruin that had fallen upon her house. Scarcely had she arrived at Trieste, when the news of Waterloo dispelled all her cherished visions of Napoleon's triumph. A heavier blow fell upon her in the sentence that condemned him to imprisonment in a far off island, and separated her for ever from a brother to whom she was deeply and tenderly attached. But at Vienna still more crushing anguish awaited her. Of her husband's movements she was in entire ignorance. Of his very existence she had heard nothing since the hour of their parting in the palace of Naples. Assurances had been given her that she might soon expect him to join her, and she was cheering herself with this hope, when in the columns of a newspaper she was first apprised of his fate. Her only consolation was in receiving soon after the letter of his dying hour. Nunziante

faithfully fulfilled the commission with which he had been entrusted by the king.

Her widowhood was not exempt from the anxieties which attend on straitened means. Her repeated applications on the subject of her property, both to the French and English government, were in vain. From England she claimed compensation for the effects she had left at Naples under the care of British officers ; from France the restoration of property to which she was entitled in a private right. For more than twenty years she resided, in summer at Vienna, and in winter at Trieste. If the report be true of her private marriage with General Macdonald, who accompanied her in her exile, this did not interfere with her devotion to her children. Of those children her two sons went to the United States to pursue the profession of advocates in that country. In late years they have returned to France. Her daughters made Italy their home. One married the Marquis Pepoli, the representative of the family who once were lords of Bologna ; the other became the Countess Rosponi. Caroline herself at last succeeded in obtaining an act of tardy justice from the government of France—a pension of 100,000 francs was voted to her by the Chambers on the recommendation of the government of Louis Philippe. She enjoyed it but a short time. In the year 1839 she died at Rome, a victim to that frightful disease which was hereditary in her family, and which in St. Helena had brought her imperial brother to the grave.²²

²² Biographie Universelle.

CHAPTER XII.

Close of the Congress—Secret Treaty of January 3rd, between France, England, and Austria—Return of Napoleon—Final division of Italy—Extinction of the Three Republics—Lucca—Its History—San Marino—Its origin and history—Monaco—Parma—Modena—Ascendancy of Austria—Her Dominions before the Revolution—Acquisition of Milan and Mantua—Seizure of Venice—Great Acquisition of Territory by Austria in 1815—Compactness of her territories—Her Military Position—The Quadrilateral—Secret Treaties with Naples and Tuscany—Destruction of Sicilian Rights—Proposal to revive the German Empire—Refusal of Austria—Restoration of the Papal States—Proposal to assign the Legations to the King of Saxony—Parts of Ferrara given to Austria—Right to garrison Ferrara—Protest of Consalvi—Protest of Spain against Disposal of Tuscany and Parma—Effect of Arrangements of Congress of Vienna—Destruction of Italian equilibrium—Complete ascendancy of Austria.

LONG before the mournful tragedy which the last chapter has recorded, the Congress of Vienna had closed the deliberations which appeared to have been disturbed by the return of Napoleon from Elba, but which, in reality, that event had brought to an amicable termination.

On the 3rd of January, 1815, the differences that divided the Congress had become so serious, that a treaty had been secretly drawn up between England, Austria, and France, by which these powers engaged with each other to resist by force of arms the demands which were made by Russia and Prussia. Metternich,

Talleyrand, and Castlereagh were the confederates in this strange conspiracy within the Congress. The contract was to be kept a profound secret from the allies, whom they met day after day in what was supposed to be friendly negotiation. So secretly was the treaty arranged that they dare not hazard the observation which would have been caused by a meeting of the representatives of these powers. It was actually signed in the bedroom of Lord Castlereagh. A ball in his palace assembled all the brilliant circle of Vienna. The ministers of France and Austria watched the opportunity of stealing unobserved from the saloons : they were followed by their host, and in secrecy and haste they all affixed their signature to the document which bound their respective nations to the terrible alternative of war ; and before any one had time to observe their absence, the three great diplomatists returned stealthily and separately to the gay company that crowded the saloons.¹

On the 5th of March another gay assemblage in Vienna was startled by the intelligence that Napoleon had left Elba. The news of his landing at Fréjus soon followed. Each day brought more alarming accounts of his progress. The desertion of battalion after battalion, and general after general, of the French army was reported to the amazed diplomatists ; before many days it was known that the Bourbon monarch had fled from Paris, and that Napoleon was once more in the Tuilleries.

Before this overwhelming danger all discord in

¹ Stapleton's Life of Canning, chap. xxii. p. 353.

the councils of the Congress ceased. On the 13th of March the declaration of the allied sovereigns declared Napoleon the public enemy of Europe ; and the armies which had been kept waiting the signal to advance in hostile array against each other, were marched against the man whom all Europe conspired to crush. The differences that had been so formidable were speedily adjusted, and on the 9th of June, 1815, the general treaty of Vienna was signed.

By the arrangements adopted or sanctioned by that treaty, Italy was divided into ten principalities or states. One of these was constituted only for a temporary purpose. The Duchy of Lucca, on the death of the Empress Maria Louisa, was to cease to exist as a separate principality.

These ten states were :—

1st. The Italian provinces of the kingdom of Sardinia, including the island from which the royal title was derived, and the territories of the extinguished republic of Genoa.

2nd. The Lombardo-Venetian kingdom of the Austrian emperor.

3rd. The Duchy of Parma, allotted during her life to the ex-empress Maria Louisa.

4th. The Duchy of Lucca, founded as a temporary indemnity for the Bourbon prince, who was the heir of the Duchy of Parma.

5th. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany.

6th. The Duchy of Modena.

7th. The States of the Church.

8th. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

9th. The Principality of Monaco.

10th. The Republic of San Marino.

Comparing these arrangements with the divisions of Italy which existed before the French revolution, we are struck by the disappearance of the three great republics, which down to the closing years of the eighteenth century had preserved their independence. Venice and Genoa were blotted from the list of Italian States. If Lucca was for a few years to retain a separate existence, it was only for the purposes of its masters. Placed under the government of a sovereign, selected without the slightest reference to the wishes of the people, it was to be transferred to another when it better suited the convenience of diplomacy. Strange indeed was the result of that democratic invasion which, in the year 1796, had burst upon Italy, to establish republican liberty by the propagandism of the sword. Within twenty years its influence had very nearly swept away all trace of republican institutions ; entirely so, if on the mountain rock of San Marino one solitary remnant of them were not still preserved.

LUCCA, the ancient seat of the Marquisate of Tuscany, had in early days lost its republican freedom, and fallen under the dominion of feudatories of the Lombard kings. Like the other Tuscan cities, it became independent in the struggle which followed the death of the Countess Matilda. It preserved its republican government to the days of the French revolution. The story of the French invasion was the same in it as in the other Italian republics. Its constitution was first revolutionised by democracy, and then destroyed. In 1805 a decree of

the senate, duly confirmed by the assembly of the Antients, declared the necessity of instituting an hereditary sovereignty. Pasquale Bacciochhi was recognised as Prince of Lucca and Piombino ; and a constitutional statute, issued from Bologna by Napoleon, confirmed the act of the Antients ; and under the sovereignty of its new prince established a form of government in Lucca, in which but little vestige of popular liberty remained.²

The government established was an arbitrary one, with little of any popular or constitutional control. A senate of thirty-six members acted as the legislative council of the state. In the first instance they were all nominated by his Majesty the Emperor of France. One-fourth of the number went out of office each year. The prince presented to the senate three names for each vacancy, from which the remaining members chose one. The prince's list was itself selected from one furnished by the electoral cantons. The senate was, in fact, nominated by the prince, under a form that scarcely affected even the semblance of popular election ; and Lucca during the days of this constitution was a mere department of the empire of France.³

The extinction of the republican liberties of Lucca, by the election of Bacciochhi as its prince, recalls to our mind the downfall of the free cities in the Middle Ages. In the act that destroyed its liberty, all the forms of liberty were observed. The council of the Antients decreed the sovereignty of the republic to the prince ;

² *Statut Constitutionnel de la République Lucquois*, June 26th, 1805 ; *Recueil des Traitéés*, p. 88.

³ *Statut Constitutionnel*.

the assembly of the people ratified their act. It was thus that Milan yielded to a tyrant. The example of old Rome appeared to be followed even in the mode in which republican freedom was destroyed. The very name of the republic was preserved, although it was a republic governed by a prince. So Florence fell in 1535 under the power of an hereditary duke. To complete the parallel, Napoleon, who affected the prerogative of the ancient emperors, approved the act of the Antients in Lucca, as Charles V. had issued his "constitutional statute" to Florence three centuries before.

The extinction of the three great republics gives a peculiar interest to the story of the hamlet, for it is little more, which high on the rocks of SAN MARINO still, by a marvellous destiny, preserves its ancient freedom. Near the centre of Italy, in the very midst of the Papal States, there exists a community of a few thousand people which can boast the uninterrupted enjoyment of freedom for more than 1400 years; a city, the inhabitants of which still possess the independence which has been lost by so many of their proud neighbours.

Not far from the shores of the Adriatic, about ten miles distant from Rimini, the traveller through that country may have observed rising abruptly from the plain a steep and rugged mass of mountain and rock. The Titans' Mount was its name in days when Pagan tradition pointed out its masses of rock as the fragments of a mountain which the giants had hurled against heaven in their conflict with the Gods. On its summit rose in later times a temple to Jupiter, the

memorial probably of his triumph over his impious foes. Its solitary glens were avoided as haunted by demons. In the earlier ages of Christianity the shrine of Jupiter was displaced by an altar of the Christian faith ; and we need not very critically scan the accuracy of the tradition which tells us that the demons fled from the spots which became the abode of Christians, whose successors and descendants preserve their freedom to the present day.

The unquestioned facts of its history are indeed more marvellous than any which legend could supply. With a territory occupying a space, including all its mountain rocks, of not more than seventeen square miles, with a population of about 7000, San Marino is an independent and a sovereign state. For nearly fifteen hundred years, during all the vicissitudes that have passed over Italy, this little municipality has retained its independence. In the centre of the Papal States it has maintained its freedom against the power before which states and potentates were compelled to bow. The invasions of the barbarians rolled by, and left its mountain dwellings untouched. The wars of the Middle Ages passed harmless by the base of its cliffs. “Many a year and vanished age” have swept over it : it yet remains “a fortress formed by freedom’s hands,” the word “Liberty” is still written over its gate, and on the portals of its cathedral ; and the inhabitants of the little district are still governed by their own magistrates, and are subject only to their own laws.

Marinus, a Dalmatian artisan, laid, in the fourth century, the foundations of the town, the liberties of which have

so marvellously survived. Driven from his native country by persecution, on account of his embracing the Christian faith, he followed his occupation of a stonemason at Rimini, and attracted by the solitude and security of one of the fertile dells which intersected the high places of the Titans' Rock, he built for himself a house in the secluded retreat. He had won the friendship of the Bishop of Rimini by his piety, and religion was supposed to hallow the retirement of the hermit-mechanic. Other habitations soon rose beside that of Marinus, and a little community was formed upon the slopes of the rugged, but not unfruitful, hill. Without the asceticism or the vows of the monastery, its members were yet a religious community, composed principally of those who sought a tranquil retreat from the cares and distractions of the world. The village which arose took the name of its founder, to whom the respect of its inhabitants was not long in attributing the distinctive epithet of Saint ; and after the lapse of fifteen centuries the free republic of San Marino perpetuates to modern times the name of the humble mechanic, who fled from the further shores of the Adriatic to find upon the heights of the Titans' Rock a retreat, in which in undisturbed security he might follow the religion of the Cross.

It were an illiberal judgment which would not acknowledge the preservation of the rights of this little republic as reflecting credit on that Papal government, which has had, at all events for centuries, the power to destroy them. Yet San Marino has had its struggles. It braved excommunication, and even the tremendous sentence of an interdict, rather than surrender itself

to Innocent IV.⁴ At a later period the vicar of Boniface VIII. attempted to enforce a Papal tribute. The Pope desired the question to be left to the arbitration of a learned referee; the award was that San Marino was and always had been independent. The symbolic phrases of ancient time would have told us that St. Peter acknowledged the rights of St. Marinus—in the more homely language of modern story Boniface granted to it a deed in which its independence was recognised. One restless spirit again attempted to interfere with the privileges of the venerable republic. Cardinal Alberoni, who plunged Europe into war as the minister of Spain, when driven from the court of Madrid, found a retreat in filling the office of legate of Romagna. The restless spirit of intrigue that had disturbed all Christendom found its last occupation in an attempt upon the freedom and tranquillity of San Marino. Determined to reduce the republic to subjection, he treacherously led by night a troop of soldiers over the one path which led up the passes of the rock. In the morning he commanded the astonished citizens to attend him in the church to take an oath of allegiance to the Pope. They obeyed the summons of the cardinal by assembling as appointed, but one after another they swore fidelity, not to the Pontiff, but to "the only prince of the republic—to San Marino." Cries of "Liberty and San Marino" echoed from the old roof of the sacred building. Alberoni soon stopped the ceremony which assumed a form so different from that which he expected. He left the

⁴ Lord Brougham's Political Philosophy, part ii. p. 367.

hill without attempting to overcome the resistance of the people by force. The Pope disavowed his act and removed him to another legation, and the baffled intriguer was compelled to console himself for his last and most ridiculous failure, by a publication in which he attempted to prove that the republic had no right to their liberties, and that their existence was a sacrilegious usurpation upon the prerogatives over Romagna which Pepin and Charlemagne had conferred upon the Holy See.

Napoleon paid to this little fortress of freedom a marked tribute of his respect. In one of his excursions from Pesaro, he saw at a distance its high cliff glittering in the sunshine. When told that the rock which attracted his attention was that of San Marino, he sent in the name of the French Republic a deputation to the authorities of the little state. "Liberty," he said in the address which the deputation bore from the general of the French army,—"liberty which in the glorious days of Athens and Thebes transformed the Greeks into a nation of heroes—which in the ages of the republic made the Romans perform prodigies—which, during the brief interval of her reign in a few towns of Italy, revived the arts and sciences, was almost entirely banished from Europe. Liberty existed only at San Marino, where, Citizens, by the wisdom of your government and particularly by your virtues, you have preserved that inestimable treasure through numerous revolutions, and defended the sacred deposit through a long series of years."

He offered them any additions to their territory

which they might find it convenient to take, and at the same time sent them some cannon as a gift. The authorities of the municipality had the good sense to refuse both, and San Marino continues to this day to realise the description which Addison gave of it in the year 1701.

“ The people are esteemed very honest, and rigorous in the execution of justice, and seem to live more happy and contented among these rocks and stones than others of the Italians do in the pleasantest valleys of the world. Nothing can be a greater instance of the natural love that man has for liberty and of their aversion to arbitrary government than such a savage mountain covered with people, and the Campagna of Rome which lies in the same country almost destitute of inhabitants.”⁵

The republic of San Marino still remains. It has its nobility and its burgesses, its general council of “anziani,” 300 in number, and its Gonfalonieri with an executive council of twelve ; while on great occasions its general assembly or parliament is convened, in which one member of every family has a seat. Justice is administered by a podesta according to the institution of the middle ages, selected always from the natives of other towns. Its archives still contain the letters in which Venice addressed the republic as her dear sister. The least superstitious may forgive the citizens of this marvellously preserved republic the belief that the spirit of its founder still watches like a guardian angel over its liberties. The coldest temperament will not refuse to join in the wish that whatever may be the future

⁵ Addison’s “Remarks on several parts of Italy,” p. 88.

destiny of Romagna, no sacrilegious hand may ever be laid upon the freedom of the republic, or constitutional monarch ever treat its privileges with less respect than they have met with from the government of the Popes.

If San Marino was left by a singular destiny to represent the republics, the principality of MONACO survived to represent the small feudal chieftainries of former days. On the shores of the Gulf of Genoa and close to the borders of the county of Nice, a promontory covered with orange groves juts into the blue waters of the Ligurian sea. A town of 1500 inhabitants built on this promontory, a district with about 7000, and a castle said once to have been of great strength—composed this sovereign state. In recent times the traveller from Nice to Genoa recognised it by the inconvenience of its Customs regulations which stopped him on his way. Our classical recollections identify it with “the citadel” of Hercules “Monœcus,” the founder of Marseilles. For nearly 1000 years it has been the principality of the family of Grimaldi. Originally it is said to have been acquired by one of the family by imperial gift, as a reward for his bravery in expelling the Saracens from Liguria: it was held, nevertheless, as allodial land or “patrimony,” free from any feudal obligation. In 1641, its prince placed it under the protection of Louis XIII., receiving in return large estates in France, with the title (once borne by Cæsar Borgia) of Duke of Valentinois. Its present possessor is the descendant of the Grimaldi in the female line. This little principality appears to have been for some reason the special object

of European care. The Treaty of Paris specially stipulated that it should revert to the state in which it was in 1792. The subsequent treaty of November 20th, 1815, altered this arrangement by assigning it to the protection of Sardinia instead of France. Up to the present year the Duke of Valentino exercised over the promontory and district of Monaco a sovereignty not unlike that which the families of Derby and afterwards of Athol possessed over the Isle of Man. It is not improbable that the end of the sovereignty may be the same, and that the last representative in Italy of the feudal princes of the Middle Ages may be induced to part with the sovereignty of Monaco by considerations like those which obtained from the Duke of Athol the surrender of that of Mona to the British crown.⁶

The treaty of Paris, it will be remembered, had stipulated that Italy beyond the limits of the territories which should return to Austria, should consist of sovereign states. Among these states Parma and Modena demand a few words of further notice.

PARMA like Lucca was one of the Tuscan cities which after the death of the Countess, asserted their independence both of Papal and Imperial power. It was among the conquests of Pope Julius II., who asserted his title to it, not only by virtue of the bequest of the great Countess, but as part of the exarchate of Ravenna, and therefore included in the donation of Pepin. Paul III., one of the ancient family of Farnese, obtained from the College of Cardinals its alienation in favour of Pietro

⁶ The principality of Monaco comprised the territories of Mentone and Roccabruna. These revolted in 1848, and placed themselves under the direct government of the Sardinian king.

Luigi Farnese his illegitimate son. A marriage of Luigi with a lady who stood in a similar relationship to Charles V. obtained the imperial consent to its investiture as a Duchy, and thus was laid the foundation of the family of Farnese of Parma.

That family became extinct in the male line in 1731. The inglorious records of the last sovereigns of the race contain accounts of princes bloated with enormous corpulence, overwhelmed with indolence, and exhibiting in a diseased drowsiness, that deprived them almost of the capacity of exertion, the strange effects of the addiction by many successive generations to sensuality and sloth.

Piacenza had long been united with Parma. About the same period with the extinction of the Farnese, the small Duchy of Guastalla held by a junior branch of the family of Gonzaga escheated by the failure of direct heirs. The German diet declared the three duchies to be lapsed fiefs, and all three in the final arrangements of Aix la Chapelle, were conferred on the second son of Elizabeth Farnese.⁷

In 1801, Don Louis, the second duke of the Bourbon line, surrendered these in exchange for Tuscany, and the dominions of Parma became the French department of the Taro. Austria by the treaty of Luneville guaranteed Tuscany to Louis. The crown of the new-formed realm of Etruria was placed upon his head. He died in 1803. The treatment experienced by his queen and his infant son has already been described.

MODENA, another of the free Tuscan cities in the year 1289, had fallen under the dominion of the House of

⁷ See ante, vol. i. p. 213—219.

Este. When the Duchy of Ferrara was seized in 1654 by the Pontiff as a lapsed fief, Modena and Reggio were still permitted by imperial generosity or carelessness to devolve upon the illegitimate descendant of that great family. Hercules, their last male representative, acquired by marriage the duchies of Massa and Carrara. In 1771, Beatrice, his only daughter, was married to Ferdinand, the Austrian arch-duke—the third son of Maria Theresa. The last interference of the German diet in Italian affairs was the act by which, at Ratisbon, in 1771,⁸ they settled the reversion of Modena on the marriage. The revolution drove Duke Hercules from his dominions, and the treaty of Campo Formio assigned him as compensation the Duchy of Brisgau on the Rhine. He died at a very advanced age at Trieste in 1803, with the reputation of having amassed by the most miserable parsimony enormous wealth.⁹ The Congress of Vienna recognised his grandson as sovereign of Modena, and an Austrian arch-duke appeared as the representative of the Italian house of Este.

The effect of these arrangements was to give to the house of Austria a complete ascendancy in Italy. Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla were under the rule of the daughter of the emperor—Tuscany and Modena were the principalities of Austrian grand-dukes—Tuscany was strengthened by the surrender on the part of Naples of that maritime district known as the *Præsidii* or the Garrison States, which from the days of

⁸ "Décret Impérial," Martens, vol. i. p. 282.

⁹ His money and effects were valued at six million ducata. Estates he purchased in Hungary produced an annual revenue of 30,000 more.—*Annual Register*, 1803.

Charles V. had been annexed to the Sicilian crown. Piombino, and that portion of the island of Elba, which had from the year 1634 been Spanish possessions, were also annexed to the dominions of the Tuscan grand-duke.

But it was in the direct allotment of territory to Austria that her influence in the Congress was most manifest. Before the French revolution the Italian dominions of Austria consisted of portions of the Duchy of Milan and that of Mantua. They comprised seven provinces close to the Ticino and the Po.¹⁰ Brescia, Bergamo, more than half of the district which now constitutes Lombardy, were the "terra firma" of the Venetian republic.¹¹

Even these limited territories had been all acquired by Austria in the contests which followed the dispute of the Spanish Succession. At the close of the eighteenth century all the possessions of Austria south of the Alps

¹⁰ These provinces were :—

In the Duchy of Milan :

- 1st. The Milanese proper, surrounding the city.
- 2nd. A part of the Countship of Anghiera, bordering on the Lake Maggiore.
- 3rd. The territory of Como.
- 4th. A small portion of the territory of Pavia, including the city.
- 5th. The territory of Lodi.
- 6th. The Cremonese district.

The Duchy of Mantua, including a not very extensive district immediately round the town.—*Guthrie's Geography*, 1795.

¹¹ On the west the Austrian territories were separated from the Sardinian states by the river Ticino. There was no such natural frontier between them and the Venetian territories. The river Adda for some way formed a boundary line between Como and Bergamo, and the Oglio between Cremona and Brescia, to a point in which it inclosed the Duchy of Mantua; but the rest of the frontier was marked merely by a line. A glance at any map of Italy, published between the period of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and the French Revolution, will exhibit this.

The fortress of Mantua was within the Austrian territory, but the strongholds of Peschiera, Verona and Legnago, were within the Venetian — the whole line of the Adige was several miles within the frontier of the republican possessions.

consisted of the territory of Trieste.¹² The Italian dominions of the House of Hapsburgh were held by the Spanish branch of the family,¹³ as dependencies of the Spanish crown.

The Duchy of Milan had been in possession of the House of Hapsburgh from the days of the Emperor Charles V. Under the rule of the Visconti, according to the charter of Wenceslaus constituting the duchy, it extended seventy miles from the Alps to the Po, and sixty from the Genoese to the Venetian frontier. On the extinction of the male line of the Visconti in 1447, the Emperor Frederick III., claimed it by escheat. That claim was founded in right, but it was not enforced for many years. The Duke of Orleans and the King of Naples both disputed the imperial right. Milan for a short time asserted her ancient liberties, but soon fell under the dominion of Francesco Sforza, who assumed the title of duke, and whose family continued in possession of that duchy for about fifty years. In 1497 the Sforza, like the Visconti, became

¹² Trieste itself, a free republic in the middle ages, had fallen under the dominion of Venice in 997. During the wars in which Venice was engaged with Genoa, Hungary, and Vienna, at the close of the fourteenth century, Trieste placed itself under the dominion of the Patriarch of Aquileia. Its citizens found the power of the ecclesiastical sovereign too weak to protect them, and in 1381 surrendered their sovereignty—under stipulations which preserved their freedom—to Leopold of Austria, Duke of Carinthia.

¹³ These dominions consisted of Naples and Sicily, and Milan. They came to the crown of Spain in very different rights. Naples and Sicily were claimed under the title by which the kings of Arragon had been called, at the period of the Sicilian Vespers, to the throne of Sicily, as representing, after the death of Conrardin, the family of Hohenstauffen. Milan was seized by Charles V. as an imperial fief of the empire, and was, under pretence of this right, annexed to his Spanish crown. In 1538 he gave the investiture of the Duchy of Milan to his son Philip. The Duchy of Milan, therefore, was held by the kings of Spain as a fief of the empire; the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily by a title professing to be derived from their nine Norman kings.

extinct, and Charles V., more powerful than his predecessor, succeeded after a war in establishing his right to grant its investiture to his son Philip. In the wars of the succession it passed to the Austrian line of the House of Hapsburgh, but the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle detached from the Milanese duchy the highlands of the Novarese and all the districts to the west of the Ticino, which were added to the Piedmontese possessions of the house of Savoy.

The loss of these districts was compensated by the acquisition of the Duchy of Mantua. This principality had been for two centuries the inheritance of the Gonzaga. In the wars of the Spanish Succession the Duke of Mantua took part against the Emperor Charles VI. By a harsh enforcement of imperial rights, Mantua was declared forfeited for rebellion to its feudal lord. The last Duke of Mantua died a pensioner in France, and the representative of the Gonzaga is now an exile, without any share in the inheritance of his fathers except the memories of an historic name.

From the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle to the French revolution the remnant of the Duchy of Milan and that of Mantua constituted the entire of the Italian possession of Austria. Separated as they were by the territories of independent states from the rest of the Austrian dominions, their very isolation prevented them from creating in Italy any formidable power, and even the Duchy of Tuscany, although held by an Austrian archduke, did not make such an addition to imperial strength as to menace the liberties or the independence of the Italian States.

In the progress of the revolutionary war occurred that memorable transaction upon which history has long since fixed the brand of unprincipled spoliation, but of which France has borne all the odium which Austria ought at least to share.

In a future chapter the History of Venice will be traced, from the days when the fugitives from the terrors of the barbarian invasion found shelter behind the mud banks in the islets of the lagoons. Suffice it now to say that at the period of the French invasion of Italy, the territories of the republic occupied all the district that lay between the Duchy of Milan and the Adriatic Sea.

These territories, and Venice itself, were seized by Napoleon, under circumstances which make it impossible to acquit the act of deliberate treachery to a friendly and confiding state. The treaty of Campo Formio portioned out between France and Austria the spoil. Austria recognised the new Italian republic, formed in part from her dominions of Milan and Mantua, and received in exchange, not the entire of the Venetian territories, but only that portion which lay to the east of the Adige. The rest formed part of the possessions of the Cisalpine republic. Subsequently Venice was severed from Austria. By the treaty of Presburg, in 1805, Austria, after eight years' possession, surrendered all the Venetian provinces to the Kingdom of Italy—receiving compensation elsewhere.

As to her former Italian territories, Austria was in the position of having, by treaties of peace, deliberately surrendered them. It was impossible to say that Napo-

leon was not rightly in possession of them—or that the claim could be put forward, which was justly made in other instances, for restitution of territory which had been wrested by wrong. The Congress of Vienna, not only restored to the emperor his ancient dominions in the duchies of Milan and Mantua, but they assigned also to him the very provinces of Venetia, which he had received in exchange for the surrender of these Duchies—and not only this, but added to this splendid gift that portion of the Venetian territory of which Austria never had the possession, which had been immediately annexed to the Cisalpine republic.

In addition to all this, they annexed to his dominions the valleys of the Valteline, which Napoleon had wrested from the Swiss canton of the Grisons.

This vast accession of territory to Austria was not made in accordance with any claim of ancient right. In such a title Austria could claim nothing except the possessions assigned to her by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. If former rights were to prevail, the Valteline should have been restored to the Swiss confederation, and the republican independence of Venice, destroyed as it had been by iniquitous wrong, revived. Through all the changes of her course during the wars of the revolution, the policy of Austria had been successfully directed to her own territorial aggrandisement. In the numerous treaties which the imperial cabinet made with Napoleon—ancient possessions were bartered for a share in the plunder of French conquest. In the final arrangement of Europe, they contrived to retain both—the new acquisition on the ground that she had once possessed

it—the old territory on the faith of her ancient right. Austria disregarded all the treaties by which she had solemnly recognised the kingdom of Italy—and resumed her possessions of Milan and Mantua on the plea that the ancient order was to be restored. At the same time she claimed the Venetian provinces, the most iniquitous of all the spoils of the revolutionary war. Her title to the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom rested, on one side of the Adige, on the inalienable prescription of ancient right—on the other it was the recognition of the gains of revolutionary violence and fraud. Both were acknowledged by the statesmen of the Congress, and between the restoration of her old domains, the confirmation of her revolutionary acquisitions, and the territories now for the first time made over to her rule, the possessions of the imperial power in Northern Italy, which before the French revolution occupied not quite 4000 square miles of country with a population of little more than a million inhabitants, were extended over districts covering 13,000 square miles, and in 1815 numbering in its population four million souls.

In the position and military resources of these provinces, the advantages gained by Austria were still more decided than even in their extent. The imperial possessions were no longer separated from the empire. By the acquisition of Venice on one side and the Valtelline on the other, they were made contiguous with the Tyrol and the district of Trieste. The Adriatic Sea became an Austrian lake. Formerly Austria owned in Italy a distant province detached from her home territories, and to be governed almost of necessity as an

Italian state. The Austrian empire was now advanced into the very heart of Italy, and the rule of the Kaiser Koenig extended continuously and unbroken from the Danube to the Po.

The effect upon the Italian provinces of Austria is obvious. They were not, as Milan and Mantua had been in former times, Italian appendages of the empire; they were among its component parts. Their government has been ever since a struggle between the feelings of the people and the natural tendencies of the imperial rule. The narrow line which separated them from the German possessions of Austria was regarded very differently at Vienna and at Milan. In the eyes of imperial centralisation they were incorporated as part and parcel of one great empire, whose only nationality was that bond of union that attached them to their chief. All the feelings and traditions of the people reminded them that they were Italians, the fact which Francis, inaugurating his new rule, emphatically desired them to forget.

Upon the rest of Italy this new position of Austria produced equally decisive effect. The whole might of a great military monarchy was admitted to the very military centre of the Italian states. From the heights of the Tyrolese Alps—through the regions of the Friuli, over the waters of the Adriatic, and by the way of the Venetian provinces—the government of Vienna could pour through territories, entirely its own, all its armies upon Italy. A regiment could march from Vienna to Ferrara without leaving the territories that submitted to the Emperor's rule. The barrier that had interposed between Italy and the strength of German power was

removed, and if the expression may be allowed, the full surge of Austrian invasion would roll unchecked and unimpeded upon Italy with resistless power.

To such a position the command of great fortresses could hardly be said to have added strength. Yet with the provinces ceded to her at Vienna, Austria acquired strongholds which seemed designed to resist forces far greater than any which could be brought against her by any Italian state, or even by a combination of them all.

Two rivers cross the plain of these Austrian possessions, rushing down from the mountains of the Tyrol, where they take their rise. The Mincio passes through the Lake of Guarda, emerges from it a shallow but impetuous torrent, by the ramparts of Peschiera, and at a distance of about twenty-five miles flows in a sluggish stream by Mantua into the Po. The Adige comes down from the Tyrol, entering Lombardy beneath the old ramparts of Verona ; it rushes on, a deep and rapid stream, towards Legnago, whence, through the marshes and lagunes, it makes its way to the Adriatic in a course parallel to the Po. Between these two rivers lies a space varying from the breadth of twelve miles between Peschiera and Verona to that of thirty-five between Mantua and Legnago. This space in recent days has become celebrated as the "quadrilateral," protected by strong fortresses at the four points already mentioned, and presenting between its natural defences and its fortresses almost insuperable obstacles to the progress of an army. Peschiera is an entrenched camp in an island of the Mincio. Mantua is built on three,

where the Mincio has expanded into a lake. Verona, a fortified place from ancient times, commanding the great pass from the Tyrol to the Italian plains, has now defences and redoubts which could form a rallying-point for an entire army. Into the shelter of this quadrilateral an Austrian army can at any time retire safe under the protection of its formidable defences. Mantua alone, of the four fortresses, was as strong in 1815 as it is now, but in the campaigns of the first Napoleon the value of every one of them was thoroughly understood. The strong posts of the Mincio and the Adige then, as now, commanded the Lombard plain.¹⁴

The policy of giving to Austria a commanding military position in Italy was avowedly that of the arrangements of the Congress. For this they violated their principles of restoring the Papal sovereignty intact, and wrested from the Pope the portions of his territory which lay on the northern bank of the Po. More than this—the Treaty of Vienna conferred upon Austria the strange right of garrisoning the citadels of Ferrara and Commachio within the Papal States. The protests of the Papal court against the first as a spoliation, the second as a violation of their sovereignty, were disregarded. A few years later, when Spain at last acceded to the treaty, the Bourbon Duke of Parma yielded a similar right as to the fortress of Piacenza.¹⁵ Austria

¹⁴ Hooper's Italian Campaigns, p. 216.

¹⁵ By the 5th article of a treaty of Paris, entered into on the 10th of June, 1817, between Austria, Spain, Great Britain, Prussia, and France, this right over the territories of Parma was conceded to Austria, "as the fortress of Piacenza was of special importance in the defensive system of Italy."—*Recueil des Traitéés*, p. 234.

commanded by her military power all northern and Central Italy. The anti-Gallican terrors of European statesmen may have induced them to build up this great military system as a resistance to France. But it could scarcely have escaped their discernment that the same power in protecting, subjugated and enslaved Italy. If it be true that Lord Castlereagh really bound England by the alleged Treaty of Prague,¹⁶ Metternich could scarcely have complained that in real and substantial power the spirit of its stipulations was not carried out. The provision of the Treaty of Paris that the States of Italy should be sovereign, was by the overwhelming power conferred upon Austria made practically of no avail.

By secret engagements contracted with at least one of those powers, that stipulation was virtually set aside. On the 12th of June, three days after the public treaty of Vienna, a treaty was entered into between the Emperor of Austria and the King of Naples, binding them upon all occasions to act together for the tranquillity of Italy—to guarantee mutually their territories, and to supply for the common defence, Austria 80,000, Naples 25,000 men.

On the same day, the 12th of June, a similar treaty with the Grand Duke fixed the proportion of troops to be supplied by Tuscany at 6000 men.

Considering the strength and position of the respective powers, these treaties might be said in themselves to amount to an acknowledgment of the lordship of Austria—a lordship, indeed, almost sanctioned in the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna, which gave the Emperor the

¹⁶ See ante, chap. iv. p. 95.

right of placing his garrisons in the territories of an independent state. But with reference to Naples there could be no mistake. By a secret article annexed to the treaty, Ferdinand bound himself "not to admit any change in re-establishing his government inconsistent with the ancient institutions of monarchy, or the principles adopted by the Austrian emperor in the government of his Italian States."¹⁷ This secret compact was completed on the 12th of June. It was on the 20th of May that Ferdinand had issued his proclamation from Palermo, pledging himself to grant to his people a free constitution.

It was true that this pledge of a free constitution had been given to Naples by Ferdinand under circumstances which bound him by every obligation of honour and gratitude to fulfil it. It was equally true that the people of Sicily already enjoyed that free constitution which the king had repeatedly pledged himself, and once at least sworn to maintain. That constitution England had engaged herself to preserve. The Prince Regent had commanded a letter to one of the Sicilian patriots expressing his royal satisfaction at its establishment. The representative of England had formally

¹⁷ "The engagements into which their Majesties enter by the present treaty to preserve the interior peace of Italy, imposing upon them the duty of preserving their respective states and subjects from fresh revolutions, and from the danger of imprudent innovations which might lead to them, it is understood between the high contracting powers, that His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies, in re-establishing the government of the kingdom, will not sanction any change inconsistent either with the ancient monarchical institutions, or with the principles adopted by His Royal and Imperial Apostolic Majesty for the internal government of his Italian provinces."—*Secret Article—Treaty of June 12th, Recueil des Traitées*, p. 203.—*Parliamentary Papers, presented March 25th, 1859.*

assured the Sicilians that as the condition of assenting to a change, England would insist that it must be one effected solely by the free act of the parliament itself. In the face of all this Ferdinand bound himself by a secret compact to Austria, imposing on him obligations inconsistent with his pledges to his people, and opposed to the assurances which England had given them. The story of the destruction of the Sicilian constitution belongs to another year. Enough now to say that before the influence of that secret compact the free constitution of Sicily soon fell. Austria, in her treaty of the 29th of April, had recognised Ferdinand not as he really was, the king of two separate and independent realms, Ferdinand I. of Sicily, and IV. of Naples, but by the title of King of the Two Sicilies.¹⁸ The treaty of Vienna, by accident or design, adopted this designation. It was contended that by this act of the powers of Europe one realm had been created by the union of the crowns, and that the ancient independence of Sicily was destroyed. Upon this soon followed the statute which professed to regulate Sicilian rights. After Ferdinand's return to Naples, the parliament of Sicily never was convened, and, without even a struggle, absolute government was re-established in the island.¹⁹

So far as Italy at least is concerned, we have no

¹⁸ The title of King of the Two Sicilies had been borne of old by the Norman princes, but was not used after the separation of Naples and the island of Sicily by the Sicilian Vespers in 1282.

¹⁹ Of the destruction of the Sicilian constitution, and the obligations which bound England to maintain it, a very full account will be found in the pamphlet, "Sicily and England; a sketch of events in Sicily in 1812 and 1848," Ridgway, 1849.

difficulty in understanding why Francis refused to accede to the strong desire expressed in the Congress that he should resume the old dignity of the empire. The German princes earnestly pressed it. On behalf of the Elector of Hanover it was proposed with the authority of the sovereign of England. Metternich obstinately refused.²⁰ In Italy he had established a power greater than ever was exercised by any of its German kings. Even north of the Alps he preferred for his master a new, and after all a revolutionary power, to that imposing sovereignty which, if it was made sacred by the traditions of 1800 years, was also bound by the law, and controlled by the limitations imposed upon it by immemorial usage and the enactments of diets. The Emperor of Austria might claim the prerogatives without binding himself by the obligations of Otho or of Charlemagne.

The arrangements were not completed without strong protests on the part of many of those whose interests they were supposed to affect. The most remarkable of these was that of Consalvi on the part of the Holy See.

Of all the powers whose claims were dealt with in the deliberations of the Congress, the Papal See might perhaps seem to have the least reason to be dissatisfied

²⁰ Fllassan, vol. ii. p. 261, book 14. Note of Count Munster, the Hanoverian representative, in which he informs the ministers of the German powers that the Prince Regent, as Elector of Hanover, had never recognised the destruction of the old German empire; that he had exerted all his efforts of persuasion to induce Francis to resume the imperial crown; and that at last he had been met on the part of Austria by a reference to the provisions of the treaty of Paris, to which England was a party, and to which Hanover had acceded. The provision of that treaty which stipulated that there should be a federative union of German states, excluded, as Austria insisted, the reconstruction of the empire.

with the result. Restored to the dominion over those territories, which, by the Treaty of Tolentino, with all proper forms and with all requisite canonical sanction his predecessor had resigned, Pius VII. had obtained for the See of Rome a concession which the most sanguine of its friends could hardly have expected.

That concession was not obtained without difficulty. The influence of England was mainly instrumental in securing its adoption. So long as Murat's claims were considered valid, both Austria and England were bound to secure to him an accession of territory from the dominions of the Church. Austria had her own designs upon the Legations. There were times when it would have suited the policy of England that they should have been given over to imperial rule. At one period of the Congress it was proposed that they should be assigned to Prussia, to induce that power to abandon its claims upon Saxony. At another it was almost resolved on to allot them to the Saxon monarch as compensation for the realms, of which the ambition of Prussia had determined to despoil him. It was not until the end of the month of May, when Lombardy, and Venetia, and the Valteline, were finally assured to Austria, and the pretensions of Murat disposed of by his own conduct, that the Congress resolved on the restitution of these provinces to the Pope.²¹

²¹ In a memorandum presented to Lord Clarendon, at the Congress of Paris, in 1856, by Cavour and De Villa Marina, the representatives of Sardinia, it is stated that "At the Congress of Vienna there was great hesitation as to replacing the Legations under the government of the Pope. The statesmen who composed it, although preoccupied with the idea of re-establishing the ancient order of things, everywhere felt, nevertheless, that they were thus leaving a focus of disorder in the centre of Italy. The difficulty in the choice

Cardinal Consalvi, on the 14th of June, delivered to the Congress the formal protest of his master against the withholding of the portions of the provinces of Ferrara which lie on the north of the Po, and with more reason still against the right conferred on Austria to garrison Ferrara and Commachio, a right which he justly designated as destructive alike of the sovereignty and of the neutrality of the Holy See.²² The right of the Pope to the restitution of Avignon was placed on grounds to which it seems difficult to reply.

Avignon, originally a part of the County of Provence, had been purchased in 1305 by Clement VI. from Joanna, Queen of Naples, the Countess of Provence, for a sum of 6000*l.* Provence was a fief of the empire, and the Emperor Rudolph, with the sanction of the Germanic diet, had confirmed the sale. Everything was done to give legal validity to the title of the Pope, and although occasionally seized in the quarrels between the French kings and the Holy See, it continued the possession of the Pontiffs until the year 1791.

In that year it was seized by the French government by one of those acts of violence for which the only title is that of might. It was alleged that at the time of the seizure an indemnity was promised, and that Louis

of a sovereign to whom those provinces should be given, and the rivalry which was displayed for their possessions, made the balance preponderate in favour of the Pope; and Cardinal Consalvi obtained, but only after the battle of Waterloo, the unlooked for concession."—*Parliamentary Papers*, 1856.—*Correspondence with Sardinia respecting Italy*.

There must be a mistake in the time. The final Treaty of Vienna expressly restores the Papal territories to the Pope. It was signed on the 9th of June.

²² Protests of Cardinal Consalvi, June 12th, 1815.—*Recueil des Traité*, p. 206.—*Parliamentary Papers*, 1859. (Treaties, Political and Territorial, between Austria and the Italian States, presented March 25th.)

XVI. had pledged himself that it should be restored. No answer was given, or could be given, in argument to this demand. The seizure of Avignon was a mere act of spoliation, without disguise or excuse. Louis XVIII. did not hesitate to avail himself of the act. Consalvi was obliged to content himself with a protest "as strong as his sacred character would permit," against the retention of Avignon and Venaissin. To this day France holds both; nor has the piety of the Austrian emperor ever induced him to make restitution of the rights of the Church in the districts of Ferrara, although "the sacred canons and the councils of Trent" visit his retention of them with the penalty of an ipso facto excommunication, exactly as effectual as that which was denounced by Pius VII. against those engaged in the seizure of Rome.

While the Pontiff thus protested against the sacrifice to Austrian interests of his rights, another of the European powers, in equally energetic language, made a similar complaint. The claims of the Duke of Parma to the Duchy of Tuscany have already been stated. In those several notes of the 4th of April, the 5th, and the 18th, Labrador, the Spanish plenipotentiary, reiterated these claims.²³ And finally the Court of Spain withheld its accession to the Treaty of Vienna, refusing to acknowledge the justice of the cession of Tuscany to the grand-duke.

It was not very easy, perhaps, in strictness, to answer these claims. Tuscany had been fairly and formally ceded by its grand-duke and by Austria to the Duke

²³ Recueil des Traités, p. 165—171.

of Parma. Compensation had been found for its sovereign. The treaty of Luneville, by which this arrangement was completed, had confirmed the cession of Venice to Austria. While the imperial court retained Venice, it seemed difficult to say on what principle Tuscany was demanded for the grand-duke.

But still more difficult to show, by what pretext even of justice or right the allied sovereigns deprived the youthful Duke of Parma of his hereditary dominions. The treaty of the 11th of April, 1814, had agreed, on the part of the sovereigns who signed it, that the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla should be settled on the empress Maria Louisa and her heirs. Parma had been in 1801 surrendered by its sovereign to France, but it was so in exchange for Tuscany. How could Parma be retained while Tuscany was not given up? But at all events the whole case was now changed. By his return from Elba, Napoleon had forfeited all that the treaty of April had provided for him. It was no longer a question of keeping faith with Napoleon, but of the seizure of the principality of a friendly power to endow the daughter of the Austrian emperor, and place another Italian state under the control of the favoured house.

In point of fact, the stipulations of the treaty of April were not fulfilled. According to the stipulations, these Italian duchies were guaranteed to the empress, and after her death to her son. The treaty of Vienna only settled them for her life, and after her death secured the reversion to the Duke of Parma.

Genoa had recorded her unavailing protest against

the act of arbitrary power which extinguished her ancient republic. Bologna formally claimed from the Congress security for those municipal liberties which had been guaranteed when the city surrendered itself to Nicholas V.²⁴ There was still one Italian state which made no appeal in defence of its liberties, and which left on record no protest against their destruction. Venice had preserved a profound and an inglorious silence. Milan may be said to have made her protest against the extinction of the Italian kingdom when her deputies vainly endeavoured to obtain terms from the allied sovereigns in Paris. But Venice had made no attempt to assert her claim to independence. Her silence seemed that of a deep and death-like trance, and the city that was glorious in the traditions of fourteen centuries of liberty, passed under the dominion which was imposed on her without uttering a voice of lament for her lost sovereignty and her extinguished freedom.

Both in Lombardy and Venetia the arrests that had been made of the Milanese patriots had been successful in silencing opposition. But this does not account for the indifference which the Venetians had manifested before. They had not yet recovered from that listless degeneracy which had marked the inglorious fall of the republic, and which had caused that fall.

The arrangements adopted at the Treaty of Vienna, instead of restoring the former political condition of

²⁴ A formal demand of these privileges was made on behalf of the city of Bologna to the Congress of Vienna, drawn up and presented by the advocate Berni.

Italy, established an entirely new state of things. Whatever might have been the intention or object of those arrangements, their effect was to make Austrian influence in Italy supreme. The fairest provinces of the country were subject to her direct rule. The great fortresses that commanded its military positions were within her territory, or where they were not were garrisoned by her troops. No power in Italy could offer opposition to her will. Most of them, indeed, were already her vassals. Parma and its appendant duchies were dominions nominally of the emperor's daughter, really of the emperor himself. Tuscany and Modena were ruled by princes of the imperial family, whose first allegiance would be given to its chief. The sovereigns of Naples and Sardinia were both attached by ties of relationship to the interests of the family of Lorraine. Naples had already bound herself in her internal affairs to submit to Austrian principles and rules. Even at the Congress of Vienna plans had been proposed which would have made Sardinia an Austrian province. The possession of the Novarese Highlands so earnestly solicited from her allies, would have given her the command of Piedmont. The abrogation of the Salic law would have placed on the throne of Sardinia an Austrian grand-duke. These projects were abandoned for the time, but they were not laid aside. Even without them the mastery of Italy was secured. Over the Papal States the fortresses of Ferrara and Commachio menacingly frowned. Those who believed in the genuineness of that strange document which professes to bequeath to the sovereigns of Austria the

maxims that were to guide their steps to the subjugation of Italy, could say with truth that the arrangements of the Congress of Vienna went far to realise for Austria the policy recommended in the political testament of the Duke of Lorraine.²⁵

²⁵ See note on this political testament.

NOTE.

THE POLITICAL TESTAMENT OF THE DUKE OF LORRAINE.

The story of the political testament of Charles V., Duke of Lorraine, is so singular, that whatever may be thought on the disputed question of the genuineness of the document, it deserves at least a notice in any account of the Italian policy of Austria.

Charles V., Duke of Lorraine, when despoiled of his hereditary dominions by Louis XIV., took refuge at the Court of Vienna. He was married to the sister of the Emperor Leopold. With the Polish King Sobieski he rescued Vienna from the Turks in 1683. At the peace of Nimeguen, eight years before, he had scornfully rejected terms which would have restored him Lorraine on condition of total dependence on France, and "retiring under the protection of Leopold, he became the great ornament of his court, the prime mover of his councils, and the director of his military operations."—*Coxe's House of Austria*.

In December, 1687, Joseph, the emperor's son, was crowned as the first hereditary King of Hungary, in accordance with the change in the Hungarian constitution, which, abolishing the old elective monarchy, established an hereditary sovereignty in the family of the Austrian Grand Dukes. Immediately after this event, so auspicious for the House of Hapsburgh, the Duke of Lorraine is said to have handed to the emperor the paper known in History as his political testament—suggesting the plan of establishing, by means of imperial influence in Germany and Italy, a great European power in the Austrian princes.

The delivery of this paper to the emperor was said to have been accompanied by the strictest injunctions to secrecy. He charged both Leopold and his successors to preserve it among the most profound secrets of the Austrian Court. It was to be transmitted from father to son, to be communicated only under an oath of secrecy to the most confidential ministers of the House of Hapsburgh, and never under any circumstances to be made known to any stranger even of the most friendly nation. He "confided it to the cabinet of his Majesty, the Emperor Leopold, as a proof of his gratitude to him for having given him his sister, and for having some confidence in him: beseeching his successors to take under their care the family which God had vouchsafed him of blood so august."

The grandson of the writer of the testament was the husband of Maria Theresa. His lineal descendants have since occupied the imperial throne.

The alleged testament of the Duke of Lorraine, if an invention, was one of his own day. A copy of it is to be found in the archives of the French Foreign Office, where it has been since the days of Louis XIV. The injunctions to secrecy were too binding to be observed. Leopold placed the paper in the hands of his Empress, who communicated it to her confessor; by his instruction the intelligence of the existence of such a document was conveyed to the French court, and means were found to obtain a copy of the precious manuscript which Leopold was not able to guard against the treachery of his own servants.

Such is the story, true or false, probable or improbable, which is entered on the records of the French Foreign Office of the days of Louis XIV., as explaining the manner in which the French cabinet obtained possession of its contents.

The French government do not appear to have kept the secret any better than the Empress. In 1696 the testament was published at the Hague, the French Cabinet contriving its publication to expose to Holland the true nature of Austrian designs.

It attracted some notice in the course of the eighteenth century; it received but little credence. Both Voltaire and Bayle contemptuously pronounced it a fabrication.

Recent researches have however revived the question of its authorship. In the third volume of his "History of the

*Annexion of Lorraine to France,"*¹ M. d'Haussonville, after a careful examination of all the documents in the archives of the French Foreign Office, does not hesitate to express the most confident opinion that it was really drawn up by the Duke of Lorraine, whose signature it professes to bear.

The great object of the writer of this paper was to urge upon the Court of Vienna a great scheme for founding an Austrian empire, which would make the House of Hapsburgh predominant in Europe. He earnestly counselled them upon the approaching extinction of the Spanish branch, not to press for the crown of Spain, but to direct their energies to secure the Italian possessions of the crown of Spain. The kingdom of Naples, and the Duchy of Milan, reverting to the elder branch of the family, might constitute the foundation of an Italian empire, which united with their own hereditary dominions and the influence of the empire would make the Austrian princes masters of Europe. The power of the empire was gradually to be transferred from Ratisbon to Vienna, from an elective chieftain to the hereditary sovereign of Austria. The powers of Germany were to become as those of France had already, the mere vassals of a central throne. The name of the empire was to be used both in Germany and Italy only for the purpose of effectually enslaving both countries.

The imperial cabinet were, therefore, earnestly exhorted to secure from Charles II. of Spain, the devolution of Milan and Naples upon the Austrian grand-duke.

Obtaining thus Naples and the Duchy of Milan, Austria was gradually to proceed to reduce all Italy to subjection. Overwhelming German forces were to be sent into these two countries, under the pretence of protecting Italy from a French invasion. By the quartering of troops and by severe exactions upon the feudatories of the empire, the states of Italy were either to be compelled to submissions which would destroy their independence, or driven into a resistance, which would furnish an occasion for their complete subjugation. By these means such relations were to be established with the princes of Italy as to reduce them to the position of Austrian governors of their states.

The opportunity was to be watched of despoiling Venice of her

¹ "Histoire de la réunion de la Lorraine à la France," par M. d'Haussonville, edition of 1860. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, July, 1859, p. 300. *Saturday Review*, April 7th, 1860.

possessions on terra firma, so as to leave her, like Dantzig or the Genevan republic without any possessions outside her walls.

Piedmont was to be made an Austrian province, and Savoy to be surrendered to the Swiss.

The Austrian monarchy would thus become an immense aggregate of contiguous territories, extending from Vienna to Milan. By the acquisition of the Venetian provinces the Italian dominions of Austria would meet her possessions on the shores of the Adriatic in the district of Trieste. The Adriatic would become an Austrian lake—and Austria would be able by her maritime position to keep the Grand Turk under her control.

The annexation of the Papal States alone was wanting to complete the subjugation of Italy. This was not to be attempted until all other states had been so reduced that their rulers should be the mere lieutenants of Austria. Learned doctors were to be employed to teach that excommunication had no force when exercised in temporal matters which Christ had not destined for his Church. But at all risks the Papal States were at last to be seized, so as to unite Naples and the Milanese. The dominion of the Pope was to be confined to the city of Rome; while his temporal power was taken away, he was still to be invested with the highest dignity, and his spiritual authority to be treated with the most profound respect.

This grand design of a universal Italian empire was founded on the contemplated acquisition of the Spanish possessions of Naples and Milan. Of the means by which the design was to be carried out the author of the testament suggests but two.

1st. To crush the spirit of Italian patriotism by adopting measures of oppression which would provoke the people to premature revolt.

2nd. To excite by every means jealousies and ill-will between Holland and England on the one hand and France on the other, so that the latter country might not be able to give any assistance to the Italian States in maintaining their independence or resisting the aggressions of Austria.

This document was certainly in existence before Austria had acquired a single square mile of Italian soil. A copy of it was deposited in the French archives in the days of Louis XIV.² In

² Haussonville tells us that he has read a copy of this document in the archives of the French foreign-office, bound up in a volume of papers of the

the division of the territories of Spain which followed the wars of the Spanish Succession, the Treaty of Utrecht awarded to Austria the Italian possessions which had descended to the Spanish monarchy from Charles V. That of Aix-la-Chapelle, took from the House of Hapsburgh, Naples, and Sicily, but left them in possession of Milan and Mantua.

When Louis XIV., in 1697, learned that Charles II. of Spain, had agreed to settle the Duchy of Milan upon the Arch-Duke Charles, afterwards the Emperor Charles VI., he instructed the Marquis d'Harcourt to demand an audience of his Majesty, and to declare to him that the possession by Austria of the Duchy of Milan could be only the foundation of a design, meditated on the part of Austria, for the total subjugation of Italy; and so entirely was his French Majesty convinced of this, that he was quite prepared to resist, even at the cost of a general war, the acquisition of Milan by the imperial family.³

year 1691, and accompanied by a memoir apparently contemporaneous, detailing the mode in which the knowledge of it had been acquired by the Cabinet of Louis XIV. See the note discussing the question of its authenticity appended to the third volume of Haussouville, edition of 1860.

³ Garden—*Histoires des Traités de paix*, vol. ii. p. 206.

CHAPTER XIII.

Effect of the return of Napoleon on the politics of Europe—League of sovereigns—True character of Treaty of Vienna—Its cessions of territory—Did not involve a collective guarantee, or bind the states receiving these territories to retain them—General rights of nations—Principle of despotic combination originating at Vienna—Carried out in congresses of Troppau, Laybach, and Verona—Crushed freedom in Italy—New treaty of November 20th, 1815—Severe exactions imposed on France. The Holy Alliance—Approval of the Prince Regent, who declines to sign—Alleged reasons for the refusal—Treaty binding England to act in concert with the despotic powers—Effect of this—Principle of despotic combination—Withdrawal of England—Policy of Canning—Policy of England in 1815—Re-establishment of German ascendancy in Italy—Its new form more oppressive than the old—Different elements of opposition—Apparent hopelessness of the causes of Italian independence—Perpetual nature of the struggle.

THE last combination of the European powers against Napoleon after his return from Elba, exercised an influence on the whole spirit of the arrangements adopted at Vienna, which long continued and still continues to have an effect upon the politics of Europe.

The declaration of the 13th of March, united the eight principal powers of Europe, in a league of which the avowed object was to maintain the public right and the tranquillity of Europe against one who was described as having placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations ; “ an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world,” “ deprived of the protection

of the law," "one with whom there could be neither peace nor truce, and who had rendered himself liable to public vengeance." This document pledged the powers who signed it to use all their efforts to maintain and guarantee the tranquillity of the world, "and to afford to any government that might need it, all the assistance required to maintain public tranquillity."

Those who held such language constituted themselves in fact the supreme tribunal of Europe's public law. It was impossible that this character should not communicate itself to the meeting in which the very same powers assembled day by day; and to the combination into which they were forced or frightened by the invasion of Napoleon, we may trace the ideas which spread throughout Europe, and even to this day make men speak of all the arrangements of the Congress as constituting acts of public law.

For such an idea, however it may have passed into an axiom in popular language, no real foundation exists. The sanction of the acts of the Congress is to be found only in the treaties which resulted from its negotiations, and those treaties possess no more force or obligation in international law, than any of the ordinary contracts between states.

The true nature of the Treaty of Vienna will be understood by bearing in mind the circumstances in which it originated, and the objects which it was intended to effect. The treaty of Paris had surrendered to England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria the territories which during the revolutionary war had been seized by France. A modified right of conquest

belonged to these four powers. To agree as to the disposal of these boundaries was the sole object of the Congress. Spain, Sweden, and Portugal, who had been allies in the war against France, were invited to unite in the deliberations as to their disposal, and by that anomalous arrangement already referred to, France was permitted to have a voice in the deliberations.

Seven of these eight powers, on the 9th of June, 1815, signed a treaty with each other, by which, distinctly reciting the objects for which the Congress of Vienna had been convened, they embodied in one general treaty the result of the negotiations in which they had been engaged.

A common, but what on consideration will appear an obvious mistake, is that which represents these powers as guaranteeing to the respective states the perpetual possession of the territories which they restored or assigned to them. In general the language of the Treaty of Vienna implies no such guarantee. The territories of Sardinia were assigned to its king, but that assignment did not bind the allied powers to defend to all time and against all comers the integrity of the Sardinian states, and if, upon a future occasion, wholly unconnected with the Congress of Vienna, that monarch found himself engaged in a war, he had no more right to call upon the powers of Europe to protect him by virtue of the Treaty of Vienna, than France would have to call upon England or her allies to secure inviolable her West Indian possessions because England had ceded them by the treaty of May 1814. The engagement of the Treaty of Vienna was fulfilled by placing the

sovereign in full and unquestioned possession of the territories assigned to him. That obligation once fulfilled in spirit and good faith, he was left to the ordinary rights and to the ordinary defence of sovereign powers.

Still less pretence is there for saying that in the Treaty of Vienna there was anything which bound any particular state to retain the territories which were allotted to it by its provisions. Over all its dominions every sovereign state possesses sovereign power. Its territories, whether acquired by treaty, or belonging to it by any other title, are at his own disposal, and no restriction was imposed by the Treaty of Vienna which could prevent any country in Europe from ceding, exchanging, or parting with its territories or dealing with them in any way it might deem suited to its own interests.

Any other construction of the Treaty of Vienna would be to erect an Amphictyonic council in Europe—to fix immutably the boundaries of nations, and to control by the arm of force the free movements of independent States. The obligations of a treaty, it must be remembered, can be enforced by any of the parties to it, and if the Treaty of Vienna amounted to a guarantee that the boundaries it fixed should be preserved, any one of the powers that signed it would have a right to interfere and prevent an alteration in territorial arrangements which all the rest of Europe might desire.

The true principle then upon which it would appear that the Treaty of Vienna should be interpreted is this. In itself it is nothing more than an agreement between the seven Powers who signed it, as to the mode in which

the territories reconquered from France were to be disposed of—a surrender by each of its share in the right of conquest collectively vested in all. If the treaty does bind the Powers to any special stipulations to each other, that obligation must result from some positive and express agreement which it contains.¹

It is to be observed, that so far as the general Treaty of Vienna is concerned, no state can claim the fulfilment of its stipulations, except one of those who were parties to it. Whatever engagements England entered into in that treaty were contracted, not with the whole world, but with the nations whose representatives signed it.

The obligations towards other states must be sought for in the separate and simultaneous acts by which agreements were entered into with them. The mutual obligations between Sardinia and England depend upon the separate treaty which these Powers contracted on the 25th of May.² If these separate acts were incorporated in the general treaty, the object and effect of this is not to give a general guarantee for their

¹ To one such agreement, at least, we can clearly and distinctly point. The neutrality of Switzerland is expressly and solemnly guaranteed. The Swiss Diet formally acceded to the terms proposed to them, and every one of the powers who were parties to the treaty of Vienna have pledged themselves to Switzerland, and to each other, to maintain the integrity and neutrality of the cantons of the Helvetic Confederation.

² This treaty supplies, perhaps, an illustration of the above principles. It contains an express stipulation that the provinces of Chablais and Faucigny, and the territory of Savoy to the north of Ugine, shall form a part of the neutrality of Switzerland as recognised and guaranteed by all the powers.

Unquestionably this treaty binds the King of Sardinia to England to maintain that neutrality, and binds England to Sardinia to respect it. But, *so far as this immediate treaty is concerned*, the obligation is one entirely between England and Sardinia, and one which those powers by mutual consent

observance by the parties immediately contracting,—that obligation remains still a question between themselves,—but simply to give the assent of the other powers to territorial arrangements which possibly might not have been valid without that assent.

It is impossible to extract from the treaties of Vienna anything to sanction a general guarantee on the part of the European powers for all the territorial arrangements which it sanctioned. Whenever a guarantee is insisted, it can only arise from an express stipulation directly contracted with the Power who claims it.

These observations, it will be remembered, apply only to the obligation supposed by some to exist on the part of any European power to do more than fulfil its own

may waive. When any other power calls on England to maintain that neutrality, it must be by virtue of some special obligation contained in a treaty contracted between England and that power.

It was to prevent the complication which might arise from implied guarantees, that all these subsidiary contracts, as well as the original one of Paris of 30 May, 1814, were carried into effect by separate and distinct treaties with each power. That which is called the treaty of Paris, consisted of four distinct and perfectly independent treaties made by France separately with England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The treaties with the King of the Netherlands and the King of Sardinia, which formed a part of the arrangements of Vienna, were carried out in the same way. The obligations of England either to Sardinia or Holland, were contained in treaties executed solely with each of these powers. Her obligations to the allied sovereigns, or her rights against them, must be sought in the terms of the general treaty of Vienna.

It follows, however, from this, that as no other power has a right, by the law of nations, to enforce the fulfilment of any obligation which England has contracted, to Holland for instance, so no other power, nor combination of powers, can release England from those obligations so long as Holland insists on their fulfilment.

What those obligations are must depend upon the terms of the treaty itself. Practically, it is quite plain that England did not regard herself as bound to guarantee to the King of the Netherlands the dominions which, by her separate treaty with him, she had assigned to that monarch.

part of the Treaty of Vienna. Unfortunate indeed would it be for England if she were really bound to maintain by force of arms every arrangement made by that treaty. The common sense of Europe has long since rejected such a construction. Changes have been made in the territorial divisions of Christendom without provoking a general war, and no one would seriously listen to a demand were it made by Sweden that England should interfere to restore Modena to its duke—yet England and Sweden were both parties to a treaty by which Modena was given to the representatives of the D'Estes, and if a mutual guarantee were really contained in that treaty, the right of Sweden to demand its fulfilment would be plain.

Totally independent of the Treaty of Vienna, the right exists in every sovereign state to interfere whenever its interests are affected by the arrangements adopted in other countries. Still more clear the right when violence is offered to a weaker nation endangering the tranquillity, or even when it does not so endanger the tranquillity, of the world. The aggrandisement of a state by cessions from its neighbours may become so formidable to other countries as to justify their interference to prevent it. Upon this ground it was that the war of the Spanish Succession was undertaken to prevent the union in one person of the crowns of France and Spain, however legally by the laws of both countries that union would have been effected. No one will deny that it is the privilege of every nation, whenever it thinks fit, to aid any state that may be exposed to the violation of its rights by the arbitrary attack of

another Power. To defend those violated rights is not an obligation imposed upon any country, but it is an office which any country may, on its own responsibility, assume.

The spirit which was evoked by the return of Napoleon unquestionably tended to diffuse throughout Europe notions of European law, which would have made a league of the great military despotisms the supreme arbiter of all the countries of Europe.³ The

³ Sir James Mackintosh, in his speech upon Genoa in the House of Commons, April 27th, 1815, thus pointed out the tendency of the Congress of Vienna to assume the form of despotic combination, destroying the rights and independence of the European states.

"They met under the modest pretence of carrying into effect the thirty-second article of the Treaty of Paris; but under colour of this humble language, they arrogated the power of doing that, in comparison with which "the whole Treaty of Paris was a trivial convention, and which made the "Treaty of Westphalia appear no more than an adjustment of parish boundaries. They claimed the absolute disposal of every territory which had been "occupied by France and her vassals, from Flanders to Livonia, and from the "Baltic to the Po. Over these, the finest countries in the world, inhabited "by twelve millions of mankind, under pretence of delivering whom from "a conqueror, they had taken up arms, they arrogated to themselves "the harshest rights of conquest. It is true that of this vast territory they "restored, or rather granted a great part to its ancient sovereigns. But "these sovereigns were always reminded by some new title, or by the "disposal of some similarly circumstanced neighbouring territory, that they "owed their restoration to the generosity, or at most to the prudence of the "Congress, and that they were not entitled to require it from its justice. "They came in by a new tenure: they were the feudatories of the new "corporation of kings erected at Vienna, exercising joint power in effect over "all Europe, consisting in form of eight or ten princes, but in substance of "three great military powers,—the spoilers of Poland, the original invaders "of the European constitution,—sanctioned by the support of England, and "checked, however feebly, by France alone. On these three Powers, whose "reverence for national independence and title to public confidence were so "firmly established by the partition of Poland, the dictatorship of Europe "has fallen. They agree that Germany shall have a federal constitution—that "Switzerland shall govern herself—that unhappy Italy shall, as they say, be "composed of sovereign states; but it is all by grant from those lords paramount. Their will is the sole title to dominion—the universal tenure of "sovereignty."—*Mackintosh's Works*, vol. iii. p. 323.

right of interference with other States was soon extended to their internal concerns, and in the congresses of Troppau, of Laybach, and of Verona, the principle was plainly put forward, that the combination of the arbitrary powers was to be used for the purpose of suppressing all attempts at freedom in any country in which they might appear. Italy was the nation which suffered most by these maxims. The ascendancy of Austria was enforced, not only by her own armies, but by those of Prussia and Russia; and the declaration was avowedly made that all the powers of the great military monarchies would be exerted to prevent in any part of Italy the establishment of representative institutions.

By the constitution of the Germanic confederation which was substituted for the ancient empire, the Emperor of Austria was declared the permanent chief of the diet. By the terms of this confederation the different states bound themselves not to make war upon each other; and further, when war is declared by the diet, not to conclude a separate peace or even armistice with the enemy.

Each of the confederated states was bound "to defend not only the whole of Germany, but each individual state of the union in case it should be attacked, and they mutually guaranteed to each such of their possessions as were comprised in the union."⁴

The construction that has been put upon this guarantee is that if one of the German states owning possessions outside the limits of the union goes to war

⁴ Federative Constitution of Germany.—*House of Commons' Journal*, 1816, p. 758.

for matters wholly unconnected with German interests, and without the authority or sanction of the diet, nevertheless in that war all its German territories are under the protection of the confederate guarantee. In the war of any naval power with Austria, their dock-yards at Fiume might be destroyed without calling on Germany to interfere ; but a bombardment of Trieste, which is within the limits of the old German empire, would make the Germanic confederation a party in the war. Verona might be stormed, but the hostile army must not dare to follow the Austrians upon the German soil. The German fortresses and the German harbours in the Austrian possessions are safe asylums to which her armies and her navies may retreat in safety, and from which they may issue again to assail their enemy at their own convenience.

This claim of the inviolability of the German territory of a belligerent was asserted during the recent Italian war. But the right of any member of the Germanic confederation to call on the diet to protect its territories in a war in which it was involved without the sanction of the diet, can scarcely be rested on any solid ground, and it may perhaps safely be predicted that such a construction of federative obligations will not survive the first occasion upon which any powerful member of the confederation finds it its interest in refusing to sanction this interpretation.⁵

⁵ Although this construction of the federal alliance bears directly on the great questions of Italian history, it is impossible in these pages to discuss its correctness. If it were the true one, the smallest state in the league has the power of dragging all Germany into war.

In the case of those states which have no possessions outside the limits of

The treaties of Vienna did not, in fact, complete the arrangements of Europe. There were still, in the eyes of the allied sovereigns, questions to be adjusted with France ; and in the month of November a new treaty was executed between France and the four powers who had signed the treaty of May, 1814.

The discussion of this treaty belongs to the history of France. It is only necessary to mention it in these pages, as throwing light on the true nature of the Treaty of Vienna, and on account of the events by which it was accompanied. So little was it then thought that the Congress of Vienna had unalterably settled the public law of Europe, that the four allied powers, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England, almost immediately proceeded to enforce a new treaty upon France. In their declaration of March, these Powers had treated the invasion of France by Napoleon as the act of an outlaw and public enemy, against which all Europe combined. With an inconsistency scarcely to

Germany, it would be absurd to say that a state so circumstanced might make the most unprovoked attack upon its neighbour, and thus invoke as of right the power of the Germanic confederation to shield it from retaliation.

But it is equally absurd to say that any state which is at war has a right to claim as protected from the assaults of its enemy, any portion of its territory which it yet uses for the purposes of war.

Neutrality is a necessary condition of inviolability ; and if the Germanic diet in the event of a war are bound to protect the German territories of any state forming part of their confederation, they must insist on the neutrality of those territories.

There seems a conclusive answer to such a construction in the general principles of the law of nations. In war there is no doubt, that by that law a belligerent is justified in assailing the territory of a neutral nation when his enemy is using that territory for the purposes of war. If Trieste were a Prussian or an English port, and were used as an arsenal for the Austrian navy, a power at war with Austria would have a perfect right to treat it as a port of the enemy.

be defended, these very same powers now made the usurpation of the French government by Napoleon the pretence for altering the provisions which they had entered into with Louis XVIII., and imposing on France terms of such a nature, that the Bourbon king declared he would endure the most terrible chances of war, rather than submit to them. But nearly a million of armed men occupied his territory, and France was compelled to submit.

The payment of 700 millions of francs—the surrender of a considerable portion of the territories guaranteed to Louis by the former treaty—and the occupation of France by a foreign army of 150,000 men, to be maintained at the expense of that nation—were the hard conditions which were imposed by this treaty, under the name of “securing to the allies, proper indemnities for the past, and solid guarantees for the future.”⁶

Severe as were these exactions, it was only the firmness of the Russian emperor that saved France from still deeper humiliation. True to that policy of acquisition which was an instinct of the imperial house of Hapsburgh, Austria had insisted on the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, while Prussia, and even some of the lesser German powers, made similar demands. Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington added their influence to that of the Russian emperor, and France was suffered to escape with the conditions which the treaty finally contained. The territories of which this treaty deprived Paris were left by its provisions at the disposal of the four allied powers. It

⁶ Treaty of 20th November, 1815. Parliamentary Papers, 1860.

was not deemed necessary in their distribution to consult any other of the European states.

Before this treaty was signed, another document had received the signature of sovereigns—take it all in all, the most singular, perhaps, in the history even of royal eccentricities. It was one of which Italy was destined to endure the consequences in misery and blood. Never were more noble professions made than these to which sovereigns put their hands in the treaty of the “Holy Alliance.” Never was there a league which so cruelly trampled on the most sacred rights of man.

This compact, destined yet to become a byword in the policy of Europe, was one in which the sovereigns of Austria, Russia, and Prussia bound themselves with the most solemn expressions of Christian piety, to establish a reign of religion and righteousness upon earth. It owed its origin to the fanaticism of the Emperor Alexander, or rather of the remarkable woman from whose mystic devotion the religious enthusiasm of the Emperor was derived.⁷ Apart, however, from the influence of the lady who suggested to her imperial admirer that he might become the Messiah of a moral and political millennium, the ambition of Alexander was attracted by the grandeur of the design. It was a hard thing to give up the mastery of the world.

⁷ The Baroness Krudner, a native of Riga, of the most fascinating manners and varied talents, is described by Cantu as “renouncing all the pleasures of wealth to preach the word of God and christianise the world according to the maxims of the primitive Church.” Her passion for mysticism in religion gave her an extraordinary influence over Alexander, who found in this a spirit congenial to the impressions of his own mind. To the Baroness Krudner is attributed the honour, not only of forming the plan of the Holy Alliance, but that of actually drawing up a great portion of its terms with her own hand.

The Russian emperor had drunk deep of the intoxicating draughts both of flattery and power. He had held at Vienna and Paris the destinies of nations in his hands. He might still continue to direct their councils, could sovereigns be induced to form a pious league, and bind themselves to reign according to the precepts of a Gospel, which none could interpret so well as the potentate to whose devotion and genius they were indebted for the thought of this sacred combination.

On the 26th of September, the document which afterwards acquired so unenviable a notoriety, and produced results so strangely at variance with its professions, was drawn up and signed by the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia. It is impossible not to give credit to Alexander for the sincerity of the intention which expressed itself in language such as that which follows :—

“ In the name of the Holy and undivided Trinity,
“ Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King
“ of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia, in conse-
“ quence of the great events in Europe which have
“ marked the course of the last three years, and
“ especially the benefits which it has pleased Divine
“ Providence to pour upon the states whose govern-
“ ments had put their trust and fixed their hopes in
“ Him alone, in the deep persuasion that it is necessary
“ now to settle on the course of adopting, by the
“ powers of Europe, in their mutual relations with each
“ other, the sublime truths taught by the everlasting
“ religion of God the Saviour,—

“ Solemnly declare that the present act has no other

“ object than so to manifest in the face of the world
“ their immovable resolution to take for the rule of
“ their conduct, both in the administration of their
“ separate states, and in their political relations with
“ other governments, only the precepts of that holy
“ religion—precepts of justice, of charity, and of peace
“ —which, so far from being only applicable to private
“ life, ought, on the contrary, directly to influence the
“ councils of princes, and guide all their movements, as
“ the only means of strengthening human institutions
“ and remedying their imperfections.

“ In conformity with the principles of the Holy
“ Scriptures, which order all men to regard each other
“ as brothers, and consider themselves as fellow country-
“ men, to lend each other every aid, assistance, and
“ succour, on every occasion ; and, regarding them-
“ selves towards their subjects and armies as fathers—
“ to direct them on every occasion in the same spirit of
“ brotherhood with which they are animated to protect
“ religion, peace, and justice. In consequence, the sole
“ principle in force, either between the civil govern-
“ ments or among their subjects, shall be the deter-
* “ mination to render each other reciprocal aid, and to
“ testify, by continual good deeds, the unalterable
“ mutual affection by which they are animated : to
“ consider themselves only as members of a great
“ Christian nation, and regarding themselves only
“ delegates appointed by Providence to govern three
“ branches of the same family—viz., Austria, Prussia,
“ and Russia; confessing, also, that the Christian nation,
“ of which they and their people form a part, has in

“ reality no other sovereign than HIM to whom of right
“ belongs all power, because He alone possesses all the
“ treasures of love, knowledge, and infinite wisdom—
“ that is to say, God Almighty, our Divine Saviour,
“ Jesus Christ, the Word of the Most High, the Word
“ of Life—they recommend in the most earnest manner
“ to their people, as the only way of securing that
“ peace which flows from a good conscience, and which
“ alone is durable, to fortify themselves every day more
“ and more in the principles and exercise of the duties
“ which the Divine Saviour has taught to men. All
“ the powers which may feel inclined to avow the sacred
“ principles which have dictated the present treaty, and
“ who may perceive how important it is for the happiness
“ of nations too long agitated, that these truths
“ should henceforth exercise on human destinies all the
“ influence which should pertain to them, shall be received
“ with as much eagerness as affection into the
“ present alliance.

(Signed) “FRANCIS.

“FREDERICK-WILLIAM.

“ALEXANDER.”⁸

Such was the solemn piety which inaugurated a league which proved to be nothing more nor less than a conspiracy of despots against the dearest rights of man; which crushed freedom, and truth, and intellect, for years throughout Europe; which wrote in the modern annals of Italy its darkest page: crushed the rising hopes of her liberty and her nationality in blood, and

⁸ Martens' Guide Diplomatique, vol. ii. p. 180.

to uphold the perfidy of a perjured monarch, and to continue the oppression of an enslaved people, sent the mercenaries of these holy allies to trample down men who had never done one of them a wrong. The transcendental piety of this memorandum was translated at Troppau and Laybach into the vulgar tongue.

The very name of the Holy Alliance has justly become hated wherever freedom is valued. If the Christianity of kings is to be judged by the same rules as that of ordinary men, it may safely be said, that the practical result of this alliance of the three sovereigns appeared to be, to violate every one of the precepts it professed. The only Gospel which it recognised was that which proclaimed the right of sovereigns to trample upon the people. Yet surely it would be a harsh judgment which would brand this alliance as a mere act of hypocrisy. A deeper lesson may be drawn from its results than that which would teach us merely to believe in the blasphemy of kings. In the failure of many a lofty scheme of universal benevolence—in their more than failure—their ending in misery and guilt—we may learn, perhaps, that there are prerogatives which Providence does not trust to the hand of man ; that all schemes of universal power must lead so far as their influence extends, to injustice and wrong, and that the only way in which it is given to any of us in any station to benefit mankind, is by means in which we respect the rights and recognise the liberties of our fellow men.

The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria signed with Alexander this memorable document.

Almost all the sovereigns of Europe gave in their adhesion to its sacred and edifying obligations. All Europe was placed under a reign of righteousness and peace. If Christianity be the great charter of liberty, liberty was all over the continent secure, except that the rebellions of France had excluded her from the blessings of this holy league to which in due time she would prove herself worthy to be admitted. England alone was deprived of the benefit of the establishment of these great principles of free and Christian government.⁹ The Prince Regent by the constitution of that country could not sign any treaty except by his minister. The Holy Alliance was a document too sacred to be touched by any but a royal hand. But the Prince Regent, in an autograph letter, assured Alexander how deeply he sympathised in the fervid piety the document expressed ; how entirely he was resolved to make the sacred precepts of the Gospel the guide of his actions and the rule of his government.¹⁰

⁹ The Pope was the only other European sovereign who refused to join this pious league.

¹⁰ "Sir, my brother and cousin,

"I have had the honour of receiving a few days ago the letter of your Majesty as well as the copy of the treaty signed at Paris on the 20th of September, by your Majesty and your august allies.

"As the forms of the British constitution, which I am charged with administering in the name of my august father, do not permit me formally to accede to this treaty in the shape in which it has been presented to me, I have recourse to this letter to convey to the august sovereigns who have signed it, my entire adhesion to the principles which it establishes, and to the declaration they have made of adopting the divine precepts of the Christian religion as the invariable rule of their conduct, in all their relations, social and political, and of cementing the union which ought always to subsist among Christian nations.

"It shall always be the object of my ardent efforts, in the situation in which it has pleased God to place me, to regulate my conduct by these sacred

The assent of England was not altogether withheld from this new principle of a kingly combination to govern Europe. On the very same day on which the treaty with France was signed (the 20th of November), England entered into a treaty with Russia, Prussia, and Austria, by which the sovereigns of these four nations agreed to draw closer the ties which united them for the common interests of their people. By this treaty they renewed the obligation of their past alliances, particularly that by which Napoleon Buonaparte and his family had been for ever excluded from the throne of France. This exclusion they bound themselves to each other to maintain in full vigour, and with the whole of their forces. So vain is man when in his puny wisdom he attempts to control that future the contingencies of which his limited intelligence cannot grasp.

But the most important part of this treaty was that which arranged for future congresses of these four powers. The article which provided for them was this :—

“To facilitate and to secure the execution of the present treaty, and to consolidate the connections which at the present moment so closely unite the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the high contracting parties have agreed to renew their meetings

maxims, and to co-operate with my august allies in all measures which can contribute to the peace and the happiness of the world.

“I am, with the most invariable sentiments of friendship and affection, Sir, my brother and cousin,

“Carlton House,
“October 6, 1815.”

“Your good brother and cousin,

“GEORGE PRINCE REGENT.

—*Martens' Guide Diplomatique*, vol. ii. p. 575.

at fixed periods, either under the immediate auspices of the sovereigns themselves, or by their respective ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the consideration of the measures which at each of those periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.”¹¹

The practical result of such an agreement, if acted upon, would have been to place Europe under the control of the three great military monarchies of the North. With England an assenting party to their deliberations, no European power could offer even opposition to their decrees. France lay in chains before an army of occupation of 150,000 men. Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, engaging to meet in separate council, had but to agree upon their common interests, and Europe was prostrate before this new coalition.

Fortunately for Europe, it was one in which the English nation could not long continue to permit her ministers to take part. The first application of this principle of combination was when at Troppau, and soon afterwards, at Laybach, the three powers determined to send their armies to destroy the constitutions which Naples and Piedmont had obtained. From these proceedings the English Cabinet were compelled by the pressure of parliament to withdraw their adhesion.¹²

¹¹ Treaty between Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England. November 20th, 1815.—*Parliamentary Papers*, 1860.

¹² Letter of the English Cabinet against determination of Congress of Laybach.—*State Papers. Annual Register*, 1821.

Nevertheless, with a dissent from England that might almost be understood as an acquiescence, in 1821, Russian, Prussian, and Austrian hosts prepared to march in resistless force to put down Italian liberty at Naples and Turin. Next year the dissent of England was more marked, when at the Congress of Verona the Duke of Wellington protested against the expedition by which France, with the assent of the Northern powers, re-established absolute government in Spain.¹³ But England could not be said to have emancipated herself from this coalition until in 1826 she sent her arms to uphold the constitutional government of Portugal against the aggressions of Spain, and her minister in the senate significantly reminded the despotic powers that there were elements of revolution in Europe which England had the power and might yet have the will to evoke.¹⁴

Far different were the views and the passions which

¹³ Alison's Europe after 1815. Vol. i. p. 525.

¹⁴ Speech of Mr. Canning in the House of Commons. December 11th, 1826. The full extent of the obligations which England and Europe owe to Mr. Canning for freeing the foreign policy of England from the influence of the Holy Alliance, can only be understood by a knowledge of the difficulties he encountered.

They are revealed in the volume in which Mr. Stapleton, his confidential friend and trusted Secretary, has given to the world the private letters and memoranda in which they are disclosed.

We know from these how in every step of that policy which he inaugurated, he encountered not only the dissent of the most influential of his colleagues, but the personal opposition of the sovereign. To those who wish to understand the history of the foreign policy of England, no chapters in history are more instructive, more full of materials for reflection, than these pages in Mr. Stapleton's book which record the history of Mr. Canning's struggles at the periods of the Congress of Verona—the recognition of the South American republics, and the Portuguese expedition, especially the written communications between the King, the Cabinet, and Mr. Canning. The opposition of his Majesty was expressed in the most decisive terms to the "liberalism" his

influenced the statesmen of 1815. Dread of French principles had become a religion—fear of French power the great actuating principle of all policy—and in these absorbing passions were forgotten alike the duty of obtaining any safeguard for liberty, and the necessity of providing security against the ascendancy of other powers beside France.

Those who will carefully read the elaborate state paper in which the Count D'Agliè presented to the English minister the view of the Sicilian court, will understand how complete was the revolution effected by the Congress of Vienna in Italian affairs. The policy of Aix-la-Châpelle was reversed; and Austrian influence, instead of being curbed and guarded, was made paramount and supreme. In the perusal of that masterly document it is impossible not to appreciate the prescient wisdom that foresaw, that to expose Piedmont to danger from an overweening power conferred upon Austria, was in fact to weaken her power of resistance to France. With the light which this paper throws upon subsequent events, we can trace to the aggrandisement of Austrian power recent occurrences in

Cabinet had shown, as reviving that revolutionary spirit, which it required all the genius of Mr. Pitt and the firmness of George III. to put down.

Mr. Canning states in one of those letters that Metternich had organised an intrigue at the English court to change the policy of England by removing him from office.

Of Prince Metternich, the moving spirit of the Holy Alliance, and all the complications which originated in it, the English minister with characteristic energy expressed his opinion :

“In the first place you shall hear what I think of him: that he is the greatest rascal and liar on the continent, perhaps, in the civilised world.”—*Stapleton's Life and Times of George Canning. Letter to Lord Granville, p. 427. Idem, chap. 24, 25, 26, pp. 385 to 453.*

Italian history which at first appear altogether remote from any connection with such a cause.

The settlement of 1815 was the re-establishment of German ascendancy in Italy—that ascendancy against which Italy had in ancient times maintained a perpetual struggle—but a power wholly different from the old empire that now asserted the Teutonic lordship over the Italian race. The authority of those who claimed from Otho to be successors of the Cæsars—who came to Rome to be crowned by the Pope—a ceremony which was in truth a confirmation of their title in the name of the Roman republic—a recognition of the supremacy of old Italian law—this authority was the exercise of prescriptive right. The new power that overshadowed Italy was that of force. The ascendancy of Austria was a territorial and military one. It consisted in the extent of her dominions, the might of her fortresses, and the strength of the armies which she could bring to maintain her power. Even the imperial title had no more connection with Rome or with Italy; it was the designation of the sovereign of a province on the Danube. The origin of this new imperial title proclaimed the arbitrary nature of the power. It came from no old traditions—it was conferred by no authority that the venerable superstitions of mankind recognised—it was assumed at the mere pleasure of the sovereign who bestowed it on himself. No law controlled nor feudal traditions bound—no ancient prescriptions hallowed the sovereignty, which represented nothing but its master's command of physical force, and knew no law except that master's will.

If the nature of the power that represented German ascendancy was thus changed, a greater change had taken place in the influences by which Italian nationality could oppose it. The free cities were no more. With Genoa, Lucca, and Venice, the last republics had disappeared from the Italian scenes. No bold Gonfaloniere could now display the civic banner or ring the alarm bell, before the threat of which a French monarch had once retreated from his meditated attack upon the liberties of Florence.¹⁵ The sacred carroccio could no more gather round it the passionate devotion of a "Company of Death," nor municipal authority summon a civic militia to the defence of its rights. On either side all that in the struggles of the Middle Ages gave the sanction of a law to the invasions of prerogative or the resistance of freedom, was gone.

Everything was changed from the times of the early struggles. The Papal power did not rally as of old Italian patriotism to the defence of the freedom of Italy and the independence of the Church. No one now thought of a Pontiff forming a holy league to drive the barbarians from Italy. Even over the pontifical elections foreign influence exercised its control. While the Austrian court could exercise its veto, no church-

¹⁵ When Charles VIII., in 1494, had entered Florence with his army, and taken up his abode in the palace of the Medici, he fancied, not unnaturally, that he could dictate his terms to the city. In vain the Florentines reminded him that they had admitted him within their walls as their guest, and not their master. The royal secretary handed to the Florentine magistrates the written ultimatum of the king. Peter Capponi took the paper from his hands, tore it into shreds, saying, "If it be so, sound your trumpets, and we will ring our bells."

The ultimatum was withdrawn, and Charles agreed to the proposals of the Florentines.—*Siemondi*, vol. vii. p. 406.

man, who had shown any sympathy for the cause of Italian independence, had much chance of being Pope.¹⁶

With the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna, it seemed indeed that the independence of Italy was extinguished for ever. Of the old lines of Italian princes, no sovereign occupied an Italian throne. In the extinction of her lost republics, the last traces of Italian nationality were blotted out. Over all her sovereigns, with the one exception of the King of Sardinia, Austrian influence was supreme. A vast military power was intrenched in the very heart of the country. To the eyes of statesmen the tranquillity of Italy was secure; Italian patriotism could only be displayed in a prudent acquiescence in that subjection which it was no longer possible to resist.


But there are elements in the life of nations that are indestructible as that life itself—there are passions and feelings which the lapse of centuries cannot suppress, and which they scarcely change. The Italian was not yet reconciled to the ascendancy of the German—the contest that had marshalled the bands of patriotism

¹⁶ The extent to which Austrian influence has, since 1815, controlled the movements of the Court of Rome, is but little understood. The power of the veto is by no means an insignificant one. It must at least teach every cardinal who aspires to the Papedom that he must not provoke the enmity of the Austrian court. It is difficult to say what may be its effect. Alexander III. would never have given his sanction as Pontiff to the Lombard league, if Frederick Barbarossa could have interposed in a secret conclave that quiet veto which, without trouble or confusion, can now prevent the election of a Pope obnoxious to Austria.

Gavazzi brings it as a charge against the cardinals that they did not, instead of Leo XII., elect Severoli, "a man of kindly disposition," for whom nine-tenths of the population wished."—*Gavazzi's four last Popes*, p. 841. Cardinal Wiseman tells us that just as the election of Severoli was about to take place, it was rudely negatived by a note from the representative of the Austrian court.—*Cardinal Wiseman's Recollections*, p. 417.

on the field of Legnano was bequeathed to a remote generation. In the new subjugation which the Treaty of Vienna imposed on Italy, another page of her history is opened—but a page still to be written over with the records of the undying struggle against the dominion of the stranger.

END OF VOL. II.



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
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
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